




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Yours Very Truly
Wm. H. Burleigh

THE STORY OF TWO WARS
AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
OF
OUR WAR WITH SPAIN
AND
OUR WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS

Their Causes, Incidents, and Results

A RECORD OF CIVIL, MILITARY, AND NAVAL OPERATIONS
FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES

WITH

*Full Descriptions of the Battles, Engagements, Exploits, and Achievements of our
Soldiers and Sailors on Land and Sea, and many Thrilling Inci-
dents and Experiences in Camp, Field, and Hospital*

INCLUDING

THE LIFE AND CAREER OF ADMIRAL DEWEY

AND OTHER FAMOUS AMERICAN NAVAL AND MILITARY LEADERS

BY

HON. HENRY B. RUSSELL

Author of "Life of William McKinley," "International Monetary Conferences," etc., etc.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR

Ex-Secretary of War, and United States Senator from Vermont

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WITH FINE STEEL-PLATE PORTRAITS, MANY FULL-PAGE ENGRAVINGS FROM
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NEW AND ACCURATE MAPS

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PREFACE.

PERIODICALLY, in the history of every nation, there comes a crisis, questions having their small beginnings far back in the past develop to a fruition, the natural result of antecedent events, the legitimate offspring of all that has gone to make up a nation's character and relative position in the world. These questions must be settled sooner or later, in accordance with the demands of progress; they may be softened for a time by diplomacy or obscured by indifference and attention to other affairs, but the inevitable settlement is only postponed, the eventual crisis but gathers new force, and, in time, it must result in bloodshed or a backward step. Placed as Cuba was, belonging to a nation whose star has been for three centuries setting, close to the shores of a free people, whose course has for more than a century been ever upward, the issue could not be avoided. The war came.

This event, like all in history, being inseparably linked with the past, it has seemed to the author that the developing causes were too important to a proper understanding of the conflict to remain unnoticed; and this must be the apology, if any is needed, for the opening pages of this history, dealing not simply with the Spaniard and the Cuban and the reasons for the bitter hatred which grew up between them, but with the part both Spain and Cuba have played in the constitutional history of the United States. This long story is replete with many dramatic and romantic incidents, which take on a new color in the light of the war that closed so gloriously for American arms, and which give the conflict its true setting in the history of the world's progress.


But, while briefly placing the causes before the reader, no space required for a full narration of the incidents of the war has been sacrificed. Though brief, the conflict has abounded in deeds of heroism, some of them without a parallel in military or naval history, and the character of the American people has been revealed in stronger colors not simply to other nations of the world, but to the Americans themselves. The last vestige of old sectional feeling disappeared in the inspiring unity with which all, North and South, fell in behind the flag; and as the war closed, our eyes were open to a wider vision, the promise of a grander destiny than we have been wont to consider in store for us. For the war has brought new questions and new responsibilities; in the future are suggestions of new experiences, possibly requiring a new policy. The Stars and Stripes now

float in the Antilles and over rich islands of the Pacific. Whatever comes, it has been shown that the people of the United States do not shrink in the face of duty to themselves and to humanity.

The first edition of this work was as complete as it was possible to make it at that time. No pains or expense had been spared to provide the reader a reliable history of "Our War with Spain," and it was fittingly closed with the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898.

Later, the war clouds again gathered in the Philippine Islands, and the native insurgents, under the ambitious and crafty Aguinaldo, rebelled against the administration of any government in Luzon other than their own. They became insolent and assuming, then aggressive. By the terms of the Protocol with Spain the United States were to occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of the Treaty which should determine the control of the Philippines. The insurgents ignored these terms, attacked our troops, and it became necessary to extend and maintain the military government of the United States, and to put down the rebellion with a determined hand. Hence followed our War with the Filipinos, the outgrowth of our War with Spain.

As the demand for the work was great and daily increasing, the publishers felt justified in making an entirely new set of plates, thus affording opportunity for thorough revision, which, while retaining all that was most valuable, made space for many important additions. Official documents not given to the public until after the first edition was published, later accounts of battles, encounters, and adventures, as described by those who took a leading part in them, were available, with the result that the work is greatly enriched with matter of interest and value, and that may be relied upon as entirely correct. New illustrations have been procured, many of which are from war photographs not elsewhere reproduced. In many cases the photographer risked his life for the sake of his art, and the pictures obtained give a truthful impression of scenes at the front and before and after hard-fought battles. These furnish, as no written description can, accurate ideas of the daily life and surroundings of our soldiers and sailors in the performance of their patriotic duty in our new possessions. Acknowledgments are due to *Leslie's Weekly* for permission to use some of the copyrighted illustrations that have appeared in that paper. Many new portraits and maps have been added, and the large colored maps have been carefully revised and brought up to date. The work in its new and complete form is offered to the public with the confident belief that it is as interesting and attractive as it is reliable and valuable.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Henry B. Russell". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline that extends across the width of the text.



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BY

HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR

Ex-Secretary of War and United States Senator from Vermont

CUBA

ITS CONDITION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1898

IT has been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw during my visit to Cuba and how the situation there impressed me. This I do on account of the public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported interviews with me.

My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion; not suggested by anyone. The only mention I made of it to the President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and to ask him if there was any objection to it; to which he replied that he could see none. No one but myself, therefore, is responsible for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at the North to bankers and other business men at Havana, and they in turn gave me letters to their correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men were very useful, as one of the

principal purposes of my visit was to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situation.

Of General Lee I need say but little. His valuable services to his country in his trying position are too well known to all his countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high character, and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unfailing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military education and training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the equipment of our representative in a country so completely under military rule as was Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at his table at the hotel during our stay in Havana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to me.

In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, the consul at Sagua la Grande. None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a broader faith, not bounded by party lines. They are all three true Americans, and have done excellent service.

There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner, being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow peninsula of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the island. The two eastern ones were practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the two fortified towns. These two large provinces were spoken of as "Cuba Libre."

Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts — Cabaña and Morro Castle, etc.— I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seemed to go on much as usual in Havana. Quiet prevailed, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police duty, and their abounding presence in all public places, one saw few signs of war.

Outside Havana all had changed. It was not peace nor was it war. It was desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village was surrounded by a "trocha" (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed-wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas had at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called "forts," but which are really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry boxes, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each.

The purpose of these trochas was to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people had been driven into these fortified towns and held there to subsist as they could. They were virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the walls were not so high and strong; but they sufficed, where every point was in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.

Every railroad station was within one of these trochas and had an armed guard. Every train had an armored freight car loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed usually, and was informed was always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There were frequent blockhouses inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there was no human life

or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards had not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio Province in the west across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas.

There were no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures except such as were under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards held in these four western provinces just what their army sat on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns had reached, was under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it was neither peace nor war. It was concentration and desolation. This was the "pacified" condition of the four western provinces.

West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, as far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills were destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as were the villages, by trochas and forts or palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos were able to obtain special favors of the Spanish government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the railroads, paid taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It was the common talk among those who had better means of knowledge.

All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified

towns when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these were the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family.

It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity, measured by ours, was not high. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory.

They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show the country was ever inhabited.

The first clause of Weyler's order read as follows:

I ORDER AND COMMAND. First, all the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.

The other three sections forbade the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, directed the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribed that the eight days should be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal district, and stated that if news were furnished of the enemy which could be made use of, it would serve as a "recommendation."

Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerillas. When they reached the towns they were allowed to build huts of palm

leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live, if they could.

Their huts were about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space were usually crowded together very closely. They had no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they could extemporize; and with large families, or more than one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions were impossible. Conditions were unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half had died and that one-quarter of the living were so diseased that they could not be saved? A form of dropsy was a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children were still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians said these cases were hopeless.

Death in the streets were not uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that many had been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order these people were independent and self-supporting. They were not beggars even then. There were plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, had not learned the art. Rarely was a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them made an appeal stronger than words.

Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given

free play to a strong, natural, and highly cultivated imagination.

Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.

I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians, and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It had to be seen with one's own eyes to be realized.

The Los Pasos Hospital, in Havana, has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and children were lying on the floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags — and such rags! — sick children, naked as they came into the world; and the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into her business methods, fearing that there would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach

me on these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies were received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited the hospitals established or organized and supplied by her; saw the food distribution in several cities and towns, and everything seemed to me to be conducted in the best manner possible. The ample, fine warehouse in Havana, owned by a Cuban firm, was given, with a gang of laborers, free of charge to unload and reship supplies.

The Children's Hospital, in Havana, a very large, fine private residence, was hired at a cost of less than \$100 per month. It was under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there. All Miss Barton's assistants seemed excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything to commend. The American people may be assured that their bounty reached the sufferers with the least possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. If our people could have seen the small fraction of the need they would have poured more "freely from their liberal stores" than ever before for any cause.

General Blanco's order of November 13th somewhat modified the Weyler order, but was of little or no practical benefit. Its application was limited to farms "properly defended," and the owners were obliged to build "centers of defense." Its execution was completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they knew the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's orders in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and were slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months before, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning.

I wish I might speak of the country — of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I agree with Columbus, that this is the "most rich and beautiful that ever human eye beheld," and believe every

one between his time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land—

“ Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile.”

I had little time to study the race question, and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there were nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They lived principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks were mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, was in their hands. They had an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalized monopolies, in which the country abounds, was given to them by the government, many of them acquired property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the islands had contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.

There were, before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and, like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or blonde, so far as I noticed. The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is not now over twenty-five per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, and improvident.

There is a proverb among the Cubans that “ Spanish bulls cannot be bred in Cuba ”—that is, the Cubans, though they are of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull fight; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly patronized by the Spaniards. One thing

that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education as his own country furnishes.

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation.

It was said that there were about 60,000 Spanish soldiers in Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that had been sent there. The rest had died, had been sent home sick, or were in hospitals, and some had been killed, notwithstanding the official reports. They were conscripts, many of them very young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They were quiet and obedient, and, if well drilled and led, I believe would have fought fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons, and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw perhaps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a tent. They lived in barracks in the towns, and were seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night.

They had little or no equipment for supply trains or for a field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses were scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the

officers, however, had good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry was considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eyewitnesses and participants in some of their battles, was for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire away *ad libitum*, and without ceasing until time to march back to town.

It did not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there were everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.

Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most.

I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men then in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Havana province itself, organized in four small brigades and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Havana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and which I went over four times.

Aranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from Havana. The Cubans were well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They were not allowed to carry

many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, were poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the streets of Havana, and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier.

Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army were colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their own horses.

Their field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night.

The dividing lines between parties were the straightest and clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It was Cuban against Spaniard. It was practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other.

I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they were so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late.

It fell as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year or two of our war. If it succeeded it could only be by armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army; and the success of Spanish arms would have been easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that the Spanish army and people believe.

There is no doubt that General Blanco acted in entire good faith; that he desired to give the Cubans a fair measure of

autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the Ten-Years War. He had, of course, a few personal followers, but the army and the Spanish citizens did not want genuine autonomy, for that meant government by the Cuban people. And it was not strange that the Cubans said it came too late.

I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew some of them were classed as autonomists.

Most of my informants were business men, who had taken no sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most cases greatly surprised at their frankness.

I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Havana, Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception they replied that it was "too late" for that.

Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you did not have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban.

I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave everyone to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal was not the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the *Maine*, terrible as were both of these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native

population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge.

I am not in favor of annexation; not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self-government are far more favorable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions.

Redfield Proctor



THE STORY OF TWO WARS

OUR WAR WITH SPAIN


AND

OUR WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS

CHAPTER I

SPANISH CHARACTER AND HISTORY—DISCOVERY OF CUBA
— EXTERMINATION OF THE NATIVES — BUILDING OF
MORRO CASTLE—SPAIN BESET BY ENEMIES.

Spain's Domain in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred Years — Spain's Daring Explorers — Heroism and Fanaticism — Mistaken Policy — Columbus Hears of Cuba — Taking Possession for Spain — Extirpating the Natives — A Long Story of Rapine, Brutality, and Insult — A Bishop's Testimony — Beginning of African Slave Trade — The World Divided — The Resistance of Chief Hatuey — Efforts to Christianize Him before Burning Him at the Stake — Maritime Adventurers — Growth of Spanish Settlements — Fortifying Havana — Building of Morro Castle — Monopolies and Restrictions — Surrender of Havana to the English — Cuba Restored to Spain.



THE latter part of the eighteenth century beheld Spain the proud mistress of a domain upon which she could boast that the sun never set. At the close of the nineteenth hardly a vestige of that great empire remained. She found a new world and, little by little, in a hundred years has lost it all. Into the Europe of the sixteenth century she poured such a stream of golden treasure as had never before been seen, the rich stores of the Incas and the Monte-

zumas, but it all slipped from her hands, and she is now practically bankrupt, loaded with a debt she can never pay. Through her was possible the renaissance of the sixteenth



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NEW ENLARGED AND REVISED

MAP OF

Cuba, its Provinces

And Havana Harbor.

SCALES

Statute Miles, 69.16 to 1 Degree

Kilometres, 111.502 to 1 Degree



century, the great reawakening of mediæval Europe; but Spain remained mediæval. Those very human forces which she set in action by the great discoveries of her intrepid mariners and by the distribution of her newly-found treasures, — forces which gave birth to modern history, she strenuously resisted. Upon that expansion of thought and action, following naturally the accomplishments of her daring explorers, she set her iron heel. She strangled her own magnificent creations, and set about destroying her colonies by as heedless and as cruel a policy as was ever conceived by barbarian of old.

They who discovered the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi, the Amazon, and the Pacific — they who first went around the world, were Spaniards. Three-fourths of North and South America were Spanish before England had acquired a little spot of land on the nearest shores of America, and to-day Spain has withdrawn from the last foot of land which once constituted her gigantic Western domain.

It would be absurd to say that this has been brought about without a reason. Sufficient reason exists, and it must to a great extent be found in the character of the nation. The foundation for the Spanish character, as in the case of other peoples, must be largely found in the history of the nation, which forms no part of the purpose of this book. For a full understanding, however, of Spain's relation to Cuba and to the United States, a brief glance at the general features of Spanish history up to the nineteenth century will be useful.

Under Roman sway Spain became, more than any part of the empire of the Cæsars, a Roman province, traces of which remain to this day in language, laws, and customs. The Italian language preserves less of the qualities of the old Latin than the Spanish, and certainly no more striking trace of lingering Roman habit need be sought than in the Spanish bull-fight. In the great amphitheaters erected by the masters of the Roman world money was lavished and victims were slain to gratify the appetite of the masses. The proud Roman maids and matrons watched with delight the fierce gladiators

hewing each other to pieces, and in later and more degenerate days looked on with equal interest while helpless Christians were torn by savage beasts.

There are other traits than the Roman in Spanish character. As a part of the political débris resulting from the fall of the Roman empire, Spain fell to the Visigoths, whose history there embraces three centuries of debauchery, intrigue, and murder, tainting the blood of the people. In time, guided by the spirit of the age, Spain became a hierarchy, in which the influence of the church became all-powerful, the best of the Gothic kings, Wamba, who resisted this tendency, falling a prey to ecclesiastical treachery. The absorption of the state by the church became more and more complete under centuries of Moorish warfare, and left its indelible stamp upon the nation. For, in fighting for his faith, the Spaniard, unlike the Crusader, was fighting for his home. He became a fierce fanatic, naturally enough, no doubt, and, when Grenada fell, Spain at last became a nation, but a nation of fanatics. It was an age of Spanish heroism, but a heroism which went hand in hand with extravagant religious zeal. In the latter were the seeds of the ruin of the greatness of her heroism, and as soon as the vast Spanish empire was created it began to disintegrate. If it was Ferdinand and Isabella who sent Columbus forth, it was they also who expelled the Jews, and sent two hundred thousand Spaniards to death in exile. So blind was Spanish fanaticism that it was not enough to light the fires under the Jews. The Spaniard who dared to think and to tell what he thought also became a victim. The hand of the Inquisitor fell upon the philosopher and inventor who came forth with the reawakening of the renaissance, and while other nations advanced slowly towards modern ideas, Spain proudly clung to mediævalism.

The economic effects of this bigotry were unmistakable. The persecuted Jews were the financiers, and, because of the improvidence of rulers and the simplicity of the people in financial matters, they possessed all the ready money. The

hated Moors were traders who brought rich merchandise from the east. In her religious zeal, therefore, Spain exterminated her mercantile classes and left none but warriors, priests, and peasants. The main wheel was taken out of her economic structure. The new wealth from America slipped into the hands of those she persecuted, and thus her wars of persecution impoverished her at the very time when she might have become the richest nation in Europe, while her further oppression of her thinkers increased her bigotry and sapped her enterprise. When there was no war on hand for the warriors, and no more heretics for the priests to burn, there was nothing left for them but intrigue. Under her various rulers this policy was continued, until, after nearly two centuries, Spain was wellnigh exhausted. She had planted her colonies all over the new world, but had neither the ability nor the resources to develop them, and in the closing years of the eighteenth century her downfall in America began. The peculiar exigencies of their history had made the Spanish people warriors unfitted for war, and colonists unfitted to govern colonies.

With this brief generalization of Spanish history and character, we may enter understandingly upon the story of Spain in America, and particularly in the Antilles. In his conversations with the friendly natives whom Columbus found on the island of San Salvador, where he first set foot in the new world, he sought with eagerness to learn whence came the gold ornaments they wore. They pointed to the south, and he made out that in that direction lay a land of great extent called Cuba, and, self-deceived as he constantly was by his maps and previously-formed ideas, he immediately concluded that this Cuba must be the country of the Grand Khan of Asia. Accordingly, he set sail, and in three days, or on October 28, 1492, he touched the Cuban shore not far from the present site of Nuevitas. He was dazzled by the beauty of the landscape before him and declared it to be "the goodliest land he ever saw."

At this time Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico were

inhabited by the Arawaks, a simple, kindly people, while in the lesser islands dwelt the more warlike Caribs. They naturally looked upon Columbus and his followers as superior beings, and, when their timidity had been removed, rendered their visitors every service in their power, and placed before them the best they had; the cotton which they had learned to rudely spin, their fruits, and everything they considered of value. Yet, in a few years, the Spaniards, with bloody hands, had swept these simple, confiding people from the face of the Antilles!

We need not dwell upon the story of the cruelty of the early Spanish settlers, or tell of the thousands of defenceless people murdered and thousands carried away as slaves. It is a long story of rapine, brutality, and insult. The natives were exterminated. We may judge from the words of a prelate of those days, Bishop of Chiapas, who was brave enough to protest against the abuses practiced by the Spanish colonizers. It throws light upon the real Spanish character. "To these quiet lambs," he wrote, "endued with such blessed qualities, came the Spaniards like most cruel tygres, wolves, and lions, enraged with a sharp and tedious hunger; for these forty years past, minding nothing else but the slaughter of these unfortunate wretches, whom with divers kinds of torments, neither seen nor heard of before, they have so cruelly and inhumanely butchered, that of three million people which Hispaniola [Haiti] itself did contain, there are left remaining alive scarce three hundred persons. And for the island of Cuba, which contains as much ground in length as from Valladolid to Rome, it lies wholly desert, untill'd and ruin'd."

Such, then, was the condition of Cuba fifty years after that bright day when it burst upon the vision of Columbus, "the goodliest land" he ever saw.

In this situation the idea of importing slaves from Africa was naturally suggested. It had been noticed that the Africans who had been brought to the new colonies continued robust under the blazing sun and in the hard labor of the mines,

and thus, from a small beginning, an extensive slave trade grew up, much more lucrative than the working of the mines. But it was not the Spaniard who prospered most in this enterprise, for soon after the discovery of America the danger that the Spanish discoveries might conflict with those of that other Catholic people, the Portuguese, Pope Alexander VI., while confirming the right of the Spanish crown to all the lands discovered, designated a line to be drawn due north and south a hundred leagues west of the Azores from one pole to the other. All pagan lands to the east of the line were confirmed to Portugal and all to the west of the line was to be the exclusive property of Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella were commanded to appoint upright, God-fearing, skillful, and learned men to instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith, and all unauthorized persons were forbidden to traffic on or even approach the territories, under penalty of incurring "the indignation of Almighty God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul." According to this offhand arrangement no other power could have anything. This simple division of the world, therefore, gave Africa to the Portuguese, and, so far as a Papal bull could, carried with it the slave trade. But in view of its lucrative character, it soon attracted adventurous spirits of other nations, who, increasing in number and boldness, found after a few years a vast field of enterprise in all sorts of piratical undertakings. In time the Spanish islands became a swarming nest of adventurers of several nations, and as the native Indian disappeared, the black man took his place, a fact which accounts for the character of the population of the islands, and the black republics of Haiti and San Domingo.

The native population of Haiti had become nearly exhausted before the settlement of Cuba was attempted, and it was because of the unsatisfactory condition of the former island that Don Diego Columbus, son of the great discoverer, determined, in 1511, to secure a footing in the "Pearl of the Antilles." The harmless Indians offered little resistance, though one chief, named Hatuey, who had been in Haiti and

knew something of the Spanish practices there, attempted some opposition. He was quickly captured and his followers were dispersed. As a high chief among his people he deserved to be treated as an honorable captive, but his death may be cited as the first instance of Spanish methods upon the island. As the story goes, when Hatuey was tied to the stake and the fagots were piled around him, a Franciscan friar stood by and besought him to adjure the heathen gods of his ancestors and accept the true faith so that, as the flames consumed his body, his soul might be wafted to that heaven of rest and happiness prepared for the faithful. He saw that his acceptance of the new faith would not save him from the flames, and so he asked if there were any Spaniards in that place of eternal bliss. Of course the friar promptly answered in the affirmative.

"I will not go," he said, "to a place where I may meet one of that accursed race."

Parties from the new colony pushed out and explored the island thoroughly, and in 1514 the towns of Santiago and Trinidad on the south coast were formed, largely for the purpose of facilitating communication with the Spanish on the island of Jamaica. The next year another settlement was made at the spot now known as Batabano, and it was named, after the great discoverer, San Cristobal de la Habana. Four years later the settlers removed both the town and its name to a more attractive place just across the island on the north shore, and here, in time, grew up the present capital.

The waters of the West Indies soon became a rendezvous of all the maritime adventurers of that ruffianly age. The other nations had never accepted the Pope's straight-cut division of the world whereby Spain was generously given the whole Western Hemisphere, and England openly disputed it. Little was done by the governments themselves, however, so long as they were at peace with Spain, but the continued stories of treasure shipped from the new lands stirred up a host of individual corsairs who cared nothing for papal boundaries.

In 1516 the capital of Cuba had been moved from Baracoa to Santiago, and Spain began to take precautions against the new marauders of the sea, who, however, became more numerous and bold, as the natives, in their intense hostility to the Spaniards, encouraged and even assisted them. It was well into the eighteenth century, and after the English, French, and Dutch had established themselves in the West Indies, that the freebooters were finally driven from the seas.

In 1551 the capital was transferred to Havana, which had been growing in importance because of its commanding situation, good harbor, and fertile surroundings. In the wars of Charles I. of Spain and his son Philip II., the English under Drake again threatened the port, and the Spaniards determined to increase the fortifications. This gave rise to the famous Morro Castle and the Bateria de la Punta, which for a long time made Havana one of the best fortified ports in the world. They were begun the year after the destruction of the famous Armada and completed in 1597, and from that time Havana was the commercial center of the Spanish dominions, being the stopping place for the treasure ships bearing gold and silver from Mexico and other colonies.

Notwithstanding the complicated relations of the European powers during the war of the Spanish Succession with which the eighteenth century opened, Cuba was left comparatively free from strife, but it was not long before there came the first serious trouble between the Cuban colonists and the mother country. By the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which the Hapsburg rule in Spain was ended, the island had become well settled and the agricultural products of the interior made a large showing beside the gold and silver of the other Spanish-American colonies. In 1717 a new policy was inaugurated by which the growing tobacco trade was made a government monopoly. Its enforcement was violently resisted and resulted in many collisions between the government forces and the people. It was but another incident in the restrictive policy of Spain which finally entirely undermined

her power over her colonies. The magnificent harbors of Cuba could be entered only by stealth or force except by the monopoly vessels. As Spain was in no condition to be a large purchaser, the production of the island was strangled and the farmers barely more than lived on what they produced.

The restrictions imposed upon trade with Cuba gave rise to systematic smuggling by British traders in Jamaica, and the constant friction finally resulted in the Anglo-Spanish war of 1739, which ended with a general European war in 1748. In the decade that followed, the smuggling trade in Cuba grew out of all control of the tobacco monopoly, and a system of farming out the revenues to private monopolists was substituted. But this only led to further trouble. The expansion of British trade in the Indies led to the Bourbon compact to put a check to it, and war began in 1762. An English fleet consisting of forty-four men-of-war and 150 other vessels under Admiral Pocock took Havana in June of that year, and an army of about 15,000 men under Lord Albemarle began the siege of the Spanish garrison numbering 27,000 under Governor Porto Carrero. The resistance was stubborn, but Morro Castle surrendered on July 30th, and the city on August 13th. The treasure which fell to the English was enormous. Over three and a half million dollars was divided among them. The English continued to hold the city till early the following year, when, under the terms of the treaty of Paris, the island was restored to Spain in return for the cession of Florida to England.

During their occupation of Havana the English had opened the port to free commerce, and when the Spanish again took hold of the island they found it impossible to reimpose the old restrictions in all their rigor. Many of the former limitations of the commerce of the island with the home country were removed, and the island made a rapid material advance. In 1777 Cuba was given a more independent colonial government under the control of the Captain-General, whose power was, however, practically absolute and

fraught with the seeds of the woes of the Cubans in after years.

At the time this change was made England was engaged in a struggle with its American colonies, and the Bourbon monarchies of France and Spain availed themselves of the opportunity to get even with their old enemy. France joined the American colonists and Spain took up a campaign in her own behalf, regaining the island of Minorca and several smaller West Indian isles which had been wrested from her. Other European powers maintained an attitude favorable to Spain, and by the treaty of Versailles in 1763 Spain regained Florida. England had lost her American colonies, with the exception of Canada and some of her West Indian possessions.

CHAPTER II

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON—HER DISASTROUS AND DISGRACEFUL FAILURES—EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

Napoleon's Ambition to Make Spain a Subject Kingdom—Ferdinand's Intrigues—Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne—Fall of Napoleon and Restoration of Ferdinand—Revolt against Spain—Mexico and South American Colonies Become Independent—Spain's Weakness and Cruelty—Always Failed to Restore Her Flag When Once Torn Down—A Policy Culminating in Disaster and Disgrace—Spain's Possessions in Washington's Time—Owning Over Two-thirds of What Now Constitutes the United States—Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to Napoleon—Jefferson's Diplomacy—Napoleon Offers to Sell Louisiana—The Treaty Signed—Dispute Over Florida Boundaries—End of a Long Struggle.

THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century Spain and France, under Bourbon rulers, had regarded themselves as natural allies, but this alliance in the end had much to do with the ruin of Spain. In 1796 a war broke out with Great Britain which was productive of nothing but disaster to the Spaniards. By pressure of France another arose in 1804 which was attended with similar ill-success, and in the battle of Trafalgar Spain lost a great part of that fleet which she needed for the maintenance of her American colonies. Napoleon had already conceived the idea of making Spain a subject kingdom with one of his own family on the throne, and he had nothing but contempt for its Bourbon ruler, although he pretended to be a faithful ally. Meanwhile, Ferdinand, the presumptive heir to the Spanish throne, was weakly intriguing to displace his father. He became subservient to Napoleon, who cultivated his intrigues without having the least idea of making him King. Finally, Ferdinand!

who was liked by the people, compelled his father to abdicate, but, lured over the border at this critical moment by Napoleon's agents, he found himself a prisoner and compelled by Napoleon to renounce all claims to the Spanish throne before he had had an opportunity to occupy it. The same year Joseph Bonaparte was prevailed upon by his brother to take the crown, and he was declared King of Spain and the Indies. But before he had reached Madrid, the country had arisen, the various provinces electing *juntas* or councils to administer affairs and resist Napoleon's purposes.

That mighty struggle during which Napoleon overran Spain, and which he acknowledged to have been one of the main causes of his ultimate downfall, is a thrilling page of history, but it concerns this story only as it affected Spain's relations to her American colonies. Napoleon's fortunes declined, and, pressed by his enemies, he again negotiated with Ferdinand, who still seemed subservient, though the French Emperor had so recently and so cruelly deceived him. Napoleon believed that Ferdinand, as King, might be a pliant tool, for Joseph had left Spain in disgust. But the imperial prestige was broken, and early in 1814 Napoleon was compelled to abdicate. Ferdinand had already returned to Spain, where he was welcomed by the people, who hoped that he would resume the throne and take up the reins of power under the constitution of 1812. But Ferdinand quickly abrogated that apparent guarantee of liberal government, together with all the acts of the Cortes, the legislative body of Cadiz, and proceeded to set up an absolute monarchy on the old lines, recalling the Papal nuncio and re-establishing the Inquisition. With astonishing ingratitude he broke his most solemn pledges and fell under the direction of priests and nobles and of a set of vulgar flatterers and favorites.

These domestic affairs of Spain had an important effect upon the American colonies. There were two Spanish viceroyalties in South America — that of Lima, which comprised the countries now known as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa

Rica, and the Guianas, and that of Buenos Ayres, which included, besides the present Argentine Republic, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the untraversed wastes of Patagonia. Mexico, which was known as New Spain, and comprised a large territory extending to what is now the southern limit of Oregon, was also a vice-royalty. The revolts and revolutions in each of these provinces had many features in common. It has been said that the history of one is the history of all; and it is true that from 1808 to 1821 all were in revolt against Spain, their revolutions following each other in rapid succession.

It is not strange that their history had so much in common, for all had been the victims of a long oppression of the mother country, and the political aspirations of their people were simultaneously stirred when Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon, and liberal ideas were everywhere noticeable as a result of the revolutions in America and France. Ferdinand's restoration of absolutism and oppression, therefore, naturally led to their revolt. Everywhere the people rose in arms against their oppressors. New acts of cruelty but added fuel to the fire of revolt, and new heroes took the place of the slain. Mexico, richest of Spain's possessions, won its independence, and the South American possessions, under the gallant leadership of Bolivar and San Martin, conquered the tyrant and constituted themselves republics.

In all these struggles Spain showed her weakness, her cruelty, and her stupidity. From the time of Philip II. to the present day Spanish fleets have taken the sea only to be beaten, and Spanish ships have seldom opened fire except to be sunk. The overwhelming disaster which overtook the Armada was but the beginning; Trafalgar was but an incident in the long history of Spain's downfall. When the colonists rose in insurrection, she threw her fleets upon all the seaports in turn—Vera Cruz, Caracas, Buenos Ayres, Valparaiso, Valdivia, Callao. In not a single instance did her squadrons accomplish anything, nor did they retard the progress of the insur-

gents for a single day. By spiteful bombardments she occasionally destroyed some lives and property, but never could she restore the Spanish flag to the forts from which it had once been torn, nor could she inspire among the rebels any terror of the Spanish name. The whole record of her colonial management is an unbroken chronicle of imbecility, cruelty, injustice, and truculence, culminating in disaster and disgrace.

We will now trace the movements by which the young republic of the United States became possessed of the richest portion of that great domain which in the sixteenth century Spain's daring discoverers had laid at her feet. It marks the beginning of those relations between the United States and Spain which culminated in the recent war.

When George Washington was president more than two-thirds of the great domain which now constitutes our Union belonged to Spain. Because the government of the United States acquired the larger part of this vast territory in a peaceful manner the fact does not occupy a conspicuous place in our histories. But in a study of the previous relations of this country with Spain, and of the gradual decline of Spain's power on this side of the Atlantic, the fact becomes interesting and important.

During the administration of Washington, and also of John Adams, the great territory west of the Mississippi from its mouth to its headwaters was Spain's. Originally settled by France, it fell to Spain through the treaty of 1763, following the Seven-Years War. England laid some claim to that part of it which now comprises the States of Washington and Oregon, but it was not deemed valid, and the whole region was an unknown wilderness waiting for the nineteenth century to unfold its wonderful resources. In addition to this Florida belonged to Spain, together with a strip of land extending along the gulf coast to the mouth of the Mississippi, and known as West Florida.

During the struggle of the American colonies for their independence, Spain held aloof for some time, though largely

out of revenge upon the English she rendered us some material assistance on the Mississippi, allowing us in the first stress of the war to obtain powder from her stores at New Orleans. But soon after the war was over Spain became so arrogant over the Florida boundaries and caused so much interference with our navigation of the Mississippi that the people of the United States clamored for redress in war.

In October, 1795, or during the second administration of Washington, Thomas Pinckney arranged a treaty with the Madrid government establishing as boundaries of the United States, East and West Florida on the south at 31° North latitude, and on the west the middle of the Mississippi River above that latitude. What was regarded as the most important and advantageous part of the instrument was a recognition by Spain of the right of the United States to navigate the Mississippi, with a privilege of deposit at the port of New Orleans, free of duty.

But the conviction that the Mississippi River and 31° North latitude were not the natural boundaries of the new republic began to manifest itself soon after peace was restored with Great Britain, and this feeling was expressed in occasional propositions for invading Spanish territory. The decadence of Spain was already well under way. The colonists in her territories everywhere were misgoverned and oppressed, and dissatisfaction prevailed. In this situation Francisco Miranda, a South American revolutionist, secretly worked upon the British ministry to promote a joint expedition for a movement upon Louisiana, Great Britain to furnish the navy, and the United States the army. Our relations with France went from bad to worse, and war seemed at hand, and, after the failure of our special mission to Paris, Hamilton became committed to the scheme of liberating Spanish America if the United States could be the principal agency and furnish the whole land force. Miranda wrote to Hamilton that England would co-operate as soon as the United States was prepared. "All is ready," he said, "for your President to give the word."

But President Adams was not inclined to favor the project, as, like Washington, he disliked forcible conquests or foreign alliances.

When Thomas Jefferson became President Spain was still a faithful ally of France. It was a part of Napoleon's design to re-establish French influence in American territory, partly for the greater security of the French possessions in the West Indies. In October, 1800, in a secret treaty by which he promised to secure for Spain the recognition of the King of Tuscany by all the powers of Europe, he obtained from her the cession of Louisiana, and soon took steps to send an expedition to take possession of the colony.

Meanwhile, the United States, being outraged by Spain's repeated violations of her treaty as to free navigation of the Mississippi, made preparations to attack New Orleans, but soon after Jefferson's inauguration information concerning Napoleon's secret treaty reached our government through our minister at London, and the project was abandoned. The new treaty was anything but agreeable to the people of the United States. The administration felt that under the control of Spain, which was on the road to decay, the United States might confidently await the time when the territory could be easily secured. But with the French, under a ruler who contemplated universal empire, in control of Louisiana, the case was different. The possessor of the mouth of the Mississippi, Jefferson wrote to Livingston, our minister at Paris, would of necessity become the natural and habitual enemy of the United States.

Livingston's instructions in taking the French mission were to dissuade France from acquiring Louisiana if possible, and, if not, to procure a cession to the United States of the Floridas and New Orleans. Meanwhile, the King of Spain informed the Intendant of Louisiana of its cession to France, and he was instructed to make arrangements for its delivery to the French government. In pursuance of this order, or, perhaps, upon some misconception of his duties, he ordered the

port of New Orleans closed as a place of deposit for merchandise, a privilege which our treaty with Spain had guaranteed. As a result the product of a large part of the United States could find no outlet. The people in the western section of the country were greatly stirred by this act, and Hamilton was in favor of seizing New Orleans and the Floridas at once and negotiating afterwards. But Jefferson was disposed to continue his diplomatic efforts, though they were not succeeding well. Livingston strove in vain to gain the favor of Napoleon, who was rapidly fitting out a large expedition to take possession of the new territory. Jefferson appointed Monroe a special minister to act with Livingston, but by the time he had reached France a great change suddenly came over Napoleon. The order for the sailing of the expedition was countermanded, and Livingston was surprised to find himself in high favor in the court.

The cause of this was a sudden threatening of a renewal of hostilities of France with Great Britain. Napoleon had charged the British with perfidy, and George III. had retorted in kind. The English ambassador was openly affronted at the Tuileries, and both governments prepared for war. Napoleon saw that if he continued in his scheme for Louisiana, the United States would become an ally of Great Britain, and, moreover, he needed money. The result was that he at once authorized the sale not only of New Orleans but of Louisiana. In this situation the sale was quickly arranged, and the famous treaty was signed May 2, 1803, the United States ministers dining amicably with the Consul, who but a short time before would hardly recognize them. By this treaty the United States became a vast empire with immunity from dangerous neighbors, securing for about three cents an acre a domain which has yielded almost incalculable wealth. Thus Spain lost her hold on the richest part of the American hemisphere.

In February, 1819, a treaty was signed by Adams and the Spanish minister in behalf of their respective governments, whereby Spain ceded to the United States all territory east

of the Mississippi known as East and West Florida, with adjacent islands, for five million dollars. West of the Mississippi the new boundary began at the mouth of the Sabine River, now the eastern boundary line of Texas, running north by that river to 32° North latitude, thence north to the Red River, thence west along that river to 100° West longitude, thence north to the Arkansas River, thence westerly along this river through what is now Kansas and Colorado to 106° West longitude, thence north to 42° North latitude, and thence westerly on the line which is now the northern boundary of Utah, Nevada, and California, to the Pacific. All the territory left to Spain, including what are now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California, with parts of Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming, were in open revolt against a country whose tyranny was rapidly despoiling her of all the gains of the sixteenth century.

The treaty was at once ratified by the United States government in anticipation of its speedy ratification by the Cortes, but the unreliability of Spanish character again manifested itself. In view of the natural sympathy of the people of the United States for the rebellious colonists of South and Central America, it became difficult for the government of the United States to preserve a strict neutrality in these revolutions. Ferdinand feared that if he ratified the Florida treaty the United States would recognize the belligerents, and so he held off, though France, England, and Russia urged him to approve. Pressed for a decisive answer, he offered only mysterious excuses. Congress was disposed to require the executive to take possession of the Floridas at once, but the administration still treated Spain with undeserved forbearance. Finally, in February, 1821, when Ferdinand's throne was threatened by his own people, and South America had thrown off the yoke, the treaty was ratified and the long series of negotiations as to Spanish America was brought to a close.

From this time forward our relations with Spain chiefly concern the history of Cuba.

CHAPTER III.

"THE EVER-FAITHFUL ISLE"—SPAIN'S SECRET ATTEMPTS TO SELL CUBA TO FRANCE—THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE.

Cuba's Peculiar Position—Importance of Havana—An Early Cause of Ill-feeling—Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand—Aponte's Uprising—Agitation for the Suppression of the Slave Trade—Favorable Influence of English Intervention in Cuba—"A Softer Word for Despotism"—Help for the Bigoted Ferdinand—Discord in Cuba—Adams's Advice to President Monroe—The Famous Monroe Doctrine—Retreat of the Holy Alliance—The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordinary Authority—Powers Misused and Unrest Fostered—The "Black Eagle"—Discord Among the Planters—Inauguration of Spanish Venality in Cuba—No Reforms for Poor Cuba—Spanish Treasury Depleted—The Queen's Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France—Class Hatred Grows in Cuba.

DURING the troublous years of the disastrous reign of Ferdinand, the province which, because of the failure of all efforts to plant the seed of liberal government in her soil, obtained the title of "The Ever-faithful Isle," maintained a position peculiarly her own. During the last years of the eighteenth century Cuba, under the rule of a few wise governors, advanced rapidly in material resources, and the ports of Havana and Santiago were opened to free commerce, excepting the slave trade, and a few minor productions. At the close of the century Havana was the most important city in America. Of the governors, none were more wise and progressive than Luis de las Casas, who imparted a new impulse to commerce and agriculture, and inaugurated a series of important public works. He took an active interest not only in relieving the remnant of the native Indians from slavery, but in developing the military defences of the island.

When Napoleon placed his brother on the throne of Spain,

and the Spanish, seeing themselves cheated and humiliated, rose in a sort of helpless frenzy, the condition of affairs in Cuba was greatly changed. England, which had long been an enemy of Spain, now became her ally. English fleets, instead of threatening Cuban waters, now aided in extending its commerce. When the news of the captivity of Ferdinand reached Cuba, the colonists, irrespective of any party divisions, refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte. The divisions between the Cubans and the Spaniards were for the moment lost sight of, and the people contributed men, money, and material to assist the Junta of Seville, which proclaimed equal rights for all Spaniards, both at home and in the colonies. The hopes of the Cubans rose high, but the Junta proved itself too closely bound to the colonial monopolies to allow of a liberal consideration of colonial rights, and the Cubans were greatly disappointed. During the years when Spain was losing her colonies in South America, many loyal Spaniards took refuge in Cuba, and, while the population was increased, and the islands became the most important of Spain's colonies, the presence of so many Spaniards naturally contributed to strengthen the reaction which followed the restoration of the despotic Ferdinand.

When, after the capture of Seville, the Spanish constituent Assembly was called to frame a constitution for the Spanish monarchy, the colonies were invited, and Cuba was represented by three deputies, the small proportion being the cause of considerable discontent. The Constitution of 1812 became only another factor in the discontent, for though the pleas of the Cuban planters prevented the adoption of the clause for the abolition of slavery in Cuba after ten years, the rumors of the failure led to serious uprisings among the slaves, led by José Aponto, a free negro. But the insurrection was quickly put down and the leaders executed as usual.

In 1817 arose the agitation for the suppression of the slave trade in Cuba. The importation of negroes into slavery had been interdicted by Denmark in 1792, by England and the

United States in 1807, by Sweden in 1813, and by Holland and France in 1814, and as England had performed for Spain the service of saving her from Napoleon, that government used its influence to bring about the suppression of the slave trade in the Spanish colonies. The result was the conclusion of the treaty at Madrid in 1817, by which the deportation of negroes to Spanish colonies was made illegal after 1820, and Ferdinand, who was greatly in need of money, received for this concession \$2,000,000, Portugal being paid a million and a half for a like concession. The change was violently opposed, not so much by the Cuban planters as by the slave-trading interests, and for years after the interdiction shiploads of slaves were either smuggled in or their entrance connived at by the Spanish authorities.

To compensate Cuba for the supposed loss of commerce from the interdiction, and in the hopes that it might have a beneficial effect upon the revolting South American provinces, which Spain expected then to recover, she consented to have Cuban ports opened to unrestricted commerce, and encouraged immigration to the islands. In short, owing to the favorable influence of English intervention, Cuba made a distinct gain at this time. But it was the forerunner of that long and troubled period in which the Cubans and the Spaniards stood face to face in an attitude of bitter hatred and hostility.

It was in 1820 that the standard of revolt was raised in Spain by Riego and Quiroga against the cruel absolutism of Ferdinand. The movement quickly spread, and in a short time the constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed and Ferdinand was compelled to accept it. But the Captain-General who had been sent out to Cuba two years before attempted to delay its re-establishment in the island. He was overborne by the garrison of the city, a part of which at once pronounced for the liberal order of things, and they were joined by the Cubans. A conflict was for the time avoided by the yielding of the Captain-General. The succeeding governors of the island endeavored to restrain the new tendency, and to unite

the civil and military power in the hands of the Captain-General in opposition to the constitution, and thus a bitter feeling was gradually aroused between the Spanish troops under his immediate command, and the local militia who supported the Cubans. Secret societies began to take root in the island, and thus the two elements of the population, those supporting the constitution and mostly native Cubans on the one hand, and the adherents of absolutism on the other, gradually took sides in opposing organizations. But while these forces were arraying themselves in Cuba the constitution was again broken down in Spain, this time by France under the behest of the Holy Alliance.

The great ruling houses of Continental Europe, strong upholders of absolute monarchial institutions and the divine right of kings, had naturally become alarmed over the sudden unfolding of free institutions in the Americas and the developing weakness of the Bourbon throne of Spain. In 1815 the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had formed the Holy Alliance, its avowed purpose being to maintain as a Christian doctrine that sovereign right of legitimacy which Henry Clay in one of his speeches expressed as "a softer word for despotism." The Alliance proceeded to put its foot upon liberal ideas in government wherever they were found. Naturally, it turned to help the bigoted Ferdinand, and the country was handed over to ten years more of tyranny.

In 1823 Ferdinand, now more arrogant than ever, set about to carry out the plan of the Holy Alliance, which was to use Cuba as an arsenal and vantage point for the subjugation of the newly-established South American republics. But at this point our ministers in Europe became aware that the Holy Alliance had a much more ambitious and sweeping project in mind than the assistance of Ferdinand. It was, in fact, a plan for the combination of monarchial Europe to throttle independence of spirit in South America. In this situation England and the United States drew closer together for the time, though the former had not yet recognized the new

South American republics. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, strongly advised President Monroe not to join with England in a protest against the projects of the Alliance in South America, but to make his annual message to Congress a declaration of what would be the position of the United States if the Alliance undertook to carry out its plans. Monroe acted on the advice, though with some reluctance, it is said, and inserted those passages which were destined to become famous as "the Monroe doctrine." After referring in the first part of his message to certain negotiations then in progress between Russia and this government concerning rights in the far northwest, he said:

"The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, *that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.*"

That is the gist of the Monroe doctrine. Monroe continued with some forcible words in explanation of this position, and plainly intimated that any attempt on the part of the European governments to interfere with the independence of the new republics would be considered as an unfriendly act, dangerous to our peace and safety. In England, where the purpose of the Holy Alliance was understood, the Monroe declaration was applauded as a bold assertion of American spirit. The Alliance drew back, and its interference with the new republics was thus prevented.

In May, 1825, Ferdinand endowed Captain-General Vives with those extraordinary powers which for years remained the supreme law of Cuba. Threatened by a revolution of the natives, and by attacks from Mexico and Colombia, and fearing the designs of the United States, he resolved, "for the important end of preserving in that precious island his legitimate sovereign authority," to give to the Captain-General all the powers which by the royal ordinances were granted to the governors of besieged cities. He, therefore, granted "the most ample and unbounded power, to send away from

the island any persons in office, whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein " the Captain-General might deem injurious, replacing them with persons faithful to his majesty. He was also granted the power to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever. From that day the Captain-General was, in effect, the absolute ruler of the island, the one essential being that he please his king. He became a military dictator, and the degree of his despotism depended only upon his character and disposition. Naturally, the sovereign appointed none but those whom he believed to be thorough Spaniards, and thus it happened that many of the governors misused their enormous powers, widening the breach between the islanders and the peninsulars, and causing that very unrest which the grant of authority was intended to repress.

As under strict military supervision, with a large army constantly on hand, uprisings had little chance of success unless operated from outside, Cuban exiles everywhere became constant conspirators. In Mexico and Colombia they organized, in 1827, a secret society called the " Black Eagle," and in a short time its ramifications extended into many Cuban cities and towns. The watchful military forces had no difficulty in finding the main conspirators on the island, and a large number of them were condemned to death, the rest to exile, though the Captain-General was wise enough, in view of the growing discontent, to mitigate these sentences in many cases. Vives used his powers with much discretion, but under his successor, Mariano Ricafort, venality and corruption became more and more manifest, large sums of money wrung from the Cubans by taxation finding their way into the pockets of minor officials instead of into public works or into the Spanish treasury.

Early in the constitutional history of the United States, the acquisition of Cuba had been regarded as desirable if only as a strategic point.

" I candidly confess," wrote Jefferson to President Monroe

in 1823, "that I have ever looked at Cuba as the most interesting addition that could be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and the isthmus bordering it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being." This theory grew naturally out of the consideration of the geographical position of the island. "Our safety from this danger," that is, the control of the Gulf by a hostile power, wrote Alexander Hill Everett, our Minister to Spain from 1825 to 1829, in a letter to President Adams, "has, I believe, long been considered as resulting wholly from the feebleness and insufficiency of Spain; and it has been viewed by all as a settled point that the American government would not consent to any change in the political situation of Cuba other than one which would place it under the jurisdiction of the United States." He considered it highly important that the United States should at once endeavor to obtain possession of the island in a peaceable way. "If they do not succeed in this," he said, "it is morally certain that they will be forced, at no very distant period, to effect the same object in a more invidious manner and at the risk of embroiling themselves with some of the great powers of Europe." He then asked that he might be favored with instructions with a view to negotiations on the basis he proposed, which was, in effect, to offer Spain, then in desperate straits financially, a considerable loan on condition of a temporary cession of the island as security. If the loan was not repaid within a specified time, the United States should assume entire and undisputed ownership of Cuba.

Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, said in a letter to Everett that same year, the United States were satisfied with the existing condition of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the hands of Spain and with their ports open to free commerce, but he intimated that if war should continue between Spain and the new South American republics, or there should be danger of Cuba falling into other hands, the United States would not be disinterested spectators.

While this was the position of the administration, it was not the position of the inhabitants of the Southern States. Slavery then dominated the sentiments of the South, and, much as it would have liked to have the United States acquire Cuba as new slave territory, Cuban independence would have been considered undesirable and unsafe. In writing to Van Ness, minister to Spain in 1829, President Van Buren said that "other considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it the interest of the Southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States." Thus it was that because of the growing predominance of pro-slavery control, even then threatening disunion, the government of the United States threw its influence in favor of the Spaniards. While boasting of our freedom, our interests in slavery made us partisans of Spanish oppression.

In 1836, when the Spanish treasury was sadly depleted, the Queen conceived the idea of selling Cuba to France, and even the Philippines, and she commissioned a Spanish banker at Paris to sound Prince Talleyrand upon the subject. The Queen then despatched Campuzano to Paris to represent the crown in the business, but he was heartily ashamed of his mission; an attempt to deprive Spain of nearly all that remained of her once great American empire. He undertook the office only because he feared that if he declined it, it might fall to some of the Queen's favorites, who would seek nothing but the personal pecuniary advantage to be derived from it. At a meeting with Talleyrand, when the secret agreement to be signed by the King of France and the Queen Regent of Spain was being read, Campuzano is described by Talleyrand's secretary as being deeply affected. The proposition from the Spanish ruler was so monstrous and base that he struck the table a heavy blow with his fist and muttered a

curse. Christina proposed for a consideration of 30,000,000 *reals* (about \$3,500,000) to hand Cuba over to France, and for 10,000,000 *reals* more to give up Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

The Queen's plan would make it necessary for France to raise a loan. Out of the loan the banker would receive large commissions, while the sum of 1,000,000 francs was to be offered to Prince Talleyrand, and 300,000 francs were to be distributed as bribes and commissions to other people whose support might be essential. When, a few days later, the parties met in the King's cabinet to sign the contract, Campuzano could hardly control himself, so disgusted was he with the business which seemed to be working to a successful conclusion. The article on Cuba hardly provoked any discussion, but when it came to the Philippines, Louis Philippe thought he saw an opportunity for driving a bargain. He remarked that the cession of the Philippines to France would be so obnoxious to England that serious complications, if not war, might result. He therefore demanded a lower price on the Philippines, and pushing the contract across the table to Campuzano, exclaimed imperiously:

"The reduction of price *must* be accepted. The terms are too onerous. Seven million *reals* is my offer, or else the contract must be thrown into the fire."

Talleyrand, who knew how disgusted Campuzano was with the whole business, and who feared that the King's move might spoil the lucrative job, stretched out his hand to pick up the paper and was about to speak, when Campuzano, starting up quickly, leaned over the table, seized the contract, crumpled it in his hand, and looking at the astonished King, said:

"Your majesty is right. The contract is worthless, only fit to be thrown into the fire."

He flung the paper on the blazing logs of the fireplace, and with the tongs beat it down until nothing remained but the blackened fragments. And thus ended Spain's only proposition for the sale of Cuba.

Meantime the condition of the Cubans upon the unhappy island became worse and worse. The despotic Captain-General Tacon was surrounded by corrupt and greedy officeholders from Spain, while the Creoles were under ban, though they were the children of Spaniards, many of them well educated and wealthy. Their misfortune consisted solely in having been born outside of Spain, and the period was at hand when class hatred was to manifest itself in an antagonism never to end till Cuba should be free.

A select commission drew up a report which was accepted by the Cortes, by which it was resolved no longer to admit deputies from Cuba. The Cuban deputies protested in vain, and from that date the political constitution of Cuba became established in accordance with the Queen's decree of April 25, 1837, a decree which stripped the "ever-faithful isle" of all voice in its own affairs.

The years which followed this order made bloody pages in the history of Cuba. Spain was deaf to the complaints of a people devoid of a free press, of the right of assembly, and of the security of the law. The military system gave rise to many excesses, and the infamous contraband slave trade was carried on and openly tolerated in violation of treaties by which, for a money consideration from England, Spain had formally forbidden it. The government of Spain had declared that all negroes brought from Africa subsequent to the treaty should be at once set free, and that the ships on which they had been transported should at once be confiscated, while the captains and crews and others concerned should be punished with ten years servitude. Yet the statistics show that for the twenty-five years following this treaty an average of fifteen thousand slaves annually arrived in Cuba from Africa. It is asserted that in the four years that Tacon was Captain-General he made no secret of receiving a doubloon, or seventeen dollars, per head on every slave landed, and the home government secretly fostered the trade for the sake of the revenue which went into the pockets of its members.

CHAPTER IV

FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ —THE *BLACK WARRIOR*—THE FAMOUS OSTEND CON- FERENCE—A CUBAN WARNING.

Buchanan's Efforts to Buy Cuba—Spain Refuses to Sell—Lopez and His Uprising—His Filibustering Attempts—Capture of Colonel Crittenden and His Men—Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote—Private Filibustering—Important Letter of Edward Everett—A Change in Party Government—Cuba and the Cause of Slavery—A Sympathizer with Filibusters—The *Black Warrior* Case—Feeling against Spain Intensified—Soulé Threatens Spain—Conference of American Ministers at Ostend—Fixing a Price on Cuba—The Manifesto—Effort to Secure Cuba—Buchanan Advises Annexation—Arrogance of Spanish Authority—Liberal Sentiment Strengthened—Burdens Only Increased—A Cuban Warning.

IN the agitation which led to the annexation of Texas in 1845, the proposition to acquire Cuba by purchase or otherwise was widely discussed in the United States, and during the Mexican war, which fixed the boundary of Texas and brought California into the Union as a free state, the strength of the Cuban idea increased rapidly. The slaveholders had become greatly concerned over the anti-slavery agitation, and they looked to Cuba as a means of establishing the equilibrium of sectional strength. In 1848, therefore, Buchanan, Secretary of State under President Polk, proposed negotiations for the purchase of the island to the Spanish government through the American Minister at Madrid, who was instructed to point out to Spain that she was in danger of losing Cuba by revolution, and that it might be wrested from her by Great Britain if a rupture came in their relations. The minister was authorized to pay as much as \$100,000,000, and the treaty should be modeled upon that of the Louisiana purchase.

But the refusal of Spain to entertain the proposition put an end to the project, and the growth of the anti-slavery sentiment led many of the slaveholders to lend support to violence in the shape of filibustering expeditions.

The Cuban liberals, unable to carry on their revolutionary movements at home because of the military vigilance of the Spanish authorities, turned to the United States as a place to organize their movements. In May, 1847, Narciso Lopez, who had formed a conspiracy for a rising in central Cuba, was detected and fled to the United States. During the following year he formed an association of Cuban fugitives in New York, and in 1849, after the failure of Buchanan's negotiations, Lopez organized a military expedition and induced many prominent southern citizens to become interested in it. The attempt was frustrated by the vigilance of President Taylor, who had succeeded Polk, and who issued a warning proclamation. The second and third attempts were more serious. In April, 1850, Lopez sailed from New Orleans with about three hundred men under his command, and, after baffling one of our naval vessels which was sent to intercept the expedition, he landed at Cardenas, overcame the Spanish guards, and took possession. But the spirit of revolution was not at that moment ripe in the cities of Cuba, and Lopez, finding himself unsupported and unable to reach the rural districts, was soon driven from the island by the government troops. He took refuge in Savannah, where he was arrested for violating our neutrality laws, but was quickly discharged.

Lopez was not in the least daunted and he saw that he had the sympathy of a large portion of the southern people. Encouraged by some revolutionary manifestations in Cuba in 1851 he hastened to New Orleans and organized a new force of about 450 men, draining as before upon the purses of zealous pro-slavery politicians. He sailed away on the steamer *Pampero* intending to land on the southern coast. But learning at Key West of a revolt at a favorable point on the north coast he made for that place, but missed it and disembarked on

a lonely portion of the coast about thirty miles from Havana. Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky, second in command, with a hundred men, was left in charge of the stores and baggage, while Lopez, with the remainder of his command, advanced inland to the town of Pozas, whose inhabitants, instead of lending their enthusiastic aid, fled at once. The separated forces never reunited. Crittenden's band finally put out to sea in small boats to escape the Spanish soldiers, and were soon captured by a Spanish war vessel, which took them to Havana, where, after a summary trial, they were shot on the 17th of August. Lopez had advanced but a short distance into the interior, suffering greatly and finding the simple inhabitants of that section indifferent to the cause, when he was attacked by government forces, and after a severe loss he fled to the mountains. But here he was surprised on the 24th of August by an overwhelming force, and his scattered men, after wandering about, were finally caught and taken to Havana. Lopez was executed at dawn, September 1st, by the Spanish garrote, an instrument by which the victim is clasped fast in an iron chair while an iron screw is pierced through a brass collar to the spinal marrow. The newspapers of the day record that this execution was publicly performed in the midst of an approving crowd.

President Fillmore had by proclamation stigmatized all such hostile adventures from our shores as violations of both national and international law, and had warned citizens of the United States who aided such projects that they would forfeit all claims to the protection of the government. The French and English governments had also issued orders to their West Indian fleets to prevent, by force if need be, such invasions of Cuba. But as a result the Spanish authorities in Cuba became very suspicious of American designs, especially when the South showed such unmistakable signs of irritation at the failure of the filibustering schemes, for a mob at New Orleans attacked the Spanish residents and tore in pieces a flag on the building of the Spanish consulate. But a little diplomacy

soon secured a better feeling between Spain and this government, and those who still dreamed of securing Cuba were for the time occupied with the more serious aspects of the slavery question at home. Henceforth the designs of the slave party were mainly confined to attempts to purchase the island. Still, there were some quiet attempts at filibustering.

Early in 1852 the French and English governments, influenced by the efforts of the South to acquire Cuba, made a joint proposition to the government of the United States for a tripartite convention for disclaiming severally and collectively all intention of obtaining possession of the island, and binding themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever. In December, 1852, Edward Everett, Secretary of State, replied to the proposition in a letter which is an important landmark in our relations with Spain as to Cuba. The French minister had stated that France could never see with indifference the possession of Cuba by any other power than Spain, and explicitly declared that she had no wish or intention of appropriating the island to herself. Lord Malmesbury made a similar avowal on behalf of the English government, but Mr. Everett stated that this government could not, for various reasons which he proceeded to enumerate, enter into an agreement to pledge itself for all time, no matter what the circumstances, not to consider the possibility of the acquisition of Cuba. One of the reasons was that such a convention would be an entangling alliance contrary to the oldest traditions of the government; another, that such an agreement, though equal in terms, would be very unequal in substance. Cuba lay close to our shores, commanded the approach to the Gulf and to the entrance of the Mississippi. "If," he said, "an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume."

Thus were France and England a half century ago given to understand that, while we could not consent to any other European power than Spain occupying Cuba, we might under certain contingencies feel compelled to take it to ourselves; but not for the aggrandizement of slave power.

But in the following year the Whig administration, whose sentiments Everett had expressed, ended, and the party whose politics were largely dominated by the defenders of slavery came into power. An ardent Southern expansionist, Pierre Soulé, a Frenchman by birth, was sent to the Madrid mission. Marcy, the new Secretary of State, sent him instructions which went much further than the judicial argument of Everett, and which indicated how closely bound up in Cuba and its illegitimate slave trade was the cause of slavery in this country. Marcy wrote to Soulé that, under certain circumstances, the United States would be willing to purchase, but he did not believe that Spain would entertain negotiations, and he felt convinced that Spain was under obligations to Great Britain and France not to transfer the island to the United States. "Independent of any embarrassment of this nature," he added significantly, "there are many other reasons for believing that Spain will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba, and that the separation, whenever it takes place, will be the work of violence."

Soulé was an exile from France for being a conspirator against the French Bourbons, and Napoleon III. heartily disliked him. He was a sympathizer with the filibusters, and not long before his departure for Spain had made a speech in public praising Lopez and his deeds, but he was formally received at Madrid, though he quickly involved himself in difficulties.

Sentiment against Spain in the United States was greatly intensified at this time by the case of the *Black Warrior*, a steamer owned in New York and plying regularly between that port and Mobile. She was the largest steamer in the coasting trade, and possessed accommodations for 200 cabin

passengers. In going and returning, she touched at Havana to deliver and receive mail and passengers, but not for the purpose of discharging or taking on any freight. The custom laws at Havana were very strict, and under them she should have exhibited each time a manifest of her cargo. This, of course, would have been to no purpose as no cargo was to be moved, so she usually entered Havana and cleared as "in ballast" to save time and trouble. She had so entered and cleared thirty-six times in succession, with the full knowledge and consent of the Spanish custom officers, and in accordance with a written general order given by the authorities seven years before. Stopping at Havana as usual in February, 1854, the steamer was held in the harbor for having an undeclared cargo. The cargo was confiscated and taken on shore, and a fine of more than twice its value was imposed on the captain and his vessel. The captain refused to pay, protesting against the whole proceeding as wrongful. He declared it a forcible seizure, and, hauling down his colors, left his vessel as a Spanish capture and made his way back to the United States, where the owners preferred a claim for \$300,000 indemnity.

Soulé meanwhile had applied every art of menace and cajolery to induce Spain to cede Cuba to the United States, and in accordance with his instructions from Marcy protested against any interference from other European powers in the negotiations. Spain proudly spurned all negotiations on the subject. The minister declared in the Cortes that such a sale would be "the sale of Spanish honor itself." Then came from Washington a demand for redress for the *Black Warrior* seizure.

In order to impress the governments of Europe as well as their own, the ministers to England, France, and Spain, Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, respectively, all eager to add Cuba to our slave territory, at the suggestion of Secretary Marcy called a conference of themselves at Ostend in October, 1854. They conferred three days, and then transferred their

deliberations to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they drew up the report which became known as the Ostend Manifesto. It was proposed that our government should make a bold strike for Cuba, and that an immediate and earnest effort should be made to purchase it from Spain at a price not exceeding a certain maximum, which was between themselves and the administration fixed at \$120,000,000. They declared that our proposal to Spain should be open and frank, so as to challenge the approbation of the world, and such a transfer, they urged, would be beneficial to Spain and to all the commercial nations of Europe. What with her own oppression and the danger of insurrectionary troubles, they said, Spain, unless she sold, might lose Cuba and the price as well. Finally, supposing a price should be refused, the question would remain, they declared, whether Cuba in the hands of Spain did not endanger our internal peace and the existence of our Union; and if so, we should be justified by every law, human and divine, in wresting it from her.

But this remarkable manifesto did not produce the desired effect. President Pierce was too prudent to follow such reckless advice, and the Kansas-Nebraska trouble soon furnished him with enough to attend to, especially as it made the North determined to allow of no more territorial acquisitions till the slavery question was settled. The impetuous Soulé, observing the hesitation of the government, threw up his commission and returned home in disgust. Thereupon, Spain made compensation for the *Black Warrior*, and both nations exhibited a more peaceful and amiable disposition.

When Buchanan became President, however, the slaveholders thought that the policy of "territorial expansion" would be vigorously prosecuted. His message certainly gave promise of such a policy, and Cuba played a conspicuous part in it. But by this time the anti-slavery sentiment had become strong enough to hold the South in check. Still, Buchanan did his best to keep the Cuban project to the front, even after the elections of 1858 showed that the verdict of the people

was against him. When Congress met in December, he spoke much of Cuba, Mexico, and Central America. He held that if Spain would not sell, self-defense would compel us to annex it by force. Slidell, one of the President's most intimate friends, presented in the Senate a bill proposing to place in the hands of the Executive \$30,000,000 for negotiating the purchase of Cuba, and he made a long report describing in glowing language the advantages to be derived, and strongly reiterating the threat that if Spain would not listen to negotiations, the government of the United States would, by themselves or in assisting the Cubans, drive Spain from the island. But Congress would do nothing in times of such domestic excitement, and Buchanan's advice went unheeded.

During this decade the Cubans bore the ever-increasing weight of oppression in a spirit of hopefulness, and every attempt to throw it off was impotent, so extensive and thorough was the military espionage. It is not strange that their valor was unequal to the situation when, living in an island smaller than the State of New York, they were under the constant watch of an army larger than was necessary in the whole of the United States. The Spanish government constantly added to the burden of taxation, and thus the discontent of the people continued to increase. Commerce with the United States was almost destroyed by prohibitory restrictions, and that with the mother country was subjected to a heavy tax.

Unquestionably, the abolition of slavery in the United States as a result of the Civil War and the re-establishment of the power of the republic on firm grounds strengthened the liberal sentiment in Cuba and gave rise to renewed movements for its expression. The pleas of the Cubans had so much effect even upon the Spanish government that a liberal ministry which happened to be in power in 1865 accepted a project for a Commission of Inquiry to consider and devise reforms for the Cuban administration. The project was duly set forth in a royal decree and the Cubans formed extravagant hopes upon the results.

But instead of a general plan for colonial reform being considered, the commission, whose deliberations were guided by a president appointed by the government, restricted itself to the proposal of certain regulations for slave-labor. The Cubans pleaded for a constitutional system in place of the autocracy of the Captain-General, freedom of the press, the right of petition, cessation of the exclusion of Cubans from public office, unrestricted industrial liberty, abolition of restrictions on the transfer of landed property, the right of assembly and association, representation in the Cortes, and local self-government. But none of these propositions would the home government consider. Even the moderate demands of the Cubans for the abolition of slavery were temporized with and nothing was done. The result was that the new Captain-General, Lersundi, tightened the screws on the reformists so that they were worse off than before. To cap it all, a little later an additional 10 per cent. on the direct taxes of the island was imposed.

One of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes, in a speech delivered in 1866, said "I foresee a catastrophe near at hand, in case Spain persists in remaining deaf to the just reclamations of the Cubans. Look at the old colonies of the American continent. All have ended in conquering their independence. Let Spain not forget the lesson; let the government be just to the colonies that remain. Thus she will consolidate her dominion over people who only desire to be good sons of a worthy mother, but who are not willing to live as slaves under the scepter of a tyrant."

CHAPTER V

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA— BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YEARS WAR—COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE—FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC—THE PEACE OF ZANJON.

The Revolution at Cadiz—Wretched Condition of Spain—Flight of Isabella—Her Vain Appeal to Napoleon—Fires of Discontent Break out in Cuba—Promoters of the Insurrection—High Standing of the Leaders—The Proclamation at Yara—Beginning of the Ten-Years War—The Appeal to Arms—The Burden no Longer to be Endured—Rapid Growth of the Insurrection—Cuban Leaders Meet to Form a Government—Diminution of Spanish Forces—Disagreement among the Insurgents—Cisneros Succeeds to the Presidency—Six Years of Desultory Fighting—The Rebellion Nearly at a Standstill—Campos sent to the Island—An Armistice—The Treaty of Zanjón—Concessions and Privileges.

MEANWHILE, affairs in Spain had been going from bad to worse. The treasury was well-nigh empty. The air was full of intrigue and conspiracy. At last, on September 19th, the revolution broke out at Cadiz, and a *pronunciamento* was issued setting forth the causes of disaffection in the mother country. It was a long array of charges, all justified. The truth was that the Spanish rulers, still priest-ridden, were clinging to the customs of the middle ages, and the people were at last awakening, but without any adequate training for governing themselves. A provisional government was established, and Isabella fled to France, where she pleaded in vain for Napoleon's help. Napoleon was beginning to have troubles of his own, and it was the Spanish throne which was eventually to form the issue of war leading to the French collapse at Sedan.

While these events were being shaped at home, the Cubans were planning another outbreak of their own, for, disappointed

over the failure of the Commission of Inquiry, and goaded almost to a frenzy by the high-handed methods of Captain-General Lersundi, nothing was left them but another break for liberty. The movement was fast ripening when the news of the Queen's overthrow reached the island, but the change in Spain made no difference with Lersundi's policy. He became even more watchful and oppressive. The plans for insurrection were quietly matured in the eastern provinces of the island by Francisco Aguilera, Manuel Aguilera, and Francisco Osorio at Bayamo, Carlos Céspedes in Manzanillo, Belisario Alvarez in Holguin, Vincente Garcia at Las Tunas, Donato Marmol in Jiguani, and Manuel Fernandez in Santiago. These men were not low-born conspirators. Francisco Aguilera, for example, though born in Cuba, had been highly educated both in the United States and Europe, and was a millionaire when he liberated his slaves and threw himself into the cause of the rebellion against Spanish tyranny. Céspedes had graduated in law at Madrid, and was a man of literary attainments. He had been imprisoned during the conspiracy of Lopez, but since his release had been practicing his profession in Bayamo. It was at his plantation at Yara that the revolution was proclaimed. The leaders had planned to have a simultaneous outbreak on October 10th, but the movement having been discovered by the authorities, Céspedes at once placed himself at the head of 100 poorly-armed men and 200 slaves whom he had liberated. Two days later he was joined by about 4,000 men, and the entire province rose in sympathy with the movement. By the middle of November he had an organized army of 12,000 men, who, though poorly equipped, were united in purpose and of determined will. Thus, in brief, began the Ten-Years War.

Cuba had not failed to ask for justice and redress. The people, before shouldering the rifle, pleaded for their rights. Far-sighted men had denounced the cancer of slavery, the horrors of the traffic in slaves, the corruption of the office-holders, the abuses of the government, the discontent of the

people with their forced state of political tutelage. No attention was given to them, and this brought on the first armed conflicts.

Within a few weeks Céspedes had gathered about him nearly fifteen thousand men, all resolute and eager, but, unfortunately, poorly armed and equipped. The plans of the revolutionists having been discovered while still immature, war began before arms could be smuggled into the island, and, as the Spanish held all the seaports, the insurgents were forced to rely almost entirely upon guerrilla methods. Still, for the first two years they were victorious in many engagements, and were generally successful, hostilities being mainly confined to the two eastern provinces.

While the Cubans were gaining ground, a Constituent Assembly of Cuban representatives met at Guaimaro, framed a constitution for the Republic of Cuba, and elected Céspedes as President, Francisco Aguilero as Vice-President, and Manuel Quesada as military commander. In a short time rights of belligerency were accorded them by Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

As the war progressed, the people of the United States could not restrain their indignation at the Spanish operations on the island. In the first place the Cubans continued to win victories in the face of obstacles. The yellow fever made havoc with the conscripted Spanish soldiers, and they were utterly untrained for the guerrilla tactics by which, at the end of 1870, the Cubans had gradually strengthened their hold on the eastern half of the island. In the second place, the conduct of the Spanish soldiers in the western part of the island, where, according to Spanish reports, peace reigned, was sufficient to rouse the anger even of those friendly to Spain.

During the campaign of 1871 the insurgents were enabled to secure considerable stores of ammunition and arms, largely from the Spanish, and the campaign of 1872 was practically a repetition of its predecessor. The insurgents, compelled to be very saving of their ammunition, confined their open at-

tacks to such small bodies of Spaniards as they could overcome, eluding the larger ones, which were nevertheless continually harrassed by sharp attacks and retreats, while exposure and disease killed more of the unacclimated than artillery in the hands of the rebels could have done.

In 1873 the war really reached its climax. But in the fall of that year disagreements arose among the Cubans themselves. The Cuban Congress met at Bijagual in December, and a majority being hostile to the policy of President Céspedes, he was deposed. He retired to San Lorenzo, where he was surprised by a detachment of Spanish troops, and, though he escaped, he was mortally wounded, and died on March 22, 1874. He had given up everything for the cause of Cuba's freedom, and at the time of his death was practically homeless and deserted.

Much difficulty was found in selecting his successor, but Cisneros, a scion of the old Spanish nobility, and a man of high social rank and abilities, was provisionally elected. In joining the revolution he had renounced his title, and his estates had been confiscated. But the disagreements among the Cuban leaders caused widespread disaffection, and for a time the rebellion was nearly at a standstill. It might have ended but for the fact that the Spaniards themselves were in discord.

After six years of this desultory fighting the end seemed as far off as ever. Without a navy there seemed to be no possibility of the Cubans ejecting the Spaniards from the island, while the Spaniards were able to do no more than drive the insurgents from one place to another. Meanwhile, it was costing Spain an immense amount of money and was well-nigh ruining Cuba.

Up to this time Spain had been regularly sending fresh levies of Spanish youths to the island, only to fall by disease, or in skirmishes with an enemy which came upon them suddenly and as suddenly disappeared to await another opportunity. The Volunteers, an undisciplined and ungovernable body, supposed to be on duty as home guards, were never

brought into the field to any extent, being allowed to play the bandit in the cities. But when the Carlist wars came on it became impossible for Spain to spare recruits, and the constantly diminishing forces gradually fell back before the insurgents.

In 1876, the Carlist uprising in Spain having been subdued and Alfonso XII. placed upon the throne, General Martinez de Campos, who had won distinction in putting an end to the republic and restoring the Bourbon dynasty, was sent to Cuba with 25,000 veterans of the Carlist wars to end the insurrection. He had had experience in Cuban warfare, yet notwithstanding his experience and energy, and that of his veterans and recruits, and in spite of the dissensions among the insurgents, he made little headway. The latter easily eluded the larger forces sent against them, and overpowered smaller detachments. The hot season was again coming on, and the Spanish troops were weakening under the effects of the climate, when Campos determined to undertake negotiations for peace. Early in 1878, both sides being well-nigh exhausted, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice.

The headquarters of the insurgents were then in Camagüey, and there the insurgent leaders met to consider the overtures. A commission of nine generals, with Garcia, who had succeeded Cisneros as president, were appointed to meet General Campos and a number of his officers at the camp of St. Augustin near Zanjón. This they did on February 10th, and there they signed the compact known as the peace of Zanjón, by which the Cubans gave up their struggle for independence, and the Spaniards promised the reforms which it had refused to grant in 1867 after the Commission of Inquiry. By the articles of this agreement Spain conceded to the island of Cuba the same political privileges, organic and administrative, enjoyed by the island of Puerto Rico, and granted complete amnesty as regards political offences. Those remaining under trial or sentence would be given their liberty, and a general pardon was given to deserters from the Spanish army.

Freedom to slaves in the insurgent ranks was granted, and no insurgent should be compelled to render military service to the Spanish government till peace should have been established, while the government would lend aid and protection to all desiring to leave the island. Insurgents were publicly to lay down their arms, railroad and steamship facilities being afforded to all sections of the insurgent army repairing to the place appointed for the surrender of their arms.

CHAPTER VI

SPAIN'S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES DURING THE TEN YEARS WAR—THE *VIRGINIUS* AFFAIR —A RACE FOR LIFE—EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND HIS COMPANIONS.

Situation Changed after the American Civil War—Spanish Fears—President Grant's Pacific Tenders—Significant Reply of Spain—Remarkable Decree of the Captain-General of Cuba—To be Shot Like Pirates—Methods of Spanish Warfare—The *Virginius*—Circumstances of Her Departure—Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser *Tornado*—A Lively Chase—Burning Hams to Keep up Steam—Horses and Arms Thrown Overboard—A Race on the Moonlit Caribbean—Captured and Taken to Santiago—The First Execution of Prisoners—The American Consul's Messages Delayed—He Asks for an Explanation—An Impudent Note in Reply—Further Executions—Captain Fry's Death—His Pathetic Letter to His Wife the Night before His Death—Arrival of a British Gunboat.

LEAVING now the Cubans who, supposing that they were to receive at last some measure of that for which they had been so long pleading and fighting, were about to lay down their arms, it will be necessary to return to the beginning of the war of 1868 and observe the manner in which it affected the United States and its relations with both the island and Spain. The importance of this struggle consists not so much in what the Cubans gained, for they really gained nothing, as we shall see, nor in what the Spaniards learned, for they learned nothing, as will also be apparent, but it consists in the position which the United States felt obliged to assume in the struggle, and which, when understood, will make clearer the reasons for intervention in 1898, twenty years after the close of the war. Public and political interest in the United States during the struggle was largely confined to the question of the recognition of the Cubans and to what is known as "the *Virginius* affair."

The Civil War had well-nigh swept out of the public mind the frantic efforts of Buchanan, Marcy, and others to secure Cuba, and the situation was greatly altered. Slavery had been destroyed in this country and retained its foothold in this hemisphere in Cuba alone. Castellar and others had said in the Cortes that they wished slavery abolished in Cuba. When the standard of insurrection was raised at Yara a Spanish minister had spoken to our representative at Madrid of "the common interests shared by the United States and Spain in Cuba," and had added, "that whatever retarded the prosperity of the island was injurious alike to both countries; the welfare of Cuba was of more commercial importance to the United States than to the mother country." Doubtless, the Spanish minister was haunted by a fear that the United States might, in a spirit of revenge which would have been so natural to a Spaniard, recognize the belligerency of the Cubans before hostilities were well begun, as Spain had recognized the confederacy eight years before; and it required uncommon assurance for him to speak of the commercial interests of the United States and Spain in Cuba when Spain did everything it could by discriminating duties to injure Cuban commerce with the United States.

General Grant, who became President in March, 1869, tendered the good offices of the United States for the purpose of restoring peace in the island, and General Prim, as the representative of the Spanish government, had replied: "We can better proceed in the present situation of things without even this friendly intervention. A time will come when the good offices of the United States will not only be useful, but indispensable in the final arrangements between Cuba and Spain." But that time did not come, and the struggle had not proceeded far before it was apparent that the United States must become very seriously interested in the way the Spanish authorities were conducting the war, and in the manner in which the rights of American citizens and of American commerce were being violated.

President Grant, with some members of his cabinet, was decidedly in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans. Senator Sumner, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, was strongly opposed to it. The one was a man of war, the other a student of international relations. Grant looked at it as a practical problem in warfare; he, doubtless, reasoned that we were under no moral obligations to Spain which, with such undue haste, had recognized the belligerency of the confederates and still defended that slave power against which he had worked out his great campaigns and won such magnificent victories. Sumner hoped that Spain would herself abolish slavery and grant self-government to the Cubans, and he had the further reason, which was certainly a good one, that he did not wish our standing in the case of the *Alabama* claims against England to be weakened by a hasty recognition of insurgents in Cuba. In one of their interviews Grant asked Sumner how it would do to issue a proclamation with regard to Cuba identical with that issued by Spain with regard to us?

"I advised against it," wrote Sumner to Motley. "He is very confident that the Cubans will succeed. On the same day I had a call from two Cubans—one of whom was Aldama, the richest man of the island and an old friend of mine—who had come to solicit the concession of belligerency, saying that with it success was certain, and that without it the island would become a desert. I gave them no encouragement."

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was very close to Sumner, and Sumner's will dominated. But for him, doubtless, Grant would have done his utmost to concede the right of belligerency and the Cubans might have been successful. Spain, with her own wars and that in the island on hand, could hardly have gone to war with us at the time, and belligerent rights would have better enabled the Cubans to secure arms, and, whereas, we were bound to intercept, if possible, all expeditions with supplies and arms fitted out in our ports for Cuba, Spain was freely buying both ships and supplies from us.

The manner in which Spain repaid us for this consideration of her interests may be seen from the decree of the Captain-General of Cuba, a copy of which arrived at the state department in April, 1869. One portion of this decree was as follows:

"Vessels which may be captured in Spanish waters or on the high seas near to the island, having on board men, arms, and munitions or effects that can in any manner contribute, promote, or foment the insurrection in this province, whatsoever their derivation or destination, after examination of their papers and register shall be *de facto* considered as enemies of the integrity of our territory and treated as pirates, in accordance with the ordinances of the navy.

"All persons captured in such vessels, without regard to their number, will be immediately executed."

In other words, if an American citizen were caught by Spain near the island with *anything* calculated to contribute to the insurrection, he would be *shot as a pirate!*

Our government at once protested that this was not only a violation of its treaty with Spain of 1795, but a violation of the laws of nations.

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this decree the Spanish minister at Washington made a complaint "that piratical expeditions are in preparation against the legitimate government in Cuba," and requested the President to issue a proclamation to restrain the same. The minister furnished no evidence of any such expeditions and none really existed at that time. No proclamation was then issued, but the regular officers of the United States were instructed to keep a close watch for such expeditions, and, later, several were stopped. But the objectionable decree of the Captain-General was quickly followed by one which concerned the United States quite as much. The course of trade and social intercourse had carried many citizens of the United States into Cuba. They and their property were subject to protection by the United States. But the commander at Bayamo issued a proclamation to the effect that: "Every man, from the age of fifteen years upward, found away from his habitation, who does not

prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot; every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops; every habitation which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes; women that are not living at their own homes or at the house of their relatives will collect in the town of Jiguani or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly."

Here was Spain, who would not admit that a state of war existed in Cuba, for that would have given us ample justification for recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, making decrees in Cuba just as if war existed and ordering the confiscation of goods, the shooting of seamen, and the destruction of private property, whether the persons involved were citizens of the United States or not. Meanwhile, she was obtaining ships and other supplies from us. She was really attempting to fight the poor Cubans under cover of the United States, and at the same time decreeing an indiscriminate slaughter, which might extend to our citizens and to the destruction of their property.

Under the circumstances, it required a great amount of self-control on the part of our administration to keep its hands off Spain. When Secretary Fish vigorously protested, the Spanish minister endeavored to justify the outrageous decrees by the code of instruction to our armies in the Civil War, but the Secretary promptly reiterated that these instructions were issued when the country was in a state of war, which Spain would not admit as to Cuba; but even so, throughout the whole Civil War not a prisoner had been shot in cold blood and not a political crime, however grave, had been visited by capital punishment. There were many instances in which the property and right of American citizens who had no connection with the insurrection in Cuba were interfered with, and although Spain made many promises, restitution was being continually postponed on various pretenses, which our government did not consider as evidences of good faith.

On the 4th of October, 1870, there sailed from the port of New York the steamer *Virginus*, which had been built in England for use as a blockade runner during the Civil War, and which, having been captured, had been brought to the navy yard at Washington. There she had been purchased at auction by one John F. Patterson, who had taken her to New York and made oath that he was a citizen of the United States, and the sole owner of the vessel. Her custom house bond was in the regular form, there was nothing in her manifest or papers or in the circumstances connected with her departure from New York to attract attention or excite suspicion, and she left, like any of the other hundred vessels leaving the same week, without attracting the attention of the Spanish consul or of the officers of the United States. Her ostensible destination was Curagoa, in the Dutch West Indies, and it appears that she went there. For three years, indeed, she cruised about the Caribbean Sea, recognized as a vessel of the United States at different ports. The watchful Spanish minister, in a communication to our government several months after the *Virginus* had sailed, enumerated several vessels of which he thought he had cause to complain, but he made no mention of the *Virginus*.

But, while it was not known then, it afterwards appeared that the vessel was in the service of the insurgents. Captain Fry was strongly advised by some of his friends not to take the risk of the venture of landing arms on the island, but he replied that it was easy enough to run around the Spaniards, and he considered it a righteous thing to work for the patriots. "At any rate," he said, "the whole question is one of bread for my family."

On the 23d of October, 1873, or more than three years after she left New York, she regularly cleared from the port of Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica. It was the intention of the expeditionists on board to sail direct for the coast of Cuba, but a slight damage to the machinery obliged the vessel to put in at a port of Haiti. This she shortly

left, and, after touching at other ports on the same island, the captain concluded on the 30th to attempt a landing on Cuba.

On this day the Spanish consul at Kingston, having heard of suspicions against the *Virginus*, advised the governor at Santiago that the vessel had recently been seen between Jamaica and Cuba. The Spanish cruiser *Tornado* had that very morning arrived at Santiago, and Governor Burriel at once communicated his information to the commander, who set out to find the alleged filibuster. On the following day the *Tornado*, which was proceeding under sail while work was being done on her engines, came in sight of the *Virginus* cruising close to the Cuban coast. All possible steam was at once put on the *Tornado*, and she was soon running for the *Virginus* with fourteen-knot speed, while Captain Fry, discovering his peril, headed at once for Jamaica. Unfortunately for him, the supply of coal was short and he was soon obliged to burn petroleum, then grease, and fat of any kind; even hams had to be thrown in to keep up steam for speed.

When night closed in, both vessels were running at their best, and were in the same relative position, though the *Tornado* seemed to be gaining. It was one of those clear nights when the full moon falling on the Caribbean makes objects visible for long distances, and the *Virginus* was easily kept in sight, especially as the greasy combustibles which she was using caused a thick black smoke to pour continuously from her funnel. Captain Fry saw that he was falling behind in the race and that he might not be able to reach neutral waters in time, and so, to lighten his vessel, horses, cannon, and cases of arms were thrown overboard. It was said afterwards that fully two thousand Remington rifles, a mitrailleuse, and much powder was thrown into the sea to facilitate the flight. But it did not avail.

Although the coast of Jamaica was but a few leagues away, the *Tornado* had come within range, and three shots flew over the *Virginus*, then a shell burst near by, bringing the fugitive to. She was boarded by the Spanish officers and crew, who

hauled down her American flag and ran up the Spanish ensign. The captain showed his papers and the Spaniards appropriated them. At midnight they turned about for Santiago.

The *Tornado* and her prize were welcomed at the port November 1st by a great crowd of people. The authorities, both civil and military, immediately visited Governor Burriel to felicitate him upon the news, and that evening the governor gave a brilliant reception; the palace was illuminated, the vessels were surrounded by boats filled with bands of music and cheering Volunteers, who made coarse jeers at "the Yankees." The festivities were continued late into the night. The next day a court-martial was held on the *Tornado*, and all but four of the prisoners were sent to jail with an escort followed by a great rabble of the people cheering and jeering.

The *Virginius* had in all 155 persons on board, most of them of Spanish extraction, but the names of at least forty-five indicated that they were either citizens of the United States or of Great Britain. The four upon whom sentence was immediately passed were three Cubans, including General Verona and a brother of the insurgent leader Céspedes, and one American named Ryan. Their execution was fixed for the 4th, and on that day they were marched to a place made famous by the number of executions there. The whole Spanish population of Santiago followed and witnessed the act with great rejoicing. The men were shot in the usual manner, kneeling close to the slaughter-house wall. Two of them were killed at the first shot, but the other two had not been mercifully hit, and a Spanish officer walked up and ran his sword through their hearts. Then the crowd ran in and picked up the bodies, still warm with life, severed the heads, placed them upon pikes, and marched about the city.

Just before the execution an interesting incident took place. There were in Santiago fifteen Spanish officers who at one time had been captured by General Verona, and generously released. They pleaded with the authorities that this

act should entitle him to mercy, but no heed was given the appeal. The Spaniards demanded blood, they had had a taste and they demanded more.

As the *Virginus* had cleared as an American vessel and displayed the American colors, she at least had an apparent claim to protection until it should be proven otherwise, and at least the American and British citizens on board were entitled to the opportunity of acting with the consuls of their countries in the defense of any rights which they might have. Our vice-consul at Santiago, Mr. E. G. Schmitt, therefore, had promptly demanded access to the prisoners, but the provincial governor replied discourteously and to the effect that it was none of the American consul's business, as the prisoners were all pirates and would be treated as such. Mr. Schmitt was even refused the use of the marine cable to communicate with the United States consul at Kingston, where the *Virginus* had cleared. Our consul protested, and meanwhile the form of a court-martial was gone through with, and the three Cubans and one American were shot. On the same day the consul received a reply from the governor, from which the following extract, indicating the character of the Spanish disposition and methods, is made:

"I have received your communications, one dated the 2d inst., and the remaining two the 3d inst.; the first inquiring if it was true that a telegram had been detained by my orders which you had addressed to the United States consul in Kingston, Jamaica, asking information as to the nationality of the steamer *Virginus* seized on the high seas as a pirate by the Spanish cruiser *Tornado*. In my desire to correspond duly to the exquisite zeal which you show in this matter, I would have replied at once to your communication, but, as I received it precisely at the moment of important and peremptory affairs, to which I had to devote myself exclusively; and further, as the past two days were holidays, upon which the officials do not come to the offices, being engaged as well as everyone else in meditation of the divine mysteries of All Saints and the commemoration of All Souls' day, as prescribed by our holy religion; it was impossible for me until early this morning to comply to your wishes. . . .

"Neither could I foresee your desire to repair with such haste to the jail where the prisoners were incarcerated; much less that you desired to do so, showing an officiousness so marked, when you had received from none of them any remonstrance whatever, which they would have made

at once through my conduct if their conscience had permitted them to even suppose that they were innocent and worthy of the protection of your vice-consulate, undoubtedly impelled thereto on this occasion by unknown and suspicious purposes. . . .

"Such conduct, especially after you were advised by the fiscal that Mr. O'Ryan was an Englishman, obliges me to apply to the government and propose that your exequatur to perform the duties of your vice-consulate be withdrawn, as an officer who addresses protests so slightly founded, and who after that attempts to surprise the intention of the Spanish authorities, accustomed to act, with the rectitude and loyalty known to all, cannot help compromising the honor of the country he represents."

Having written this reply, the governor seems to have proceeded to the execution of a few prisoners, and the pretended trial of others. Our consul bore himself with dignity and honor. In his reply he said:

"I should have been the last person to disturb the important duties of your Excellency, and the religious meditations which your Excellency's subordinates were indulging in, had it not been that I consider the case a pressing one and imagined that, where there was sufficient time to censure and detain my telegram, there might have been also time for a few lines of explanation, with the additional motive of my second dispatch, that I observed that the circumstances which your Excellency enumerates were no hindrance to the despatch of other business connected with the steamer. . . .

"I shall therefore abstain from saying anything further on this point, than that it seems to me, considering that the *Virginius* was flying the United States flag at the time of her capture, that she claimed to be a United States merchant steamer, and her papers as such were surrendered by her captain to the boarding officer of the steamer *Tornado*, it would have been a delicate attention on the part of your Excellency to have informed me thereof, and that the use of such flag and papers was an abuse of the goodness of the country which I represent, in order that I might have brought the same to the notice of my government. . . .

"Finally, I note your Excellency's intention to apply for the revocation of my exequatur, and while ignorant of any cause given therefor, I can only assure your Excellency that my conscience being perfectly clear in the question, and having acted honorably, and as I consider for the best, the result of your Excellency's application is to me a matter of profound indifference."

On the 6th there were further court-martial proceedings and thirty-seven more were sentenced to be shot the next morning, including Captain Joseph Fry, the commander of

the vessel. Of this man's indomitable courage in the face of death, and his intense affection for those for whose sakes chiefly he had undertaken this hazardous adventure, the pathetic letter written to his wife the night before his execution bears sufficient testimony.

ON BOARD THE SPANISH MAN-OF-WAR "TORNADO."

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, November 6, '73.

"Dear, dear Dita—When I left you I had no idea that we should never meet again in this world; but it seems strange to me that I should to-night, and on Anne's birthday, be calmly seated on a beautiful moonlight night in a most beautiful bay in Cuba, to take my last leave of you, my own dear sweet wife! And with the thought of your own bitter anguish—my only regret at leaving.

"I have been tried to-day, and the President of the Court Martial asked the favor of embracing me at parting, and clasped me to his heart. I have shaken hands with each of my judges, and the secretary of the court and the interpreter have promised me as a special favor to attend my execution, which will, I am told, be within a few hours after my sentence is pronounced.

"I am told my death will be painless. In short, I have had a very cheerful and pleasant chat about my funeral, to which I shall go in a few hours from now; how soon I cannot say yet. It is curious to see how I made friends. Poor Bambetta* pronounced me a gentleman, and he was the brightest and bravest creature I ever saw.

"The priest who gave me communion on board this morning put a double scapular around my neck, and a medal which he intends to wear himself. A young Spanish officer brought me a bright new silk badge with the Blessed Virgin stamped upon it, to wear to my execution for him, and a handsome cross in some fair lady's handiwork. They are to be kept as relics of me. He embraced me affectionately in his room with tears in his eyes.

"Dear Sweetheart, you will be able to bear it for my sake, for I will be with you if God permits. Although I know my hours are short and few, I am not sad. I shall be with you right soon, dear Dita, and you will not be afraid of me. Pray for me, and I will pray with you. There is to be a fearful sacrifice of life, as I think, from the *Virginius*, and, as I think, a needless one, as the poor people are unconscious of crime, and even of their fate up to now. I hope God will forgive me if I am to blame for it.

"If you write to President Grant, he will probably order my pay, due when I resigned, to be paid to you after my death. People will be kinder to you now, dear Dita; at least, I hope so. Do not dread death when it comes to you. It will be God's angel of rest,—remember this.

* A Cuban rebel general, passenger on the *Virginius*.

I hope my children will forget their father's harshness and remember his love and anxiety for them. May they practice regularly their religion and pray for him always. Tell ——— the last act of my life will be a public profession of my faith and hope in Him of whom we need not be ashamed; and it is not honest to withhold that public acknowledgment from any false modesty or timidity. May God bless and save us all! Sweet, dear, dear Dita, we will soon meet again. Till then, adieu for the last time."

Your devoted husband,

JOSEPH FRY.

The next morning, with thirty-six others, he was executed. The next day twelve more shared his fate, and probably all the remaining 102 would have been shot but for a sudden interruption. The interest of the British and French consuls and of the authorities in Jamaica had been aroused, for some of the prisoners were British subjects. The British sloop of war *Niobe*, commanded by Sir Lambton Lorraine, left Kingston on the 6th, and on the 8th came flying into Santiago harbor. The commander hastened to land, and at once demanded that the massacre be stopped.

"But Señor," protested the commanding Spanish officer, "what affair is it of yours? There are no countrymen of yours among them. They are all dogs of Americans."

"It makes no difference," replied the gallant captain. "I forbid you to put another one of these men to death."

"But, Señor," returned the Spaniard, haughtily, "permit me to remark that I take my orders from the Captain-General and not from you."

"Permit me also to remark," replied the captain, "that the *Niobe* is lying in this harbor, with her guns double-shotted, and I am her commander. And, so help me God! if you so much as harm a hair on the head of another one of those prisoners, I will lay your town in ruins." And he went back to his ship.

The Spaniard looked at the *Niobe*, saw the big black muzzles of her guns trained squarely upon the city, and — there were no more *Virginus* prisoners massacred in Santiago.

CHAPTER VII

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE—GENERAL SICKLES ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS—UNITED STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND.

Minister Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the *Virginius* Affair—Curious Break-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment—Some Impolite Replies—General Sickles Demands his Passports—The Spanish Government Quickly Comes to Terms—The People Impatient to Recognize the Cubans—Fall of the Spanish Republic—America Insists that the Cuban War Must Cease—Intervention Threatened—Spain Makes Another Promise—Forbearance at Washington—Campos Ends the War by the Agreement at Zanjón—Canovas Refuses to be Responsible for the Cuban Settlement—Resignation of Canovas—Campos Forms a Ministry—Disagreements—A Reform Act Passed—Great Cost of the War to Spain—The Emancipation Act—Cuba Still in a State of Insurrection.

THE first intimation of what was taking place reached General Daniel E. Sickles, our minister at Madrid, on the 6th, or the day before Captain Fry's execution, and he hastened to call at the Ministry of State. Spain had meanwhile become a republic under President Castelar, whom Sickles saw in the evening. Concerning the interview he wrote: "President Castelar received these observations with his usual kindness and told me confidentially that, at seven o'clock in the morning, as soon as he read the telegram from Cuba, and without reference to any international question, for that, indeed, had not occurred to him, he at once sent a message to the Captain-General admonishing him that the death penalty must not be imposed upon any non-combatant without the previous approval of the Cortes, nor upon any person taken in arms against the government without the sanction of the executive."

As not infrequently happens in Spanish diplomacy, this

order failed to get further than Havana, at least, in time to do any good. There were two telegraphic lines between Havana and Santiago, one by the coast and one overland. One of them had been out of repair for some time. Significantly enough, the other failed to work the day that the *Virginus* was brought into port, though it suddenly resumed operations in perfect working order as soon as the *Niobe* came into port. Public feeling was running high in Spain. The press, violent and abusive, advised the government to order General Sickles out of Spain. One night a mob collected to attack and sack the legation, but the authorities interfered. Meanwhile the Spanish in Cuba were threatening all Americans, and in Havana they gave a great fête and bullfight in honor of Governor Burriel, who had ordered the outrage.

General Sickles pressed his remonstrances insistently, and Carvajal, the Spanish Minister of State, thereupon began to couch his replies in the rather insolent language adopted by the governor of Santiago, while Sickles retorted with some very sharp but thoroughly dignified communications. He had been instructed by the Secretary of State to protest most solemnly against the barbarities perpetrated at Santiago, and in communicating with the Spanish government adopted as near as could be the words of the instructions from Washington. To this Carvajal made an exceedingly ill-tempered reply. Secretary Fish used strong expressions in his instructions to Sickles. Mere condemnation, disavowal, and depreciation of the act would not, he said, be accepted by the world as sufficient to relieve Spain from participation in a just responsibility for the outrage. There must be punishment of those concerned.

Unable to make any headway in bringing the Spanish government to some agreement as to the settlement of the question, Secretary Fish cabled Sickles to make formal demands. If these were not complied with within twelve days he should leave Madrid. General Sickles did so, and, obtaining no satisfactory response, on the 26th of November he

asked for his passports. Spanish bravado at once withered. Carvajal within a few hours sent a note, conceding upon some conditions the demands of the United States that the *Virginius* and the survivors should be given up, the perpetrators of the massacre tried and punished, and the flag of the United States saluted. One condition was that a salute of the flag should not be deemed essential if the Spanish government could bring forward sufficient proofs that the *Virginius* had no right to fly the American flag. A conference was held at Washington between the Secretary of State and the Spanish minister, Don José Polo, and the arrangements were completed. Meanwhile the antecedents of the *Virginius* were inquired into and it was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that she had no right to carry the American flag. Patterson was not the legal owner of the vessel, the money for her purchase having been furnished by a junta of Cuban sympathizers; her registry, therefore, had been obtained by perjury. This did away with the necessity of Spain's saluting our flag and made it incumbent upon the United States to prosecute the proper persons for violation of navigation laws. The *Virginius* and her survivors were surrendered to the authorities of the United States on December 15th, and while being conveyed to the appointed port she was lost in a storm off Cape Fear.

Then followed a long correspondence over conflicting claims, Spain setting up many counter claims for alleged injury done to Spain by filibustering expeditions.

While those who considered it wise to refrain from a recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans were strongly impressed by the conduct of the Spanish government, it may be imagined that among the mass of the people, sympathizing as they did with the Cubans in their hard struggle for freedom, the bitterness towards the Spaniards was great and the excitement caused by the *Virginius* affair intense. President Grant fully anticipated war, and with his thorough knowledge of military affairs perfected plans for attacking Spain. But

Sumner's policy prevailed with the administration, and it continued to tolerate the repeated promises and shifting tactics of the Spanish government. Meanwhile, the claims of American citizens for spoliation in Cuba continued to accumulate. General Sickles was so impatient under the temporizing policy of his government that he resigned, and he was succeeded early in 1874 by Caleb Cushing.

A number of British subjects had been among those executed from the *Virginius*, and Great Britain, also wearied with delay, early in 1874 insisted upon a decisive answer as to indemnity, and with her Spain hastened to settle. As the claims for executed citizens of the United States rested practically upon the same basis, late the same year our government, after much difficulty, reached a settlement. Considerable sums were eventually paid by Spain to the families of the American and British citizens, but the governor who ordered the executions was never punished. Secretary Fish demanded that that part of the treaty should be carried out, but Spain calmly replied that it considered Governor Burriel's conduct justified, and he was even promoted from the rank of brigadier to major-general. The United States swallowed the insult out of love for peace.

The war still dragged on, and late in 1875, when the end seemed as far off as ever and property of American citizens in Cuba was going up in smoke, the administration began to feel that patience had at last ceased to be a virtue.

On the 5th of November, 1875, Secretary Fish addressed a note to our minister at Madrid, in which he reviewed the question and practically stated that the United States had come to the conclusion that the state of things in Cuba must cease.

Spain made another promise, a favorite method in meeting such emergencies, and just before our Congress met submitted to Minister Cushing certain proposals which it was hoped might be used as a basis for a settlement of differences. These proposals had not reached this government by the time Presi-

dent Grant submitted his annual message, but he reviewed the whole question, stated the reasons why he had not deemed it wise to accord the Cubans belligerent rights, and explained why he believed that the time for intervention had come. As Spain was then, however, disturbed by the Carlist wars at home, and as proposals had been submitted, he deferred any positive recommendation till the situation could be more perfectly understood. Shortly before leaving office General Grant proposed to European powers a joint convention, but soon other matters began to absorb public attention. As a result of the conference between Minister Cushing and Calderon, the Spanish Minister of State, a protocol, often insisted upon during the recent Cuban war and as often violated by Spain, was signed. It was intended to guard against any repetition of the *Virginus* affair and secure to American citizens a civil trial on the charge of sedition or conspiracy, except when taken in arms, and even in that case they were to be allowed attorneys and make their defense in public trial. Spain agreed to command the strictest observance of the terms of this protocol in all her dominions, especially in Cuba.

Upon the pacification of the island, the rebels having laid down their arms according to agreement, General Campos, evidently intending that the compact made at Zanjón should be kept in good faith, returned to Madrid and submitted the plans for reforms in Cuba before the cabinet of Canovas, who at once declared his unwillingness to lay them before the Cortes with his recommendation, saying that that body would feel and always feel that Spanish honor required the complete subjection of Cuba. General Campos insisted that he had made this agreement with the rebels in good faith, that, trusting in it they had laid down their arms, and that it must be submitted to the Cortes. Canovas replied that in that case Campos must do it on his own responsibility. This and other causes led to the resignation of the Canovas ministry, and Campos, as the leader of the Liberals, formed a cabinet, but his ministers could not be made to agree to the Cuban agree-

ment, and so Campos quickly resigned. An act was passed, however, in January, 1879, whereby Cuba was to have representation in the Cortes. But the Spanish senators practically controlled the elections and more than three-fourths of the deputies proved to be natives of Spain, so that the Cubans really gained no voice even in the small representation temporarily allowed them.

The Campos ministry fell in December, 1879, Canovas resumed the reins of government, and the promises made concerning reform in Cuban government were practically ignored. Spanish methods in Cuba continued very much as they had for years. The bitter hatred between the insulars and peninsulars was only intensified. The island of Cuba had been laid waste, thousands of the sons of Spain had found their graves, millions of money had been spent, and still Spain had not learned the lesson. The Cuban was still oppressed and waited only for the next opportunity to take up arms.

The loss of life and treasure in this war was enormous. Two years before its close, in a debate on Cuban affairs in the Cortes, it was said that Spain had up to that time sent 145,000 men and her best commanders to Cuba. The number in the field in the last year of the war was given as 81,700, while the records of the Madrid War Office show that over 73,000 of the land forces had been lost. The minimum total of Spanish soldiers who fell in Cuba must have been, therefore, nearly 160,000, for of those who had gone out not enough ever came back to make a full regiment. Adding to this total of Spanish forces the Volunteers, about 80,000 in number, the Captain-General must have had at his disposal, from the beginning to the end of the war, over 230,000 men. Thousands fell victims to the guerrilla tactics of the Cubans, but more died of fever and other diseases incident to the climate and changed conditions of diet. The young men who were conscripted and sent to Cuba were thoroughly unfitted for campaigning in such a country, and discipline was so strict in the army that many of them deserted to the rebels rather than suffer hard-

ships in camp only to be killed in some Cuban ambuscade. The loss of the Cubans has never been known, for no account was kept. It was small compared with that of the Spaniards, for the army was small and scattered in little bands. The loss has been estimated at 50,000 for the ten years, but this is probably an exaggeration.

The cost of the war to Spain was about \$300,000,000, and certainly not less than that was lost in Cuba from the destruction of property and the loss of commerce and trade.

In the years succeeding the war some reforms were made, though the nature of the government did not improve; indeed, as will appear later, tyranny was increased under the cloak of concessions. The one step in advance was the abolition of slavery.


During the sixteen years from the close of the Ten-Years War to 1895, Cuba, if not in a state of insurrection, was seldom quiet. When the people saw that they had again been deceived, it was difficult for them to restrain their disposition to revolt. But a general rising was out of the question so soon after the long struggle, for they had laid down their arms and the Spaniards had taken them.

CHAPTER VIII

CUBA AFTER THE TEN YEARS WAR — THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL AND HIS EXTRAORDINARY POWERS — A SWARM OF SPANISH VAMPIRES — "CUBA IS UNDONE."

The Government Liberal Only on Paper — The Captain-General and His Extraordinary Authority — The Cuban's One Ambition — Cubans Excluded from Office — Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal Government — Spain's Deceitful and Crafty Policy — Replenishing the Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries — Two-thirds of the Island Practically Ruined — Enormous Increase of Taxation — Remarkable Growth of Cuba's Debt — Pledging Cuban Revenues for Spanish Interest Payments — Not a Cent of it Spent to Improve Cuba — Excessive Import Duties — New Oppressions in New Disguises — Taxes on Everything — The Prey of a Swarm of Vampires.

THE government of Cuba after 1879 showed evidences on paper of some liberality, but the evidences were misleading. The head was still the Captain-General, appointed by the crown usually for a term of from three to five years, and who was *ipso facto* the Governor-General. In his military capacity, which was not easily distinguished from his civil capacity, he had an army during peace of from 13,000 to 20,000 men sent from Spain and maintained out of the Cuban budget. He was assisted by a sub-Inspector-General, who was also governor of Havana, but in time of disturbances the military divisions were rearranged to suit the emergency. Notwithstanding all the alleged reforms granted after the treaty of Zanjon, the Governor-General practically retained all the powers granted him in 1825 by Ferdinand, powers which possessed all the absolute qualities of the Turkish Sultan without the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of European politics.



MAP OF CUBA SHOWING ITS PROVINCES, POPULATION OF EACH, PRINCIPAL POINTS, ETC.

Bad as the system of government and of commercial policy was upon paper, it was in its practical application that the Cuban was oppressed. He had little understanding of the laws of government and of trade, but he saw concrete results. To him the one trouble was Spanish mis-rule, and his one ambition became "Cuba Libre." He saw that the changes in law were not changes in fact. Concessions had really taken the form of new oppressions. Names, not the things themselves, were changed. The Captain-General was called the "Governor-General." The royal decrees took the name of "authorizations." The commercial monopoly of Spain had been named the "coasting trade." The right of banishment had been transformed into the "law of vagrancy." Brutal attacks upon defenseless citizens went under the term "compote." The abolition of constitutional guarantees had become the "law of public order." Taxation without the knowledge or consent of the taxed had been changed into the "law of estimates," the budget being voted by the representatives of peninsular Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy which would have allayed public anxiety, and quenched the thirst for justice felt by the people, Spain, while lavish in promises of reform, continued her old and crafty system, which was to exclude the Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs.

For years Spain had been simply a parasite upon Cuba, and had exploited the island through a fiscal regime, a commercial regime, and a bureaucratic regime. Her thought from the beginning had been to draw from the island all that could be squeezed out of it. Nothing was consecrated to the development of the island. Whatever was done was solely to replenish the exhausted treasury of Spain and to enrich Spanish functionaries. Having saddled Cuba with debt, and reached that point where increased taxation reduces rather than increases revenue, the island was of little further value except to the Spanish bondholder and the official who came to Cuba

with but one aim - to draw a fortune from resources which should have been devoted to the native population. When he had amassed all the money he could hope to draw from his position, he invested it, not in Cuba but in Europe, returning home to enjoy the income he had gained at the expense of the Cuban.

When the Ten-Years War came to an end, two-thirds of the island was completely ruined. The other third, the inhabitants of which had remained peaceful, was abundantly productive, but it had to face the great economic change involved in the impending abolition of slavery. Evidently it would have been a wholesome and provident policy on the part of Spain to have lightened as much as possible the fiscal burdens of a country in such a condition. But instead, Spain was bent upon making Cuba pay the entire cost of the war. She at once overwhelmed the colony with enormous budgets reaching as high a figure as \$46,000,000! And this only to cover the obligations of the State, to fill the gulf left by the wastefulness and plunder of the civil and military administration during the years of war, and to meet the expenses of the military occupation of the country. For the first two years after the war the budget was over \$46,000,000; in 1882 it fell to \$35,000,000, and from then till 1886 it remained at about \$34,000,000. Then it dropped to \$26,000,000, where it remained until the outbreak of the recent insurrection.

The debt of Cuba was created in 1864 by the simple issue of \$3,000,000; in 1868 it had risen to \$25,000,000; in 1891, according to a statement made by Perez Castaneda in the Spanish Senate, it had increased to the extraordinary sum of \$175,000,000, and by the middle of 1895 it stood at \$300,000,000! Thus, by the time of the recent outbreak the debt of the little island, considering its population, exceeded that of all the other American countries, including the United States.

This enormous debt, that ground the country down and did not permit its people to capitalize their income, or foster its improvements, or even to advance its industries, constituted

one of the most iniquitous forms of the Spanish spoliation. In it were included a debt of Spain to the United States; the expenses incurred by Spain when she occupied San Domingo; those for the invasion of Mexico, and for her hostilities against Peru; the money advanced to the Spanish treasury during the later Carlist wars; and to cover the lavish expenditures of its administration following 1868. Not a cent of this enormous sum had been spent in Cuba in the advancement of civilization. It had not contributed to build a single mile of highway or of railroads, to erect a single lighthouse, nor deepen a single port; it had not built one asylum nor opened one public school. This heavy burden was left to future generations without a single compensation or benefit.

The budget showed that nearly 40 per cent. of the revenues were expected from duties upon imports. Everything that was imported was taxed as heavily as possible, unless it came from Spain. Nearly every class of articles paid a much heavier duty than was paid by the sister isle of Puerto Rico. In very many cases the duty on imports was placed at twice what they were for Puerto Rico. The Cuban producer was oppressed with every kind of exaction; the introduction of indispensable machinery was heavily taxed, transportation was obstructed by taxes on the railroads, a direct tax or industrial duty was exacted, and still another, equivalent to an export duty, for loading and shipping, while always and everywhere were the illegal exactions of corrupt and thieving officials.

Besieged by complaints of such destructive discrimination, Spain made great promises of reform. Cuban products were to be admitted to the peninsula free of duty, excepting, however, tobacco, rum, sugar, cocoa, and coffee, which remained "temporarily" burdened. Duties on the importations from Spain to Cuba were to be gradually reduced through a period of ten years, till, in 1892, they were to be entirely extinguished. But, like other Spanish reforms, this was a new oppression in a fresh disguise. The temporary duties, which were upon the principal and almost the only products of the

island, were left undisturbed. Spanish products paid no duties in Cuba, but Cuban products paid heavy duties in Spain.

The salaries of the various Spanish officials in Cuba were in no way curtailed, while the perquisites and peculations continued to grow, and it was one of the most exasperating of all the oppressions to which the Cuban was subjected. Falsification of documents, bargains with delinquent debtors, exactions of higher dues from simple peasants, delays in judicial or other business in order to obtain a gratuity, all combined to divert the money of the Cubans into the pockets of the functionaries. And while these evils were brought to light from time to time, no one was ever punished. Said Rafael de Eslava in his *Judicio Critico de Cuba en 1887*: "It seems to be self-evident that a curse is pressing upon Cuba, condemning her to witness her own disintegration and converting her into a prey for the operation of those swarms of vampires that are so cruelly devouring us, deaf to the voice of conscience, if they have any; it will not be rash to venture the assertion that *Cuba is undone; there is no salvation possible.*"

CHAPTER IX

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS—THE BANNER RAISED AT LAST—FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING—SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION.

Exile of Many of Cuba's Best Citizens—José Martí and His Early Life—Imprisoned When a Boy—Deported to Spain—He Vows to Free Cuba—Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party—His Impassioned Address and Eloquence—Many Rebuffs and Disappointments—An Influential Friend—His Trusted Friends in Cuba—Fostering the Spirit of Revolt—Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-General—Martí Starts for Cuba—Stopped by United States Authorities—Martial Law Proclaimed—The Outbreak in Matanzas—An Apparent Failure—Natural Advantages of Santiago de Cuba—A Forbidding Shore—"The Garden of Cuba."

THE vigilance with which Spanish officials followed persons suspected of entertaining plans against the Spanish government, and the cold-blooded manner in which political prisoners were treated, naturally led to the exile of many of the better educated Cubans. They were scattered through the other West Indian islands, through Europe, and especially the United States. While as peaceful citizens they had many opportunities to prosper in the United States, they did not and could not forget Cuba where others of their nationality were still suffering, and thus there were active juntas of Cuban sympathizers everywhere. Spain was continually complaining that they menaced the peace of the island, but their exile she alone was responsible for.

One of these exiles was José Martí, who was living at New York. He was the son of a Spanish colonel, who had learned to sympathize with the Cubans, and who, upon José's birth, threw up his commission, saying that no son of his should be

brought up a servant of Spain. It is not surprising that with such a father José, at the age of fourteen, should be attacking the Spanish government in an amateur newspaper he had established. The little paper was suppressed and the young editor sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Havana. Afterwards he was condemned to the chain for life, and obliged to work with gangs of convicts under conditions which killed strong men. The powerful influence of his family finally secured a mitigation of his sentence to deportation to Spain, where he was confined to the limits of the country. He there received a university education and began to show his remarkable talents. But while the amnesty gave him his freedom, it did not appease his indignant resentment for Spain's broken promises and continued oppressions in the island of Cuba. He resolved to act. At first he went to Central America, thence to the United States, where he was in constant communication with the promoters of the insurrection of 1868, and it was not long before he became the leader of the revolutionary party.

Martí gave himself to the interests of this party, and there was not a moment when he was not devoted to the effort to realize his dream of independence for his country. Through the United States, San Domingo, everywhere, he traveled, preaching his holy war. He was a man of charming and captivating personality, yet with audacity and perseverance. His impassioned address; his eloquence, at the same time exalted and simple; his hatred of Spain, from which each day he drew some new grievance, and his energetic and magnetic oratory gave him the aspect of a modern Peter the Hermit, preaching a new crusade.

Martí gathered here and there a few contributions which he sent to trusty agents in Cuba for the purchase of arms and ammunition. But his work was often painful for one of his nature; he met many rebuffs and disappointments, yet when all the world ridiculed and doubted his mission, he remained confident. He attracted the attention of the late

Charles A. Dana, who was an admirer of sincerity and energy, and was quick to appreciate talent. Dana believed with Marti that Spanish despotism in Cuba was a wrong that cried to heaven, and therefore could not endure; he became a strong advocate of Cuban independence, and his influence gradually brought the cause to notice and helped to shape events.

The dreams of Marti in those days seemed so far beyond the possibility of reality that even among the people who had been won over to his cause by his convincing and impassioned words, there were those who looked upon him as the victim of hallucinations. He had friends in Cuba who thought with him that the hour was fast ripening, but they were few. There were not then more than 500 who were ready for the word to take up arms, and nearly all of them were young men. The old generals had not forgotten the failure of 1878, and looked upon another effort then as rash, if not foolish. But Marti faithfully corresponded with his few trusted friends, and in secret nourished the spirit of revolution, while in his hands he held the threads of the developing conspiracy. He knew that if too many Cubans were at once concerned, the Spanish would become alarmed and balk his efforts; and he believed that when the standard of revolt was raised thousands would flock to it, while those in exile would soon find their way into the insurgent ranks. This being the purpose in view, February 24, 1895, was fixed as the date for raising the cry of "Cuba Libre!" all over the island.

Three vessels, the *Lagonda*, the *Amadis*, and the *Baracoa*, were chartered by Marti, who sailed from New York with men and war materials in January, 1895. Arrangements had been made for landing the recruits and arms in Santiago, Puerto Principe, and Santa Clara, but the expedition was stopped at Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, and Marti left for San Domingo to join Maximo Gomez, who had been a military leader in the former war. Meanwhile, the Cuban secessionists clamoring for the revolution to proceed immediately, the banner was raised at the appointed time.

The authorities were aware of the project, and martial law was proclaimed throughout the island the day before, and in the province of Puerto Principe a rigorous search was made for arms and ammunition, which were confiscated. For a similar reason the revolutionists in Pinar del Rio did not at once respond. The rising was confined to Santiago, Santa Clara, and Matanzas, and in the two latter provinces the leaders and many suspected persons were quickly imprisoned.

The apparent failure of the uprising and the small number of the insurgents seemed to have deceived the Spanish officials, and there was little alarm as Spain had at that time an army of over 19,000 regulars in addition to so many of the 50,000 volunteers as might be called out.

It was in the province of Santiago de Cuba that from the beginning the insurrectionary movement assumed a dangerous importance. It was there that the revolution of 1868 had been strongest, and it was there always that the Cuban hatred of the Spanish was most marked. By reason of the mountainous configuration of the country it is admirably adapted for resistance, and much of its coast is difficult to protect from secret landings. The shore for mile after mile is characterized by long reaches of lonely snow-white beach or rugged brown rocks, and is apparently devoid of all human habitations, while a little distance back rise twisted hills showing evidence of former volcanic upheavals. But beyond these hills, and within the watershed of the Rio Cauto, are delightful valleys where nature can be enjoyed in unstinted measure, though the comforts of civilized life are rare. The fruits and vegetables render subsistence an easy matter to small guerrilla bands, and the temperature is uniformly genial. Roving bands can camp almost anywhere among the hills or valleys in security; the water bubbles forth from springs of crystal purity, and camp life is burdened with the least amount of encumbrances. It had been called the "Garden of Cuba," and some of the earlier colonists were so delighted with the region that they imagined it to be the original garden of Eden. In the moun-

tains along the shores is much mineral wealth, which generally remains untouched, while in the valleys are great plantations which, in times of peace, are very valuable and flourishing. The principal city is Santiago de Cuba on the south shore, situated at the head of a landlocked bay, and from it proceeds one of the two short railways in the great province, a distance of about twenty miles to the town of Euramada. About forty miles to the east of Santiago is Guantanamo, connected by a dozen miles of railway to a small port on the Bay of Guantanamo.

CHAPTER X.

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN — GENERAL CAMPOS SENT TO CUBA — LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO.

Spain Beset Within and Without — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta Ministry Resigns — Canovas's Ministry — Campos Sent to Cuba — Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the Spanish — How He Learned to Read — His Exile and Travels — A Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crombet and His Record — An Obstinate Captain — Crombet Blows out the Captain's Brains — They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings — Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded and Killed — Maceo Escapes — Wanders Alone in the Woods — Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro — In an Insurgent Camp at Last — His Presence Works a Marvelous Change — Recruiting His Army — Drilling His Men While Carried in a Hammock.

DURING the weeks immediately following the outbreak of the insurrection Spain was beset with troubles within as well as without. The arrest and summary treatment of an American citizen in Havana and the seizure of an American vessel had placed the State Department at Washington in a position of diplomatic hostility, and it was becoming very evident that the authorities in Cuba were not suppressing the rebellion with that thoroughness required to uphold Spain's supremacy. The home government had treated the agitation as a recrudescence of the former so-called "brigandage," and, having fostered this impression, the sudden call for volunteers to go to Cuba not only opened the eyes of the incredulous but brought the government into a sharp contest with the militia. While it was apparently easy to recruit men from the ranks of the army, the officers, according to some of the Spanish papers, refused to volunteer to go to Cuba, and this forced the government to the unpleasant ex-

pedient of drawing lots. The fact was the subject of much comment in the press, and, in many cases, harsh criticisms of the army officials, with imputations of cowardice and venality. The officers, furious under this criticism, on March 16th went in a body to the office of one of the newspapers, invaded the composing-rooms, and broke the printing-presses. The police contented themselves with a very feeble interference. Demands made by army officers upon the Liberal ministry that they suppress the newspapers daring to assail the army met with a refusal which, on the following day, caused the resignation of the ministry. Great excitement followed this step, and it was not till General Campos was made Captain-General of Madrid and given full authority that even a semblance of order was restored.

On the 23d of March the Conservatives, under Canovas del Castillo, took possession of the reins of the government. Immediately after his installation the president of the council made a very clear statement regarding the conditions prevailing in Cuba, and the people became aware of the seriousness of the insurrection. Public opinion changed, the danger was realized, and there arose a clamor for a strong hand to stay the insurrection. With one voice the people called for General Campos, and soon his appointment as Governor-General of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief was made known. Meanwhile, the first expedition, consisting of over 8,500 soldiers, had already landed in Havana.

The news of Campos's appointment was generally welcomed in Cuba. The insurgents knew that Spain's most famous general was a fair fighter, though severe, while those who still hoped for peace, even though they sympathized with the Cubans, had great confidence in the sagacity and skill of the man who had happily brought to a close the Ten-Years War. Everyone agreed that Campos was the most honest man in Spain, the Spaniard of all Spaniards who knew Cuba, her needs and her aspirations best. Besides, there was a conviction that as soon as Campos had informed himself of the

state of the country he would ask his government to make such concessions as would deprive the war of a rational basis. But while he was on his way to Cuba with reinforcements events were happening on the insurgent side which had the greatest influence upon the future of the war.

What the insurgent bands lacked at that time was a chief vested with the authority that comes of an unquestioned record, or that authority which by reason of a strong personality and magnetic power over men would stand for experience and a name. It was the common opinion that if some of the exiled generals of the former war could succeed in landing in Cuba, they could infuse the necessary strength into the cause. In the province of Santiago the partisans of the insurrection prayed for the coming of Maceo and Flor Crombet.

They did not know that the old leaders were about to enter upon the scene and change in a short time the whole course of events. At that moment Maceo and Flor Crombet were in San Domingo, and they had but one arm of the sea to cross.

Antonio Maceo was born on July 14, 1848. His father had a little plantation near Barajagua, and there were eleven sons, of whom Antonio was the eldest. His skin was very dark, something between the negro and the mulatto, although he seemed much nearer the latter type. At the beginning of the Ten-Years War he did not know how to read or write. His father kept mules for hire and they were driven along the lonely mountain roads by Antonio. In this way the boy made trips to Baracoa, to Guantanamo, to Santiago, and even to Holguin.

He saw the slaves toiling their lives away in the fields, fettered and lashed by overseers. He saw the red and yellow Spanish flag floating above the fortified towns, and came to understand it as an emblem of rapacity, cruelty, and greed. One autumn day in 1868 Antonio returned to his father's plantation from Baracoa with the information that the Cubans had rebelled. The father, being a careful man, at once advised his family to remain strictly neutral. But they secretly

exulted over the successes of their countrymen, and it may have been that the Spaniards obtained an inkling of their sentiments. At any rate, Spanish spies began to annoy them, and more than once they were threatened. The revolution had been in progress for some months, and the Spaniards were wild over a series of disasters, when there appeared at the Maceo plantation a band of Spanish guerrillas. Maceo and his older sons were away with a mule train.

They returned at nightfall. As the plantation came into view, a horrifying sight met the gaze of Maceo and his sons. Where his home had been there was nothing but a smouldering heap of ashes and embers. His barns were burned, his crops destroyed, his mules, sheep, horses, and cattle driven off. But where were the members of his family? Out in the jungle a woman screamed. Father and sons rushed in the direction of the voice. Six young boys lay on the ground, bound, bleeding, and senseless. The gray-haired mother stood tied to a tree, moaning, with a broken arm.

On the following day the father called his sons about him, and exacted from each a promise that they would never lay down their arms until the invader was driven out and Cuba was free. A few days later Maximo Gomez, lying out in the mountains of Santiago with his little following, was confronted by a gaunt, haggard man, behind whom were half a dozen awkward boys. Little did Gomez know that in this gathering of raw recruits there stood his future lieutenant-general. He asked them if they could fight. They smiled and said "Perhaps." Soon afterward some Spanish troops were riding leisurely along with an ammunition train. Around the bend of the road, in front, swept a flying body of horsemen, with their machetes glittering. They were guerrillas of Gomez, and at their head rode the "awkward squad" of the Maceos.

Right into the heart of the Spanish troops they drove, pell mell, cutting, slashing, and striking right and left. When the fight was ended the elder Maceo lay dead on the ground.

Before the expiration of two months, Manuel, Fermin, and Justice Maceo had been killed in battle.

Raphael was so cut up by wounds that he left the island to die as an exile in Costa Rica. For six months after this the survivors of the Maceo family seemed to bear charmed lives, and they became the foremost fighters under Gomez.

Next, Miguel was killed by a bayonet thrust at the capture of Une Vitas. Soon after Julio was shot dead at Nuevo Mundo. Felipe and Thomas were so badly wounded that they became helpless cripples in San Domingo.

Then, almost at the end of the war, Marcus was killed in a gallant machete charge, leaving Antonio, of all the "awkward squad" of fighters, still in the field. His brother José was still too young to join his relatives. During the first twelve months of Maceo's service he received sixteen of the twenty-one severe wounds that marked his body at the close of the war. With great taciturnity and apparent gruffness, he combined a magnetism that drew men to him. Within a year he had been promoted through the various grades of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain to that of major.

One of Maceo's notable achievements in this Ten-Years War was in the battle of Zarzai, where 2,500 Spaniards were utterly routed. Later, at the battle of Santa Maria de Holguin, he charged the Spanish line at the head of his followers, and many were cut down before they could fire a shot. It was at this time that Maceo first met General Weyler. The latter had been made a brigadier, and at the battle of Guaimaro was sent against Maceo.

Maceo had placed his men across a steep ravine in some heavy brush. The Spaniards came tumbling and running up to the edge of the ravine, and there they were slaughtered like sheep. Weyler fled, leaving five hundred dead on the field. He never stopped to look back until he was safe within the Spanish lines at Puerto Principe.

For these and other brilliant acts Maceo was made major-general. It seemed as if this new honor put additional spurs

to his heels. He lost no opportunity to harass the enemy, was in ambush and on guard everywhere, and he became the terror of the Spaniards. He expected them at all points, even when he was far away, and his life seemed beyond the reach of Spanish bullets. How to take Maceo became the one idea of the Spanish soldiers, and as he became the terror of the Spaniards he became equally the hero of the Cubans. In rapid succession he engaged the Spaniards in a series of brilliant and bloody fights.

While he was in the midst of his fiery crusade the Cuban and Spanish leaders met at Zanjón and signed a treaty of peace. The news was brought to Maceo by a messenger who was authorized to procure his signature to the treaty.

"Tell them," was Maceo's reply, "that I will never sign any compact with Spain other than a compact for the freedom of Cuba. I will not submit."

So Antonio Maceo kept on fighting. It soon became evident, however, that the backbone of the war had been broken. Ten years of starvation and exposure in all sorts of weather had broken the spirit of all but Maceo. Unable to obtain supplies, he was reduced to complete want. Then the capitulation came. He wrote Campos a haughty letter, agreeing to lay down his arms, disband his forces, and submit to exile on the condition that a Spanish man-of-war be placed at his disposal to convey him and his officers to Jamaica. This offer was readily accepted by Campos, who realized the impossibility of catching Maceo in a country where he knew every tree and bypath.

Maceo disbanded his men in the early dawn under a big tree near Guantanamo. There were men among that 500 who had fought under Maceo for almost ten years. They were ragged and half starved, but they had stood together in the brunt of many a hard-fought battle, and it was no wonder that tears were in their eyes as they bade their leader goodby.

For them it was a return to the blackened sites of their burned homes and their ruined plantations. For him it was

exile forever to a foreign country — and Cuba still in chains. No wonder the thought maddened him. Yet he counselled patience, industry, and obedience to the laws. “As for me,” he said, “I will follow the will of fate that leads me blindly onward. Will I come again? *Quien sabe?*” Then there were handclasps and goodbys, and Antonio Maceo sailed away to Jamaica.

In the few moments of his leisure he had learned to read and write. At night, when the fighting was over, by such light as his straightened means could compass, he poured over his books as industrious and submissive as a child. General Lacroix was his preceptor, and he suddenly acquired an amazing fondness for books relating to wars and military tactics, which he read early and late.

Early in 1879 Maceo arrived in New York. For a month or more he lived alone, without other companionship than that of books. In a few months he made his way to West Point, where he obtained employment as a hostler. Nobody in the academy dreamed that the broad-shouldered, dark-browed man who handled the horses so easily had ever smelled the smoke of battle, or heard the song of rifle bullets. Day after day, on the parade ground, he watched the evolutions of the cadets, listened to the commands of the officers, studied the discipline of the place, pored over volumes of military tactics that he had managed to borrow, and added to his natural genius the knowledge of other great generals.

At last the hostler, who was regarded as book-mad, gave up his position and returned to New York. From New York he went to Costa Rica, taking a hundred or more weighty volumes with him. Some wealthy Cubans had settled in Costa Rica during the war, and they now offered Maceo a tract of land on which to colonize his brave followers. Here for ten years the exile worked and studied and dreamed, instructed his veterans in the modern theories of war, and gave them practical lessons in drilling and in cavalry evolutions. Never for a moment did he forget his purpose.

One day in February, 1895, word came that the Cubans had risen. A week later Maceo, his brother José, Flor Crombet, Cabreco, and sixteen other veterans, sailed from Costa Rica for San Domingo. At this time Maceo was forty-seven years old. His hair and his beard were beginning to show threads of silver, but his strength and agility were surprising. He was a sharpshooter and a horseman of incomparable finish and skill. Calm, imperious, and inflexible as he stood under the rain of bullets, he was the ideal of a guerilla chief. In the march of events he was to display qualities which proved that he was as true a man and as masterful a general as he was keen and skillful in strategy. Springing from obscurity, he hewed out of the rugged history of Cuba a name that will be remembered while liberty endures. Unknown as he was and of a race of slaves, backed only by a small band of rebels, he met the soldiers of a European power and the head of an imposing army on the ground of man's equality, and for a moment the rebel held the safety of the royal army in his hands.

Flor Crombet was also a guerrilla of unquestioned valor. He fought side by side with Maceo during the greater part of the Ten-Years War; wounded many times, he seemed to bear a charmed life. He was a lion in battle, but he lacked Maceo's greatness of soul, and he had neither the noble instinct nor the generosity of Maceo. But he was whiter than his compatriot, his mother having been a mulatto, while the untainted blood of the Caucasian race ran in the veins of his father.

At San Domingo they chartered a little American boat in which to cross to the coast near Baracoa, the nearest port, taking with them a few arms and such equipments as they considered necessary. They crossed without attracting attention. The Spanish cruiser which patrolled the coast did not appear. On the morning of April 1st they sighted Baracoa, and the leaders then asked the captain, who was steering his boat towards the port, to land them farther along the coast at some distance from the city. The captain refused, urging

that it had been agreed that they should land at Baracoa; he declared that he should land just as he had contracted to, and added that he had no wish to run upon the rocks which line the coast for the purpose of pleasing his passengers.

Maceo and Crombet insisted that he should not land in the port, and when the captain would not listen to their entreaties they told him that to do so would be to thrust them into the jaws of death. They told him that they could not approach the port without being recognized, and that they would be arrested and shot. But nothing that they urged had any influence upon the captain. He steered steadily towards the city, and Crombet, beside himself, seized a rifle and blew out the captain's brains.

They then took the ship, put about, and steered for the coast, and shortly afterwards landed in a little bay situated some distance from Baracoa. It was a part of the country of which they knew very little, and they wandered for some time at random, and the few inhabitants whom they met, Indian guerrillas in the service of Spain, were hostile to them. Maceo and his band kept in hiding in the woods, where they were soon called upon to undergo serious privations. After a few days of trial and discomfort, however, they arrived at a plantation of banana trees laden with fruit. They were thankful for such a feast after their prolonged fast, but while they were busy with this harvest they were surprised by a troop of Indians commanded by Spanish officers. Maceo, realizing their position, in an instant cried out to his companions:

"Sauve qui peut!" (Let him escape who can.)

All ran, with the exception of Crombet, who was at once surrounded. He fired and killed several of his adversaries, then fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. The Spaniards turned to pursue the rest of the band, but they had disappeared.

Dispersed and wandering separately, their sufferings were intense. Maceo lived for days on bitter oranges, the only fruit which grows in those Cuban woods. His boots had given

out, he was barefooted, for in his precipitate flight he had been forced to abandon all his supplies. After a time he met an Indian and asked him to show him the way out of the woods. The Indian, who had recognized him, agreed, and they went on together for several hours. Evening came on.

"General," said the Indian, "beyond this point I do not know the way, and I think it would be better for you to remain in this grotto to-night. To-morrow I will return with one of my friends who knows the country, and he will lead you wherever you think best."

Maceo thanked him and rewarded him by giving him the only money he had left, an American twenty-dollar gold piece. In the shelter pointed out by the guide the wind had heaped up a bed of leaves, upon which the tired fugitive stretched himself. But he was too tired and too anxious to sleep, and the thought came to him that it would not be prudent for him to rest there.

"No," he said to himself. "It is not well that anyone should know where I pass the night."

Then he arose and looked about him. The dew lay heavy upon the great leaves of the rich undergrowth, and a white, malarious veil, hanging above the earth and embracing it, trembled in the dim light of the night. Maceo's heart swelled with memories of his sorrowful youth, the remembrance of the natural and inevitable wrongs of his birth, and the desperate fight for freedom of his tortured country. He thought of Crombet who had fought by his side and had been like a brother to him, and of all the brave, determined men who had given their lives into his keeping and followed him without a question or a doubt. They too were fugitives, groping about in the forest.

Despite his longing for rest, he left his cave and crept out into the woods, where he hid himself among the leafage of the great plants at the foot of a tall tree. In that position he could watch the cave and signal should his guide return according to his promise.

He had just settled himself comfortably in his shelter when he heard voices in the direction of the grotto, and immediately afterwards saw a troop of armed Indians advancing. They were led by his guide, who had no sooner received his money than he had gone to betray him to his enemies, and the Indians had come to capture him while he slept.

Maceo crept further away through the underbrush, that luxuriant growth which returns no sound of the cautious human footfall. It was not long before he heard the Indians clamoring loudly because the perfidious guide had brought them to an empty cave. It is evident that the Spanish authorities, knowing of Maceo's departure from San Domingo, and anticipating that he would attempt to land on the island, had laid their traps to capture him. The obstinacy of the captain whom Crombet had shot was suspicious, and the quickness with which armed bands turned up in the thick woods where he had been almost lost could hardly have been without design.

Maceo wandered about all that night, expecting at any moment to meet an enemy. Reaching at last a small hut among the rocks, he entered, revolver in hand, and an old negro sprang up from the floor.

"Do you recognize me?" asked Maceo.

"Yes, General," was the reply. "You are Don Antonio Maceo."

"Very good," said Maceo. "You will guide me to the nearest insurgent station. If you lead me into an ambush I will blow your brains out."

The old negro did not reply. Silently he led Maceo along a faintly-marked trail, and after several hours of marching they met a little group of Cubans who welcomed Maceo with joy and gratitude. As for Maceo, he was utterly exhausted, unable to take another step. The dangers which he faced after landing near Baracoa afford another proof of the daring qualities of the man, and also of the lack of real sympathy which the uprising encountered at the beginning. But as

soon as it was known that Maceo had landed, and, in spite of the attempts to capture him, was at the head of an army, the whole aspect of things was changed. One by one, or in little groups, the Creoles who were serving in the Spanish ranks joined the insurgents; those who had held back doubtfully shouldered their guns and came into camp, while the Indians who had failed to capture and assassinate Maceo, awed by his bravery, soon became some of his best soldiers.

All those who had landed with Maceo and had escaped from the attack at the banana plantation had to pass through trying ordeals before they arrived at insurgent camps, but they all came out safe. Maceo, who had not been a witness of the killing of Crombet, believed that he was still alive, and as soon as it was possible he ordered the woods searched in every direction. For a long time he looked for him at every turn, and in his dreams of Cuba Libre he saw his old friend living and triumphant. The Spaniards boasted that they had carried away his body, but this is doubtful, as those who saw the body which they exhibited as that of Crombet did not recognize it.

Maceo exerted himself at once to gather about him an army, and when he had a few hundred armed men he felt that his success was assured. When it is considered what he accomplished with these men, one can imagine what he might have done, with his military talents, could he have commanded a large army of trained soldiers. His organization of the rough material at his disposal was masterful, though for a long time he was hardly able to do much work with his troops. In his terrible ordeal he had become crippled; his feet were so swollen that for some time he had to be carried about in a hammock. But nothing escaped his keen eye and vigilance.

CHAPTER XI

GOMEZ AND MACEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC DEATH OF MARTI — MACEO'S BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN — NARROW ESCAPE OF CAMPOS.

Arrival of Marti, President of the Cuban Republic, and Gomez, Commander-in-Chief — Influence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival of Campos — His plan to Confine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba — Plan of Campaign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo — Gomez with Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy — A Wild Charge — The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves — Marti's Horse Becomes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They Fall upon Him — His Death — Campos Orders a Military Funeral — Barbers as Surgeons — Maceo Plans an Attack — Death of Goulet — Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge — Did Not Know He was Attacking Campos.

GENERAL MACEO had hardly begun his preparations when a detachment was sent to receive Generals Maximo Gomez, Francisco Borrerro, Angel Guerra, and José Marti, under whose energetic management the insurrection had been organized. They arrived in Cuba on the 11th of April, five days before General Campos succeeded General Calleja as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces in the island. Pending the formal action of the Cuban leaders when they should become more firmly established, the revolutionary committee appointed Marti President of the Republic of Cuba and Gomez as Commander-in-Chief of the army. In two months, therefore, a revolution which had, to all appearances, begun so insignificantly was fairly launched, and the greatest general in Spain was on his way to measure arms with the strongest leaders among the Cubans. If Gomez was less than Maceo an idol of the Cuban people in the east, he was better known in the central divisions of the island, and

the plan was to take steps at once to extend the insurrection into that quarter. Gomez had been one of the leading spirits of the previous war, and later had been an officer of high repute in the Honduras army. The knowledge of his presence in the island was an inspiring impulse upon the Cubans in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, who immediately prepared to join the insurgents, and, as in that section of the island the white race predominated, their sympathy afforded the insurrection a more favorable standing.

Campos's first plan of campaign was to confine the revolution to the province of Santiago de Cuba, and he was reported to have made the statement that he would crush the insurgents, establish peace, and return to Spain the following November. He issued a proclamation promising pardon and freedom to such rebellious Cubans as would surrender themselves and their arms, but it was too late for such an expedient to have the desired effect. Campos asserted that the province of Puerto Principe would never rise in revolt, and, in order to prevent it, he projected a line of railway from Santa Cruz on the south coast to the city of Puerto Principe, and another from Manzanillo to Bayamo, hoping thereby to engage the unemployed and quiet the fever of revolt. It became equally important for the Cuban generals to cross the country into Puerto Principe so that Gomez could bring into the field those who were waiting for a leader, hence both the Cubans and the Spaniards awaited the results of this first movement with great interest. Campos hastened a cordon of troops, estimated to number 10,000 men, near the border of Puerto Principe and Santiago to prevent Gomez from entering. Meanwhile, Maceo, who could more readily than Gomez recruit in the east, organized the troops as best he could. Several chiefs brought in little bands which they had gathered together, and Goulet with his force, which by this time numbered near 1,000 men, hastened to join his old commander. To the indomitable courage and fierce endurance of the Cubans was now added the buoyancy and confidence which came from the

knowledge that they were to follow the lead of generals of tried capacity, and recruits came in much faster than the equipments could be supplied.

Gomez, Marti, and Maceo arranged their plan of campaign and then separated. It was decided that in order to facilitate the entrance of Gomez and Marti into the province of Puerto Principe, Maceo should attempt a diversion of the royal forces in the direction of Guantanamo. Gomez and Marti with about 700 cavalymen turned their course westward. As their main purpose was to work their way into Puerto Principe, where Marti counted on the presence of Gomez and his own personality and eloquence to influence the undecided, it was policy for them to avoid, if possible, the Spanish troops, leaving them to be drawn away by Maceo with his superior forces. But, unfortunately, when they found themselves in the neighborhood of the enemy, the prudence of Gomez was overborne by the zeal of Marti.

On the 18th of May, when camped on the plains of Dos Rios, they learned that the first line of the enemy was in the neighborhood, safely protected by a fort. Starting out before daybreak the next morning, they soon came upon the Spanish outpost. Marti was all excitement. He desired to fight, but the prudent Gomez reminded Marti that skirmishing was not to be the object of the expedition, that they should pass around the enemy, if possible, and he thought it would be wiser to profit by the heavy fog which enshrouded the plain by firing a few shots at the outposts, while they continued on their march unnoticed along the flank of the royal army. But the firing of the muskets excited Marti more and more. They were face to face with the hated Spaniards against whose oppression he had struggled and suffered. The hope of his youth and his manhood at last seemed to be realized. He had planned the great struggle now at hand; step by step, in the face of discouragements and obstacles, had infused it with life and made it a working force. Here at last was a chance to strike. Why should they avoid this enemy with whom for

twenty years he had longed to measure strength? He could not bear to think of drawing back, of slinking away.

Before the wild exaltation of Marti, Gomez had not the heart to insist upon his own prudent tactics. And if, indeed, they had had a large army, instead of a force insignificant in comparison with the royal troops; had been properly armed and equipped, a decisive blow might have been struck then and there. The enthusiasm of the young recruits, led by an old warrior of mark and such a spirited champion as Marti, would have been hard to withstand, for no such frenzy of patriotic fervor prevailed among the Spanish youths, drawn into the struggle against their will. As it was, they quailed before the charge of those seven hundred cavalymen, and no serious harm might have been done but for the recklessness of Marti, who was mounted upon a very beautiful and vigorous horse. He was told that the animal might be unmanageable in a skirmish, even if ridden by an experienced horseman, but Marti would not listen.

"Viva Cuba Libre!" he cried, waving his sword, and, followed by his soldiers, he rushed upon the Spanish lines. Before the avalanche the Spanish army retreated, but in good order, upon its reserves. That was the trap. Gomez sounded a rally to the troops, and they stopped, but Marti, carried on by the vigor of his horse, which he could not control, was taken straight into the ranks of the enemy. He received a bullet in his left eyebrow, another in his throat, and several sword thrusts in his body. Then the Spaniards fell upon their victim. The insurgents charged again, but in the face of such superior numbers the movement was of no avail. There was danger of losing all, and Marti was dead.

Marti wore upon his hat a scarf in the colors of Cuba Libre on which was embroidered his name. The commander of the Spanish forces hastened to transmit to Santiago the news of this important capture, and the rejoicing was great among the Spaniards. General Campos at once gave orders to despatch two persons who knew Marti to identify him and bring back

official proof of his death. After its identification the corpse was to be brought to Santiago, let it cost what it might. He did not propose to neglect the opportunity of producing upon public opinion an impression unfavorable to the Cuban cause, and, naturally, the news of Marti's death was at first received with incredulity by some. But the evidence was conclusive. The body of the dead President was carried to the cemetery, where it was exposed to the public view and photographed. By the order of General Campos, a Spanish general presided at the funeral of the illustrious insurgent, and pronounced a discourse over the grave, eulogizing the brilliant qualities of the fallen enemy, and mourning because his courage and his talents had not been exerted in a better cause. Those who had been present at the summary executions of the previous war thought that times had changed and military manners with them. At that time Marti's corpse would have been dragged through the streets of the city. But Campos knew that such brutal treatment would only arouse thousands of Cubans who were then in a doubtful attitude.

Marti's death appeared at first sight to be an irreparable loss, but the movement had received such an impulse that nothing could then have stopped its onward march. It was quickly arranged that T. Estrada Palma, one of the leaders of the revolutionary committee, should act as president until such time as the Cuban Assembly could meet to definitely organize the republic. Marti had already issued the call for this meeting and it only awaited the favorable opportunity.

Experience had taught Marti that Céspedes had failed in 1878 largely because of lack of arms. Before attempting to begin the war, therefore, Marti had organized a system of collecting money from exiled Cubans everywhere. He had but a small sum at the beginning, for his system had only begun its operations. The Spaniards generally believed that Marti controlled millions and jumped at the conclusion that he was backed solely by the people of the United States. But it is stated as a fact that Marti was compelled to start the war with

no more than \$75,000, which would be hardly enough for a single expedition. But his system was in working order and it represented millions.

While Gomez, mourning the fate of the dashing but reckless Marti, was adroitly working his way along the flank of the enemy towards the province of Puerto Principe, Maceo was vigorously diverting the Spanish forces in the eastern part of the island. Other bands of insurgents were having frequent skirmishes amid the hills of Santiago de Cuba, and occasionally a quite serious engagement.

It required a stout heart to endure the privations and suffering in the Cuban camps. There were no doctors and no medicine, and the wounded insurgent had to rely upon nature for his cure, though there were a few barbers in the ranks who acted as surgeons.

Meanwhile, General Campos had become impatient because his generals displayed so little energy; he determined to show them that he, the Captain-General, would meet the insurgents without the support of the entire army. Since his arrival in Cuba he had seldom left the ship upon which he had established his headquarters. He sailed from Havana to Santiago, going wherever he thought he was needed, urging on first one and then the other, negotiating in one place and ordering a fight in another. Early in July he went to Manzanillo and landed. Numerous complaints had appeared in the press that the Spanish forces at Bayamo, an inland city about twenty-five miles from Manzanillo, were in a deplorable condition, without food or hospitals, and cut off from Manzanillo by the insurgents. Campos, apparently, conceived the plan of relieving Bayamo and of crushing the collected forces of Maceo and Rabi at one blow, and of afterwards pushing westward to drive Gomez into the Spanish military line between the province of Santa Clara and Puerto Principe, thus catching the Cubans between two fires. He ordered three Spanish columns to march against Maceo's force from different directions, while he started from Manzanillo on the 12th with a

convoy under General Santocildes, which was to re-victual Bayamo.

Everything went well until they reached the neighborhood of Peralejos, where the road divides. The new highway stretches out towards the north, while the old road deflects slightly towards the south. The guide turned into the new road, which is better known and more worn by travel, but General Campos ordered him to take the old road.

Maceo had been warned that a Spanish column was to leave Manzanillo with commissary stores for Bayamo, and he decided to attack it with as strong a force as he could muster. With this end in view he had picked up Goulet's force encamped at St. Georges, and also sent messengers to Rabi and the others who were near by to join him. It was not long before his army, swelled by these reinforcements, numbered 3,000 men, of whom at least 500 were practically without arms. They had proceeded toward Bayamo, and halted near the parting of the roads.

Thinking that the Spanish column would follow the new, well-beaten road, Maceo distributed his troops among the underbrush and placed his equipage and the men who had no guns along the side of the old abandoned road. Goulet and his band was placed between the largest body of the insurgents and the military impedimenta. General Campos was moving forward with great caution, when his advance guard came full upon the band of unarmed Cubans and fired a volley of musketry into their ranks. The result was a wild retreat. The panic of the unarmed soldiers was so great that Goulet's troops were swept backward. For a moment he seemed utterly abandoned, but his two aids-de-camp, Palacios and Colas, were near him, and the three undaunted soldiers united in a desperate effort to stem the flood of retreat. The Spaniards advanced, firing volley after volley at the flying fugitives. Goulet mounted a rise of ground, to watch the movements of the enemy and to give orders to his lieutenants, and as he crouched at the foot of a tree half stripped by the Spanish

bullets, which fell like rain, a bullet entered his knee, traversing the groin, and he fell dead. His two aids hastened to carry his body from the field.

Maceo, who had expected to face the Spaniards on the other road, heard the noise of the battle, and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of his position, he rallied his troops and faced the enemy by a change of front. When it is remembered that the undisciplined and panic-stricken unarmed band was in full retreat, it must be acknowledged that Maceo's change of front was remarkable, and that it did honor to his generalship. The aspect of the combat at once changed: the Spaniards fell back under the unexpected attack and felt that they were defeated.

At that moment General Campos ordered his officers to dismount. General Santocildes did not hear the order and remained upon his horse. Maceo was in front of his line, surrounded by his staff, all young men of excellent family, used to the management of firearms and better marksmen than the average soldier. He ordered them to fire full upon the person who had remained upon his horse, supposing him to be the general in command. Santocildes received in his body the contents of twenty rifles and fell mortally wounded. As he fell the Spanish soldiers rushed forward with a stretcher to bear away his body. Maceo ordered his staff to fire upon the compact group which the enemy formed at that point. Three times the Spaniards were forced to drop the stretcher upon which lay the body of their general, and each time they left upon the spot a number of dead and dying. They returned after the third repulse and this time they succeeded in carrying the body away with them.

Campos, seeing the turn the battle had taken, ordered his men to shoot all the horses and mules, and the dead bodies of the animals were piled up as a barricade. Maceo, on foot, urged the soldiers on with all his accustomed energy and courage. It was a warm and spirited fight. The dead increased on the side of the royal army, but they continued to pour upon the insurgents a well-sustained fire. The rebels, on the other

hand, held their ground firmly. Campos received a ball in his boot and another broke his staff.

As it drew on towards night the rain began to fall in torrents and the ardor of the insurgents, whose ammunition was running low, was somewhat cooled. At this favorable moment Campos gave the order to his men to resume their march toward Bayamo, and the insurgents followed, harrassing the royal army all the way to the gates of the city. The engagement lasted eleven hours and cost the Spaniards, according to their own account, a general and seventy men killed, and 100 soldiers wounded more or less seriously. The Cubans declared that the Spaniards lost 400 killed and a large number wounded, while the Cuban loss was Goulet and about 130 men. Altogether the day had been a hard one, and Campos acknowledged in his report that his column had twice been in danger. On reaching Bayamo he sent for reinforcements, withdrawing a considerable number from Santa Clara province, thus tending, as Maceo purposed, to make Gomez's contemporaneous efforts in that direction easier.

Maceo did not learn till the following day that he had been fighting with the Captain-General.

"Had I known that," he said, "I would have sacrificed 500 of my men and taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow I would have ended the war."

It is true that had such been the result of the battle the consequences would have been incalculable, and even had Maceo attacked the Spanish as he expected to, the result might have been very different. As it was, Maceo was compelled to rescue his army from a rout. With what skill he faced his armed men about, and brought them up past the unarmed stragglers who were running for their lives, the results showed. That one battle proved that Maceo was a great general.

But it was not simply upon the field that he showed his great qualities. After the battle Maceo had the wounded picked up and cared for, and then, sitting down in his humble camp, he wrote the Captain-General the following letter:

TO MARSHAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS :

Desiring that the wounded abandoned by your troops upon the battle field shall not perish for want of help, I have ordered my men to carry them to the houses of the Cuban families living near the place of the combat, where they are to be kept until you send for them. It is understood that the soldiers who are sent by you for this purpose shall not be attacked by those whom I command.

(Signed) ANTONIO MACEO.

We may imagine the feelings with which the greatest general of the proud Spanish nation received this note from the mulatto general. But Campos was a wise and generous foe and knew how to appreciate Maceo. If the Spaniards had always been as magnanimous in the treatment of the wounded Cubans who fell into their hands there would have been less cause for a war which was destined to devastate the fair island of Cuba.

The next morning Maceo filed off with his troops. They were within sight of the city, and the Spaniards fired after them a harmless volley of artillery.

"That is the way to salute a general," said Maceo with a laugh.

When once his brilliant exploit was accomplished the insurgent leader retired. He had just learned that important forces were on their way to Bayamo to reinforce Campos, and he feared to be taken between two fires. He sent each band to its respective encampment to await such a time as he might think best fitted for a new sortie.

CHAPTER XII

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA — PECULIARITIES OF CUBAN WARFARE — ON TO HAVANA! — THE FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA.

Campos Sends for Reinforcements — Landing of Other Cuban Leaders — Gomez Enters Puerto Principe — His Order for the Destruction of Sugar Plantations — The Reasons for It — Campos Leaves Santiago for Santa Clara — Cuban Delegates Meet to Found the Republic — A Government Largely on Paper — Gomez's Great Plan for a Westward March — Divisions of the Cuban Army — Gomez's Instructions — Tactics of the Insurgents — Their Advantages — The Nature of Alleged Spanish Victories — Cubans Constantly Pushing Further Westward — Campos Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha — Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed Wire — Gomez's Plan to March 12,000 Men Over It — Maceo Deceives the Spaniards — Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara — Insurgents Divide into Small Bands — The Battle of Coliseo — Campos Falls Back to Havana — All Cuba Under Martial Law.

FORTUNE certainly favored the insurgents in leading the Captain-General into the province of Santiago de Cuba, for while Campos was unsuccessfully exerting himself to crush the rebellion there, he was leaving the way open for Gomez to carry the banner of Cuba Libre to the westward. After reaching Bayamo and examining the garrison there, Campos immediately sent for reinforcements and a considerable number of troops came from Santa Clara. That province he regarded as thoroughly loyal, and he did not believe for a moment that Gomez would be able to push beyond the old Jucaro trocha.

But it happened at about this time that three able Cuban leaders, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, and Rodriguez, landed in Santa Clara province with a large amount of war material, and before the Spaniards had extricated Campos from his position at Bayamo the army in Santa Clara had been organized into the Fourth Army Corps, and operations were at once

begun. It was not long before the insurrection had taken a vigorous stride there. Skirmishes were of almost daily occurrence and there were some important encounters caused by the action of the insurgents who undertook to destroy the railroad and telegraph communication of the province.

General Gomez, after the engagement in which Marti lost his life, succeeded in eluding the forces sent to intercept him and entered the southern part of the province of Puerto Principe early in June, or before the events just related took place. Here he was joined by Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, the most influential Cuban in that district, and soon his forces were increased by young men from all over the province, thus forming the nucleus of what was later the Third Army Corps.

When Gomez reached Najasa, about thirty miles from the city of Puerto Principe, he issued one of the first of those general orders which had so much effect in the later conduct of the island. It was as follows:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,
Najasa, Camagüey, July 1, 1895.

To the Planters and Owners of Cattle Ranches :

In accord with the great interests of the revolution for the independence of the country and for which we are in arms :

Whereas all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island, that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop, notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished. The person who, "disobeying this order, will try to profit from the present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct little respect for the rights of the revolution of redemption, and therefore shall be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in case of his capture.

MAXIMO GOMEZ,
The General in-Chief.

The reasons for this order were the same as those which led to the destruction of cotton in the South during the American civil conflict. The sugar crop was a large source of revenue to the Spanish government, both directly and indirectly.

He who follows the developments of this rebellion must always remember that while the Cubans were in no position to drive from their strongholds the Spaniards who held the ports and garrisoned the large towns, they could practically hold and control the rural districts. It was equally true that the Spaniards could not subjugate, except by vastly superior numbers, the numerous battalions of Cubans who were scattered about in the country, where the people generally sympathized with the insurrection. But while the Cubans could subsist easily upon the country itself, the Spaniards always required money.

Having issued this order and another to the insurgent troops to destroy all railroad and telegraph lines possible, Gomez proceeded to ride over the country surrounding the city of Puerto Principe. Whenever he found his position inferior or met a force too great for him to attack with safety, he contented himself with an ambush and a rapid retreat, which the Spanish news headquarters at once construed into a rebel rout, although the unmistakable fact was that the insurgents were constantly growing in numbers and were pushing their campaign further and further westward. By summer the insurrection had taken shape in the three great provinces of the east, and the time had come for the supreme effort to be made by the insurgent leaders.

Campos had meantime left Santiago de Cuba, where the uprising had become general, and was being vigorously pushed by Maceo and other insurgent leaders, and hurried back to Santa Clara province to prevent Gomez from passing beyond the Jucaro trocha, which stretches for fifty miles across the western portion of Puerto Principe. The forces he had relied upon to prevent the westward march of Gomez had proved entirely inadequate for the sharp tactics of the veteran Cuban, and, besides, daring bands of insurgents were by this time roving over the districts of Santa Clara.

It was at this point that Gomez announced his intention of marching through Santa Clara into Matanzas and on to

Havana. This movement must be regarded as the most remarkable of any during the war.

By the beginning of the dry season Gomez had practically perfected all his plans and had ordered Maceo, with about 4,000 men, mostly infantry, to follow up and join him near the trocha. Further westward, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, Perez, and Laeret were waiting under orders for the advance of the Commander-in-Chief. Gomez established his headquarters at Jimaguaya, in the province of Puerto Principe. Near the town is an immense prairie or savanna, difficult of approach, and it was upon this plan that it was decided to accomplish the formal organization of the republic and the concentration of its military forces. The call for a meeting of representatives of the Cuban people to form a permanent civil government had been issued by Marti as soon as he reached the island, but his death and the exigencies of the campaign had rendered it inadvisable to comply with the call till this time.

Seldom has a republic been set up under more picturesque circumstances than attended the establishment of the Republic of Cuba on the 13th of September, 1895. On that broad savanna gathered the men who were to stand in the same relation to the young republic as the fathers of the Constitution of the United States stood to our people.

On the 18th the assembly proceeded to the election of the officers of the government council, each representative depositing his ballot in an urn placed on the chairman's table. The voting resulted in the election of the following:

President. — Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, who had held the same position in the former revolutionary government.

Vice President. — Bartolome Masó, a prominent citizen of Manzanillo.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. — Raphael Portuondo y Tamayo, a member of a wealthy and distinguished family of the province of Santiago de Cuba.

Secretary of War. — Carlos Roloff of Santa Clara, a native of Poland, who had borne a conspicuous part in the former revolution.

Secretary of the Treasury. — Severo Pino, of an old and wealthy family of St. Spiritus.

Secretary of the Interior. — Dr. Santiago Garcia Canizares

Civil formalities having been completed and the government having concluded a grand review of the forces which were to march to Havana, Gomez proceeded with his plans for marching to Havana. Maceo was bringing his forces up from the east with little difficulty, though he was compelled to fight some of the way. In point of strategy there have been few events in recent warfare to equal the remarkable character of the undertaking Gomez had in mind. For it is to Gomez alone, it has been said, that the honor of devising the movement is due. In carrying it out he accomplished feats worthy of the most conspicuous of the world's renowned generals, and he exhibited qualities placing him among the first of American commanders. That part of the Spanish army which was between Havana and Gomez must have numbered at least 50,000 well-armed men. It was against this defending force, vastly superior in numbers and equipment, that the insurgents were about to measure their strength.

From the outset, Gomez divided his troops into three columns, one commanded by Antonio Maceo, about 3,000 strong; another under the command of Suarez and Laet, numbering 2,000 men, and the principal corps, numbering about 6,000 men, under his own personal direction. A column of 1,000 men under the command of Francisco Perez formed the advance guard. In all, therefore, there were 12,000 men. This was the effective army with which Gomez began his march upon Havana, but it should be borne in mind that it was only the nucleus, for as the insurgents marched along they were joined by all the Cubans who daily embraced the cause of liberty.

After Gomez had unfolded his plan and explained to his lieutenants all that he hoped, he told them that all their efforts were to be directed towards one object, to reach Havana. He insisted that it was not a question of killing Spanish soldiers, but of arriving before Havana. He expected them by a march — strategic if need be — and as rapid as possible, to succeed in reaching the goal, and they were to foil the enemy

as often as possible, and in any way, whether by a false attack or by an absolute avoidance of a meeting. His final instructions were: "In the event of a forced battle, overthrow them; pass over them — and on to Havana!"

However inferior the Spaniards of the royal army may have been in point of enthusiasm, there could have been no doubt that they were capable of defeating in open battle the undisciplined army of insurgents who were homogeneous in nothing but their love for Cuba and their hatred of Spain. But there was no reason to fear that the army of Gomez would be forced into battle, for in order to bring about such a result it would have been necessary to surround the insurgent army to bring it to a halt and then attempt to destroy it in a close conflict.

While the Spaniards marched in columns relatively large, from 1,000 to 1,500 men, who could move but slowly, burdened as they were with a certain amount of luggage and the usual military impedimenta, the Cubans had divided their army corps into detachments of from 200 to 300 soldiers, well-equipped and carrying an adequate supply of ammunition, soldiers familiar with the country, with no useless baggage to transport, and accustomed to such nourishment as they could gather from the trees, the plants, and other products of the ground over which they marched. These small detachments of natives, thoroughly habituated to a climate which is barely supportable to others, slipped between the meshes of the net which Campos essayed in vain to stretch out, and as they marched with a very small convoy they cared very little if they left behind them an enemy who with his best efforts could not have hindered them from returning to their point of departure should such a movement become necessary.

It may be thought that it would have been a rational way of circumventing the Cubans for the Spaniards to have followed the tactics of Gomez and divided their columns into small bodies calculated to compete with the rebel troops in rapidity of mobilization, but the Spanish officers had a distinct

disinclination to attack the Cubans except with a very superior force. Moreover, the Spanish soldiers were much embarrassed by the natural difficulties of the country, and their lack of familiarity with these difficulties, and with the country itself. They dared not leave their positions without the guidance of some one born in the country, and the recruiting of these guides became a serious problem. Each day it became more difficult, for the natives feared the insurgents and were haunted by visions of the reprisals which they feared might follow any great victory obtained by Gomez, as the insurgents had declared that any Cuban found by them serving in the ranks of the Spanish army should be hanged.

There existed another reason why the movement of the Cuban army was easier and less influenced by nervous dread. Every movement of the Cubans was calculated, and they began their march with a distinct end in view, while the object of the Spanish movement was much more vague. To chase after the fleet-footed Cubans was far from easy. On the rare occasions when an insurgent column was engaged in a skirmish with the Spaniards, the insurgents sent forth a few flying volleys and disappeared as if the earth had swallowed them. It seemed to be of no importance to them which direction they took; they faced about in the very midst of a combat and fled in any direction, apparently without a plan. The Spaniard stood alone upon his ground and cried "Victory!" This is the explanation of the Spanish despatches to the journals of that day. It was always the same story, reading something like this: "After an insignificant discharge of musketry, the Cubans ran away."

And yet the Cubans were every day marching nearer and nearer to Havana. While the Spaniards were winning their alleged victories, the Cubans were bringing the whole island into insurrection and making it well-nigh impossible for loyal planters to harvest a sugar crop. Some of the war correspondents, who had never seen a war before, complained that there was only a handful of insurgents here and there, and that

Gomez would not fight. They missed entirely the stratagem which he was carrying out with the most consummate skill.

Whether these tactics are called Cuban retreats or Spanish victories, it cannot be denied that they gave to the insurgents an advantage far exceeding victories which fall on more important combats. At times the royal troops endeavored to equal their adversaries in rapidity of movement, but it was like a race between day and night. As one observer expressed it: "The passage of the rebels resembled the trail of Hop o' my Thumb, except that in the place of crumbs and pebbles the Cuban Hop o' my Thumbs left along their trail the bodies of their foundered horses, the chewed remains of sugar cane and bananas, and the empty cans of preserves which had been devoured as soon as pilfered, for the insurgents lunched as they fled. There were whole days together when their only food was sugar cane; and this simple nourishment sufficed to sustain the strength of these robust men who were inured to all suffering, who went into a skirmish as children go to play, and whose chief advantage was that there was no climatic danger for them in an atmosphere that is fatal to their enemies." Under such circumstances the march from Gomez's point of concentration was made. The Spaniards were incapable of parallel efforts and such a mode of living, and they lost more than an hour each day in making the soup for their meals.

Two weeks after Gomez began his march he was before the Jucaro trocha on which Campos was relying to keep the enemy within the eastern provinces. This military defense, which had been constructed during the former war, he had, in anticipation of the movement, strengthened and reinforced along its entire length. Those who have not seen these lines of defense have an inadequate idea of what they consist, and as similar lines were built later in the western section of the island, a description of the Jucaro trocha will serve for all. It stretched from Jucaro on the south coast of the province of Puerto Principe to Moron on the north, a distance of about fifty miles. The country on each side of it was covered by a

thick jungle of woods. The trocha consisted primarily of a cleared space through this jungle from 100 to 200 yards wide, and the trees, cut down to clear a way, were piled up on each side, thus forming a sort of barrier of tree trunks and their branches, averaging perhaps six feet high and fifty feet wide. These alone would seem to an observer sufficient to prevent the passage of any army, especially if the barricades were guarded, but the Spanish found that such a device would not even prevent the passing of Cuban cavalry. The space between the lines of fallen trees was given up to a military road and forts and a maze of barbed wire. The wire was strung back and forth from three rows of poles, about five feet high, 450 yards of wire being used to every twelve yards of posts. At intervals of every half mile along this roadway were the larger forts made of stone and adobe and painted white. Midway between the larger forts were placed blockhouses of two stories, the upper being of wood. Between each of the larger forts and the blockhouses, or within the short distance of a quarter of a mile, were placed three small forts of mud and planks surrounded by a ditch. They were capable of holding five men and were within hailing distance of each other, or about 150 yards.

Maceo had not yet brought up his division, and while waiting for him Gomez thought he would ascertain what he could do with the trocha, and, if possible, discover the condition of things on the other side. So, leaving the main body of his army, with a few hundred men he began to manœuvre before the trocha and finally succeeded in working a small force through on the southern end. He immediately fell upon the little town of Pelayo, and captured the forts which guarded it, together with the entire garrison and a large amount of arms and ammunition. He then moved cautiously northward through the woods into the district of Remedios, then suddenly westward toward the trocha. The Spaniards appear to have been closely watching the southern end, believing that Gomez's remaining force would try to effect a passage there. In

consequence, Gomez found the northern part weakly defended, or at least he succeeded in re-crossing it, and was soon joined by Maceo, who by this time had brought up his army, having marched across the whole of Puerto Principe province, eluding four Spanish columns which had been sent against him. Maceo's forces were therefore in front of the trocha some little distance to the north of where Gomez's main division was waiting to cross. It might seem that when they were in this position it would have been easy for the Spaniards whom Maceo had left in the rear to have closed in and caught the Cubans between the trocha and themselves, but the country is a difficult one for the moving of disciplined troops, and, moreover, the Spanish officers were never quite sure where the enemy was and seemed to content themselves with trusting in luck to come upon him in a favorable location. Gomez understood their position perfectly.

He ordered Maceo to make a feint of attack upon the northern portion of the trocha. Maceo accordingly sent a few soldiers to the front of the entrenchment of the royal army, and the Spaniards, thinking that the advance guard of the Cubans had opened an attack and proposed to cross the trocha to the north, passed the word down the trocha, and immediately the Spanish rushed *en masse* toward the north, leaving the southern portion, before which Gomez was concealed, unprotected. This was exactly what Gomez had counted upon, and he forthwith crossed the barricade without striking a blow, except to clear away trees and other obstacles. His passage seems to have been unsuspected by the Spanish engaged in holding back Maceo, who had no intention of crossing there or then. Finally, when he had heard that Gomez was safely over, Maceo beat a retreat, the Spaniards thinking they had won a victory.

Maceo had apparently disappeared towards the north, and the enemy naturally kept their attention turned in that direction; but as soon as the shrewd Cuban leader was out of sight he faced southward and hurried his men to the point where

Gomez had just taken his men through, followed in his tracks without difficulty, and before the Spaniards realized what had happened the entire Cuban army were marching into Santa Clara province.

Campos at Santa Clara saw that he had been outflanked by the clever ruse of the Cubans before the trocha and that he was now in a measure surrounded. So when he heard that Gomez was threatening Cienfuegos he made a precipitate march to that place, intrenching himself and assuming direct command of his troops. He also dispatched a large number of troops to form a line between Cienfuegos and Las Cruces to impede the westward march of the Cubans. Meanwhile, Gomez had not forgotten one of the main purposes of his campaign, which was to prevent the grinding of sugar cane so that Spain would lose her revenue and the Cuban workmen, left with nothing better to do, would take up arms. Shortly after crossing the trocha, therefore, he issued a peremptory order for the destruction of sugar plantations and railroad communication.

The insurgents continued their evasive movements with great skill. They advanced until in their devious ways they reached the boundary of Matanzas. Campos was again outflanked; he drew back and established his headquarters at Colon, twenty miles over the border of Matanzas. Here, while Campos was planning to concentrate his forces, surround Gomez and force him into open battle with a vastly superior Spanish force, Gomez foiled him by radiating his troops. By the time Campos was ready to concentrate his forces, therefore, there was nothing except one of these various "will-o'-the-wisp" divisions to concentrate upon.

He had hoped that the Spanish forces in Gomez's rear would be able to co-operate with him, but every means of communication by railroad, telegraph, or telephone had been completely destroyed by the insurgents in their progress. Under other circumstances it is doubtful if the complicated strategy he contemplated would have been practicable owing to the

natural conditions of the country, for such a move, even in European countries, would have required the co-operation of officers who were familiar with the ground over which they were to deploy, and the officers upon whom Campos depended were unaccustomed to Cuba. Campos, however, agreed with his generals — Garcia, Navarro, and Valdes — on the point of concentration, where they were to meet on a day appointed and were to drive the enemy before them. At that place and at that appointed time the great battle should be fought. To draw the insurgents into his proposed trap, Campos ordered his pickets to return the fire of the insurgents in a feeble manner, while Maceo, who, like Campos, was hoping to deceive the enemy so as to leave the divisions to the north and south unobstructed, had given a like order to his men. This engagement, therefore, amounted to but little. Suddenly the cane-brake which surrounded the Spanish camp burst into flames and towards the west there appeared a great blazing plain. Campos understood at once that he had been foiled. It was not long before the flames threatened to lick the feet of his frenzied horses. He gave the orders to break the camp at once and looked about for his lieutenants. They were not to be found; they had been unable to concentrate. Campos alone had come to the rendezvous!

Such, in brief, was the battle of Coliseo in December, 1895, which was so construed by the press censors as to occasion much rejoicing at Havana, for they thought the rebels had been met and checked. In reality, however, a few insurgents had played their games with General Campos; a detachment of Cuban cavalry, commanded by Maceo, had made an exasperating charge on the Spanish pickets, a fire had broken out in the cane-brakes, and the Cubans had marched into Matanzas province.

Campos drew back to Jovellanos, towards which Gomez advanced, burning the sugar plantations on the way. With calls for the protection of the sugar plantations in both Santa Clara and Matanzas to attend to, the cities of Santa Clara,

Cienfuegos, Colon, and Cardenas threatened, Campos drew back to Limonar, and Gomez advanced to Jovellanos, which commanded the railroad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas, and Havana. These lines he destroyed, while the smoke of the sugar plantations never ceased to darken the sky. With all communication with the east, except by water, cut off, Campos moved back to Matanzas and hurriedly sent orders for the concentration of as many troops as possible, sending even to the province of Santiago de Cuba for as many troops as could be spared from there. Then he fell back to Havana and the insurgents, without serious obstacle, continued their destructive march towards the west, while Campos waited for reinforcements and set about actively to fortify the land approaches of the capital city. He also hurried as many troops as he could spare to the neighborhood of Batabano, directly across the island from Havana, withdrawing even a large number of marines from the fleets for shore duty, for by this time the insurgents were threatening to break the line and penetrate into Pinar del Rio. So grave was the situation that martial law was declared in both the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Thus by the end of 1895 the whole island from Point Maysi to Cape Antonio was declared to be in a state of siege.

As already explained, it was not the intention of General Gomez in carrying out this winter campaign to lay siege to Havana. That would have done little good, even supposing his troops could have held their place before the gates, for, while the bay was open, supplies or reinforcements could have been easily brought in. Gomez's two great objects were to prevent the grinding and export of sugar and the consequent flow of treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to infuse the Cubans everywhere with courage to take the field, with the belief that he could control the provinces and enforce his orders. While the westward march of the main body of the troops was being carried on, the forces of the other Cuban army corps succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning

sugar cane and the destruction of Spanish lines of communication. Some artillery had been introduced into the Cuban army, and with this small garrisons were more easily attacked. Moreover, the insurgents, in spite of the Spanish patrol of the coast, managed to preserve communication between the interior and certain points on the coast, where, from time to time, supplies were received and carried inland.

The insurgents in the east were under the command of General José Maceo, Antonio's brother, and they were passing their lives in comparative quiet in their various camps. Nearly all martial efforts were confined to the surroundings of Havana, where Gomez was in charge, and the insurgents of Santiago de Cuba were rarely troubled with the unimportant sorties of the Spaniards. They pitched their camps wherever they could find a comfortable place, the officers usually taking possession of some old building or shed, while the men brought in palm leaves and constructed primitive shelters. They usually posted pickets on all the roads, and made themselves comfortable. Frequently, camps were placed near some planter, who deemed it wise to show his sympathy for the insurgents whether he really wished to or not.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ADVENT OF WEYLER, KNOWN AS "THE SPANISH BUTCHER"—HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY—THE FAMOUS \$5,000,000 TROCHA—DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO.

Campos Coldly Received at Havana — Spaniards Clamor for Sterner Methods — Campos Consults the Leaders — His Resignation — Weyler's Arrival — His Infamous Reputation — Commissioned Because of It — Progress of Gomez and Maceo — Weyler's Immense Forces — Largest Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea — Strength of the Insurgents — Object of Their Campaign — Weyler's Boastful Proclamations — Civilized War Abandoned — Weyler's Ineffective Military Operations — His Big Fence — Maceo Crosses and Recrosses It Easily — Cuba "Pacified" — Maceo Appears Where Least Expected — Maceo Surprised — Turning Defeat into Victory — Battles and Skirmishes — Death of Maceo's Brother José.

WHEN General Campos, having fallen back from one stronghold to another, finally made his stand in Havana, he was very coldly received by the people, who considered him guilty of culpable negligence and carelessness. It was one of the absurdities of the situation that Spain was continually characterizing the rebellion as only the outbreak of a lot of ignorant negroes, and insisting that a state of war did not actually exist upon the island. Spanish pride bled at the thought that at any moment a horde of rebels might pour triumphantly into the streets of Havana. Public emotion ran high. Since the battle of Coliseo hundreds of families had taken refuge within the walls of the capital, deserting the rural districts and even the villages. The highways and byways were cumbered with people distracted with fear and bringing in whatever they could carry or transport of their useful and precious possessions. Household goods and objects of value were piled together in confusion.



EMINENT SPANISH LEADERS IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.

Admiral Cervera.
General Weyler.

Prime Minister Sagasta.
General Blanco.

The Spaniards of Havana were haughty and unrelenting, and from the beginning of the insurrection had clamored for revenge without mercy. Their aim was to restore the system of reprisals which had piled up hecatombs of helpless Cubans during the former war; such a system of revenge as had distinguished with an unenviable celebrity some of the Captain-Generals of the preceding insurrection, like Balmaceda and such subordinate officers as Weyler. These fanatics, furious and trembling with fear, demanded of the marshal some cogent reason for his repeated defeats. They made serious threats, but the well-known energy of Campos held them in check; they dared not make any open attack on his person.

Confronted by the disfavor of the populace, Campos met the leaders of the three parties in an interview having for its object the adjustment of the existing conditions. He asked what measures they could propose and what they would advise. The Conservatives clamored for vigorous reprisals; the Reformists dared not express an opinion. The Autonomists timidly assured their leader of their support. In the face of such divergence of opinion, practically deprived of the assistance of the governmental parties, Campos thought it but right that he should resign his command.

Campos sailed for Spain on the 17th of January, 1896, his office being temporarily left in the hands of General Sabas Marin, who, on the 10th of February, was succeeded by General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Tenerife, better known and hated by the world at large as "Weyler." This general arrived preceded by a reputation for excessive severity and cruelty. He was accused of having committed the most atrocious crimes during the former war. The insurgent leaders were inclined to welcome his appointment, for they knew his disposition and counted upon the probability that his acts would quickly arouse sympathy for the struggling Cubans in the United States and elsewhere, and eventually secure for them that recognition which they so much desired, and which their representatives in the United States were so

industriously seeking. Moreover, they said that his military talents were not brilliant, in ability not to be compared with Campos, and his appointment to the office at such a crisis in Cuba could be but for one purpose, of returning to a system of severe reprisals. Undoubtedly, the Spanish government had been moved by a certain stress of public opinion to appoint him, for the impression then was that the failures of General Campos were due to a too lenient treatment, not simply of Cubans in the field but of Cubans apparently peaceful. Chiefly because of his reputation for severity in the former war, the Conservatives in Havana demanded him. He secured the important mission, indeed, mainly because as a man he lacked the high qualities possessed by Campos. It was pretended, however, that he had been especially instructed to moderate his ardor, a pretence doubtless suggested by the fear of possible complications with the United States.

The Cuban question had already been taken up by the United States Senate, and considerable excitement prevailed in New York as well as elsewhere in the country when the news of Weyler's appointment was received. The fear that the United States might recognize the belligerency of the Cubans hung like the sword of Damocles over the head of the Spanish Ministry, and while it was compelled to heed the clamors of the Conservatives in Havana and Madrid, it ostentatiously used every means calculated to avoid a declaration by this country which might double the force of the revolution.

Meanwhile, Gomez and Maceo had pushed through Madruga, Neuva-Paz, and Güines. When they reached the important railway line which unites Batabano to Havana, they destroyed it at several points, as also the telegraph lines. Having done this, the two chiefs separated; Gomez to go towards Havana, and Maceo to continue his march westward to bring the province of Pinar del Rio into the insurrection.

General Weyler brought over with him large reinforcements, and he must have begun his work for the pacification of the island with a force of about 140,000 men. According

to the official figures given out at Madrid, there had been at the outbreak of the insurrection 20,000 men for field work in the island. From that time to the 10th of March, 1896, there were sent over nine successive bodies of reinforcements aggregating a little more than 120,000 men.

It has been said that this made the largest military force ever transported by sea, and if it is added to the original permanent force, not counting the Volunteers in city garrisons, it makes an army of over 140,000, of which Weyler took command in an island no larger than Pennsylvania. Yet the Spanish government maintained that this was not a war!

The insurgents starting in February as only a handful of men in the province of Santiago de Cuba, in December consisted of about 50,000 men, not over half of whom were fully armed and equipped; the rest carried miscellaneous weapons. This army was divided into five corps, two in Santiago, one in Puerto Principe, and two in Matanzas and Santa Clara. These corps were subdivided into brigades and divisions, scattered here and there all over the island.

This was the force that General Weyler with about four times as many armed men at his command was to crush. So far as the insurgents were concerned, their great object had been nearly accomplished; they had spread the insurrection all over Cuba, and all that remained for them was to hold the island till Spain went into bankruptcy or some one should interfere. There was no more thought of taking Havana than there was of taking Madrid. Their work was simply to harass the Spanish at every opportunity and at every point, to capture their arms and to cut off all supplies and all revenue from the island.

Upon his arrival at Havana, General Weyler, much to the delight of the uncompromising Spaniards, issued several boastful proclamations announcing that the war should be conducted in the sharpest manner. One of his proclamations commanded the different municipal governments to send him lists of all persons in any way identified with the insurrection,

and announcing that all who did not surrender would be severely punished. It was generally understood that no quarter would be given. The first results of his efforts to find those likely to be identified with the insurgents was to bring under suspicion many people who had taken no part in the uprising, many mothers who perhaps had sons in the insurgent ranks, or peaceful Cubans who were known to have taken part in the Ten-Years War. No leniency was to be shown to Cuban prisoners of war. Cuban hospitals were to be ruthlessly destroyed and all found in them put to death. It was no longer to be civilized war. The brutality of the fierce Spanish guerilleros was not to be restrained by any humanitarian considerations so foreign to their nature. The shooting in cold blood of luckless young Cubans became a regular early morning scene about the Spanish garrisons, and many were the examples of Cuban heroism all unknown to the world except to the soldiers who delighted in this wanton cruelty.

Weyler's military achievements were chiefly conspicuous for their ineffectiveness. With Gomez and Maceo both in the regions of Havana when he boastfully took command, instead of throwing his vastly superior forces upon the insurgents, he adopted the expedient, always popular with Spanish commanders in Cuba, of building a fence. His idea was to prevent Maceo from getting into Pinar del Rio, or, if he should get in, to keep him there while he sent his columns against him. The boundary line between the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio lies close to the narrowest part of the island. At this narrowest part, between Artemisa and the Bay of Majara, Weyler, therefore, constructed another trocha about twenty-five miles long, and lying about forty miles west of Havana. This pretentious device was constructed in a country quite thickly settled, and therefore quite dissimilar from the jungle through which the Jucaro trocha was built. It differed also in character. A road wide enough to permit the cavalry to pass comfortably was bordered on each side by a ditch, three yards wide and three yards deep, in the lower

places filled with water. Along these trenches was stretched barbed wire — imported from the United States, of course. As the island was not admitted to be in a state of war, nothing was contraband so far as the Spanish were concerned, but everything was so far as the Cubans were concerned. Beyond the ditches and the wire fence, which it was supposed would offer some obstacles to cavalry, were dug rifle pits twenty feet apart, and at intervals of about 100 yards were built “forts,” so called, whose walls were formed by partitions of thick planks, a yard apart, the intervening space being filled with sand. At night this fortified line was lighted by electricity and the forts were connected by telephone wires. Twelve thousand men were concentrated on this elaborate highway, making it a permanent post, and 6,000 were placed toward Pinar del Rio and 6,000 more towards Havana to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce the troops on guard in case of an attack. This great military work is supposed to have cost nearly \$5,000,000. It was to aid in pacifying “a few bandits.”

But in spite of General Weyler's precautions, in the latter part of February Maceo led his forces across the incomplected trocha, and then recrossed to assist Gomez to carry the wounded out of reach of danger. Then he went on an expedition towards Matanzas, and Weyler announced in one of his glib proclamations that the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio were pacified and free from any large body of insurgents, whom he classed as outlaws to be dealt with by the mounted police. Both Maceo and Gomez were represented as fleeing towards the east before the victorious Spaniards. But Maceo escaped easily from the combination which had been planned by Weyler, and at the head of a large force, by quick marches through the swamps skirting the southern coast, once more appeared where he was least expected, determined to humble Weyler and return again to Pinar del Rio. On the 11th of March he suddenly attacked the city of Batabano, pillaged it, and burned a part of it. On the 14th he crossed the trocha again, and two days later fought

a fierce battle with the Spaniards in which he captured arms and ammunition, but the resistance was so spirited that Maceo's force was for a time divided.

Typical skirmishes and battles were taking place all over Cuba during the whole of the year 1896. Their description would be tedious and unnecessary, for they were much alike. They were nearly always reported as Spanish victories, though the insurgents roamed at will over every part of the island. Gomez had but one purpose — to wear out the Spanish. In July, General José Maceo was killed in a hard engagement in which his small army beat off the Spanish. Of the Maceo family none were left but Antonio. All had been sacrificed to Cuba Libre.

CHAPTER XIV

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN—THE SANGUILY CASE—CAPTURE OF THE *COMPETITOR*.

A New Insurrection Proclaimed — Diplomatic Friction — The *Alliance* Affair — Rights of American Citizens Ignored — Sanguily and Aguirre Arrested — A Sharp Interview — Threatening to Shoot American Citizens — The Consul's Strong Reply — Release of Aguirre — Sanguily Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life — His Lawyer Arrested and Placed in the same Jail — Spain's Protests and Complaints — American Sympathy with the Cubans — Palma Appeals for Recognition of the Cuban Republic — U. S. Senate Favors Recognition of Belligerency — Indignation of the Spanish Populace — The Belligerency Question — Opposed by the Administration — The Capture of the *Competitor* — Penalty of Death — Cares Transferred to the Madrid Court.

IF the people of the United States had felt upon the point of interfering in Cuban affairs during the Ten-Years War, the lovers of peace had abundant reasons for misgivings when the Cubans proclaimed a new insurrection in February, 1895. Cuba had become more closely identified with this country commercially; Americans controlled large property interests there and thousands of Cubans had meanwhile become citizens of the United States. While the far-sighted deemed it inevitable that this government would in time be brought into the conflict, there were few manifestations of concern at first, and conservative opinion all over the country was strongly set against any steps which should give Spain offense. But with a diplomacy such as Spain practiced, and methods of warfare such as she adhered to, it was absolutely impossible for a self-respecting nation to remain thoroughly cordial, and the diplomatic friction began almost immediately after the standard of revolt was raised.

The revolution was hardly two weeks old when a Spanish gunboat off Cape Maysi fired upon and chased an American steamer, the *Allianca*, which was engaged in regular traffic between New York and Colon. This act at once raised a flurry in the United States, whose people knew how prone Spain had been in the former war to interfere with American vessels, and it was feared that something like a *Virginius* affair might result. The government of the United States at once demanded an explanation of the conduct of the captain of the gunboat and an apology. It should be remembered that no state of war existed affording any excuse for firing on American vessels. Spain at that time, engaged in putting down the outbreak of army officers in Madrid, knew well enough that if an outrage were committed on American commerce the United States might step in and grant belligerent rights to the Cubans, and her ministers very quickly disavowed the act with full expressions of regret and assurance of a non-recurrence of such an event, while the offending officer was relieved of his command.

But the State Department of the United States soon found that it had much more serious business on hand in protecting the rights of American citizens in Cuba. As already related, one of the first acts of the Captain-General at the outbreak of the rebellion was to place the western provinces under martial law, and on the day of the outbreak many arrests were made in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas, the revolution in that quarter being for the time suppressed. Two of the persons arrested in Havana were Julio Sanguily and José Aguirre, both American citizens. The former had been a brave and efficient officer in the Ten-Years War, had been wounded seven times, and, whether the Spanish authorities had any evidence against him or not, they naturally assumed that his sympathies were with the insurgents, though since the war he had become an American citizen. On the morning of the 24th of February, Sanguily was arrested at his house while taking a bath, a circumstance which furnished no positive

proof of his connection with the uprising of that day. He was thrown with others into Cabaña fortress, and subjected at once to trial by court-martial in direct violation of the treaty between the United States and Spain of January 12, 1877, which provided that American citizens arrested without arms in hand should not be tried by any exceptional tribunal but by those of ordinary or civil jurisdiction.

Our consul-general at Havana, Ramon O. Williams, went on the morning of the 25th to Captain-General Calleja and informed him that both Sanguily and Aguirre were naturalized citizens of the United States, and as such were duly inscribed in the register of foreigners kept in the office of the Governor-General. He remonstrated against the commitment to court-martial and asked for their immediate transfer to the civil jurisdiction. The Captain-General pretended to be surprised that they were American citizens and instantly answered the consul in an outburst of most violent language and gesture, saying that it was a disgrace to the American flag for the government of the United States to protect these men, who, it was notoriously known, were conspirators against the government of Spain; and, growing more violent, he exclaimed that many citizens of the United States were conspiring in Cuba against Spain, and that he would shoot every one of them caught in arms regardless of the consequences.

"But, General," interposed the consul calmly, "in carrying out such measures you will surely observe in all its parts the agreement between the two governments?"

"Yes, in observance of the agreement," he said, somewhat more moderately.

"Well, General, that is all I have come to ask for, but these American citizens, instead of having been committed before a civil court in observance of the agreement have been subjected to a trial by court-martial contrary to the agreement; for neither of them has been captured with arms in hand against the government, but both were arrested by the municipal police while peacefully deporting themselves in the city."

Calleja merely observed that the law governing the residence of foreigners in the island was paramount to the treaty between the United States and Spain. The consul firmly replied that his government would not admit such a construction of it. Calleja said the prisoners might apply to his judge-advocate, who would see whether they were entitled to rights under the treaty. As the judge-advocate was a creature of the Captain-General, he doubtless would have decided that the prisoners had no rights. Our consul firmly maintained that in deciding such a question no Spanish judge-advocate should supersede the diplomatic representative of the United States, and that he should at once take steps to formally remonstrate. Calleja again became excited.

"Your defense of these men is a disgrace to the American flag!" he exclaimed.

"General," replied the consul, "I am acting entirely within the confines of my official duty and in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States, and in strict conformity with the agreement of the 12th of January, 1877"; and he then bade Calleja good morning and withdrew. The incident, which is thus related in the diplomatic correspondence, serves to illustrate how lightly Spanish officials regarded treaty obligations, and shows also their feeling towards the United States. About a month later Sanguily was transferred to the civil jurisdiction, but he was almost immediately arrested upon another and a ridiculous charge, and submitted to a court-martial on that without any information being officially conveyed to the consul, who learned of it only through Sanguily's attorney in the other case. Another protest was made, and the Captain-General pretended to comply with the demand, but Sanguily was kept in military prison, and apparently it was to keep him there that the second charge was trumped up.

Four months later the consul wrote to the State Department that the cases of both Sanguily and Aguirre presented the anomaly that, while arrested at the very outbreak of the re-

bellion, they had not been brought to trial, though others arrested solely on suspicion were subjected to extreme arbitrary measures. "They are discriminated against on account of their quality of being American citizens," wrote the consul to the Secretary of State. In September, in view of the delay, the State Department demanded the instant release of Sanguily and Aguirre, and the latter was released, a promise being given that Sanguily would be tried soon. As a matter of fact, the authorities had no case against him. The courts in December took up his case, and, although the evidence adduced against him was of the flimsiest character, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Justice at Madrid, which ordered a new trial. In the last days of December, 1896, nearly two years after his arrest, he was again tried and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Meanwhile, his health had become broken in prison and he begged to be allowed to leave the island with his family. Another appeal was taken and still he languished in prison. Meanwhile, the lawyer who defended him in the first trial, and who made a magnificent defense, was arrested and looked from the bars of a cell adjoining Sanguily's in Cabaña fort, and the lawyer who managed his first appeal before the Madrid court was made to suffer so much in consequence that it was difficult to find any one who would undertake his second appeal there.

As in the Ten-Years War, Spain was constantly making strong protests and bitter complaints against the alleged aid that the Cubans were receiving from sympathizers in the United States. Our government did all it could. Proclamations were issued warning citizens, and instructing officials to renew their vigilance, and a large expense, over \$2,000,000, was incurred in keeping a fleet of cutters in southern waters to intercept expeditions, many times to the annoyance of those engaged in legitimate business. The Cuban expeditionists were so sharp that they frequently escaped without being suspected by the Spanish spies or caught by the authorities. No government could have done more to live up to its obligations.

Meantime, it was inevitable that the successes of a people struggling for their freedom from oppression should be welcome to the people of this country. When Campos was driven into Bayamo, the adherents of the policy of recognition gained evident strength and Congress manifested a decided disposition to act. Public meetings were held in many cities and towns expressing sympathy with the Cubans. These expressions were not dictated out of any hatred to Spain as a nation, but out of a natural dislike of her methods in Cuba. But the Spaniard could not bring himself to comprehend how the people of the United States could be actuated by a desire to see an oppressed people free. To the Spanish character such a sentiment would be entirely inexplicable. They could find no other motive for our interest in Cuba except in a desire to possess her by fair means or foul. They had not learned that the Civil War had greatly changed the sentiment of this country towards Cuba.

In the latter part of 1895 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations took up the question of our attitude towards the new Cuban Republic. Palma, the Cuban representative at Washington, had made a strong appeal for recognition, and the claims of the Cubans were set forth in detail. By that time Gomez and Maceo had made their remarkable march of invasion and were the masters of the rural districts and were overrunning Havana province. Campos was about to be succeeded by Weyler, whose unpleasant reputation gave additional strength to the Cuban cause in this country. Even under Campos the people had been shocked by authentic accounts of the treatment of insurgent prisoners by the Spaniards, while the insurgents themselves treated the Spanish prisoners in a manner approved by civilized warfare. Early in February the Senate committee reported a concurrent resolution to the effect that the war had reached a magnitude which concerned all civilized nations, and if it were to continue it should be conducted on both sides on principles acknowledged to be obligatory upon civilized nations, and that the President,

if he concurred in this opinion, should in a friendly spirit use the good offices of the government in requesting Spain to accord to the armies with which she was engaged the rights of belligerents. But President Cleveland was evidently opposed to interfering in Cuban affairs, and it was said to be at the administration's instance that the resolution was made concurrent instead of joint, the custom being not to send resolutions of the former character to the President.

After a long debate the Senate passed by a vote of 64 to 6 a resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency, and interposing our friendly offices in behalf of Cuban independence. The House passed resolutions essentially the same by a vote of 263 to 16. This undoubtedly was a fair expression of the sentiment of the people of the United States. From this time forth, therefore, only the delicate requirements of international law could prevent interference by this nation, and it became a question of time when diplomacy should give way to sentiment and action.

The Spanish populace was much wrought up over this expression of opinion; our legation at Madrid had to be placed under guard, and at Barcelona our consular headquarters were attacked and the Stars and Stripes contemptuously treated. Spain hastened, however, to apologize and to offer reparation for those acts. She was frightened. But as these resolutions had no effect in shaping our active policy towards Spain, we continued to live up to the requirements of international law and to seize vessels and cargoes suspected to be intended for Cubans.

Notwithstanding the violent feelings which the Spanish in Spain and Havana were manifesting towards the United States, the Spanish government showed its desire to conciliate this country. General Weyler received our new consul-general, Lee, at Havana with marked cordiality. General Lee's military experience and professional training made him unusually competent to ascertain the exact state of affairs in Cuba, and he was not a man to be hoodwinked or cajoled when

the interests of the United States were in danger. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1896, the presidential campaign diverted public interest in a great degree from the struggle going on in the oppressed island. It had become evident that it would remain for the next administration to determine what should be our policy towards the Cubans, against whose armies General Weyler was making poor headway, though he was beginning to treat the innocent and the helpless with a disregard for human instincts which excited the horror of the civilized world.

On the last day of April, 1896, the American schooner *Competitor* from Key West, with part of her crew, was captured near San Cayetano while engaged, as the Spanish alleged, in landing arms for the insurgents. She was towed to Havana, and our consul at once demanded that the protocol of 1877 be adhered to in the trial of any Americans who might be among the crew. The minister to Spain was urged also to request that the Captain-General be instructed to a strict observance of that treaty. The Spanish admiral claimed, however, that these men did not come within the treaty inasmuch as they were not "citizens of the United States residing in Spanish dominions," one clause of the treaty. We claimed that in the part of the treaty covering such cases there was nothing making residence of American citizens within Spanish dominions a condition necessary to entitle them to all its guarantees. The Spanish government promptly sent orders to Cuba for the suspension of all executive action till an examination had been made as to the standing of the Americans captured. But three days later the Spanish admiral officially informed our consul that the treaty did not apply to the American prisoners and that they would be tried by court-martial.

The Spanish prosecuting officer asked for penalty of death for all on the ground that the local law for foreigners took precedence in such a case over any treaty, and the obedient court quickly pronounced a death sentence. Secretary Olney at once urged upon the Spanish minister at Washington that exe-

cutions should not take place till this government had been permitted to examine the proceedings of the court, and as a result the Spanish government, much to Weyler's indignation, ordered the cases transferred to the Madrid court. This meant indefinite delay.

The summer months passed by, the prisoners complained of insufficient food, were afflicted with prison fever, and some of them were transferred to the military hospital. On September 3d Secretary Olney cabled the minister at Madrid that the delay in deciding the *Comptitor* and other cases which had meanwhile arisen was "absolutely unreasonable. Call for prompt action and reasons justifying past delay or additional delay, if such is asked for." Thereupon the minister was informed that the authorities of the Madrid court had ordered a new trial before an ordinary tribunal, and that the decision would be made public "soon." But the time passed on, and late in November the consul at Havana accidentally heard that the marine court-martial was again trying the prisoners. He asked for an authorization to protest, but the State Department upon investigation was informed that it was only a preliminary proceeding.

Congress soon afterwards called for the correspondence and took the matter in hand, but Spain continued to hold the men in prison, and it was long before their fate was determined.


CHAPTER XV.

WEYLER'S EFFORTS TO CAPTURE MACEO—WEYLER PROPOSES TO STRIKE A DECISIVE BLOW—THE NEW COMMANDER—DEATH OF THE LAST OF THE MACEOS.

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation—Weyler's Futile Efforts to Capture Him—The Largest Body-Guard Known in the History of War—Maceo as Undaunted as Ever—He Leaves Pinar del Rio—Was it a Spanish Trap?—Attack at Punta Brava—How Maceo Fell—Gomez's Son Kills Himself at His Side—Cubans Rescue Maceo's Body—Rejoicing of the Spanish People—Excursions to the Spot Where Maceo Fell—Hopes of Cuban Surrender Disappointed—Maceo's Successor, Rivera—Insurgent Successes—Weyler Criticised at Madrid—Weyler's Inaccurate Reports—Weyler's Campaign of Destruction—A Gallant Fighter—Preferring Death to Captivity—General Garcia takes Command.

THE terror of the proud Spanish nation was the dusky Maceo. Weyler had constructed a five-million-dollar trocha and garrisoned it with about twenty thousand men to prevent Maceo from escaping from Pinar del Rio, but it soon appeared that the dashing Cuban had no particular desire to escape. With a force at his command of less than 4,000 armed men, he moved about the province of the west at will, capturing and destroying the garrison towns and so terrorizing the Spanish soldiers that they dared not move except in large columns, and these, moving slowly about in a hilly country, were at the constant mercy of the cleverly-handled insurgents. It was evident that unless Maceo could be subdued, Weyler's boasted trocha would be set down as a failure. Hence, Weyler's chief object was the capture of the Cuban general.

More reinforcements came from Spain, and at the end of the wet season Weyler took the field in person and with much



FAMOUS CUBAN LEADERS IN CUBA'S WAR WITH SPAIN.
General Maximiliano Gómez.
General Antonio Maceo.

General Antonio Maceo.
General Don Julio Sanguilly.

éclat, but despite his reports of successful engagements with Maceo's army a continuous stream of wounded Spanish soldiers found their way back to Havana.

Soon Weyler returned and announced that the province was "pacified." But shortly came reports, which the censor was unable wholly to smother, that Maceo was capturing garrisons, and driving into fatal ambush the Spanish detachments sent against him. Again Weyler took the field. Three times he did this with the same results. In November he went forth with the largest body-guard ever known in the history of war, a cordon of 6,000 men, whose duty it was to care for his personal safety in a "pacified" province. At his command were over 60,000 troops to capture an army but one-fifteenth as large. Yet, as undaunted as ever in the gloomy gorges of the hills, within sight of the trocha, was the man against whom Weyler had made his showy marches.

Maceo was as strong in that province as ever, in spite of the columns which Weyler had sent against him. There he might have remained and possibly might have lived till Cuba was free. But he had other plans. Just why Maceo at this time left his army to another gifted guerrilla chief, Ruis Rivera, has never been satisfactorily explained. That he left it because it was in sore distress, as the Spanish averred, and because he wished to learn why he was not reinforced, is absurd. His army was not in distress and Maceo had no fear of death. For years, time after time, he had rushed into the thickest of the battle laughing at the Spanish bullets in the belief that they would not hit him unless fate willed it so. The most plausible explanation of his move is that he proposed to leave the Pinar del Rio forces to Rivera to carry on the war there while he joined the forces operating in Havana province, thereby accomplishing the double purpose of making an aggressive movement under the nose of the boasting Weyler, and diverting his attention from the western province, which Rivera could then easily hold. At the same time that Maceo started eastward, Gomez started westward. With a

guard of about a dozen of his staff Maceo suddenly crossed the trocha at the north and appeared in the province of Havana where he was apparently expected by the Cubans, and where he was least expected by the Spaniards, unless it is true that he was enticed over the trocha by a plot and drawn into a Spanish trap. He quickly gathered about him a small force of Cubans operating in the western part of Havana province, and on December 7th was suddenly attacked by a superior Spanish force under Colonel Cirujeda at Punta Brava. While Maceo was in the center of his staff, a heavy volley was fired directly at them and Maceo was shot in the neck and fell from his horse mortally wounded. Several of his staff also fell, while one of them galloped back to secure aid to carry away Maceo's body. Gomez's son, also on Maceo's staff, remained by the body and, when he could no longer defend it, seems to have killed himself and fallen at Maceo's side. The Spaniards rifled Maceo's body of his jewels, but probably without knowing whose they were, for the body was left on the field and afterwards buried by the Cubans in a spot which remained a secret to all except a few.

Great was the Spanish rejoicing. Royal flags were hoisted everywhere in Madrid, and bells were rung, while the Queen sent a gift to the wife of the Spanish officer whose men killed Maceo. As soon as the news reached Havana, a grand torch-light procession was organized, and after a long march through the illuminated streets, it proceeded to the palace where a great crowd was assembled. General Weyler was received amid cries of "Long live Spain!" "Long live the King!" and in response he said that he would now speedily pacify the island. A few days later, there was a great excursion from Havana to Punta Brava, and a fête on the spot where Maceo fell. On the arrival of the excursionists they were received by the officers, and there were speeches and much jubilation.

But General Weyler's expectations of a speedy breaking up of the rebellion were disappointed. He fully believed that the Cubans in Pinar del Rio would rush in and lay down their

arms. But no one surrendered except Dr. Zertucha, a man denounced by the Cubans as a traitor, while every night the volleys of the insurgent skirmishers could be heard in the suburbs of Havana.

General Rivera, Maceo's successor in Pinar del Rio, took up a position in one of Maceo's old strongholds. In a few days General Weyler went again, in person, and with a strong force, to the province which he had declared pacified. The insurgents were more active than ever, and the discouraging effect of the bullet which had gladdened Spanish hearts by killing Maceo was only temporary. After Weyler had marched his men about the hills till they were tired out, and had won no signal advantage over the insurgents, he made his way back again towards Havana, and the Madrid papers were so vehement in their criticisms that the government seized them and began action against their proprietors.

As Weyler's position became more insecure at Madrid, he became more reckless in fixing the character of reports. Without a word of truth Gomez was represented as desirous to treat with him for peace, though Gomez at the very moment was aggressively attacking Spanish forces in Santa Clara. Pinar del Rio was again declared as pacified, and within a few hours reports came to Havana that a Spanish division had been completely routed by Rivera, who had drawn the Spanish troops into a tight place in the hills, and then charged with terrible effect; nearly three hundred Spaniards were killed, and as many more wounded, while the Cuban loss was small. This report was suppressed by the censors, and the government circulated a report that Rivera had been killed. It was a desperate game and could not be expected to last long.

Unable to drive the Cubans out of Havana province with his greatly superior army, Weyler ordered the destruction of all plantations and buildings in the province which could be likely in any way to prove useful to the insurgents. He did not seem to recognize the fact that he was doing exactly what the insurgents had been doing for two years in order to de-

prive the Spaniards of revenue. He was helping the insurgents carry on their campaign. Thus the whole island, except in the east, where the insurgents were in full control, where they collected taxes and where some industries were proceeding under their protection, was made a desert. About Havana and Matanzas the Spaniards destroyed everything within their reach, and the insurgents did the same. If the Cubans came to a patch of potatoes they took what they wanted and destroyed the rest so that the Spaniards could not have them. If the Spaniards arrived at the patch first they did the same thing.

Gomez had started westward at about the same time Maceo began his fatal journey eastward. The plan of his campaign was to move westward slowly, augmenting his force with the various brigades scattered along the route, and also by the army of General Garcia from the east. Meanwhile he detached two divisions, which made their way westward, and were soon operating in Weyler's rear.

General Calixto Garcia, who arrived in the island somewhat later than the other Cuban leaders, was one of the best-known fighters for Cuban freedom. He had fought with great ardor during the Ten-Years War, and shortly afterwards when he found that Spain did not intend to keep her promises made at Zanjón, he took up arms again. But his small force was surrounded by the vigilant Spaniards, and, rather than be captured, he deliberately shot himself. The bullet passed from his chin through his tongue and came out between his eyebrows, and to the end of his life the opening remained from the roof of his mouth to his forehead. He always kept a bit of cotton in the hole in his forehead, a peculiarity which can be distinguished in his photographs.

Having been captured when thus wounded, he finally escaped from prison and wandered about the world till the new war began. Then he remained in the United States for a time, fitting out expeditions for Cuba. At last he arrived there and took command of the army of the East.

CHAPTER XVI

THE MURDER OF DR. RUIZ AND THE THREATENED RESIGNATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE — RELEASE OF SANGUILY — ON THE VERGE OF WAR — SPAIN ALARMED.

Congress Stirred by Stories of the Death of Maceo — The Cameron Resolution — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe the United States — Spain Seeks European Support — "Independence or Death" — Weyler in Disfavor — The Murderous Fondeviela — Killing of Dr. Ruiz — No Notice Given to Consul-General Lee — Lee Not Supported at Washington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott — Lee's Forceful Despatch — He Threatens to Resign — A Dramatic Climax — Cuban Sympathizers Classed as Jingoers — Senator Sherman's Defense — Its Significance — Demand for a Ship-of-War for Havana — Sudden Release of Sanguiely — Spain Alarmed.

FOR some weeks prior to the reassembling of Congress in December, 1896, it was apparent that the people of the United States would not permit the Cuban situation to drag along indefinitely. In behalf of the Cubans, both parties had inserted a strong plank in their platform, and the hopes of the Cuban sympathizers, which had been dashed by President Cleveland's inaction, eagerly awaited the coming administration of William McKinley. That our interference would be tolerated, if, indeed, it were not welcomed by British interests, was evident from editorials in leading English papers. The chaotic condition of industry and commerce in Cuba could not be longer endured with complacency, when there was no evidence that the Spaniards could pacify the island, and when Spanish atrocities seemed to warrant interference on the grounds of humanity alone. Indignation meetings were held all over the United States, and were often addressed by leading and influential men. There was little interest in President

Cleveland's message — his last annual state paper — except in his references to Cuba. He reviewed the struggle and saw no prospects of its early termination, and he suggested that if Spain should offer to Cuba a full measure of home rule, Cuba remaining subject to the Spanish sovereignty, such a solution might be satisfactory on both sides, and the United States might well consent to give guarantees for the carrying out of the arrangement. For the present he recommended our government to pursue our usual course. But hardly had the message been printed when the people were aroused by the stories of the fate of Maceo.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations proceeded to action at once, and, notwithstanding the fact that Secretary Olney departed from custom and appeared before the committee and advised against any action by Congress, it unanimously passed a joint resolution, introduced and championed by Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania, acknowledging the independence of the Republic of Cuba. It was evident that the time was drawing near when something would be done, and but for the fact that a new administration was about to take up the responsibilities of office, Congress would have done its best to force the Executive to take action.

The Spanish people were again greatly aroused by the action of the committee. Popular feeling was evidently in favor of boldly defying the United States and of notifying this government that Cuba would be retained if it took Spain's last dollar and her last man to uphold her sovereignty. But the government of Spain, in spite of the clamors of the people, maintained a dignified attitude, relying on the influence of President Cleveland to oppose interference for the time, and again made it known that it would soon, or as soon as the condition of the island permitted, institute a system of autonomy similar to that in Puerto Rico and would liberalize the commercial regulations. Spanish statesmen seemed always to consider that the mere announcement of reform purposes would effectually soothe the feelings of American people.

On December 21st the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made a long report citing for the right of intervention a long line of European precedents, and showing that Europe has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere, separately and collectively, amicably and forcibly, when questions of independence were involved. The situation in Cuba and the duty of the United States as the committee saw it were stated, and it was claimed that there could be no rational interference except on the basis of independence. Congress then adjourned over for the holidays.

Meanwhile, Spanish policy was directed towards securing support from other European powers. She labored desperately to show the powers that her troubles with this country were also theirs, and it was evident she expected aid in defying "the Yankee." The attitude of France and Austria appeared to be favorable; they sympathized with Spain but were non-committal. The Vatican was of course distinctly favorable to Spain's cause. England offered little encouragement. President Cisneros of the Cuban Republic allowed it to be distinctly understood that it would treat with Spain only on the basis of the absolute independence of Cuba, and the Spanish journals announced that, while the death of Maceo implied the stupefaction of the insurgents, only the destruction of a large insurgent force or the complete pacification of a province could be sufficient for the establishment of the contemplated reforms. They looked to see General Weyler follow up the advantage which accident had thrown in his hands, but as the days elapsed, and the fruitlessness of Weyler's campaigns became apparent, they gave way to a spirit of criticism of the man who was so continually boasting of what he would do but never did it.

As soon as Congress reassembled after the holidays it appeared that there was little chance of the passage of the Cameron resolutions, which were successfully side-tracked. As the last days of the administration approached it was apparent that Spain had only contempt for President Cleveland's policy

of friendly mediation, had never seriously considered it, was proposing reforms only for effect upon the coming administration, that the Cubans would take no notice of it, and that the people of the United States rejected such a policy with scorn and were simply waiting for McKinley. This attitude was reflected in Congress and nothing was attempted with the resolutions of recognition. Fearing that the coming administration might not be so easily trifled with, the Spanish journals, which, in treating of the United States, had long been insolent, pretentious, and bombastic, became for the time very conciliatory.

While Weyler was in the field in Santa Clara, and at that moment when it was expected that he would engage Gomez and either fall or conquer, the murderous Fondeviela in his bloody operations at Guanabacoa became so reckless as to make American citizens his victims. Several Americans were already under arrest and lodged in various prisons at points held by the Spaniards, and the State Department had been diplomatically busy in looking out for their interests. It was difficult for General Lee to obtain any satisfactory reasons why these persons were arrested and thrown into vile prison holes, and all protests and demands were met by that evasive shifting policy which had always characterized Spain's dealings with American interests.

Among those arrested about the middle of February at Fondeviela's orders was Dr. Richard Ruiz, a naturalized American citizen who had studied and practiced dentistry in Philadelphia for many years before going to Cuba. He was charged with having assisted in the derailment of a train, when some Spanish officers were captured by the insurgent General Aranguren, and magnanimously released. The charge was of the flimsiest character, as the doctor had the reputation among all of attending strictly to business and of not meddling in any way with revolutionary movements. He was thrown into the Guanabacoa jail, no communication with him being allowed, and on the afternoon of February 17th he was found

dead in a cell, there being little doubt that he had been beaten to death by the jailers at Fondeviela's orders. The Spanish authorities, as usual, had failed to give our consul any official notice of the arrest, and Consul-General Lee heard of it only unofficially. He was fully aroused.

General Lee had experienced some difficulty in having his efforts in behalf of arrested American citizens satisfactorily supported at Washington, where the administration was apparently clinging to a hope that something might result from Spain's abundant promises. Spain had given a semi-official assurance that Sanguily would be released, but the release did not come, and, meanwhile, other American citizens were pining away in jail, and others were being arrested and disposed of in utter disregard of their rights as American citizens. It was stated in the papers that General Lee had kept the wires busy informing the State Department as to the death of Ruiz, and the arrest of other Americans, but had received no reply. Ten days before he had sent a despatch, saying that Charles Scott, an American citizen, had been arrested at Regla, charges unknown, as usual. Scott had been eleven days *incommunicado*, and it was reported to the consul that he had been several times under severe torture.

It was reported in the newspapers that Lee had made a demand for warships for a protection, had been refused, and had sent in his resignation. The feelings of the people were greatly aroused; Congress became more bitter against the administration, and immediately called for the correspondence and reports of the consul-general at Havana relating to all American citizens in prison, whose cases had not been before reported on. It was not submitted till three days before the Cleveland administration went out of office. From this report it appears that General Lee sent the following telegram to the State Department on February 20th:

"Charles Scott, a citizen of the United States, arrested Regla; no charge given. Been without communication, jail, Havana, two hundred and sixty four hours. Cannot stand another Ruiz murder and have de-

manded his release. How many war vessels Key West or within reach and will they be ordered here at once if necessary to sustain demand?"

Whatever the reply to this telegram, the State Department did not submit it to the Senate committee, not being compatible with public interests. Its nature may be judged from Gen. Lee's next despatch to Secretary Olney, which appears in the document:

"HAVANA, February 23, 1897.

"Situation simple; experience at Guanabacoa made it my duty to demand, before too late, that another American who had been incommunicado two hundred and sixty-four hours, be released from said incommunicado, and did so in courteous terms. If you support it, and Scott is so released, the trouble will terminate. If you do not, I must depart. All others arrested with Scott have been put in communication. Why should only American in lot not be? He has been incommunicado now three hundred and thirty-eight hours.

LEE."

That day the Spanish authorities complied with Lee's demand, as is seen from the following dispatch:

"HAVANA, February 23, 1897.

"Scott released from incommunicado to-day, on demand, after fourteen days' solitary confinement in cell five feet by eleven; damp; water on bottom cell. Not allowed anything to sleep on, or chair; discharges of the body removed once in five days. Was charged with having Cuban postage stamps in house. Scott says went always twelve hours without water, once two days. He is employe American Gas Company.

LEE."

Rather graphic, if concise, were these two dispatches of a single day, but they serve to illustrate the treatment received by Americans in Spanish hands on more than one occasion, indeed, almost continually during the war. In Santiago those alleging American citizenship were arrested early in the war, and their fate remained a mystery. There were known to be at this time about forty Americans in Spanish prisons in Cuba, against whom charges had long been pending and never tried, or against whom no charges whatever had been preferred.

From the day of the arrest of Dr. Ruiz to the day of his death the Spanish authorities, though having his papers in their

possession, never took the trouble to inform General Lee that he had been arrested, and he was only kept informed of the course of events from unofficial sources. This alone constituted a grave breach of international law. Yet, the case of Ruiz was one of daily occurrence in Cuba then, with this difference that the victim was usually a Cuban. It was the custom of Spanish officials to torture and, perhaps, murder their defenseless prisoners in their attempts to wring from them a desired confession incriminating them, as well as others, in some imaginary offense.

In investigating the case of Ruiz, Consul-General Lee demanded that the body be turned over to him, and that an autopsy be performed by two physicians, one an American, to be designated by himself. The acting Captain-General in Weyler's absence, Ahumada, saw that Lee was aroused and complied. The consul and physician proceeded to Guanabacoa, where Fondeviela tried to delay them, but they insisted and went to the jail to find that the body had been placed in a cart and was about to be taken away. A little delay would have prevented an investigation, which showed that Ruiz had met a horrible death, in a cell which would in a short time have proved the death of any man; that he had been arrested on a trumped-up charge, and that he had been kept incommunicado, like so many others, though, under our treaty with Spain, no American citizen could be held in close confinement for more than seventy-two hours.

For months General Lee had placed overwhelming proofs before the State Department that not a single provision of the treaty rights secured to us by Cushing and Pinckney was being observed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, but Lee's friends claimed that his representations had not only been kept from the public, but had drawn no reply from the executive department. Lee had submitted in silence to a position so little to his liking and probably would have done so till the end of the administration, which was so near, but for the murder of Ruiz, of whose imprisonment he had notified the State Department

and of whose fate he had warned it. He had taken the same course in the case of Scott, whose wife went to Lee in tears and said that he was being tortured, and, she feared, killed, though arrested only because he had a Cuban stamp in his stamp collection.

The threatened resignation of Lee, unless upheld in his efforts to protect American citizens, precipitated a dramatic climax to the administration's conciliatory Cuban policy, and stirred Congress, with but a few hours longer to exist, into one of its most heated debates of Cuban affairs. The Cameron resolution for the recognition of the Cubans had already been set aside, and everyone had accepted as a fact that the delicate problems involved would be left to the new administration with our Spanish relations still cordial, when Lee's practical request for warships came like a bombshell in a quiet camp. Secretary Olney had evidently endeavored to ward off an open rupture with Spain at any cost, while the Spaniards of Cuba, thinking, apparently, that Americans could be attacked with impunity, began to vent their natural hatred. Congress had nourished a feeling of contempt for our diplomatic forbearance with Spain, but, like others, had given up attempts at action. The conservative element which feared war and the burdens it might involve even with a power so weak as Spain, had found it easy to avoid sympathy for a few American citizens, most of whom were of Cuban birth, and the conservative press immediately branded any one who demanded that the government should compel Spain to live up to its treaty obligations as a "jingo."

But when the Ruiz incident and Lee's position became known, strong resolutions for insisting upon the protection of American citizens were introduced in the Senate and passed without division, and a resolution demanding the immediate release of Sanguily was also passed after a strong argument by Senator Sherman, who, in four days, was to take Olney's place at the head of the State department. "I trust the time will never come," he said, "when an American citizen can be

wronged or persecuted by any power, great or small. I am in favor of protecting this American citizen, though he is a naturalized citizen. I am opposed to wrong and tyranny and violence wherever it is exercised, and when it is exercised against an American I will stand up for him even if I am alone." "If I had my way," exclaimed Senator Frye of Maine, "a ship of war would start forthwith for Havana."

Spain was alarmed. At noon the next day a telegram reached Havana from Madrid for the immediate release of Sanguly. In two hours he walked feebly out of a prison where he had been kept, without a shadow of evidence to justify it, for over two years. Spain saw that it was no time to trifle with the United States. If she had not acted speedily the McKinley administration would have begun with a war. It is probably also true that had not the strained relations between General Lee and the State Department leaked out through Havana, Sanguly would have remained in jail. Secretary Olney had made public nothing concerning the condition of affairs, and the attention of Congress would not then have been called to them but for the newspaper reports. By Sanguly's release the tension at Washington relaxed, and the public mind was absorbed by the inauguration of a new administration.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897—HELPLESS WOMEN AND CHILDREN—AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE—FACING STARVATION AND DEATH.

Attitude of the McKinley Administration—Another Decree of Autonomy—Weyler's War on the Pacificos—On the Verge of Starvation—Unparalleled Scenes of Suffering—Weyler's Reasons for Concentrating—A Death Warrant to Thousands of the Innocent and Helpless—Driven from Burning Homes—Huddled in Swamps—A Plague Spot on Earth—A Spanish Account of Misery—The Living and the Dead Together—Scenes at the very Gates of Havana—Heaped Pell-mell like Animals—The Dead in the Embrace of the Dying—Extermination the Real Object—Daily Execution of Captured Peasants—The Massacres of Pacificos—The Dead Carts on Their Rounds—Facts Impossible to be Exaggerated—Incredulity in the United States.

FROM the first, the McKinley administration in courteous and diplomatic language gave Spain to understand that neither the people nor the government of the United States could regard with complacency an indefinite continuation of the existing condition of things in Cuba, and, as before, the friendly services of the United States were placed at the disposal of Spain in any way that might conduce to peace in the island and the institution of genuine reforms. But the two nations regarded Cuba from utterly irreconcilable standpoints.

Spain's ministry recognized in the attitude of the new administration a determination not to be so easily trifled with as before, and it therefore proceeded to release more American prisoners, and to make in its diplomacy as well as in the public prints great pretensions concerning a new scheme of autonomy which it was proposed to introduce, but in which lurked the insincerity characterizing all the plans of reform which Spain

had from time to time been "meditating" for forty years. The Queen Regent signed the decree for these reforms on April 29th, and one of the humors of the act was that it was done upon the assurance of General Weyler that the four western provinces were at last completely pacified. That the reforms were intended to hoodwink the United States was evident from many circumstances, and the Havana papers quietly laughed at the cry of "Weyler and Reform."

The administration was not deceived by Weyler's assurances, and while hoping for the best from the alleged reforms, it proposed to examine into Cuba itself. President McKinley appointed William J. Calhoun of Illinois a special commissioner for the purpose of acting with General Lee in an investigation of the Ruiz case.

Meanwhile, the enormous expenses of Weyler's management of affairs had produced something like a financial crisis at Havana. The debt had risen to \$425,000,000, and the revenue the Spanish could collect in the first two years of the war amounted to only \$25,000,000.

It will now be necessary to examine briefly a feature of General Weyler's methods in Cuba to which full justice could hardly be done in a whole volume — his war on the pacificos. There is no parallel for it in history. If a true and adequate history of it is ever written, it will be the largest and darkest picture of man's inhumanity ever drawn. Nothing in real life has quite so closely approached the tortures of the damned in the poetic dreams of Dante as the punishment deliberately imposed upon the innocent and the helpless, old men and old women, mothers with babes in their arms, Cuban maidens and Cuban boys. And the remarkable thing about it is that it was taking place at the end of the nineteenth century within a hundred miles of the shores of the United States while many of its citizens were crying "Peace!" "It is none of our business!" "Do not interfere!"

In October, 1896, while Weyler, who had shown no military talents in the field, was vainly throwing his forces into

Pinar del Rio, he conceived the idea that the quickest way to pacify the insurgents was to make war against the peaceful Cubans. Seeing that the movements of his columns were always made known to the Cuban leaders, thus giving them the opportunity of making ambushes, disastrous to Spanish columns, he thought that if the *pacificos* were driven from the country to the fortified towns, their houses and crops destroyed and their property confiscated, they could no longer aid the insurgents with information, shelter, or food. Having obtained permission from Madrid, therefore, he issued a decree on October 21st that all the inhabitants of the country districts or those who resided outside the lines of fortifications of the towns should within eight days enter the towns, and any individual found outside the lines in the country at the expiration of that period should be considered a rebel and should be "dealt with as such" — which in guerrilla Spanish meant that he should be shot or hacked to death with machetes. The decree further stated that the transportation of food from one place to another without the permission of the military authorities at the place of departure was absolutely forbidden. The owners of cattle were ordered to drive their herds to the towns.

Most of these men and women were of the *guajiro* class, respectable, hard-working farmers on a small scale. On three or four acres of land they raised all the necessities of their simple lives, and even the luxuries, including coffee and tobacco. But they were naturally improvident in a land which was ever productive, and thus they had few resources to fall back upon in such unfortunate circumstances as Weyler's order suddenly forced upon them.

This death warrant of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, particularly women and children, was sent to the governors of the western provinces — it could not, of course, be carried out in the two eastern provinces which the Cubans controlled — and the governors made it known to the leaders of the Spanish guerrillas, who were intrusted with the task of in-

forming the country people that they must leave their homesteads and belongings and remove to the appointed places of concentration. As these guerrillas, composed exclusively of Spanish jail-birds, were notorious for their inhumanity and outrages upon defenseless Cubans, brutality being a part of their trade, it may be imagined how the order was carried out. The people were not allowed to take away with them any property but what they could carry on their backs, and, as they fled away to the stations where they were destined to die of starvation and epidemic diseases, they saw their homes go up in smoke, their crops burned down, and their cattle and oxen confiscated to feed the hated Spanish troops. Wherever the peasants resisted they were driven in at the point of the gun, or shot down to avoid further trouble.

This order showed Weyler's absolute incompetency as a general as well as his inhumanity, for the able-bodied men of each family who had remained neutral, if not loyal, so long as they were permitted to live on their few acres, at once joined the insurgent ranks when ordered to concentrate, and thus it was almost entirely the old, the infirm, the women and the children who were driven into the towns. The order failed also to embarrass the insurgents by the destruction of the plantations, for they were accustomed to finding their living in the woods, and they always regarded such destruction as an injury mainly to the Spanish. As a war measure, therefore, it was successful only as a boomerang.

The helpless people were allotted ground near the towns, almost invariably in low-lying, swampy, and malarious places. The Spanish residents would not be burdened with them and generally cared not how soon they died. They were concentrated in greatest numbers where the accommodations were least adequate, as if extermination was the main object. There was nothing for them to do and there was less and less for them to eat, and finally they stretched out upon the damp ground, gazing vacantly before them as the weary days dragged by. Mothers lay listless with dead babies in their

arms. The quick and the dead lay side by side till the latter were taken and thrown in the dead carts, and carried off into the country where lay the half-buried bodies of hundreds of victims of this system of warfare. The huts of these people were jammed together in rows with but a few inches of space between, and the ground was covered with filth. Diseases of malignant types claimed their victims everywhere and every day. There was no medical attendance; it was fortunate if there were half rations. In the different stations of concentration there were estimated to be over 400,000 of these helpless people, and by the summer of 1897 the death rate had become terrible. The beautiful island was a plague spot upon earth.

The reconcentrados, it should be understood, were at the very gates of the city of Havana. As General Lee said in one of his communications, there were fewer here than in most other places, and in general their condition was better than elsewhere. Yet their condition could hardly be exaggerated by the use of any words which the English language can command. In a report which was submitted to General Lee by one who visited these reconcentrados, and whom Lee vouches for as "a man of integrity and character," one of the sights was "460 women and children thrown on the ground, heaped pellmell as animals, some in a dying condition, others sick, and others dead, without the slightest cleanliness, nor the least help, not even to give water to the thirsty, with neither religious or social help, dying wherever chance laid them, and for this limited number of reconcentrados the deaths averaged between forty and fifty daily, giving relatively ten days of life for each person. Among the deaths we witnessed there was one impossible to forget," continued Lee's informant. "We found a girl of eighteen seemingly lifeless on the ground; on her right side was the body of a young mother, cold and rigid, but with her young child still alive clinging to her dead breast; on her left hand side was also the corpse of a dead woman holding her son in a rigid embrace; a little farther

on a poor dying woman having in her arms a daughter of fourteen, crazy with pain, who after five or six days also died in spite of the care she received. In one corner a poor woman was dying, surrounded by her children, who contemplated her in silence, without a lament or shedding a tear, they themselves being real specters of hunger, emaciated in a horrible manner." As the dead were taken away new victims were driven in, and, says this informant for whom Lee vouches: "If any young girl came in any way nice looking, she was infallibly condemned to the most abominable of traffic." In time something was done through the energy of private persons for the help of these people, but it was estimated that the usual death rate among them was about 77 per cent.

Reports of the massacre of *pacificos* were of daily occurrence and many of them were shown to be authentic. Late in July, one was reported from Sancti Spiritus peculiarly appalling in its details. The *pacificos*, who had been starving for several days, crowded around the forts and asked in vain of the commander to be allowed to seek food. A woman whose four children were dying of hunger resolved to brave the anger of the soldiers to save her boys from misery. In the night she slipped unnoticed between two sentinels and reached the woods. On returning in the morning with vegetables, she was caught and recognized. At once the rumor was spread among the soldiers that the *pacificos* had an understanding with the insurgents and that the woman had gone out to inform them of the Spanish defenses. With a shout of "treason" the troops began the slaughter, the helpless *pacificos* were mowed down like sheep, and the commander reported the occurrence to General Weyler as a victory of his troops over the insurgents, who had many killed. Such news was, of course, received at Madrid with demonstrations of delight.

The morning light broke with little good cheer to any one in western Cuba, unless to the Spanish guerrillas and butchers. The first rays of the sun fell upon a land, once glowing in all the emerald brightness of exuberant tropical vegetation, now

resembling nothing so much as a great ash heap. Where once stood the humble dwellings of the *pacificos*, surrounded by their rich garden patches and waving fields, were now heaps of ruins, the marks of fire, of death, and of desolation, and hovering always in the sultry air were the greedy vultures. Here and there were half-made graves from which protruded the festering flesh, sometimes the ghastly countenances of the victims of Spanish "military regulations."

Each town awoke each morning to face a fresh installment of the dead. Out to the *esplanada*, in full sight of the town, filed the usual morning procession, the band, playing a jaunty air, the priests, the soldiers, and their officers, and there were shot in the back young boys who had been captured in various ways and charged with the stereotyped crime of rebellion, and found guilty after a court-martial in which the victims had nothing to say. As a matter of fact, very few of these victims were ever in the insurgent ranks; the great majority were simply peasants who had not heeded the proclamation of reconcentration, or who, starving, had attempted to escape through the Spanish lines to find a few roots, but had fallen in with the Spanish bushwhackers lying in wait day and night about the roads and byways leading from the town to the country districts. As a rule, those who were caught were shot down in cold blood in their tracks, and, possibly, covered with a sprinkling of earth, while the case was reported as another Spanish victory in a skirmish. Some, however, were brought to town when captured and fiendishly tortured for a time in the hope of securing from them useful information; then in the gray dawn they were led out and shot.

As the sun rose higher over the desolate and bloody scene, it shone upon the dead carts filing away. In the camp of the starving *pacificos* the dead had been assorted from the living, the harvest of another night, while those in whom the breath of life feebly lingered lay listless, speechless, dazed by the very enormity of their own suffering and of the suffering about them.


These are but glimpses of the panorama of death which it is distressing and revolting to follow. Of such was the whole. It has never been exaggerated; it never will be. Here fiction fell before reality. It was one of the unfortunate facts of the situation that the people of the United States did not really believe the stories of misery, of suffering, of outrage upon the island, partly doubtless because it seemed too terrible for the nineteenth century, and on American shores, and partly because of the poor character for truth which had been given some stories of military operations there. These stories of the reconcentrados were considered by many as examples of rather graphic writing by newspaper correspondents, whereas these plucky and gifted writers had actually encountered a subject for which their capacity for exaggeration proved entirely inadequate to the demands of reality.

CHAPTER XVIII

RELIEF OF STARVING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA — FAILURE OF WEYLER'S CAMPAIGN — INCREASING MISERY ON THE ISLAND — ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS.

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba — The President Asks for \$50,000 for Their Relief — Spain Watches Us Anxiously — The Morgan Resolution — Exciting Debate in the Senate — Its Effect in Spain — Sagasta Rebels — Canovas Resigns — Given a New Lease of Life — Reasons for His Continuance and for Weyler's Longer Stay in Cuba — Political Conditions — Don Carlos — Canovas between Two Fires — Madrid Opinion — Superior Tactics of Gomez — Return of Commissioner Calhoun — Gen. Stewart L. Woodford Appointed Minister to Madrid — His Instructions — Nothing to Humiliate Spain — A Season of Waiting — Death of Canovas — Party Quarrels Cease — Weyler Driven into Havana.

OFFICIAL information from our consuls in Cuba established the fact in the spring of 1897 that a large number of American citizens in Cuba were in a state of destitution, suffering for want of food and medicine as a result of Weyler's order for concentrating the country people in the towns. Early in May, Consul-General Lee reported that from six to eight hundred Americans were without means of support. The local authorities, even if kindly disposed, were unable to relieve the needs of their own people. President McKinley assured General Lee that provision would be made to relieve the American citizens, and to that end on the 17th of May he sent a message to Congress recommending an appropriation of \$50,000 to be immediately available for use under the direction of the Secretary of State; and it was desirable that a part of the sum might be left for providing transportation for such American citizens as desired to return to the United States but had no means to do so.



EMINENT AMERICAN CIVIL LEADERS IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN

Hon. William R. Day, Secretary of State.
Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War.
Gen. Pittsburgh Lee, Consul-General to Cuba.

Public opinion in the United States was again strongly aroused. At a large mass meeting held at Washington, presided over by Senator Gallinger, strong pleas for intervention and sharp criticism of the mild policy of the previous administration were made.

Spain watched these developments in the United States very anxiously, and the conservative Spanish journals advised the government to make no more concessions, and especially to forbid us to interfere in Cuban affairs. But the government was aware that such a policy would at once strengthen the warlike feeling in this country, and so it was officially announced that Spain would place no obstacle in the way of relieving the American *reconcentrados*.

The message was followed by three days of long and exciting debate in the Senate over the Morgan resolution for acceding belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed by a vote of 41 to 14, most of the minority being Republicans who did not wish to interfere with the policy of the administration, which at that time was summed up in the words, "a peaceful intervention to secure the independence of Cuba." This was substantially the demand in the platform on which the President had been elected, but he evidently did not propose to be swerved from a judicious course, though he recognized that the people were becoming impatient. Independence through purchase was regarded as one of the possibilities, but in any event it was seen that it must be independence. Spanish rule over the island was recognized as no longer possible or desirable. It was not unreasonable to suppose that some of the support of the belligerency resolution had come from political enemies who wished to force the administration into precipitate action, and the President did not propose to be forced. In his position he was upheld by the House.

The effect of this new excitement in the United States upon the Spanish government was pronounced. Sagasta, the Liberal leader, had allowed Canovas to pursue his policy for a long time without criticism, though believing that the attempt

to uphold the Weyler regime was driving the United States into warlike expressions. When the action of the United States Senate became known, Sagasta announced that the truce whereby he had supported Canovas in his Cuban policy was at an end. In a debate in the Cortes he said: "We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not masters of the territory trodden by our soldiers. Carlism is organizing itself in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the immunity it enjoys. The picture could not be gloomier. We have a war in Cuba and a war in the Philippines. We wish to know what has become of the sixteen millions of the former loan, as eight millions are still due the army. In Cuba no important problem has been solved, and there has only been an exaggeration of long-existing evils."

The feeling between the Liberals and Conservatives became very bitter. In a dispute in the lobby of the Cortes over the Morgan resolution between Comas, a Liberal senator, professor in the Madrid University, and the Duke of Tetuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter boxed the senator's ears, and the excitement became so great that the sitting was suspended. The Duke resigned his office, but the bitter feeling continued, though a duel was averted. The Liberals declared their intention of absenting themselves from the Cortes till reparation was made. Canovas appealed to the absentees, saying that love of country in the presence of grave international troubles should lead them to resume their duties, but they obstinately remained absent, and on the 2d of June Canovas tendered his resignation to the Queen. She summoned General Campos to Madrid, and after a consultation with the party leaders the Canovas ministry was given a new lease of life. Faith still lingered in the reports of Weyler as to the speedy pacification of Cuba; in fact he had held and continued to hold this position of the greatest pecuniary profit to himself largely by continually repeating what was not true as to the condition of the island.

The Cuban revolutionary party had always sought from

the beginning to weaken Spain, to wear her out so that in despair and to save herself she would drop Cuba and leave it to the Cubans. And when Spain was really brought to the point of seeing that Cuba could be of no further use to her, her pride and domestic politics left her no other course but war with the United States. "War," said a Madrid journal, "is the only solution that will prolong the days of the doomed monarchy. Woe to the throne if it avert it. To fall in Cuba is to fall with all the ignominy of Sedan; to fall in the United States is to fall with all the glory of Waterloo."

It was quite evident that Madrid could not be deceived by the claims of pacification. "We have for some time purposely refrained," said *El Imparcial*, "from all comment and criticism concerning the Cuban question in order not to be prosecuted and not to give rise to press scandals. If we now break silence it is to express our astonishment upon learning that provinces have been declared pacified where fighting is an every-day occurrence and where the rebellion's most famous leaders continue at the head of their followers."

General Garcia, operating in the province of Santiago de Cuba with a well-equipped army, had driven the Spaniards into the more important towns after several victorious engagements. In their effort to hold Bayamo the Spaniards had several times undertaken to transport supplies from Manzanillo, but each time the rebels had fallen upon them and captured a large portion of the arms and provisions. Once they had blown up a boat laden with men and supplies on the Cauto River. It cost the Spaniards a large amount of money and blood to keep a garrison at Bayamo, and it was of no importance to them from a military standpoint, for the country was filled with insurgents and the Spaniards did not venture to attack. But Weyler knew that the fall of Bayamo would result in the fall of the ministry and possibly in a Spanish uprising.

After passing around Weyler's troops and entering Matanzas, Gomez returned to Santa Clara, where Weyler again endeavored or pretended to surround him. The result was that

General Weyler met General Gomez for the first time in a pitched battle. There is a cattle ranch at La Reforma, in the eastern part of Santa Clara province, consisting of about 10,000 acres, and it was always a favorite camping-ground for Gomez, as his son, who fell by Maceo's side, was born there. At this time he camped on this ranch as usual.

It seems incredible that 1,500 men should stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards generally march in columns of 1,000. They came into La Reforma from twenty different directions. The trap was apparently well laid, but Gomez, who was cognizant of it for two weeks, simply waited. His tactics here were typical of his tactics elsewhere. He sent a hundred men to fight one column and fifty to fight another column; a hundred against another, and seventy-five to meet still another, and so on. Ten Cubans have often been known to hold a Spanish column of 1,000 men until General Gomez could get together his impedimenta and get away — hold them at a complete standstill. The Spaniards were always in deadly fear of an ambushade, and they would not run into it.

The Cubans on this occasion not only held the Spanish columns in check, but several times small divisions charged, and on the last time Weyler's left flank was routed. His horse was wounded three times, although he did not come to the front. The battle wound up by Weyler's withdrawing his troops and Gomez came in and camped on the field. It was reported in Havana as a Spanish victory. The Cuban loss was twenty-six and the Spanish loss 185 and about 300 wounded.

The net result of Weyler's Santa Clara campaigns, from which such great results were expected, was the complete devastation of another province and a consequent reduction of the food supply upon which the Spanish troops were more dependent than the Cubans. In the country which the insurgents commanded, which was at least four-fifths of the island, and into which the Spanish troops did not venture except in a large force, the Cubans found food on every bush and in every

root. They held hill-locked valleys where their cattle grazed in safety and where they even planted quick crops like sweet potatoes, which ripen five or six times a year in Cuba. Gomez and his leaders availed themselves to the fullest extent of the advantages afforded by the nature of the country, fought only when they wanted to, and chose favorable movements for attack with rare discernment and judgment. He showed himself to be not only a man born to command, but one skilled to a high degree in military science so far as it could be applied to the peculiar warfare in which the Cubans were engaged. His masterly circular movements by which he brought his forces to Weyler's rear when that general fancied he had the wily Cuban hemmed in was but a single example of the many cases in which he never failed to puzzle the Spanish, who, worn out by the chase, could never succeed in cornering him, and who lived in constant dread that he would fall upon them suddenly from some favorable ambush.

On his return from Cuba, Mr. Calhoun, the special commissioner appointed by the United States, made a confidential report to the President upon the Ruiz case and as to the situation on the island as he saw it, and a few days later Stewart L. Woodford of New York was appointed to the Madrid ministry, with instructions to secure an indemnity of \$75,000 in the Ruiz case, and to impress upon the Spanish government the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid towards the ending of the war in Cuba by the reaching of peaceful and lasting results, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entailed, the burdens and restraints it imposed upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests and the injury resulting from an indefinite continuance of this state of things.

It was stated that at this juncture our government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destruc-

tive war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colonies. It was urged that as a neighboring nation with large interests in Cuba we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result.

During the interval of time required for the newly-appointed American minister to present his credentials to the Spanish court, both the governments of the United States and of Spain maintained a waiting attitude as to Cuban affairs, though in the latter country domestic politics were much disturbed. It was held as an assured fact that the Canovas ministry would in a short time be required to resign, and it was expected that the event would take place very soon after the American minister presented his credentials and made his demands, an event which could hardly occur until October, when the Queen returned to Madrid from San Sebastian. Meanwhile, the Cortes had been dissolved, and Canovas, whose health had become somewhat impaired, had gone to Santa Agueda, a watering place not far from San Sebastian, where he was taking a course of baths and attending to affairs of state.

On the 8th of August, while Canovas was standing in the gallery of the bathing establishment waiting for his wife, a young Italian anarchist named Golli fired three shots at the minister, all taking effect, and he died in a few minutes. For years Canovas had been one of Spain's leading statesmen, a strong upholder of the monarchy and a defender of the integrity of the kingdom, and, though Spain's relations were in a very trying state, he was still hopeful of a settlement which would preserve to the kingdom peace at home and continued dominion over Cuba with little surrender of royal prerogative. This assassination had the effect of stopping the political quarrel; Sagasta and other Liberals at once placed themselves at the orders of the government, but General Azcaraga, the minister of war, was made the premier provisionally.

It was the general opinion in this country that the death of Canovas would greatly change the Cuban situation, for by his ability and strength as a statesman he had braved as no other man could the public opinion of those who more and more called for the removal of Weyler. That general was at this time engaged in an effort to beat back the advancing insurgents in Matanzas, but he was gradually being forced back towards Havana. The day after the tragedy in Spain his forces suffered a severe defeat at Aguacate in Havana province, and, leaving many Spanish dead on the field, he hurried back into the city with insurgents firing on his rear guard. He had been utterly unable to check the invasion which Gomez had planned. Death had been on all sides, in the open ground of battle, in the hidden ambush, in burning buildings, in fever-infected swamps, and in disease-breeding hospitals — yet the rebellion remained a living, active, aggressive force. The Spanish soldiers were in a bad way; they had not received their pay for months; they were weak from illness and poor rations; they were badly clothed and sometimes shoeless; their credit was exhausted, and they were in no condition to take the offensive. The only feature of Weyler's campaign which was working successfully was his war on the pacificos. They were dying by the hundreds in the centers of concentration every day. In Pinar del Rio whole towns were starving. There were no vegetables; people were feeding on emaciated dogs. Pacificos were driven into the city of Matanzas from some of the outside fortifications which the Spanish could not hold, and as the poor famished wretches came straggling along, cruelly beaten by the soldiers to make them go on, many dropped and died. Everywhere was misery and death.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEROS AND HER REMARKABLE ESCAPE—RECALL OF WEYLER—PENALTY OF DEATH TO ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS.

Weyler Retained by the New Premier—The Escape of Evangelina Cisneros—Her Romantic Story—Following Her Father to Jail—On the Isla de Pinos—Attracted by Evangelina's Beauty—Berriz in Close Quarters—Guerrillas Appear—Her Escape to a Cave—Found by the Guerrillas—Sent to Havana—Thrown into a Vile Prison—Sympathy Aroused in this Country—An Appeal to the Queen—Her Escape through a Barred Window—Smuggled on a Steamer in Boy's Clothes—Her Enthusiastic Reception in New York—The Queen Tired of Cuban Troubles—Her Farewell to Minister Taylor—Sagasta's Ministry—Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and Return of Weyler—Weyler's Grotesque Failure—Blanco Announces a More Liberal Policy—A Stroke of Spanish Diplomacy—Release of the *Competitor* Prisoners—Their Wretched Lot.

THE provisional premier, General Azcarraga, announced that General Weyler would be retained in Cuba and be supported by the government, which would strictly adhere to the late minister's policy. In writing to one of his political supporters he said: "General Woodford will be received and even welcomed as our mourned Don Antonio (Canovas) wished to welcome him. If he brings only claims of American citizens harmed in Cuba, attention will be paid to these claims so far as they are just. In a friendly manner he will be notified also of Spain's right to claim other damages, and instructions will be given for the purpose to our minister at Washington. But it will be a great mistake if he intends to suggest any other kind of American interference in Cuba." He said that America would be told very plainly to keep her hands off or take the consequences. But the Conservative forces were badly divided, and as the success of the ministry depended upon the carrying on of that policy which had nearly

been disastrous even under the strong hand of Canovas, it was evident that it could not long endure. Nothing but a conspicuous success by Weyler in Cuba could give it strength.

Though the Spanish continued to report victories daily it was, nevertheless, a notable fact that the insurgents were still as active as ever in all the provinces. All the rural districts were in their hands. They reigned as absolute masters, and in the eastern end of the island had reorganized the provinces. The royal troops were cantoned in the cities, from which they sallied forth now and then, but with small results. They would start out in the morning to crush a rebel force, fire a few volleys at them and return in time for their evening meal. In these engagements the Spanish loss was generally greater than the Cuban, though the Spanish reports were always to the contrary.

In the fall of 1897 public interest in the United States was greatly aroused in the remarkable escape of Evangelina Cisneros, a young Cuban girl of good family, whose story reads like a romance. At the outbreak of the revolution she lived with her father and three sisters at a pleasant little place in Puerto Principe. Her father decided to enter the Cuban army, but before he could go he was arrested, and in time was sent to Isla de Pinos with other prisoners. Evangelina faithfully and dutifully followed his footsteps to share his punishment and comfort him in his sorrow. She was eighteen years of age, cultured, talented, and beautiful. Through her efforts and the mediation of some friends, the governor of the penal settlement gave Cisneros permission to withdraw from the common criminals, and to live with his daughter, and there everything went well till a new governor came to the island, Colonel Berriz, a nephew of the Spanish minister of war and a favorite adjutant of Weyler. Struck by the girl's beauty, he endeavored to attract her to him, but failing, adopted harsher measures. Her father was arrested and taken to an unknown place. Late that night, when the girl was alone and wondering where her father was, Colonel Berriz came to her

house, forced himself into her presence, sought to force her to submit to him by making her father's liberty contingent upon her compliance, and when this failed he would have overpowered her had she not slipped away from him, opened the door, and screamed for help, which came at once. Berriz was in close quarters for a moment, but succeeded in calling a few guerrillas who were near. As her friends were unarmed they could make no resistance; they tried to escape as best they could, and several were shot in cold blood. She managed to escape and hid in a cave till the next morning, when she was discovered by guerrillas, locked up, and later, with others, was sent to Havana, where she was placed in the Casa de Recojidas, the prison for disreputable women. In order to save the reputation of the villain, Colonel Berriz, the Spanish had invented an accusation against her character. Her experiences in that prison were horrible.

At intervals the story of this innocent girl's wrongs ran through the Cuban news in this country, and many people became interested. Her trial came on in August, and she was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in an African penal settlement upon the testimony of the perjurers who were trying to save the reputation of the nephew of the man who had become the Premier of Spain. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, Julia Ward Howe, Mrs. John A. Logan, and others petitioned the Queen for her release. The Pope, who had been appealed to, urged clemency, while Weyler, incensed at the efforts in the girl's behalf, publicly reiterated the falsehood as to her character. The Queen did not act.

Meanwhile, a New York newspaper commissioned one of its reporters to go to Havana and see if he could bring about her escape. The rescue was carefully planned and successfully executed. It was a desperate game, but it succeeded, and one night, having succeeded in drugging the wretched women in the prison pen with her, lest they should betray her, she was helped through a window, one of the bars of which had been filed and bent by her accomplices. She was at first taken

to a house of a friend in Havana and carefully concealed. In a few days, dressed in boy's clothes, she was smuggled on a steamer bound for New York, while the Spanish guards were searching in every nook and corner of Havana for her. She became the heroine of the hour in New York, where a reception was arranged for her, and where her beauty and cultured ways won admiration and the story of her trials thrilled every heart.

While it is possible that few cases possessed so many dramatic features as that of Miss Cisneros, it was well known that there were hundreds of other victims, innocent of any charge except sympathy for the Cubans. Had it not been for the daring rescue of Miss Cisneros, she, like others, might have gone to wear away her life in an African penal settlement. For could the Queen pardon a mere girl when her punishment was necessary to save the reputation of the nephew of her Prime Minister? That she was moved by the appeals and the story of Miss Cisneros's sufferings there can be little doubt. She was tired and sick of the condition of things in Cuba. To pardon this girl might mean a cabinet crisis, and how much the case had to do with the fall of General Azcarraga can only be surmised. It was on September 28th that the Queen talked so plainly to Azcarraga that he resigned, but before the new ministry was fairly at work Miss Cisneros had slipped through her barred window and was on her way to New York.

On September 13th, when taking leave of Mr. Taylor, the departing minister of the United States, the Queen said:

"Do, pray, be a friend to Spain when you return to America."

"Madam, I will, so far as my conscience will permit," was his reply.

The Queen received Minister Woodford graciously and conversed with him in an informal manner without any reference to the subject upon which both countries were intensely interested. His instructions were such as to give Spain no intimation of just what the United States would do as a last

resort to end the trouble in Cuba, and his first duty was to sound Spain as to our friendly intervention to bring about a settlement between the Cubans and the Spaniards. If Spain rejected this plan, the minister was to inform this government and receive new instruction.

Meanwhile, General Azcarraga was engaged in a desperate attempt to bring into a cabinet all the dissenting Conservative forces, but the larger wing of these under the leadership of Silvela refused to become a party to the government unless Weyler was recalled. To this Azcarraga would not consent. The Queen, who had become disgusted with Conservative quarrels, and horrors in Cuba, returned to Madrid September 28th, when she stated her sentiments so forcibly that the impending crisis was precipitated and the ministry tendered their resignations. Sagasta was summoned to form a new cabinet. Hope of peace in Cuba was stimulated by the announcement that Weyler would be recalled if he did not resign, and General Blanco, considered as the most humane general in Spain, would take his place to carry out a comprehensive scheme of autonomy. But Weyler was not disposed to resign his lucrative position, and the hopeful feeling in the United States was offset by the rage with which the bloodthirsty element of Havana received the news of Weyler's fall. The Volunteers, at the instigation of one of Weyler's factotums, paraded the streets shouting "Death to the United States!" "Long live General Weyler!" and the whole city was for a short time in a state of terror.

General Blanco arrived at Havana on October 30th, and General Weyler departed, having bought a bill of exchange, it is reported, for \$600,000. His salary during his occupancy of the island would have amounted to about \$80,000. The expenses of the war had nearly doubled; millions had been spent for supplies, and yet the Spanish troops were poorly fed and poorly clothed. Medicine had been purchased in large quantities, but was always scarce, and the names of legions of dead Spaniards were kept on the pay-roll. Never had been

more strikingly illustrated the saying that though a Spaniard will fight for his country, he also does not hesitate to rob it. The frauds of the commissariat were enormous, and Weyler was only one of the principal benefitters.

To sustain Weyler in pacifying a country which he was continually reporting to be troubled with a few bands of scattering bandits, Spain had poured out her young blood with a lavish hand — 130,000 men and officers in addition to the 120,000 which had been previously sent. Thus from the outbreak of the war she had sent to the island over 250,000 men, fully armed, and the mystery of the military world was what Weyler could do with them in an island so small that an army of 30,000 insurgents could practically hold the whole country and even raid the suburbs of Havana. History affords no parallel in the way of grotesque failures. With such an army and over 50,000 Volunteers at his back, Weyler had done nothing but complete the devastation of the fertile island and starve and kill thousands of pacificos, driven like sheep from their burning homes. His guerrillas had swept the country for hiding innocents, and butchered in cold blood wounded Cubans in their hospitals, not sparing the nurses. Hundreds had been thrown into filthy jails upon the flimsiest charges or none at all, their fate often remaining a mystery. He had met the generosity of the Cubans, who regularly set at liberty the Spaniards they captured, by killing Cuban prisoners upon nearly every occasion, and all this cruelty and wantonness had but added fuel to the flame of Cuba's hatred toward the mother country, which now, in the hope of saving her devastated island, grudgingly proposed to offer an autonomy which, if more liberal than heretofore, was still restricted.

Sagasta, whether believing that autonomy would be accepted or not, knew that it would gain time and tend to diminish the aggressive spirit in the United States. He had been given to understand that if something were not done it would be impossible to silence the demands of Congress when it met in December. Moreover, the time had come when the

island was of no further financial use to Spain. She had mortgaged Cuba's revenues for more than they were worth by the issue of bonds. To hold her longer would mean only an exhausting expense to Spain, and it was only that ungovernable pride which had been her ruin that prevented her from withdrawing from the devastated island. In this situation a war with the United States seemed to afford an avenue of escape with the possibility — the probability — as the Spanish statesman thought, that the other powers of Europe would step in and not only help her humble the United States but even give her back Cuba and preserve the dynasty. From this time forth Spain used what resources she could command, not to push the war in Cuba, but to strengthen herself for a contest with the United States, while doing everything to postpone the break by an ostentatious reversal of Weyler's policy as to the reconcentrados, and an attempt to infuse the forlorn hope of autonomy with enough life to keep the United States in a waiting attitude.

A reply to Minister Woodford's note was received by our government on October 23d. Stripped of its diplomatic phrasology, Spain's answer to the United States was substantially this:

"All the armed expeditions intended to benefit the Cuban rebels are organized in the United States and sail from United States ports. Some of these expeditions have been prevented from going to Cuba, but most of them have succeeded in leaving America. If there were no aid from United States citizens there would be no insurrection. The United States can best extend its friendly offices by suppressing these expeditions."

The wisest men saw that war was inevitable unless Spain surrendered her sovereignty in Cuba on some terms. From this time on diplomacy was used largely in an effort to arrange the terms, and in Spain it was used to provoke the European powers into an attitude of hostility towards us. The administration wisely began the work of putting the defences and the

armament of the nation, so long neglected, into better shape. In Cuba the Spanish continued to burn Cuban hospitals, kill the inmates and helpless women and children, while the insurgents continued their successes. According to the reports of the Spanish health bureaus, a thousand reconcentrados were dying every day. It was too late to amend matters by annulling the decree of concentration, for the hapless people were now destitute, they had no homes to return to, and their fields had been destroyed.

At this time, by order from Madrid, the *Competitor* prisoners were released (17th of November), and the act was naturally regarded not so much as a concession as an effort on the part of Spain to deprive the friends of intervention in the Congress of a rational basis for action. It was in exact keeping with previous Spanish diplomacy to appease sentiment in this country at certain intervals by the release of American citizens kept a long time in prison without evidence of their guilt.

Broken in health by their long confinement and the treatment accorded them, and clad only in the rags which they had worn since their capture a year and a half before, they presented a pitiful spectacle as they landed in New York and fell into the arms of their friends. The story they told of their sufferings was heartrending. Sentenced to death without any chance to defend themselves, and saved only because the execution was postponed from Madrid, for eighteen months they had lain in jail and been frequently subjected to torture by their cruel jailers. Yet some of the newspapers of the country hailed the tardy release of these men as a triumph of American citizenship and a disarmament of "jingoism." They pretended to regard it just as Spain in her crafty insincerity trusted they would, and of course they reflected the opinion of many people desirous of peace at any price.

CHAPTER XX

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE — TRAGIC DEATH OF COLONEL RUIZ — RIOTS IN HAVANA — ARRIVAL OF THE *MAINE* IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA.

The Administration's Cuban Policy Outlined — Possibilities of Intervention — Opposition to Autonomy — Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the Young Cuban Leader, Nestor Aranguren — The Latter's Reply to Ruiz's Letter — Aranguren Warns Him — The Meeting — Aranguren's Own Story of What Happened — Ruiz Shot — Organized Relief for the Reconcentrados — Military Operations in the East — Disquieting Reports — Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness — A Delicate Situation — Winter Drill of North American Squadron — The Storm Breaks in Havana — "Death to Autonomy!" — Lee's Message — Blanco's Prompt Action — Death-Blow to Autonomy — Protection of American Citizens — The *Maine* Ordered to Havana — Strange Action of the Havana Authorities — Gen. Lee's Misgivings — The *Maine* Arrives Quietly — Demonstrations of Eternal Friendship.

THE assembling of Congress in December and the message of President McKinley were awaited with the keenest interest in the United States, in Spain, and in Cuba. Could the crisis in Cuban affairs be longer postponed? The President recognized the problem as the most important with which the government had to deal. His message told the story of the previous rebellions, and the relation of our government to them and to the existing rebellion in which destruction had been carried to every part of the island. He denounced the "cruel policy of reconcentration," which had utterly failed and which "was not civilized warfare, but extermination." Against this abuse he had repeatedly protested. After reviewing the more recent diplomatic negotiations, he said that three untried measures remained — the recognition of belligerency, the recognition of independence, and neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise.

Although the apparent hopefulness of the message was not shared by the majority of the members of Congress, they could not but be impressed with the strength of the reasons for waiting and watching results. But it soon became evident that, however good the disposition of Captain-General Blanco, it could have little effect upon an island so conditioned as Cuba. A large proportion of the Spanish subjects having commercial and business interests there would not accept autonomy, and the openly hostile attitude of the always troublesome Volunteers caused the government much anxiety. Blanco did all he could to bring the insurgents around to a more favorable attitude, going so far as to liberate General Rivera, Maceo's successor, who had been captured in March and had been in Cabaña fortress ever since. The Captain-General endeavored to have him use his influence with the insurgents to accept autonomy, but he refused. A decree was published, offering amnesty to all exiles ordered from the island by Weyler, except common criminals, but how determined the insurgents were in the position they had taken is shown by one of the tragic incidents of this period.

The fearless young insurgent leader, Nestor Aranguren, whose daring raids upon the Spanish forces about Havana had given him the sobriquet of "the Cuban Sheridan," was a personal friend of Colonel Ruiz, Blanco's aide-de-camp. Ruiz had informed Blanco that he believed he could convince Aranguren of the advantage of surrendering and accepting autonomy. "I know his good heart," said Ruiz, "and I can induce him to abandon his folly and come back to Havana with me." Nothing could have been more pleasing to Blanco than to make a convert of this dashing young Cuban. Ruiz opened correspondence with him to this end, and Aranguren answered in amicable terms, but energetically refused to betray the Cuban cause. "We are suffering all the hardships of the life we are leading," said Aranguren, "only to make our country free. We do not hate the Spaniards personally, but we do not **like** their government in any form. As a gentleman I appre-

ciate you and admire your talents, but in our intercourse let us drop political questions."

This letter encouraged Ruiz to answer that he was sure that "personally" Aranguren would not refuse to see him, and he asked for a meeting on December 9th two miles from Campo Florida. Aranguren sent the letter to General Rodriguez, commander of the insurgent forces in the province of Havana, and awaited orders. Receiving no reply on the day Ruiz had appointed, he did not go, so Ruiz returned to Campo Florida and wrote again to Aranguren. On the 11th the latter received from General Rodriguez the message, "Do as you please, but if he offers autonomy do your duty." Aranguren sent a copy of this order to Ruiz with these words:

"If you desire to talk about the independence of Cuba or as a friend I will see you to-morrow. If not, for God's sake do not come."

Ruiz well understood the nature of the order which Gomez had given to his army. Anyone appearing to offer autonomy would be treated as a spy, but Ruiz still had faith in his powers to persuade Aranguren, so when he received the reply on the 13th he at once started for the rendezvous. What followed was thus related afterwards by Aranguren himself:

"The following day (it was 10 o'clock in the morning) Ruiz, in the full uniform of a Spanish colonel, and accompanied by two *practicos*, presented himself at one of the outposts. From the very start I felt nervous and would gladly have avoided the encounter, but it was not in my power to do so. I met Ruiz at the entrance to my camp. He was very pale and acted in a nervous, hesitating manner. He rode forward and attempted to grasp my hand, which I refused to let him have.

"'How fine you are looking,' he said, not appearing to notice my action. 'This life evidently agrees with you. You are a fortunate boy; no man among you all has the future that you have. Autonomy has been granted, and you, my dear friend, have been selected as the first one to be pardoned.'

"In vain did I hold up my hand and motion him to stop talking.

"'I have come,' he continued, 'to offer the pardon of a generous Government and such a position as you may desire. Ask what you will and you will have it. It all lies with you. Ask.'

"Ruiz had condemned himself, and I ordered my men to arrest him. He was at once tried, found guilty, and shot. He met his death like a

brave man, fearless to the end. This is a true account of how all this sad affair occurred, and when my friends in the north read this, I hope they will reason as I did, that a soldier's duty to his country comes first of all."

It was said that the insurgents found upon Ruiz's body an authorization from General Blanco offering to give Aranguren \$100,000 and to extend official favors in the autonomous government. This act was industriously heralded as an evidence of the barbarity of the Cubans by the Spanish ministry and by "the peace at any price" men in the United States, and more ado was made over it than over the hundreds of cases in which Cuban officers had been ruthlessly slain in cold blood, a fate that was still reserved for Aranguren himself. Ruiz did not go under a flag of truce; he went in the face of a warning. Aranguren was soldier enough to carry out the orders of his commander-in-chief. The injustice of classing this with the outrages daily practiced by the Spaniards was so flagrant that it only stirred the deeper the spirit of Cuban sympathizers.

In view of the continued and indeed increasing suffering of the reconcentrados, and the widely-expressed desire throughout the United States to assist the helpless and starving, the government, after some difficulties, arranged in December with the Spanish minister so that charitable contributions in money or kind could be sent to the island by the benevolently disposed people of the country. Articles so intended could be consigned to the consul-general, who had arranged to co-operate with the local authorities in certain places. At first the relief was confined to Havana, but in a short time proper organizations were formed in the surrounding sections. The work was systematized under the supervision of Miss Clara Barton, president of the Red Cross Society of the United States, and her active and experienced assistants. Much suffering was prevented, though when the number of poor and destitute was so large it was almost impossible to relieve more than a few of the worst cases in each locality.

The decree of General Blanco announcing the establishment of autonomy on January 1st had a bombastic introduc-

tion about the blessing to be expected from the new regime. The plain truth was that outside the army of office-seekers, who were the natural result of the general poverty of the country, and a few Spaniards whose private interests led them to support Sagasta's government, there were no honest believers in autonomy. The Cubans were well aware that the decree was a sham, promulgated merely to endeavor to deceive the patriots.

The determination not to give offices in the government to the uncompromising Spaniards had greatly enraged some of them. The advantage given to them by General Blanco of ten votes out of sixteen in the electoral junta, which practically enabled them to gain a majority in the Assembly, did not mollify them. The mutterings of discontent threatened to break out into violence upon slight provocation, and hardly had President McKinley's message been read in Congress before the State Department was receiving disquieting information from our consuls.

There were rumors, as General Lee telegraphed, of an extensive conspiracy in Matanzas directed against Americans. General Blanco promised to deal at once with the alleged conspirators, and in his note of December 3d General Lee said that he had the assurance that American life and property would be protected by the government at a moment's notice. "I have declined to make an application for the presence of one or more warships in this harbor, and have advised those of our people who have wives and children here not to send them away, at least for the present, because such proceedings would not in my opinion be justifiable at this time from the standpoint of personal security. I still think that two warships at least should be at Key West, prepared to move here at short notice, and that more of them should be sent to Dry Tortugas, and a coal station be established there."

The situation was one of extreme delicacy. The administration did not fail to perceive that the lives of American citizens were in some danger and that they should really have the

moral support to be derived from the presence of a man-of-war; on the other hand, there was the danger that the appearance of a United States warship in Cuban ports would cause a demonstration by the already inflamed enemies of autonomy and of the United States. There was a suggestion in General Lee's correspondence that a large and influential portion of the Spanish people in the Cuban cities were really desirous of a war with the United States, and that this feeling lay to some extent underneath the manifestations of disorder. General Lee was inclined to think that the arrival of a United States warship would so excite the people as to precipitate a crisis at once, and so, from time to time, he advised delay. He had, however, come to the conclusion that it was essential to have a naval force in readiness to act, and the administration strongly seconded him in this belief. But it saw the necessity of proceeding cautiously, for Spain was regarding our naval plans with expressions of disapprobation.

The North Atlantic squadron had orders to rendezvous about Key West, not, it was stated, because of conditions at Havana, though the plan for winter drill in those waters undoubtedly had in it a measure of precaution. The *Maine* was coaled and ready for sea at short notice and was undoubtedly held in readiness in case of emergency.

On the 12th of January the anti-reform storm broke forth in serious riots in Havana, taking the shape of attacks upon the autonomistic papers. A mob headed by several army officers and made up of hundreds of the conservative Spaniards wrecked four newspaper offices, the immediate cause being General Blanco's refusal to suppress these journals, which were supporting him. The next day General Lee telegraphed to Washington: "Soldiers sent to protect them fraternized with the mob. Two attacks were attempted to-day. I am told that troops massed inside the palace to protect Governor-General shout 'Death to Autonomy!' 'Death to Blanco!' Uncertainty exists whether Blanco can control situation. If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and

keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominates everywhere." Blanco acted promptly and courageously. Artillery forces and cavalry detachments were placed at all strategic points in the city. He issued orders also to the autonomic papers to publish nothing more which would inflame the rioters. This was really a confession of weakness. The rioters thus gained their point. A death blow had been given to autonomy!

Thousands of troops were brought in from the field and massed in the city under officers whom Blanco thought he could depend upon, and gradually quiet was restored, though there was much suppressed excitement.

The administration was fully aware of the dangers of the situation, and quietly began to make preparations to act if necessary, though maintaining the most friendly attitude toward Spain. It was evident that autonomy was dead. The insurgents were driving the Spanish troops from their garrisons, the reconcentrados were starving notwithstanding measures of relief; there could be but one outcome, but one policy. Spain must yield her sovereignty in the island or face war. The President, aware that any accident might precipitate trouble and endanger every American on the island, determined to use his diplomacy to induce Spain to peacefully yield her sovereignty in Cuba, and at the same time prepare to protect American rights.

In taking the necessary steps the administration desired to avoid any affront to Spain, and also the dangers of arousing the excitable Spaniards in Cuba and Spain. To have sent a battleship into Havana harbor while Blanco was offering assurances that the rights of all foreigners would be protected would in all probability have added new fuel to the riots. In two or three days quiet had been restored and a few days later the Spanish minister at Washington was informed that the United States desired to "resume" friendly naval calls in

Cuban ports. The minister was inclined to demur, but considering the spirit in which the proposal was made there could hardly be reason for any diplomatic objection, and any Spanish alarm might be prevented if a Spanish warship made a similar call at some American port.

On January 24th, Assistant Secretary Day sent the following despatch to General Lee:

"It is the purpose of this Government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports. In that view, the *Maine* will call at the port of Havana in a day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities."

Secretary Day made a statement to the public in which he said: "Sending the *Maine* to Havana means simply the resumption of friendly naval relations with Spain. It is customary for naval vessels of friendly nations to pass in and out of the harbors of other countries with which they are at peace, and British and German warships have recently visited Havana. This is no new move. The President has intended to do it for some time, but heretofore something has happened to postpone it. The orders for the *Maine* mean nothing more than I have said, and there is nothing alarming or unfriendly in them. The Spanish minister here is fully informed of what is going on, and so far as I know has not made the slightest objection to it." In a public statement the Spanish minister at Washington said: "It is perfectly in accord with usage for warships of two friendly powers to enter and leave each other's ports; the warships of Spain have visited American ports on complimentary missions three times in as many years, and if there has not been an American warship in Havana in the same length of time it is merely because the United States government has not seen fit to order one there." Unquestionably, it was a purely friendly act from a diplomatic point of view, and it was so published by the Spanish government, but the Spanish people were inclined to think otherwise. Excitable Spaniards in Madrid professed to think the United States had ulterior motives, and General Lee reported that the

Havana authorities were fearful lest it should excite the people of the city and cause a demonstration. But the Spanish government, to show the appreciation of the courtesy of the United States — so smooth are the words of diplomacy — announced that the cruiser *Vizcaya* would soon pay a visit to an American port.

As soon as General Lee received Secretary Day's despatch he cabled back, advising a postponement of the visit of the *Maine* for six or seven days until the recent excitement was allayed, but he said he would consult the authorities. Captain-General Blanco had just gone on a trip to the eastern part of the island in the hopes of converting the insurgent leaders. Lee received a reply at once that the *Maine* had been ordered and would be at Havana the next day. "Keep us advised by frequent telegrams." The next day Lee telegraphed: "At an interview authorities profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship. Say it will obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, and most probably a demonstration. Ask that it is not done until they can get instructions from Madrid, and say that if for friendly motives, as claimed, delay is unimportant."

As the Spanish minister at Washington had been fully informed of the purpose of this government, the ignorance of the Havana authorities must have been assumed or the authorities at Madrid had not advised Havana. The former was probably true, and the objections at Havana were doubtless made to provide an excuse for the inevitable failure of autonomy. They saw a chance to cast the responsibility upon the United States and use it as an argument with the European powers. Madrid had doubtless advised Havana how to receive the suggestion.

That General Lee had misgivings, not for the *Maine*, but of a hostile demonstration on the part of the Volunteers, is evident from the despatch which he sent on the 25th: "Ship quietly arrived at 11 A. M. to-day. No demonstration so far." The *Maine* steamed into the harbor with no more disturbance than attends the arrival of the Key West mail steamer. When

she came alongside Morro Castle she saluted the Spanish flag with twenty-one guns, the response being given by the guns of Cabaña. The *Maine* ran up the Spanish royal ensign and saluted the Spanish flagship with thirteen guns. The *Alfonso XII.* ran up the Stars and Stripes and returned the salute gun for gun. The *Maine* dropped her anchor where the harbor master directed, and the official calls and other demonstrations of eternal friendship followed. But in spite of them it was impossible to overlook the strong undercurrent of feeling in the city, the excited talking of groups about the cafés, and the expressed opinion of radical Spaniards that the cause of Spain had been betrayed by the government, and that the nation had been humiliated by the first step in Yankee intervention. The arrival of the battleship was considered a joyful event among the Americans, for they had been in suspense and now felt that they were safe. This alone was enough to anger some of the Spaniards of the city.

In reality, the appearance of the *Maine* in Havana harbor was a necessary and justifiable move for the proper protection of American citizens. In view of recent outbreaks in the city our citizens could not feel secure without such protection, and another outbreak might occur at any time and be less easily put down. The State Department had waited until it thought a reasonable time had elapsed after the outbreak to permit of the visit of the *Maine* being classed as a friendly act, a "resumption" of naval cordiality, and a free use of diplomatic fictions was doubtless wise for its effects not simply upon Spain but upon the inflammable Spaniards in Havana and the impatient people of this country.

It was plain that Congress was watching with impatience and ill-concealed excitement the next step in the President's policy. The belief was strong that when it was made perfectly clear to the world that autonomy had failed, the President would feel called upon to act in accordance with the declarations of his message. It did not seem possible that a crisis could long be delayed, for if it did not come through the

vigorous action of the President, there would evidently be an uprising in the Congress which would force the issue upon the country. The Congressional situation was strained to the last degree, for it was known that the half had not been told regarding the horrors of starvation and there was no appreciable amelioration of the dreadful situation. Only because of the profound respect for the President's judgment, the thorough confidence in his devotion to the national honor, the entire belief that he would act when the moment was ripe, restrained the impetuosity of his own party, while some of his opponents were striving to force the question for political effect.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE STORY OF BATTLESHIP *MAINE*—THREATS AND WARNINGS—MINISTER DE LOME'S ABUSIVE LETTER—A STARTLING MIDNIGHT DISPATCH—THE *MAINE* BLOWN UP.

The Story of the *Maine*—The *Maine* in Havana Harbor—Captain Sigsbee's Precautions—Extraordinary Vigilance—The Hostility of the Spanish Rabble—Warnings Handed to Captain Sigsbee—His Official Relations—No Cordiality from Spanish Military Officers—Reporters at Hotel Inglaterra—Story of a Letter from Weyler—Weyler's Mysterious Hints at Mines—General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro Captive—Surrounded and Killed—Conditions Worse and Worse—Publication of the De Lome Letter—Characteristic Spanish Diplomacy—De Lome Admits His Authorship and Resigns—Spain's Disavowal—A Better Feeling—A Midnight Dispatch—Startling News—" *Maine* Blown up"—An Awful Catastrophe.

THE *Maine*, which was officially rated as a second-class battleship, was launched at the Brooklyn Navy Yard November 18, 1890. An act of Congress in 1886 authorized her construction at a cost not to exceed \$2,500,000, and it is said that her exact cost was \$2,484,503. Her dimensions were: Extreme length 324 feet, beam 57 feet, draught 21½ feet; her displacement was 6,650 tons. She could carry enough coal to steam 7,000 miles at ten knots an hour; she had twin screws, and the indicated horse power of her vertical triple expansion engines was 9,290. Her armor in the water line belt and the barbettes was twelve inches thick, and on the turrets ten inches thick. A protective steel deck, two inches in thickness on the crown and four inches on the slopes, protected the boilers and engines. Her armament consisted of a main battery of four 10-inch guns, mounted in pairs in two turrets, and six 6-inch guns, two each in the bow and stern, and two on the main deck

superstructure, amidships. The other armament consisted of eight 7-pounders and four machine guns; there were also seven torpedo tubes and two 30-foot torpedo boats, each weighing seven tons. She could hurl a broadside of 1,322 pounds, not including her small-arms fire, and she could fire 1,224 pounds ahead from her two turrets and forward guns, besides the smaller fire. Her crew consisted of 328 sailors and twenty-six officers.

The berth given the *Maine* when she arrived in the harbor of Havana was in the man-of-war anchorage off the Machina, or "the Shears," and was one of the regular mooring buoys of the harbor. The Havana pilot who conducted her in said it was buoy No. 4. It was, in fact, buoy No. 5, as shown on Chart 307 of the United States Hydrographic Office, but it was known at Havana as No. 4. It was stated that the vessel last anchored there before the arrival of the *Maine* was the *Legazpi*, a Spanish dispatch boat which had been used by General Weyler in his tours about the waters of the island. She had run out and anchored there two days before the *Maine* arrived, and afterwards had taken a different position. It was noticed that in the series of social formalities following the arrival of the *Maine* the captain of the *Legazpi* never called upon Captain Sigsbee, who regarded the fact with some suspicion, but did not consider it of serious moment.

Fully aware of the state of feeling among the radical Spaniards and Volunteers in Havana, Captain Sigsbee took extraordinary precautions. He had sentries on the fore-castle and poop, quartermaster and signal boy on the bridge, signal boy on the poop, the corporal of the guard especially instructed to look out for the port gangway, the officer of the deck and the quartermaster particularly directed to look out for the starboard gangway; a quarter watch was kept on deck all night; sentries' cartridge boxes were filled, and their arms kept loaded; a number of rounds of rapid-firing ammunition were kept in the pilot house and in the captain's spare pantry, under the after superstructure; additional charges of shell

were close at hand for the secondary battery; steam was kept up in two boilers instead of one; special instructions were given to watch carefully all the hydraulic gear and report defects, and the officer of the deck was charged to make detailed reports to Captain Sigsbee, even of minor matters.

He also instructed the master-at-arms and the orderly sergeant to keep a watchful eye on everybody that came on board. When the visitors went below they were to go with them, and afterwards were to carefully inspect the routes that these persons had taken lest packages of high explosives should have been left somewhere. The whole purport of the various orders was that the vessel was in a position requiring extreme vigilance.

The reasons for this were not founded upon any distrust of the high authorities of Havana, but upon the possibilities of danger from attempts of irresponsible parties. It was hardly conceived as possible that the *Maine* stood in any danger of mines or torpedoes, for they would have required some kind of official connivance. But the hostility of the Spanish rabble was very apparent. On the first Sunday after the arrival, when a ferryboat crowded with people, both civil and military, returning from a bull fight in Regla, passed the *Maine* she was greeted with yells, whistles, and derisive calls from a number of the passengers. When Captain Sigsbee and other officers were in the city they would occasionally be handed slips of paper warning them to look out for their ship, but the captain thought little of these. General Lee was constantly receiving warnings and threats of assassination, about which he gave himself no concern. One day Captain Sigsbee received in his mail a circular protesting in vehement language against the *Maine's* visit, and closing with, "Death to the Americans! Death to autonomy! Long live Spain! Long live Weyler!"

Yet his relations with the officials were outwardly cordial. Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, second in command, was very particular concerning the occasional visitors, who

were chiefly Cubans of the highest social standing. Captain Sigsbee invited Spanish officers to the ship, in fact, made considerable effort to get them on board socially, in order to show good will according to the spirit of the *Maine's* visit, but they did not come except to pay the customary official calls. The members of the autonomistic council made a formal visit, and afterward a social visit, accompanied by their friends.

The correspondents of the United States papers and the reporters of the Havana journals were in the habit of meeting at the Hotel Inglaterra at night to talk and exchange news. One of these was Honoré François Lainé, the correspondent of the New York *Sun*, who was on rather friendly terms with Francisco Diaz, a reporter for the *Union Constitutionnel*, a Weylerite paper. One night in January, according to Lainé's story, they met at the hotel, and Diaz said that he had reliable information that General Weyler intended to become a candidate for the Cortes from the district of Havana. Asked how he knew, he said that he had a copy of a letter which Weyler had written to Santos Guzman, a lawyer and the head of the conservative party in Havana. Guzman had turned the letter over to the editor of the ultra-Spaniard *Union Constitutionnel*, in order that at the proper time Weyler's candidacy might be announced and commented on. Diaz had succeeded in getting a copy of it, and Lainé made a copy of which the following is a translation:

MADRID, January 8, 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY DON FRANCISCO DE LOS SANTOS GUZMAN,

HAVANA.

My Distinguished Personal and Political Friend: — Since the last events, I have changed my views about the attitude which our political party in Cuba ought to assume. I have thought before that it was more dignified for us to abstain from the electoral contest: I believe now that it is a patriotic duty for us to go to the polls. Our success can not be doubted; neither can be our majority of voters, nor that, with a program of defense of national honor, we will have side by side with us all those lukewarm politicians who, though Spaniards by heart are deceived by the inside combina-

tions of Moret and Sagasta and take as scientific solutions of our colonial problems what are really dishonorable humiliations of our country before the United States.

Write on your flag, the flag of Spain: "Defense of National Honor," and I offer you my name as your candidate. After having commanded during two years 200,000 Spanish heroes in Cuba, the title I shall be more proud of is that of Deputy from Havana at the Cortes of Spain.

By the way, I have read these days that the Americans are thinking about sending one of their warships to that city. During my command in Cuba they did not even dare to dream about it. They knew the terrible punishment that awaited them. I have Havana harbor well prepared for such an emergency. I rapidly finished the work that Martínez Campos carelessly abandoned.

If the insult is made, I hope that there will be a Spanish hand to punish it as terribly as it deserves.

Romero is in better health than his friends could have expected, and notwithstanding how morally sick I feel breathing this humiliating atmosphere, is well, also, your affectionate friend and servant,

VALERIANO WEYLER.

By the time this letter reached Havana the riots had taken place, autonomy had revealed its weakness, and it had become a question whether any elections would be held. The Conservatives had announced that they would not by voting become parties to such a plan, and the information that Weyler had changed his mind and counselled participation in the elections and electing him as deputy in the face of the autonomous plan was naturally regarded as an important piece of news. But as the *Maine* had not then reached Havana, and little or nothing was known outside of official circles of her intended visit, the reporters took no notice of the latter part of Weyler's note, regarding it as a species of that braggadocio to which they had become accustomed when he was Captain-General. Lainé threw the copy of the letter into his desk, and two days later the *Maine* anchored in the harbor.

Fortunately, the attention of Havana people was somewhat diverted at just this time by events in the field. General Blanco had gone on a trip to the eastern end of the island, where the Spanish forces had suffered several defeats at the hands of García and Rabi, and on January 27th there was great joy among the Spaniards when the dead body of the

young Cuban general, Aranguren, who for months had terrorized Havana by his daring raids, was brought to the city and exhibited. He had been one of the picturesque figures of the rebellion, second only to Maceo in the dread he inspired in the Spaniards, and after he executed Colonel Ruiz, who tried to induce him to accept autonomy, the great object of the Spanish officers was to capture Aranguren dead or alive. But he was not captured in battle. Through a Cuban prisoner, the Spaniards learned that the daring insurgent was in the habit of quietly paying visits to a family in the suburbs of Havana. Offered a bribe of \$500 if he would lead them to the place, the negro accepted, and one morning the Spanish cavalry burst upon it from all directions. Aranguren and his orderly were shot at the first volley, and the younger members of the family fell wounded into the arms of the father and mother, who were made prisoners.

General Blanco's mission to the east was a complete failure. He had gone with the expectation of winning the insurgent leaders over to autonomy, but their only response had been to press harder upon the Spanish forces in the east, which were in a sad condition of neglect, poorly fed, and not paid at all. The pretence of autonomy was sinking into contempt; the new cabinet was like a hornets' nest; deeper and deeper became the misery of the starving reconcentrados. From an American point of view the situation had become well-nigh intolerable. American citizens were held as virtual prisoners away from their plantations; the American consuls required constant military and police protection, yet in response to the appeal for contributions they were doing everything possible to relieve the condition of the starving people, while the Spanish guerrillas were doing everything possible to exterminate them.

In a diplomatic note Spain pleaded for a longer trial of autonomy and said that the United States could not expect the war to close within an indefinite period unless filibustering expeditions were prevented. The whole responsibility for

the success of these expeditions she placed upon us, though her naval vessels were supposed to command the whole coast of Cuba. This intimation was resented by the United States in a strong note, detailing our efforts to prevent filibustering.

When affairs were in this delicate situation, the Cuban Junta in New York made public the following astounding letter purporting to have been written by the Spanish minister at Washington, Senor De Lome, to the editor of *El Herald* at Madrid, who had recently been on a visit to Cuba:

LEGATION DE ESPAÑA, WASHINGTON.

EXIMO SEÑOR DON JOSÉ CANALEJAS:

My Distinguished and Dear Friend: — You need not apologize for not having written to me; I also ought to have written to you, but have not done so on account of being weighed down with work, and *nous sommes quittes*.

The situation here continues unchanged. Everything depends upon the political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method of warfare will end the day that the Colonial Cabinet shall be appointed, and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility of what may happen there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the Cubans whom they believe to be so immaculate.

Until then we will not be able to see clearly and I consider it to be a loss of time and an advance by the wrong road — the sending of emissaries to the rebel field, the negotiating with the autonomists not yet declared to be legally constituted and the discovery of the intentions and purpose of this government. The exiles will return one by one, and, when they return will come walking into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will gradually return. Neither of these had the courage to leave *en masse*, and they will not have the courage thus to return.

The message has undeceived the insurgents who expected something else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness (*groseria*) with which he repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain has said of Weyler, it shows once more what McKinley is — weak and cowering to the rabble, and, besides, a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.

Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves whether he will prove bad and adverse to us. I agree entirely with you; without a military success nothing will be accomplished there, and without military and political success there is here always danger that the insurgents will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least by part of the public opinion.

I do not believe you pay enough attention to the rôle of England.

Nearly all that newspaper *canaille* which swarm in your hotel are English, and at the same time that they are correspondents of the *Journal* they are also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews in London. Thus it has been since the beginning. To my mind the only object of England is that the Americans should occupy themselves with us and leave her in peace, and if there is a war so much the better; that would further remove what is threatening her — although that will never happen.

It would be most important that you should agitate the question of commercial relations even though it would be only for effect, and that you should send here a man of importance in order that I may use him to make a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to win over exiles.

There goes Amblard. I believe he comes too deeply taken up with little political matters and there must be something very great or we shall lose.

Adela returns your salutation and we wish you in the new year to be a messenger of peace and take this New Year's present to poor Spain.

Always your attentive friend and servant, who kisses your hands.

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME.

How this letter found its way into the hands of the Cuban Junta was a mystery, and, indeed, has practically remained so, but it made little difference, as the Spanish minister at once declined to deny its authenticity, and afterwards admitted it. Following its publication events moved rapidly. Anticipating the inevitable, De Lome cabled his resignation to Sagasta. However much the President might be inclined to overlook the attack upon himself, he was aware of the serious aspect of the letter as affecting our relations with Spain. The State Department, which on the following day came into possession of the original letter, secured from De Lome a frank affirmation that he had written it, and Minister Woodford was requested to demand De Lome's immediate recall. The Sagasta ministry accepted the resignation in time to prevent this government from handing De Lome his passports, but the incident was not regarded as closed unless Spain made some disavowal of the intimations that her agitation of the question of commercial relations was for nothing more than effect, and that she proposed to institute a lobby in the United States Senate.

It was apparent enough to all who were watching develop-

ments that all of Spain's diplomacy was for effect and for the sake of throwing obstacles in the way of active intervention by this country in Cuban affairs, and of creating sympathy in Europe. But until this diplomatic veneer had been frankly exposed in the De Lome letter no notice was taken of it.

On the 14th of February, Spain sent a disavowal of the sentiments of the letter, and named Don Luis Polo y Barnabe to take De Lome's place, and the President authorized the statement that the incident was closed. The tension in the relations between the two nations appeared to be relaxed; a resolution for the belligerency of the Cubans was the same day reported adversely; De Lome had gone to New York, where he was waiting for the departure of a steamer, and the Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya* was on her way to the port of New York to reciprocate the friendly visit of the *Maine*. Such was the situation when the following message flashed over the cables to the State Department:

HAVANA, February 16, 1898. — 12.30 A.M.

Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9.40 P. M. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merrit not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer *City of Washington*. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department.

LEE.

CHAPTER XXII

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898 — A FEARFUL EXPLOSION AND SCENES OF HORROR — REMARKABLE ESCAPES — THE WORK OF RESCUE — THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON.

A Quiet Night in Havana Harbor — The *Maine* Swinging at Her Chain — A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a Mass of Flying Flames and Débris — The Shrieks of Dying Men — The Silence of Death — Captain Sigsbee's Escape — Standing on the Sinking Ship — Lowering the Boats — The Officers in the Mess Room — Frightful Experiences — Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water — "Which Way?" — Lieut. Hood's Graphic Story — The Work of Rescue — A Last Call but no Answer from the Burning Wreck — Spanish Delight — Captain Sigsbee Leaves the Ship — Visits from Spanish Officers — Sigsbee's Dispatches to the Department — "Don't Send War Vessels" — Excitement at Washington — Scenes at the White House — In the Cabinet Room — The Official Impression — The General Impression — Sympathy of Spanish Officials at Havana — Appointment of the Court of Inquiry.

IT was a dark and sultry night in the harbor of Havana — the night of February 15, 1898. The great United States battleship *Maine* lay quietly at her anchorage pointing nearly northwest. About 250 yards ahead of her and midway between her anchorage and the Machina wharf was moored the Spanish man-of-war, the *Alfonso XII*. The Spanish despatch boat, *Legazpi*, which had come out two days before, lay at a berth a little further to the north. The steamer *City of Washington* of the Ward line, which had just arrived, was lying a short distance astern of the *Maine*, and other vessels were quietly at anchor at distances somewhat more remote.

Across the gently undulating waters of the harbor vibrated the lights of the city. So quiet was the night and the surroundings that the echoes of the bugle sounding from the deck of the *Maine* at "taps" were singularly sweet and distinct, and they fell pleasantly upon the ear.

The usual inspection of magazines had been completed; every part of the ship, every room, every passageway had been entered and examined; the keys had been given to Captain Sigsbee, who was seated at his port cabin table, writing a letter to his family. Other officers were in their rooms aft, reading or writing, or conversing in little groups in other parts of the ship. Swinging in their hammocks and lying about the ship forward, some asleep and some spinning yarns, were the gallant young sailors and marines off duty. Others were on their watch on deck, and the sentries were at their posts. The reports had been made to the officer of the watch. Half-past nine — All was well.

Passengers from the United States on the *City of Washington* had come up to the stern of the ship to watch the *Maine*.

"We are under the guns of the United States," said one. "We are well protected, and we can sit here."

As they looked there came a roar of immense volume, then a succession of heavy, crashing reports, a burst of flame high in the air, and a great rising mass of smoke, streaked with burning or black flying objects. The bow of the *Maine* rose out of the water, and then, before the light of the explosion faded, the ship settled back and down — deeper and deeper — while round the bow surged a foaming semicircle of water, of débris, and groaning men, the cries for help falling to a low murmur as the bow settled below the foam.

Such was the frightful spectacle in that awful moment — at 9.40 on the night of February 15th.

Death sealed the lips of 253 of her gallant men. All that was known of their experience was told in that appealing cry for help as it mingled with the hissing and the roaring of the fearful maelstrom of fire and water in which they were struggling — a cry which died away into a moan and then into the silence of death.

Captain Sigsbee was just finishing his letter when he felt the first crash of the explosion, the trembling and lurching

motion of the vessel and the subsidence. The electric lights went out and there was intense darkness and heavy smoke. He felt at once that the *Maine* had been blown up and was sinking. Thinking it might be necessary for him to make an exit by the cabin port holes on the starboard he rushed in that direction, but found that he could get out by the passage leading to the superstructure. He, therefore, took the latter route, feeling his way along and steadying himself by the bulkheads. At the quarter deck he found some of his officers who had escaped, asked a few questions hurriedly, and then climbed up on the side-rail, holding to the main rigging in order to see over the poop awning, which was covered with débris, but he could make little out of the black mass ahead of him. He ordered Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright to post sentries all around the ship, but in a moment they saw that there were no marines to post and no place forward to post them. By this time the surviving officers had worked their way out and were standing by his side. All were quiet and self-contained, overawed by the magnitude of the disaster. The captain directed that the forward magazines be flooded, but soon saw that they were already under water, and those who were coming up from the ward room told him that the water was rushing in over everything. About this time fire broke out in the mass forward and he could see the white floating bodies in the water and hear their faint cries. That gave him a better knowledge of the situation than anything else, and he immediately ordered the boats to be lowered, but only three boats were available. These were lowered and manned and left the ship to save the wounded, jointly with other boats, which by this time had arrived on the scene from the *Alfonso XIII.* and the *City of Washington*.

While Captain Sigsbee, with a few of his officers, was standing there the boats returned and reported that they had gathered in from the wreck all the wounded that could be found. The *Maine* was settling very fast, and by this time the deck where the officers stood was level with the gig's gun-



DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE" IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA, FEBRUARY 15, 1898.

wale afloat in the water alongside. The fire amidships was burning more fiercely and the spare ammunition in the pilot-house was exploding.

All the officers were accounted for except Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt. At the time of the explosion Lieutenants Jungen, Holman, and Jenkins, and Chief Engineer Howell were in the officers' messroom, when there came the dull, deafening roar, followed by the frightful crash, and it seemed to them as if the whole ship was falling to pieces.

"We have been torpedoed!" shouted Holman, jumping up. "Follow me."

They had hardly reached the opposite door when the lights went out and left them in total darkness. Jungen supposed that both Holman and Jenkins were ahead of him, but he could hear neither, and stretching out his hands he followed along till he reached the ladder, which he ascended to the passageway of the after superstructure, turning to the left, intending to go forward. But he at once encountered a mass of *débris*. He tried to reach the ladder leading to the poop; but could not. His only escape was to raise himself by a door on the superstructure. At his first effort he failed and fell back; straining every muscle for the second effort, he swung himself up, caught a chain and raised himself to the poop, where he found the Captain and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright. Holman and Howell worked themselves out in much the same manner.

The mess attendant, John H. Turpin, had been in the wardroom pantry when the explosion occurred, and the officers in the messroom had started to find their way out. Before he reached the messroom the lights were all extinguished. He heard Jenkins shout to him, "Which way?"

"I don't know which way," cried Turpin.

The water was rushing in rapidly, and as they groped about came nearly to their waists.

"Which way?" shouted Jenkins again.

"I don't know, sir, which way," replied Turpin again, as he felt his way along a wall. The water rose to his breast and Jenkins shouted again, and again Turpin replied that he could not make out his direction. Suddenly the whole compartment lit up by the light of an explosion — one of the after-explosions in the magazines — and Jenkins started forward, threw up both his hands, and fell by the steerage pantry. Turpin got his direction, and groped his way aft to the captain's ladder, which he found carried away. The water was up to his chin, and rushing in with frightful rapidity. He was just giving up when he felt a rope, and climbing on this hand over hand, he reached the deck, from which he soon jumped overboard. As he swam out a Spanish gig passed him, but he dove under water, thinking that the ship had been attacked and that he would be captured. When he came up he swam towards the *Maine's* barge and was pulled in. By this time many small boats were about the wreck, picking up the drowning men, and many were the thrilling, the fearful experiences of those who succeeded in extricating themselves from the awful wreck.

Lieutenant Hood's graphic story, as told to the Naval Board of Inquiry, gives a graphic picture of the horrors following the explosion. He said: "I was sitting on the port side of the deck, with my feet on the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more than I heard — a big explosion that sounded and felt like an under-water explosion. I was under the impression that it came from forward, starboard, at the time. I instantly turned my head and that instant there was a second explosion. I saw the whole starboard side of the deck and everything above it as far aft as the after end of the superstructure spring up in the air with all kinds of objects in it — a regular crater-like performance with flames and everything else coming up. I immediately sprang behind the edge of the superstructure for shelter, as there were a number of objects flying in my direction. I ran very quickly aft, as fast as I could, along the after end of the superstructure, and

climbed up on a kind of step. I went under the barge, and by this time the explosion had passed. The objects had stopped flying around. Then I saw on the starboard side an immense amount of foaming water and wreckage and groaning men out there. It was scattered around in a circle, I should say about a hundred yards in diameter, off on the starboard side. I immediately proceeded to lower the gig, with the help of another man. After I got that in the water, several officers jumped in it and one or two men (having been ordered to pick up the wounded.) In the meantime somebody else was lowering the other boat on the port side. I heard some groans forward and ran forward on the quarter deck down the poop ladder, and I immediately brought up on an immense pile of wreckage. I saw one man there who had been thrown from somewhere, pinned down by a ventilator. We got him up just in time, just before the water rose over him."

Corporal Thompson was lying in his hammock on the port gangway about twenty feet from the turret, when he was suddenly thrown through the port awning as high as the superstructure. He fell back on the deck stunned. As soon as he realized his position, he regained his feet and hung to the ridge rope till the water came nearly up to his neck. Just then a rope was thrown him from one of the boats; he let go of the ridge rope, sank, came up and managed to catch the line and was pulled into the boat.

Every few minutes, as the *Maine* burned fiercely, a shell would burst, scattering the flaming débris all about, but still the men in the boats worked bravely to find the injured. No more cries could be heard, though they knew that over 200 sailors had been on board. Then an officer of one of the *Maine's* boats approached the ship, and, with a voice that could be heard far away in the stillness of the night called out: "If any one is alive on board, for God's sake say so!" All waited for an answer, but none came, save the echo from the shore.

Nearly all Havana was on the wharves watching the spectacle, and among the rabble could be heard the cry of "*Viva España!*" and "*Mueran los Americanos!*" Expressions of delight were unmistakable.

While Captain Sigsbee and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright were watching the details of the awful scene from the poop, it became evident that they must take to the boats, as there was danger that the forward magazine might explode, for parts of it were constantly going off. Everything had been done that could be done. So they left the ship and went to the *City of Washington*, where they found the wounded and dying lying upon mattresses in the dining saloon. Many had been taken aboard the Spanish warship, where they were being cared for. Having observed that the wounded were being attended to, and having directed a muster to be taken of those on board the rescuing vessels, the Captain went on deck and took a last look of the burning wreck of his vessel. At midnight he went below and dictated a telegram to the Navy Department. While there several Spanish officers — civil, military, and naval — came on board, in their own behalf and in representative capacity, expressing sympathy and sorrow for "the accident." There were the representatives of General Blanco and of the admiral of the station, and the civil governor of the province was on board in person. Having finished his telegrams, Captain Sigsbee met the group of Spanish gentlemen and thanked them for their visit and sympathy. Invariably, their expressions of sympathy were followed by eager inquiries as to Captain Sigsbee's idea of the cause of the accident, for accident it must have been, they said. Invariably, the Captain replied that he must await further investigation. Doubtless, this curiosity was natural. Even if entirely innocent, they knew that Spanish designs would be suspected because of the bitter feeling in Havana toward the United States, and because of the desperate character of the officers of the Volunteers, as well as some of those of the regular army. But

Captain Sigsbee's visitors insisted that it must have been an accident.

"I am convinced it was the dynamo boiler," said a Spanish naval officer.

"But we had no dynamo," said Captain Sigsbee.

"Then it must have been the boilers," said the Spanish officer.

"But the forward boilers had not been lighted for three months," replied Sigsbee. "Only the after boilers were used, and the explosion occurred well forward."

"But the torpedoes," someone suggested. The torpedoes had not been fitted with war-heads, and without them the torpedoes were harmless. Besides, they were kept aft. As for the forward magazines, the ammunition was exploding in detail while the officers were talking, and kept on exploding much of the night. Fifty feet aft from the bow was the first storeroom for ammunition. It was twenty feet wide across the ship, twelve feet fore and aft, and seven feet high. On one side was kept the shells and on another the powder for the 6-inch guns. Aft of this room was another of the same dimensions, the storeroom for ammunition for the six-pounder, and one-pounder Hotchkiss guns. Back of this was the first of the ship's large magazines, twenty-eight feet wide and twenty-four feet fore and aft. It was divided into three compartments by partitions, so that one-half of the magazine was used for powder for the 10-inch guns, and the other compartments contained powder for the six-inch guns and shells for the 10-inch guns. Running along either side of the magazine were narrow coal bunkers. Everything had been thoroughly inspected shortly before the explosion. Had the explosion originated in those magazines, thought the survivors of the *Maine*, there would have been nothing left to explode. But they kept their thoughts to themselves. It was a critical time.

The despatch Captain Sigsbee sent to the Navy Department was as follows:

"*Maine* blown up in Havana harbor at 9.40 to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send Light-House Tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water. None has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved; Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers including representatives of General Blanco now with me to express sympathy."

He also sent the following to Key West:

"Tell Admiral *Maine* blown up and destroyed. Send Light-House Tenders. Many killed and wounded. Don't send war vessels if others available."

When asked afterwards at Washington why he had advised against sending warships he said: "In the first place there was a great deal of excitement, and I wanted to work along without men-of-war, and to allay the excitement in the city; and, in the next place, if there were any more mines, I did not want any more war vessels blown up. Up to that time I had strongly recommended that the *Indiana* be sent there, just to show them that the *Maine* was not the only vessel in the navy or the most powerful. After that time I had no more confidence in the people. Treachery had been shown us, and there was no special care for us. They had not attempted to protect us."

General Lee was sitting in his room in his hotel when the explosion occurred, and as soon as he learned that it was the *Maine* he hastened to the palace and asked for General Blanco. He came immediately and Lee said that tears were in his eyes. He seemed to regret it as much as anyone in Havana. But he soon heard that many Spanish officers were drinking champagne at different cafés in honor of the event.

Three hours after the *Maine* had been blown up, representatives of the press were rushing about Washington in cabs at midnight, ringing doorbells, and informing the Secretary of the Navy and every one connected with the department, of "a bad accident to the *Maine*." There was no

doubt in the minds of the Secretary of the Navy and his assistants that something unfriendly had happened to the battleship sent on her "friendly mission" a little more than a fortnight before. Suppressed excitement continued everywhere. Early the next morning crowds were gathered about the models of battleships and cruisers in the halls of the Navy Department. Men of the press and others were keeping a well-worn path between the Department and the White House, and here and there were little groups of pale-faced people, talking in low tones. At the White House were faces white and set, and the few words one heard were in strangely quiet undertones. The men on duty at the door and about the halls replied mechanically to questions of visitors.

Up in the Cabinet-room the President was talking it over with such members of his cabinet as were in town, and during the day the contents of the dispatches from Havana were given out from time to time. There was no disposition to withhold anything, and, indeed, it would have been very unwise to have done so, under the strain of public excitement and anxiety. When the Attorney-General came out of the Cabinet-room he was instantly surrounded by men of the press, eager for information. He said in cool, deliberate tones:

"Everything known about the disaster will be given out; the President directs it, and you will learn all from the Secretary of the Navy. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, that I should say nothing more."

Then, after an instant's pause, he added. "The Spanish government at Havana tenders its sympathy." He bowed and passed down the stairway. There was not a word of comment. Men had become hardened to the "friendly relation" phase of the Cuban policy.

Ten minutes later the Secretary of the Navy came out of the cabinet-room. Three men who had been waiting for him were at his side at once. On their return one was asked:

" Well, what is the impression—the official impression? "

" Oh, the official impression is that it was an accident. "

" And the other impression—the general impression? "

" Oh, the general impression is that it was *not* an accident. "

In the meantime at the Navy Department telegrams were coming by the score from relatives and friends of the dead sailors buried next day at Havana. A Court of Inquiry to investigate the cause of the disaster was at once appointed, and it was also promptly decided not to send another warship to Havana for the present, General Lee, as well as Captain Sigsbee, having so advised.

The Spanish authorities, however, acted in the most sympathetic and cordial manner. The hospitals were opened for the wounded and the Spanish physicians and nurses assisted the surgeon of the ship in alleviating the sufferings of the injured. It being impossible to embalm the dead and send them to this country, the bodies that were found were buried in Havana. The first burial, of nineteen men, was at the expense of the Spanish authorities. There was a great funeral cortége, in which 5,000 people were in line, and every mark of respect was shown. The Bishop of Havana and Chaplain Chidwick of the *Maine* conducted the religious ceremonies. No trouble was spared in Havana to make the survivors as comfortable as possible and to show sympathy for the great loss by the " accident. "

The Court of Inquiry was composed of Captain William T. Sampson, at that time in command of the battleship *Iowa*; Captain French E. Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, of the flagship *New York*; and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, at one time an officer of the *Maine*. They proceeded at once to Havana and began a secret investigation on Monday, the 21st. Divers were set to work under command of Captain Sigsbee. At first some little friction developed as to our rights in the wreck. When early on the morning of the 18th Captain Sigsbee and three of his

officers rowed out to endeavor to find in the hulk the bodies of Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt, they were stopped by a guard of armed Spanish sailors surrounding the sunken battleship. Captain Sigsbee declared who he was and his intentions, but they told him that they had strict orders not to allow any diver employed by Americans to go down unless accompanied by a Spanish diver. Captain Sigsbee returned and together with General Lee held a long discussion with the Admiral and General Blanco. It was urged that the wreck was American property and under the jurisdiction of American officers, and the point was finally carried. Had the Havana authorities insisted on their claims, the impression would naturally have been formed that they had reason to fear that something incriminating them would be found. They asked for a joint investigation, but the court preferred to act independently, with assurances to the Spanish officials that, on their part, every facility for making a separate investigation would be extended to them.

The administration had every reason for confidence in the members of the Court of Inquiry. Captain Sampson had been chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for several years, and was a man of positive convictions and judicial disposition. The other members had special qualifications which entitled them to confidence.

CHAPTER XXIII

PREPARING FOR WAR—EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY —MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE—A HISTORICAL MOMENT—THE DRIFT INTO WAR.

Effect of the *Maine* Incident upon Our Cuban Policy—A Plain, Concrete Case—The People Remain Patient—The President's Policy Interrupted—Reasons for the Accidental Theory—Not Really Believed in Official Circles—General Lee Informs the State Department that It Looked Like an Outside Explosion—Sudden Activity in Official Circles—Preparations for War—*Oregon* Ordered Home—Dewey Ordered to Concentrate His Fleet—Arrival and Departure of the *Vizcaya*—Our Precautions for Her Safety—Spain's Responsibility for the Safety of the *Maine*—Deeper and Deeper Misery in Cuba—Red Cross Work—Spain's Request for the Recall of General Lee—Her Reasons—Probing for the Weyler Letter—Lainé's Arrest and Expulsion—Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram—Corroborative Evidence—The President Seeks Support in Congress—\$50,000,000 for National Defense—A Critical Moment in Our National Life.

IT is a question whether the *Maine* incident really hastened or delayed actual hostilities. Undoubtedly, it crystallized American sentiment; here was something concrete in its character and appealing directly to the sentiment of the people as Americans. If they had been balancing doubtfully as to our grounds for interference because of Spanish excesses in Cuba and Spanish disregard of our rights, they could doubt no longer when a fine battleship lay at the bottom of Havana harbor, with the mangled bodies of 253 sailors and marines in the wreck. They might fail to appreciate the seriousness of affairs when couched in the smooth words of diplomacy, but the ruin of the *Maine* was understood. No matter whether it suggested motives of revenge or not; it suggested action. There was something more than a general impression that it was not an accident. It was a belief.

Nevertheless, the people were not at first impatient. Self-repression was a dominant characteristic, even in Congress.

Nothing else was talked about in conversation, but little was said in public utterance to arouse the suppressed excitement, and though it was attempted it met a silent reproof even from Cuban sympathizers who fully realized that action must follow. But it introduced a new phase into our relations with Spain, and one which required a little time for an adjustment, so that we might not appear to rush into war out of pure revenge. It really interrupted the course of the policy which the administration had laid down. Spain had been given to understand that we could not contemplate an indefinite continuance of the existing affairs in Cuba; our warships had been sent to the vicinity of Cuba, and as a preparation for a vigorous policy the President had collected from the consuls on the island a great mass of reports confirming all the assertions in the newspapers about the starving reconcentrados. Congress had called for these reports and the President was just on the point of giving them to Congress and to the world when the news of the *Maine* explosion came. So the reports were held back in the fear that, when added to the disaster, the excitement might lead Congress to declare war on the instant, and prudence commanded that we should go to war, if we went at all, decently and in order.

Going to war is not a simple business. It requires, besides ways and means, men and arms, and a motive which any European nation favorable to Spain or hostile to the United States on general principles could not question. To rush into war might prove disastrous, and yet the President felt that if anything developed showing conclusively that the *Maine* was blown up from outside war would become inevitable. The people would hardly allow the government to take any other course, and no man ever had a greater respect for the sentiment of the people than President McKinley. They could not appreciate the perils of the situation nor the tremendous responsibilities resting upon the executive, who knew we were living over a volcano. But he wisely counseled patience and allowed the people to think that he believed the *Maine* to have met her

fate through an accident. He had planned a Cuban policy upon broad lines, and it was a very serious matter to have such a disaster at such a moment suggesting in the hearts of so many the thought of revenge or swift retribution. Every consideration of prudence and safety required him to keep this great moving patriotic sentiment of a nation of nearly 80,000,000 people in check. But could he?

General Lee sent but one dispatch concerning the investigation of the causes of the disaster, and that was the day after the naval board began its inquiry. It was not given out until some time after its receipt. In it he said: "Copper cylinders' ammunition found intact in 10-inch forward magazine, star-board side, this morning. Seems to show that magazine not exploded. Evidence beginning to prove explosion on port side by torpedo."

The people understood the pacific official expressions and were not surprised when preparations for action were suddenly begun. Vessels out of commission were being put in readiness; ammunition was being manufactured at an unusual rate; coal was being stored at convenient points along the coast; fortifications were being repaired and put in readiness for the defense of the coast; inquiries concerning the mobilization of the naval and ordinary militia were sent to a few States likely to be first summoned into action in case of war. On March 9th it was decided to withdraw the battleship *Oregon* from the Pacific squadron. Such a step could hardly have been taken had peace been deemed probable, for it imposed upon the battleship a very long journey around the Horn. Orders were sent to Rear Admiral Dewey, commander of the Asiatic naval squadron, to concentrate his ships at Hongkong; in fact, no step was spared for placing us in a position to face a foe in the immediate future. Spain also began to negotiate for ships, and, fearing the successful consummation of such negotiations, Secretary Long on March 9th cabled to the naval attachés of the United States abroad to obtain options on armored cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. But, peace or war, the Presi-

den had a fixed purpose in view. If forcible intervention came, it would be because Spain declined to consider intermediary propositions looking to the independence of the island through peaceful means. He determined to keep his existing Cuban policy intact and to handle the *Maine* disaster as a separate incident.

So far as could be seen, the Spanish authorities made no attempt to discover whether a plot to blow up the *Maine* had existed. They seem to have taken it for granted that it was an accident, and their investigation was a farce — a most transparent effort to bolster up the accident theory. The whole forward part of the ship from a point just abaft the forward turret had been twisted fifteen or twenty degrees to starboard, and that part of the wreck was a wilderness of débris and curled and twisted plates.

But was the force of the explosion inward or outward? In seeking to answer this question the divers soon found conclusive testimony.

When it became evident from what little leaked out that the disaster could not have been caused by an explosion of the boilers, the "official impression" was that it must have been due to the explosion of the forward magazines where the powder was.

It was evident by the 26th that the administration had in reality abandoned the accident theory, and at a cabinet meeting the possibilities of the future were discussed. Even if it were conclusively shown that the Spanish government either at Madrid or at Havana had nothing to do with the design, Spain would be no less responsible for not protecting the ship while in the harbor, particularly if she had been deliberately anchored over a mine. Should it be established that the *Maine* was blown up either through design or want of due diligence on the part of the authorities at Havana, Spain's responsibility would be complete, and would justify the United States in resorting to drastic measures of redress.

The Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya*, which had arrived at the

port of New York in the midst of the public excitement over the loss of the *Maine*, departed on February 26th. The precautions of the port authorities to guard the Spanish vessel from all harm were thorough and effective, and the extreme to which these precautions were carried was illustrated by the fact that even the Holland submarine boat was constantly watched. The government, in short, accepted its responsibility for the security of a foreign vessel of war visiting its waters on a friendly mission.

Convinced that the Cubans would not accept the plan of autonomy proposed, the autonomist party in Cuba began to discuss additional measures without any assurance from Spain that she would consent to them. They were suggested with the evident intention of determining, if possible, to what extent it would be necessary to go to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. But the insurgents continued firm in their demand for absolute independence, and Spain was equally firm in her determination to maintain her sovereignty and reject any active interference by the United States.

Financially, Spain was sinking deeper and deeper into debt, and knew not how to pay arrears due the army, civil servants, and other debtors, while an annual interest charge of \$65,000,000 was due, and the Cuban indebtedness had arisen to nearly \$500,000,000. Meanwhile, affairs both financial and military seemed to be drifting without any clear plan of action or distinct hopes for the future. Bad as this was, the starvation and suffering in Cuba were much worse. Official statistics as reported showed that in the province of Matanzas alone 50,000 people had perished, and a third of the population left were in destitution.

Miss Clara Barton of the Red Cross Society, on her arrival in Cuba reported that the condition was far worse than she had believed possible. The planters and business men were almost or quite ruined. It appeared as if years of peace would be required to restore industry and commerce to a normal state. In short, the entire condition of the island was des-

perate and apparently almost hopeless. Wholly apart from the *Maine* disaster, the serious issue in the Cuban question was a continuing one. Our government had reached the belief that the time had nearly come when humanity and commercial interests alone required it to intervene.

While the Court of Inquiry was conducting its inquiry, the public waited patiently and with little knowledge of the nature of the testimony or of the impression made upon the members of the board, which observed the greatest secrecy. But some points leaked out, such as, for example, the fact that much of the ammunition in the forward magazine was found intact. Everything went to confirm the general impression and belief that the disaster was not an accident. The public had made up its mind with an instinct which is generally unerring.

If the official appeal for help for the starving reconcentrados had been made in the hope that the sympathy of the people of the United States would prove the most humane factor, and therefore one of the most powerful influences in the peaceful effort to bring the war to a speedy close, it was a hope with little promise of fulfillment. Apparently, it had no effect on Spain. The authorities at Madrid and Havana did nothing, and did not try to do anything. But the American relief continued and could not be withdrawn when the need for it was becoming more and more pressing.

Up to the 10th of March the American committee for the relief of the reconcentrados had distributed rations to 18,000 starving people in Havana and the neighboring towns of Guanabacoa, and \$5,000 in the whole island. Still the misery was intense and people were dying by the hundreds every day.

When, early in March, it was announced that fresh supplies would be carried to the island on two American warships — the *Montgomery* and the *Nashville* — the expedition was awaited with especial interest in view of the fate of the *Maine*, and this was followed by much disturbance of feeling when Spain, through Minister Woodford, requested that supplies

should not be sent to Cuba on war vessels, and that our government should recall Consul-General Lee, through whose active efforts supplies had been distributed where most needed. The Madrid papers were charging that General Lee's sympathies were more with the insurgent than with the Spanish forces, and that he was in friendly relations with correspondents of papers which were considered to be decidedly unfriendly to Spain. It would have been strange, indeed, had General Lee failed to have sympathy for the insurgents after what he had observed, but he at all times carefully refrained from official acts that would have compromised him or the people he represented.

After the destruction of the *Maine*, the correspondent, Lainé, whose story was afterwards told to a Senate committee, bethought himself of the Weyler letter, to the latter part of which he had paid little heed at the time a copy of it came into his possession. Lainé asserted that he tried to see Diaz, his informant, and secure, if possible, the original of the letter, but could not. He assumed that Diaz, being a Spaniard, must have notified the authorities that he had a copy of the letter, for on March 4th he was arrested and kept in Cabaña fortress. Through a friend who had witnessed the arrest he was able to inform the consul-general. On the 9th he was expelled from the island. He averred that the Spanish police officials had informed him that they knew of his secret, but that it would die with him, and he considered that he had been expelled rather than killed because he had been enabled to make his arrest known.

The letter was published in a New York paper and drew forth a denial from Guzman that he had ever received it, and from Weyler that he had ever sent it. General Lee knew Lainé well, and had, as he says, always found him "a very upright, honest, straight fellow." When he saw the copy of the Weyler letter, therefore, he thought the chances were that he had a copy of a genuine letter, and he set some machinery at work with the result that he found a cablegram signed "Wey-

ler," sent from Barcelona to Eva Canel and Santos Guzman. The former was quite a noted Spanish woman in Havana who was a great admirer of General Weyler. During the mob riots she had shouted "*Viva Weyler!*" and "*Muera Blanco!*" and was finally expelled from the island by Blanco and sent to Mexico. Guzman was the one to whom the letter Lainé showed had been addressed. This cablegram read:

"Grave circumstances cause me to ask you to destroy the last letter of February 18."

General Lee was entirely satisfied that it was a genuine telegram received at Havana, and considered it corroborative of the letter shown by Lainé. The cablegram seemed to refer to a later letter, and to all appearance was sent after receiving information that his former letter had been made public. It will be noticed that Lainé's arrest occurred the 4th, the request for Lee's recall the 6th, and Lainé's expulsion on the 9th.

Many saw in Spain's request for the recall of General Lee the influence of De Lome, who had just arrived at Madrid, as he was known to have advised his government to take such a course when he was minister. When the State Department first considered sending relief supplies to Cuba by warships, De Lome had been very prompt to protest, and he also spoke unofficially to members of the State Department of what he considered the impropriety of General Lee's conduct in Havana.

The request for Lee's withdrawal was promptly refused by the President, who said in a public statement: "The President will not consider the recall of General Lee. He has borne himself throughout this crisis with judgment, fidelity, and courage to the President's entire satisfaction. As to the supplies for the relief of the Cuban people, all arrangements have been made to carry a consignment this week from Key West by one of the naval vessels, whichever may be the best adapted and most available for the purpose, to Matanzas and Sagua."

It was decided to send the supplies in the *Fern* with the

Montgomery as convoy, so, practically, both requests from Spain were refused and she was too wise to press them. The tone of the conservative press in Spain became very hostile to the United States, though the ministry made frequent expressions of its desire for friendly relations. Elections for the Cortes were pending and the Liberals were anxious that a majority should be chosen in support of the Sagasta ministry. There had been no election since the Canovas ministry, and thus the Liberals were in a minority, dangerous in view of the complications ahead.

The trend of events was unmistakable. The administration was doing everything possible to place the navy and army on a war footing and Spain was making efforts to buy war vessels. The President felt that the time had come to add to the fleet, and that required the support of Congress. His consultations with the leaders of Congress plainly showed that he would be gladly supported in any preparations for war, though there was some hesitancy shown by the naval committee, curiously enough, from the representatives of the State of Maine. The result of the President's consultation was the introduction by Mr. Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, of a bill setting apart \$50,000,000 for the defense of the nation to be used at the President's discretion. No statement was made of the reason why such a sum was demanded. But it was warmly approved throughout the country. The people simply knew that the controversy with Spain had reached such a point that the President felt it his duty to prepare for war.

It was passed in the House of Representatives on the 8th and in the Senate on the 9th of March, without a dissenting voice in either body and without debate in the Senate; and it was at once signed by the President. One of the striking features of the debate in the House was the apparently general agreement that it was essentially a peace rather than a war measure. The argument was that to be well prepared for any possible emergency was the best way to insure the calm and

reasonable consideration of fair propositions for the maintenance of honor and justice without resort to war. The same reason was given for the continued activity of the army and navy, the reorganization of military departments, the purchase of war material, the equipping of ships, the enlisting of men, the increased estimates in the naval bill, the forming of two new regiments of artillery, which the army officials had long before unsuccessfully demanded as a necessity for coast defense. All of these steps were being taken, and the two days in which the resolution for defense was passed formed a dramatic climax. They were days when stocks, bonds, and calculating self-interest were lost sight of in the rise of American patriotism; a cool, strong, determined unit of thought and action, sweeping everything before it in the Congress of the United States.

If it was only a peace measure it was a pretty big one. No step in the three years of our Cuban policy had so won the respect of nations. Its meaning was great and far reaching. It meant the freedom of Cuba — by peace if possible; if not, by war. That would depend upon Spain. President McKinley completely dominated the situation. Congress gave to him \$50,000,000 and a vote of confidence such as no President ever had, both without his making a promise in return. He deeply felt the trust imposed upon him, for he considered it as a trust and not as a vindication.

History will certainly call that a striking moment in our national life when \$50,000,000 were given to the President without a minute's hesitation or a dissenting voice. Such a vote was not recalled in the whole history of Congress — every man voting, and all on one side, ready and eager to go on record. The four hours' debate in the House was not really a debate — but four hours of speeches all on one side. For the first time since the Civil War, Congress was united as one man in a common cause for the honor of a common flag. It was worth a few millions just to show to the world that silver and gold, protection and free trade, and all other differences, with

the party names of Republican, Democrat, and Populist had vanished, leaving no East, West, North, nor South, but instead one solid American party, with a single plank in its platform, pledged to stand by the government. The nation with such confidence in its government is a great nation.

The measure certainly seemed to have a calming effect upon Spain, and a semi-official statement was made in Madrid to the effect that Spain was no more desirous of war than the United States. Undoubtedly, this was generally true, in spite of a feeling that a war with the United States might be necessary to save the throne. The statement said there was no cause for war, but this was from Spain's standpoint. She had no desire for war so long as the United States allowed affairs to go on in Cuba, and she held there was no cause for war so long as the United States did so. But from the American standpoint the war in Cuba must stop, and the only chance for peace was in Spain's yielding, and she would welcome a war with the United States rather than do that. If she withdrew from Cuba, it must be at the point of the guns of the United States, not of those of Cuban bandits. The far-sighted in this country understood this perfectly, and therefore considered the \$50,000,000 a war measure, not a peace measure.

The government at once became intensely active in putting the country in a condition of defense. Enormous quantities of war supplies were ordered; negotiations for the purchase of warships building abroad were begun; recruiting stations for the navy were opened; the monitors, cruisers, and rams were put under commission; the great ordnance factory of the government was kept working night and day, and two cruisers, receiving finishing touches in English shipyards and intended for Brazil, were purchased.

CHAPTER XXIV

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION — FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH SPAIN — REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

Sounding European Governments — Friendly Attitude of England — Reasons for Cherishing an Alliance — Moral Influence of the Attitude of the United States — The Spanish Court of Inquiry — Marked Impression Made by Senator Proctor's Speech — Differing Policies — Renewed Activity in War Preparations — Senator Thurston's Speech Enthusiastically Received — Spain's Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the Canary Islands — Hastening Diplomacy — A Critical Situation — Our Demands upon Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Submitted — Its Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the Wreck — Evidence Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — Efforts to Fix the Responsibility — Suggestive Phrase from Spanish Report.

THE European governments, while not officially sounded as to their attitude in case of war, gave indications of their official position, and in all cases save one their responses were satisfactory. Austria's manner, if not positively unfriendly, was somewhat chilling. Germany gave us to understand that its friendship and trade with the United States were of more importance to her than friendship and trade with Spain. But the most significant expression, and by far the most important, came from England. There had been some discussion as to joint action between the United States and England in case an attempt was made by continental powers to close neutral ports in China, but it had been indecisive. It was made clear, however, that there was a practically unanimous feeling in England with regard to the strength and justice of the American position in the differences with Spain. Never before in the history of England and the United States had there been such outspoken approval of

American policy; never before such warm expression of Anglo-Saxon fellowship. The sobriety of spirit and quiet determination, first to be in the right, and next to support the right at any cost, which had thus far been shown by the President, by Congress, and by the people of the country during these trying weeks had won the English heart, and it was evident that if war came with Spain, England would stand as a warning against any interference from Continental powers. It was not considered probable that there would be a formal alliance between the two countries, but their unconscious gravitation towards each other in time of danger showed again that blood was thicker than water. The historical and race kinship of the two peoples was evidently becoming more distinct in the national consciousness, and promised to constitute a great factor in the international problems of the future.

England's disposition to cherish an alliance with us was very reasonably influenced by the diplomatic situation in Europe as to China. Rather than be deprived of the markets of the far East or to suffer the dismemberment of the Chinese empire, which was seriously threatened by the aggressive policy of Russia, France, and Germany, England had intimated that she would go to war. Matters had arrived at a very critical stage, and had not the trouble between Spain and the United States brought forth the evidences of an understanding between the latter and England, the three Continental powers threatening England's prestige in the East might have pushed her to active operations. When the influence, even though entirely moral, of the United States was thrown in the balance with England, the powers drew back. This, doubtless, had its effect in stirring up the severe criticisms of the United States and the evident sympathy with Spain in the press of Russia, France, and Germany. It compelled a relinquishment of designs in the East at a time when they thought England to be unsupported.

Moreover, the Cuban war had been as disastrous in many ways to the interest of England as to ours. The railways had

largely been built with capital borrowed in London; over 100 plantations were owned by Englishmen or were controlled by English capital, and England had been seriously considering what she should do with all the claims of her citizens for damages in the Cuban war, — damages for which Spain was liable.

Little was heard from the Naval Court of Inquiry in the *Maine* disaster, though from unofficial sources came occasional intimations that the explosion was external and not internal. But, in the pressure of other events, the importance of the inquiry was lost sight of. The President of the Spanish Court of Inquiry, Captain Peral, publicly stated that in his opinion the disaster was an accident, pure and simple. The prevailing idea was that much depended upon the report of our Court, and also much upon the reply of Spain to any demand for indemnity that might be made. It was semi-officially announced that Spain would resist the payment of an indemnity. This attitude, taken in advance of the report of our Court, and only upon the public statement of Captain Peral, gave abundant evidence that the United States could expect nothing from Spanish diplomacy. When it took twenty years to collect the *Mora* claim, which Spain acknowledged to be just, there was little prospect of securing an indemnity for the *Maine*.

Spain remained as firm as ever in its refusal to consider the freedom of Cuba; Captain-General Blanco, at a dinner given at Havana, declared that Spain would never give it up nor would she sell at any price.

Nothing made a more marked impression upon Congress and the country at this time than the speech of Senator Proctor in the Senate on March 17th. Owing to the aggressive character of some of the pro-Cuban newspapers, many people had formed the habit of discounting the news which came from the troubled island. Even when these statements were backed by reports from some correspondents of good repute, there was a disposition to doubt occurrences which hardly seemed possible

in civilized warfare. This doubt manifested itself in the Senate among those who dreaded precipitate action, and it was fortunate, therefore, that some of the senators and congressmen had determined to see for themselves. Of all those who chose thus to inform themselves no man was more respected among his colleagues than Senator Proctor of Vermont, a level-headed, conservative New Englander, with much acumen, sobriety of judgment, and due regard for the responsibilities of his office. When, therefore, he described in cool, dispassionate language the conditions of Cuba as he saw them in February and early in March, and voiced his judgment concerning the future of Cuba if it continued under Spanish rule, doubtful people began to realize why it was that so many had long urged intervention. He assured the Senate that he spoke without any consultation with the President, and that his words could only be interpreted as an expression of his personal belief.

It had become apparent that, assuming that the *Maine* incident was satisfactorily settled, two radically differing parties existed among those close to the President: those who advocated immediate intervention on the ground of humanity and commercial necessity, and those who preferred to give Spain a longer time to demonstrate the success or failure of autonomous government. All agreed that it would be useless and unwise to attempt to force the insurgents into accepting even the most generous Spanish terms, and all dreaded an attempt to settle the question by force at any time between May 1st and October 1st, when the mortality from fever might be greater than that from Spanish bullets. Undoubtedly, many sincere friends of Cuba, who had made up their minds that force would be necessary and wise, would have been glad to continue the relief to the reconcentrados and to impress upon Spain diplomatically the necessity of her granting freedom to Cuba on honorable terms, but events could not be so easily managed. The action of this nation cannot be determined by the President alone, or by Congress, or by any special interest;

in the last analysis it must be determined by the people. There are times when the national consciousness rises higher than anything else and such times are momentous ones in the life of the nation.

As the time for the report of the Naval Board approached, the public impatience increased. By the 24th the gravity of the situation could no longer be disguised by expressions of peace; the feeling of restlessness was noticeable everywhere. A crisis seemed at hand. The activity of preparations in the Army and Navy Departments constantly increased. Troops had been ordered eastward; important changes had been made in the naval commands; telegraphic orders for the purchase of tugs and torpedo destroyers had gone forth. In Congress the nervous enthusiasm of the crowd of spectators who daily wandered about the great marble capitol found vent when Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire depicted the horrors he had witnessed in Cuba, and when Senator Thurston of Nebraska, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba, where his wife had died, in a glowing speech described the dreadful scenes he had witnessed, and declared strongly for action. As he neared the close of his speech he broke down under excitement, sympathy, and sorrow, and as he sat down he bowed his head upon his desk and wept, and the galleries broke into applause that for the first time in the United States Senate was allowed to go on unchecked.

The gravity of the situation was increased by the departure from the Canary Islands of a flotilla of torpedo boats, ostensibly for the West Indies, though the opinion was held that the movement was for the purpose of influencing the elections to the Cortes to be held on the 27th. The Carlists, Conservatives, and Republicans were attacking Sagasta for alleged weakness in dealing with the United States.

The President early decided to treat the *Maine* question and the general Cuban question separately. Realizing that it would be impossible to restrain Congress and the people after the report of the Court of Inquiry, the inevitable conclusions

of which the administration well knew, the President hastened on his diplomatic negotiations in every way possible. He impressed upon Spain his desire for peace, but declared that the situation in Cuba must be relieved. We should insist upon making the relief of the starving effective. It would be impossible for the United States to allow the contest to go on, and as autonomy such as Spain had proposed would not be accepted by the Cubans, it was useless to consider further the possibilities of that plan as a measure of peace. But if Spain could be induced to suspend hostilities and induce the Cubans to treat, it was possible that the United States might by some arrangement bring about the compliance of the Cubans.

On March 23d Minister Woodford conveyed to the Spanish government the attitude of the administration, and two days later Spain replied to the effect that she could not agree with the "inaccurate conclusions" of the American government as to the conditions in Cuba, and she still insisted that autonomy was working well. Neither could Spain admit the interference foreshadowed in the American note and she deprecated the sending of official relief and war vessels to Cuba.

There was little time left. The President received the report on the *Maine* on the 25th, and it would not do to hold it back from Congress. He saw that the only way to avert war for the time was to induce Spain to grant an armistice during which the Cuban question could be deliberately and dispassionately considered and settled. Accordingly, on the 27th, as a result of much previous correspondence, he submitted through the minister at Madrid propositions for an armistice until October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of the independence of Cuba, with the good offices of the President. In addition to this, he asked for the immediate and effective revocation of the order of reconcentration so as to permit the people to return to their farms, the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

On the following day, and while the President was awaiting the reply to what he considered a final effort to settle affairs diplomatically, the report of the Court of Inquiry was made public, but it created no new excitement. The public mind had already been made up, and the report came chiefly as a formal finding in a case that had already been decided upon abundant circumstantial evidence. Among a certain class some disappointment prevailed because the Court had not been able to fix the responsibility definitely, the difficulties in the way of such a board when endeavoring to detect a Spanish culprit, in such a state of affairs as existed at Havana, not being appreciated; but it made little difference whether the responsibility was fixed or not, for, in fact, and in the eyes of the people of the United States, Spain could not escape the responsibility of the outrage, even if her officials were ignorant of any plot. She had failed to protect a vessel at Havana on a friendly mission, and the fact that the evidence was quite conclusive that the *Maine* had been blown up by a mine made the case against Spain all the stronger, for a mine sufficient to cause such destruction could not have existed without the knowledge of someone in authority about the fortifications of the city. Even had the Court reported that it had been unable to determine how the *Maine* had been blown up, it is doubtful if it would have made any serious difference with the situation. The fact that a state of things existed in Cuba which made it unsafe for American warships to go there was sufficient. The great Cuban question was still over and above incidental considerations; the *Maine* had simply determined the people to settle it, if not quickly by peace, then quickly by war.

President McKinley sent to Congress the full text of the report, together with the voluminous evidence taken; a brief message recapitulating the well-known facts about the visit of the *Maine* to Havana, and the organization of the court and its proceedings.

In conclusion, he said that he had directed the findings of the Court and the views of this government to be communi-

cated to the government of Spain, and added: "I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two governments." He refrained from making an immediate demand for indemnity, desiring first to see what Spain might see fit to answer to our presentation of facts.

The evidence that the disaster was caused by an outside explosion was convincing to all who had a knowledge of the work of the Court of Inquiry. The center of the explosion was beneath and a little forward of the conning tower and on the port side, and not only did the wreck show that no explosion of the forward magazines could have produced such effects, but that they were plainly the effect of a force from underneath the ship. The keel at this center of explosion was blown up above the surface of the water, and the forward part of the ship had been thrown over forward so that the bow was driven into the mud. Indeed, about all of the forward part of the ship which appeared above water were the keel plates. More than this, the divers discovered, underneath this part of the raised keel and exactly where the center of the explosion was, a large hole in the mud, fully fifteen feet in diameter and seven feet deep. The Court was inclined to think that the force of the mine explosion must have exploded some part of the forward magazines, but, nevertheless, considerable ammunition from these magazines was found intact, whereas had the initial explosion taken place within them nothing would have remained. Besides, there was nothing to cause these ammunition stores to explode except an explosion from outside. The evidence was entirely conclusive.

Recognizing the obstacles to the work of obtaining any evidence calculated to fix the responsibility for the outrage, the Court of Inquiry does not seem to have devoted much attention to that branch of the investigation, although it secured some evidence that was not made public. As the *Maine* had been conducted to the buoy by direction of the harbor author-

ities, and as such an explosion could not have been worked except by connivance with some one on shore in charge of or with a knowledge of the mines, an investigation to fix the responsibility would naturally have taken the Court in the direction of the authorities who were investigating the case for Spain, and who had asserted from the beginning that it was an accident. It was generally thought that General Blanco was innocent of any knowledge of a plot, but it was well known that a large proportion of the guards were hostile to him, were adherents of Weyler, were bitterly hostile to the United States, were capable of almost anything in the way of outrage, and were, moreover, in a position to use mines if such there were in the harbor.

The report of the Spanish Court of Inquiry based its reasons for concluding the explosion an internal one mainly on the statements that no dead fish were seen about the wreck, a fact entirely inconclusive, largely because there are few fish in the dirty waters of the bay. It was admitted that no effective examination had been made of the conditions of the wreck, but, it said, "this must not be understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof."

CHAPTER XXV.

NEARING A CRISIS--"REMEMBER THE MAINE"—SPAIN'S FINANCIAL STRAITS—HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPARATIONS—SPAIN'S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS.

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty—The President's Trying Position—Radical Resolutions in the Senate—The President's Firm Hand—Liberal Victory in Spain—The Cuban Deputies—Arrival of the *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* in Havana—Spaniards in Hostile Mood—Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements—Spain's Appeal to Europe—Suicide of the Dynasty—Desperate Financial Conditions—The Church as a Holder of Spanish Bonds—Putting the United States Navy in Readiness—The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squadron—Apparent Concessions—Only for Effect—The Proposed Armistice—Congress Becomes More and More Impatient—The President's Reasons for Delay—Time Needed to Prepare—His Influence upon Congressional Leaders—Condition of Some of Our Battleships—Learning a Lesson.

THE report of the Court of Inquiry was formally and without debate referred to the committees on foreign affairs, but it at once became evident that the public patience, which had endured till this formal act was completed, could now be restrained only with the greatest difficulty. The navy was not disposed to rest content under an indefinite continuance of futile diplomacy while the murder of their comrades went unpunished, and this feeling was shared by a large portion of the public. Revenge is doubtless a questionable motive for war, but under the circumstances it could not fail to exist, and "Remember the *Maine*" became a catch-phrase of the day.

The President fully realized the increased difficulties of the situation, and, while he desired peace, he was in no mood to shrink from war if it became necessary; he simply wished to proceed in a manner which would leave no stain upon our action for history to record, and give none of the European

powers a ground for just criticism. This desire was not influenced by any fear of them, or tacit surrender of the right of the United States to determine its own course in its own way, but because he wished war, if it came, to stand upon a sound moral basis as far as this country was concerned. Having enjoyed a long career in Congress as one of its leaders, he was fully able to appreciate its feelings, and he had no intention of defying a body for which he had the highest respect and in whose wisdom he had the greatest confidence. Still, he wished to use his own powers so that there could be no mistake resulting from the bitter passion of the hour.

On the 29th, the war spirit in the Senate, so long confined, burst forth with renewed energy. Four resolutions on the subject were offered respectively by Senators Allen, Rawlins, Foraker, and Frye, and were referred without debate to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the two senators last named being members of that committee. Senator Allen's resolution recognized the independence of Cuba and appropriated \$500,000 for relieving the suffering there; Senator Rawlins made his a virtual declaration of war against Spain, authorizing the use of the army and navy to carry it to a successful conclusion. Senator Frye's resolution was more mild, authorizing the President to take such effective steps as in his discretion were required to bring about peace in Cuba and the independence of the Cubans. The Foraker resolution called on Spain to withdraw from Cuba, and while not formally declaring war, authorized the use of the land and naval forces of the country to enforce the demands.

The same day the President held a conference with some of the leading members of the two houses to arrange, if possible, a plan for executive and legislative action with the hope of heading off the too radical element in Congress, determined to have war at once and without reference to the existing diplomatic situation. Those who were attempting to hold back Congress till the executive could act were inclined to think that he would not be able to maintain his control of the

situation and meet the expectations and demands of the people of the country unless he at once announced a positive policy, which would include a demand upon Spain for the immediate cessation of hostilities, not through the military device of an armistice but by the actual evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops, the granting of full and complete autonomy, and the assurance of ultimate independence. They considered it too late to talk of an armistice such as the President had proposed at Spain's suggestion. The people were not in a mood to take Spanish suggestions with patience, and there could be no true armistice so long as the Cubans refused to suspend hostilities for anything except independence.

But the President was able to prevail upon the leaders in Congress to curb their warlike spirit till after he could inform them whether Spain accepted or rejected the demands he had made in his last note, a reply to which he momentarily expected. He was hopeful, though far from sanguine, that at the last moment Spain would yield to the inevitable and accept terms on which war could be avoided, at least till the summer season was over. For he knew full well that those who would plunge the country into war at once had no adequate conception of the difficulties of summer campaigning in Cuba.

The elections to the Spanish Cortes passed off quietly on Sunday, the 27th, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Liberals. While the other parties endeavored to secure popular support by declaring that the Sagasta ministry was not sufficiently firm in dealing with the United States, Sagasta gave expressions to terms of defiance, declaring that Spain would not concede our right to intervene, and thus partisan lines gave way before a sentiment uniting all men in the support of those who were already in office. The result naturally strengthened the hands of Sagasta and gave him greater confidence in a determined policy. In the elections in Cuba, twenty of the thirty deputies to the Cortes were from the Autonomists, the rest from the Conservatives. Of the

twenty Autonomists chosen, only eight were natives of Cuba, and of the ten Conservatives but one was Cuban-born, and he had lived mainly in Spain and was very pro-Spanish. Five of the Conservative deputies were notorious for their hatred of the United States. Feeling against this country ran very high in Havana, and Americans there were far from being in a comfortable or safe position. They were apt to be insulted wherever they went, and it was dangerous to resent it.

The arrival of the *Vizcaya* at Havana created an enthusiasm which threatened to end in an outbreak of the lawless elements. Crowds gathered to welcome the cruiser, shouting "*Viva España!*" and "*Viva Weyler!*" and it was only by taking extraordinary precautions that General Blanco was able to preserve the peace. A few days later the *Almirante Oquendo* arrived and was similarly welcomed.

In the latter part of March the report that the Spanish torpedo flotilla which had stopped at the Canary Islands had been ordered to Puerto Rico added to the gravity of the situation in this country and caused much alarm. As such a flotilla was not needed in Cuba for the purposes of suppressing the rebellion and was of an aggressive, not defensive, character, it seemed likely that Spain had determined upon hostile actions, and even the *Army and Navy Journal* went so far as to term it an act of war, justifying our immediate action, as if war had been declared by Spain. But in view of the preparations we had already made for action, if necessary, the appearance of the Spanish flotilla at Puerto Rico could really be regarded as little more than justifiable precaution.

Although the Queen and the Spanish government made many diplomatic appeals for the help of Europe in preventing the impending intervention in Cuba, there was little indication of success. In Europe, as in the United States, the question which statesmen and financiers were asking was, how could Spain enter upon a great war with a treasury so empty? — a war in which she would ultimately and inevitably stand to lose not only Cuba and Puerto Rico but the Philippines,

and which might involve the overthrow of the monarchy. But in reality the Spanish people had been so persistently deceived by their government as to Spanish successes in Cuba, and as to the military weakness and boastfulness of the United States, that they really believed Spain capable of doing great things, of actually invading the United States; and to have drawn back in the face of such an opinion would have so enraged the deluded people as to have at once overthrown the monarchy. The dynasty was likely to fall in either case. But if it stood any chance, it was in war.

The wisest in Spain as well as in the United States saw that the triumph of Spanish arms in Cuba, or even in the retention of Spanish sovereignty, would be a fruitless, if not a dangerous, victory. It certainly could not be final. The interest on the Cuban debt would then amount to \$30,000,000 per annum, and the revenues could not be made to reach this amount even before the island was devastated and by recourse to every possible means of taxation.

But beyond this, the maintenance of the army which would be necessary, and of the civil administration, would cost \$80,000,000 more. Spain would hardly be able to make both ends of her own budget meet, to say nothing of helping Cuba.

Continued Spanish sovereignty in Cuba had, therefore, become to Spain an absolute impossibility, and yet to yield it was a political impossibility — the suicide of the dynasty.

The financial condition of the Spanish government could hardly have been worse. Taxation, which before the war with Cuba was reckoned to consume one-fifth of the total income of the people, had been increased by every expedient known to bankrupting finance. Confessing the corruption or incapacity of her own officials, the government had carried further the costly policy of turning over to private monopolies the collection of the various taxes. The old tobacco monopoly had been renewed at a higher rental and monopolies were created to deal in petroleum and explosives. The govern-

ment had asked permission to turn over to private companies for twenty-five years the state lottery, and for fifteen years a monopoly in the sale of salt. The 4 per cent. bonds of the government, which three years before had sold at 80, had by the end of March fallen to 51, and the government, in its straits to borrow, had pledged its customs revenue, increased the privileges of the state banks, and offered the railroads subsidies and an extension of privileges till 1980 for assistance in raising loans. The debts nominally resting on Spain had not been materially increased, because the war loans figured as the Cuban debt; but the home debt alone amounted to \$1,300,000,000, or \$400 for every family in the poverty-stricken nation. The enormous Cuban debt was relatively a more serious matter, for it was a question whether all the property remaining in Cuba after three years of war would have discharged the debt which the island would have been required to carry if Spain had been victorious. The crushing weight of this prospective load was one of the factors which made submission worse than death to the patriotic Cubans.

The impending conflict, therefore, involved not only the Cuban debt but the bankruptcy of Spain, and naturally the holders of all her millions of debts became greatly concerned over the situation. Much of this debt was held by the Church of Spain.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the property of the Church had so accumulated that it might be said almost without exaggeration that it had absorbed the wealth of the country. In 1820 there were no less than 150,000 priests in Spain, and clericalism had played a large part in the struggle of the dynasties, factions, and parties. The success of Christina after the death of Ferdinand in 1833 meant a defeat for the clerical party, and it was followed by sweeping confiscatory decrees which led to a protracted quarrel between the Vatican and the Spanish government. In 1859, in accordance with a compromise between the Pope and the Span-

ish government, a large amount of church property was sold and there was issued to the church several hundred millions of dollars of interest-bearing Spanish bonds. It was natural, therefore, that the church as a holder of such an enormous block of Spanish bonds should become especially anxious to maintain Spanish credit, and a war with the United States meant bankruptcy beyond peradventure.

During the last week in March the government of the United States had further increased its army and navy and put it in a condition of readiness for possible war. Admiral Sicard was given six months' leave of absence because of ill health, and Captain William T. Sampson was appointed commander of the fleet at Key West. He was considered an ideal officer for the important commission. A flying squadron with headquarters at Hampton Roads was organized with Commodore Winfield Scott Schley as its chief. It consisted of the battleships *Texas* and *Massachusetts*, and the cruisers *Brooklyn*, *Minneapolis*, and *Columbia*, the fleetest of our navy. Negotiations for the purchase of foreign warships continued; the entire fleet of revenue cutters belonging to the Treasury Department, which had for three years been kept busy in the effort to intercept Cuban filibusters, were by command of the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, transferred to the navy to co-operate with the naval service. Eleven of the finest yachts and largest tugs in the possession of private parties were purchased to be fitted out as torpedo, dispatch, and gunboats. Monitors that served in the Civil War were ordered into commission, and sent to the harbors of New York and Boston, there to be manned and handled by the naval militia. Ammunition was distributed to all the important seacoast fortifications, and all reserve field and siege guns in the interior were ordered to coast ports, while the infantry and cavalry forces of the government were placed in such a condition that within three days the entire army could be mobilized either at Atlanta or at Washington. Our agents scoured Europe for available munitions, and we secured an

option upon everything that would be needed if war were declared. Most significant of all was an order to paint the war vessels in colors never used except in likelihood of hostile action.

The war tide rose by leaps and bounds during those few eventful hours in which Spain's reply was expected. The newspapers were full of conflicting statements as to what Spain proposed and what the President's policy was to be. Owing to the mystery which always surrounds diplomatic communications, the situation appeared much more complex and delicate than it really was. The President's note of the 27th had demanded an armistice till October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of the independence of the Cubans, the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, and the relief of the needy. Spain saw that some concession was essential to pacify Congress, but she endeavored to grant only that which had the appearance but not the substance of concessions.

Her reply arrived at Washington on the night of the 31st. She consented to release the reconcentrados at once (something which she had ordered months before but without effect), and she announced that the cabinet had voted \$600,000 for the relief of the needy. But when it came to arranging terms of peace she said that she would confide that to the insular autonomist parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach the final result, "*it being understood, however, that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the central government are not diminished or lessened.*" In other words, she did not propose to permit the United States to take part in peace negotiations, and she did not propose to surrender her sovereignty of the island. She proposed to leave peace measures exclusively to an autonomous government which was a farce and a failure, with which the insurgents would not treat and which was really but a blind to conceal Spain's purpose to handle the island as she always had handled it. Moreover, this alleged

insular parliament would not meet for over a month. Spain said, however, she would not object to a suspension of hostilities if it were asked for by the general-in-chief of the insurgents. It was well known that Gomez would do nothing of the kind. In fact, the reply, while calculated to give those prejudiced in favor of peace at any price a chance to say that Spain had offered all we had asked, had really given nothing. Even the order for the release of the reconcentrados and the appropriation of money for the needy were valueless, simply on paper and of no effect, as afterwards appeared. It was characteristic Spanish diplomacy, and the misfortune was that a certain international or diplomatic courtesy compelled the United States to wait on it.

Following this and during the first week in April our relations with Spain came to a crisis and the country was in a condition of feverish anxiety. Every day news was expected to show whether the outcome was to be peace or war, and as the days passed it became more and more apparent that war would be inevitable. The feeling in Congress was tense. An increasing number in both the House and Senate showed an eagerness for action which would bring the differences with Spain to a head. Undoubtedly, this feeling was strengthened by the report of the Court of Inquiry and by the further evidence concerning the disaster which was later given by General Lee and Captain Sigsbee. The more the testimony was studied the more did the feeling gain ground that the blowing up of the *Maine* was an act of treachery. Naval experts unhesitatingly expressed their belief that when the *Maine* was anchored to one particular buoy it was known that a mine lay underneath her, and mines of that kind, they said, were not in the possession of individuals, nor were they to be purchased in the markets. It was hinted that certain Spanish officials knew of the location of the mine and had expected to use it in case hostilities were declared.

Nothing but the influence of the President prevented Congress from prompt action, which would have been a virtual

declaration of war. He could not have had any great amount of faith in the possibility of bringing Spain to terms by diplomatic methods after Spain's reply, but at the same time some of the European powers and the Vatican began to use their persuasive powers upon the proud but weak nation and something might come of it. At least the delay would enable the United States to perfect its preparations and take the necessary steps for the safety of American citizens on Spanish territory. It would undoubtedly have been his wish to have continued the negotiations over the rainy season in Cuba, meanwhile helping the reconcentrados, and in October, if necessary, to have struck the intervening blow to set Cuba free. It doubtless would have been the part of wisdom. Our forces could have been drilled and acclimated in southern camps, our navy could have been put in prime condition, the reconcentrados could have been helped back to their farms and started again, and sober sense might by that time have convinced Spain that the best policy for her was to declare Cuba free.

But the impatience of Congress, whose members were daily swamped with letters from the people clamoring for war, could not be indefinitely curbed, and while the President was aware of it he did the best he could and much more than a man of less tact or one possessing in a less degree the confidence of Congress could have done. He had constant interviews with the leading men of both parties, took them into his confidence, explained to them the exact situation and succeeded in convincing them that a little delay would be wise from every point of view. These representations had their effect upon a majority of the Senators and Congressmen, and by common consent they agreed to wait a few days longer.

Unfortunately, there were some who, boasting of superior patriotism, were anxious to make political capital by making bitter speeches against delay, even attacking the motives of the President. Unfortunately also, the peace-at-any-price men in the country, professing to believe that the President

was in accord with them, began to raise the cry "Stand by the President!" thus adding to the impatience of Congress by creating the impression that he, like the peace men, had no idea of putting an end to the state of things which had become intolerable.

The people of the United States had lived so long at peace and had such an inadequate idea of the requirements of modern warfare that they could not appreciate the wisdom of delaying the initiation of hostilities. Our battleships were far from ready. The foul growth on the bottom of the *Massachusetts* had decreased her maximum forced draught speed from sixteen to ten knots, while the *Iowa*, the fastest of our battleships, at Key West was reduced to a like speed, and the dry dock capacity was inadequate. Had not the navy yard forces been kept at work day and night almost from the time of the blowing up of the *Maine*, and all preparatory work been pushed with feverish haste, even while peace seemed possible, we should have been ill-prepared for an aggressive warfare beyond our shores at the time when the patience of Congress at last gave out. The people of this generation had yet to learn that two nations cannot proceed to war with the promptness with which two street gamins square off for a struggle with no other weapons than their fists.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE COALING PROBLEM - SPAIN'S PRETENDED ASSISTANCE OF THE STARVING RECONCENTRADOS—AWAITING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

The Army Ready to Move—The Importance of the Coaling Problem—Spain's Small Supply—Coaling at Neutral Ports—Blanco's Orders to Help the Reconcentrados—No Charity Except Through Fear of War—Spain Appropriates Money for Relief Fund—No Chance for Money to Pass the Spanish Officials—Appeal of the Autonomist Government—Position of the Self-professed Friends of Peace—The Influence of the Commercial Spirit—April 6th an Exciting Day—Waiting for the Message—It Fails to Arrive—General Lee's Request for Time to Get Out of Cuba—The President's Courageous Act—Bitter Attacks upon Him in Congress—Bravely Defended—Other Important Reasons for Delay—Spain's Foolish Action—The President's Expectation of War.

TURING these days of uncertainty and excitement preparations for placing the armies and navies in condition for immediate use, if called upon, continued with vigor in both Spain and the United States. The fleet of auxiliary naval vessels was further increased by the purchase of tugs and yachts; a new cruiser, called the *Diogenes*, which was built in Germany for a foreign power, was bought in England; the ships at Key West and Hampton Roads were stripped in readiness for actual war, and every preparation was made for moving the army. The state of New York placed a million dollars at the disposal of the governor for putting in readiness the military and naval reserve, and Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa took similar action. An effort was made to purchase the Danish Island east of Puerto Rico for a coaling station, but was abandoned because of the price asked.

It was at once recognized that the coaling problem was one of the most important in modern naval warfare. Only

one power had really solved it in a satisfactory manner, and it is largely in the adequate establishment of a great number of coaling stations that Great Britain's commercial and naval strength lies. This had been so effectively demonstrated in the far East that Russia, Germany, and France were eagerly endeavoring to follow her example.

Spain was poorly prepared to meet the problem in American waters, in spite of her possessions. One port in Puerto Rico and a few in Cuba were all that she could count upon, and in these the supply was not large, not more than enough to coal her fleet for two months. As to her coaling at neutral ports — mostly British — the government of Great Britain, as far back as 1882, had drawn up a series of neutrality regulations by which it was declared that any belligerent ship should be allowed to buy only enough coal to take her to the nearest port of her own country, and, furthermore, that no two supplies of coal should be granted at any British neutral port within three months of each other. The same restrictions had been adopted by some of the other powers, and for many years those in the United States who had advocated the "forward policy" had urged upon our government that we not only needed coaling stations in the West Indies, but in the East, and that our station at the Hawaiian Islands should be preserved at all hazards. Some of our highest naval authorities had frequently asserted that our national policy ought to be that no foreign power should hereafter acquire a coaling station within three thousand miles of San Francisco.

Spain sought to deprive the United States of a certain moral advantage in the dispute at this critical time by ordering Captain-General Blanco to rescind the infamous concentration order at once. Blanco stated that after the publication of the order the reconcentrados and their families would be allowed to return with safety to their homes, that relief committees would allow them to secure new houses, and that assistance would be given to them in obtaining work and in engaging in agricultural pursuits. Spain, moreover, officially

announced that the ministry had voted an appropriation of \$600,000 for the relief of the reconcentrados, and would accept whatever assistance in affording relief the United States might send, if not sent officially or by way of intervention.

Nothing but the certainty of war had up to this time been sufficient to induce Spain to even make the show of appropriating one *peso* for the relief of the starving people, and there was little in Spanish methods to convince us that she really had the intention of effectively relieving the suffering at this critical time. A vote of \$600,000 by the ministry was a very different thing from the actual use of that sum in relief.

During all those months when such steps on the part of Spain might have amounted to something, it was not known that the government, nor even the Queen, who was pictured as a woman much to be admired, had made the mildest sort of protest against a policy which would have disgraced the worst of the Sultan's Kurdish cavalry in Armenia. During the time when the whole world was ringing with the horrors of the Spanish policy in Cuba, and American charity was endeavoring to find a way to carry relief without offending Spain, all the Spanish illustrated papers were full of lively accounts and showy illustrations of the carnival revels throughout Spain. While nothing was contributed throughout the whole of Spain for the relief of the Queen's suffering subjects in the "Ever Faithful Isle," the Spaniards, with all their oft-mentioned impoverishment and lack of resources, had wealth enough to lavish upon carnival frivolities. Meanwhile, the Spanish government, evidently satisfied with its policy of extermination in Cuba, was somehow finding money all over Europe to spend in the purchase of munitions of war and additions to the navy with the purpose of fighting the United States. The Spanish element in Havana was able to give brilliant public balls and theatrical entertainments for the raising of money for the Spanish navy, while contributing inappreciably for the relief of the wretched people who were dying daily in the very streets of Havana.

When, therefore, in the critical early days of April the Spanish ministry went through the form of appropriating money for the relief of the reconcentrados, there was very little reason to believe that a penny of it was really intended to be used for the purpose proclaimed, and as the days passed there was no evidence that any attempt was made to so employ it. As General Lee pithily remarked to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, even if the money actually ever passed out of the Spanish treasury, none of it would succeed in running the gauntlet of the Spanish officials in Cuba, who would certainly steal every dollar of it before it could reach the poor wretches for whom it was nominally intended. Officials who would steal even in handling the money intended for the army and for national defense would hardly hesitate to take money sent for the relief of the Cubans whom they had ruthlessly imprisoned and starved in the hope of exterminating them.

The first week in April was one of the most remarkable in the history of the country. Up to this time the peace people had hardly realized that a crisis was approaching; they had not believed such a thing as war possible. Indeed, up to the last moment a few self-possessed friends of peace in the United States declared their inability to discover any possible reason why we should give ourselves the slightest degree of concern about what was going on in Cuba. There are always men, otherwise intelligent, who are incapable of understanding events till they have receded some distance into history; they were born so. The bewilderment of the public as to the behavior of these advocates of peace at any price was not lessened by the fact that, to some extent, they were the same gentlemen who, but a short time before, had vehemently demanded that the United States should make war upon the Turkish empire because it had not paid over to our government some thousands of dollars considered by us to be due for certain educational property destroyed by mobs several years ago in Asiatic Turkey. Some who had vehemently denounced the slaughter of seal pups on the Pribilof islands ap-

peared to be unmoved when the slaughter of Cuban women and children was mentioned.

There was another and a larger class who, while expressing no opinion concerning the Cuban question, were actuated by more worthy motives. They formed the opinion that Congress was driving the country into an unnecessary war, which would cost an immense amount of money, disorganize business, which was just beginning to recover from the previous depression, and cost much in American blood. Assembling as boards of trade, or chambers of commerce, they petitioned Congress to sustain the President in his effort to procure a peaceful settlement. While these men were patriotic citizens, ready to do their part if war became necessary, their efforts naturally became associated with those in this country and in Europe who brought their influence to bear at Washington simply out of regard for the value of stocks and bonds. While no appreciable part of the Spanish debt was held in the United States, the great bankers of Europe, who had large interests at stake in the maintenance of Spanish credit, had also intimate connection with great banking houses in New York, and these, in turn, had intimate connection with banking houses in other parts of the country. The rich rewards which the large banking houses of New York reap from gigantic financial operations are dependent upon their ability to enlist the co-operation of European capital. It was unfortunate that many people had the impression that the President's message was being held back out of deference to these petitions, and this led to many bitter attacks upon him which were wholly unjustifiable. It was a trying time for the President's friends as well as for the President.

At last it was announced that the message was completed and would be sent to Congress on Wednesday, April 6th. On Tuesday it was read at the cabinet meeting. The air of the capital was full of electricity. On Wednesday morning the crowds surging to the Capitol reminded people of the exciting days of the Civil War. At six o'clock in the morning

the entrances were besieged though the Houses would not convene till noon. The regular business of the House began and the time wore on without sign of that for which all were waiting. It was all very well to discuss the reorganization of the army, but the crowd were waiting for another story — the President's story of Cuba's wrongs. Five minutes past two and no message! At last notes were sent up from members on the floor to their friends in the galleries with the disappointing news that the message was not to be sent over, and reluctantly the crowd melted.

When the message had been read to the cabinet and was ready to be transmitted, word came from Consul-General Lee, suggesting that action be postponed till the following week, in order that all officials of the United States and all citizens so desiring might withdraw from Cuba in safety. Excitement was running high at Havana. The President at once saw the force of the appeal. Lee's message was not only a reason for further delay, but it was a convenient one, something that might hold Congress in check a little longer till the last peaceful resource had been expended. The President intimated that he would comply with Lee's appeal. Immediately some of his ablest advisers in the cabinet protested that the temper of Congress and the people was such that no postponement would be tolerated. A fear was expressed lest the President should suffer greatly from criticism.

"It is not a question of what will happen to me," he is reported to have said, "but what will happen to those in Cuba. I shall not send in this message till the last one of them has left the island."

And he did not. It was a courageous thing to do when so many of the people were impugning his motives. One afternoon a Democratic Congressman from Ohio ventured to declare that "influences in New York wired over to Boston, wired from Boston out to the Western cities, and then back here under the name of the peace party — which simply means the speculating party in stocks and bonds, a new name and a

disguise — demonstrate that there will be no war." . . . " It is a sympathetic fall in stocks that gentlemen who control the administration fear more than they fear war."

This called forth a prompt reply from another Ohio Congressman, General Grosvenor, who said:

" The gentleman from Ohio makes a charge that ought to condemn the President of the United States to impeachment and imprisonment. The gentleman declares that no message came from General Lee yesterday, that it was a 'fake' report; that it was false, and that it was given out for a corrupt purpose by the President—namely, to affect the stock market. Every part of that statement is, without qualification, absolutely without foundation in truth. I will ask the gentleman from Ohio, suppose the message had gone to Congress yesterday, and suppose that last night the blood of the chivalrous gentleman from Virginia [General Lee] had soaked the soil of Cuba, what would have been the verdict of the American people against the administration?"

It is a source of gratification that only one member of Congress was found at that time willing to give official publicity to this absurd and baseless charge. But other reasons contributed to the President's wish to hold back the message, diplomatic reasons which could not prudently have been made public, and which, therefore, only increased the mystery, the impatience, and the criticism. Reference has already been made to the deep interest the Roman Catholic Church had in maintaining Spanish credit, besides the interest naturally felt by the Pope in a Catholic nation. Pope Leo had for months been bringing his influence to bear at Madrid, where his influence was greatest, in a desire to ward off a war. His advisers in this country and in Rome must have confirmed his own intuitions that the American people would not accept his arbitration or do anything to concede his authority as a temporal ruler. But the Pope seems to have cherished the hope that Spain might be persuaded to withdraw under such terms as would not sacrifice her pride at every point, while the essential features of the demands of American public opinion would be granted, and President McKinley had intimated to the Vatican authorities that any influence which the Pope could bring to

bear on Spain would be appreciated by lovers of peace. It was due to the joint pressure of the Pope and the European powers that Spain made new advances at a time when diplomatic relations were thought to be closed.

Unfortunately, the Spanish authorities allowed the Minister of the Interior, Señor Capdepon, who had had nothing to do with the negotiations, and, in view of his official position would not have, except as an adviser, to make a statement that the Pope had consented to act as mediator *at the suggestion of the United States!* This was so utterly false that it did not need the official denial of the administration at Washington, which was, however, made. The Spanish government seems to have made the statement to satisfy its ungovernable pride. In answer to Spain's appeal the Pope had declared that if she would suspend hostilities for a time he would endeavor to make a permanent peace. Spain accepted the condition just before the day approached on which the President intended to send in his message, and such was the situation on that day when the message was held back.

It was plain to the President that whatever form he gave his message, Congress would take its appearance as a signal for taking action leading to war. If he counseled peace, Congress would take the matter into its own hands; if he counseled war, Congress would cheerfully follow. Realizing this, he felt it would be unwise to send in a message while the powers and the Pope were bringing their influence to bear upon Spain. He was entirely right, but the expectant people could not understand his motives because of the mystery surrounding the affair. That the President fully expected war was evident, for the wrecking company which was at work on the *Maine* had been ordered to leave Havana harbor, a step that would hardly have been taken if any hope of peace remained.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWERS — QUEEN CHRISTINA ACTS TOO LATE — THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AT LAST — "THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP."

A Little Play Behind the Scenes — Attempts of European Powers to Act — Austria's Interest in the Spanish Dynasty — The French Investment in Spanish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in the White House — The European Note — The President's Reply — Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceedings in Our Diplomacy — Condition on which England and Russia Acted — A Good Opportunity for the President — A Similar Request Made at Madrid — Spain Replies that She has Gone as Far as She Can — The Queen Takes Matters in Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered to Suspend Hostilities — Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many Americans Leave Havana — No further Postponement of Message Possible — Useless to Listen to Spain's Insincere Diplomacy — The Message Submitted — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Spain's Proposals as to the *Maine* — The Time for Action at Hand.

UP to this time the European powers had taken no concerted action either to influence Spain or to plead with the United States for peace. At the time our relations with Spain approached a crisis after the destruction of the *Maine*, the European powers were on the point of a crisis of their own because of affairs in China. The aggressiveness of France, Germany, and Russia in securing rights from the weakened Chinese empire had stirred Great Britain to the defense of her rights, and called forth from her ministers the declaration that she would go to war rather than suffer a diminution of her rights in the East by the partition of China. Germany, France, and Russia were in a position to act with a degree of concert against England, and were evidently on the point of doing so when the Spanish-American crisis suddenly revealed the fact that England not only sympathized with us but was disposed to favor an English-speaking alliance, whose

influence, of course, would be felt in the East as well as the West. The Continental powers, which had thought to take Great Britain unsupported, suddenly drew back when they saw that their action would force Great Britain into a natural alliance with the United States.

Austria had also a special interest in Spanish affairs, as the nation was ruled by a branch of the Austrian Bourbons, and the house of Hapsburg could not in decency neglect its own. The French government also had the further interest of protecting her investors who had absorbed a large portion of Spain's bonds. The Spanish debt had been scaled down considerably after the Ten-Years War in Cuba, and the prospect of a war with the United States was a serious one for these French investors.

When these powers saw that it would be impossible to take concerted action in defense of Spanish sovereignty, the proposition was made for a joint appeal for peace to be presented to both Spain and the United States, and this was done on the 7th, the day following the excitement over the delay of the message. The visit had been arranged in advance, the President knew that an appeal would be presented the same day to the Madrid government; he knew just what the diplomats would say before they said it, and, indeed, their joint note had been inspected and *viséd* at the State Department before presentation. Nevertheless, it was an impressive moment when the representatives of the European powers appeared before the President, and the British ambassador stated that they had been commissioned to approach him with a message of "friendship and peace." He then presented the following note:

"The undersigned, representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, address in the name of their respective governments a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

"The powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognized and appreciated by the American nation."

The President replied:

"The government of the United States recognizes the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquility of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sense of humanity.

"The government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable."

The fact that the representatives of the powers were received in a collective capacity at all aroused some criticism in this country, for it was a distinctly novel proceeding in our diplomacy. Doubtless the President might have declined with propriety to be addressed by the particular group of European powers which of late years has assumed to impose its mandates upon the rest of the world. On the other hand, the attitude of the powers was one to which this government could take no just exception, and it might have proved disadvantageous had the reception of the appeal been declined. The British minister would not consent to act with the representatives of the other powers until he was assured that no design of menace lay in the proposition, and the Russian minister declined to act till assured that the note would be welcomed by the United States. He considered the affair a mere bit of formality. It also gave the President an opportunity to make a statement which might remove any misconception in the minds of Europeans as to our right to deal with our own affairs

unmolested, and of reminding them that, much as they deprecated war from a humanitarian point of view, it was chiefly from this very point of view that we were about to go to war.

The powers proffered the same request to the government at Madrid, and Señor Gullon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, simply replied that Spain had reached the limit of her policy in conceding the demands and allowing the pretensions of the United States. She, however, immediately embraced the opportunity to bring forward another alleged concession, carefully stating that it was in obedience to European intervention and not American demands. The concession took the form of an order to General Blanco to suspend hostilities for the present. Contrary to previous intimations, this so-called armistice was entirely without conditions, and its duration was to be determined by Blanco. It was not an armistice in any sense of the word, nor did it even include a request to the insurgents to join in it. An armistice is, of course, an agreement between two hostile governments or military commanders for a mutual cessation of hostilities. In this case, so far from an armistice having been determined upon, Señor Quesada, speaking officially for the Cuban Junta, said positively that the Republic of Cuba would not consent to any negotiations for armistice or suspension of hostilities unless the basis was the absolute independence of Cuba.

The Spanish cabinet were reported as at odds over the question of the suspension of hostilities, but the Queen, influenced apparently by the Pope, took the matter into her own hands and insisted upon it. The Queen was evidently in a mood, when it was too late, to concede autonomy rather than lose the sovereignty of Cuba. But these repeated yieldings to what were considered the demands of the people of the United States made the royal position even more uncomfortable by angering the Spanish masses.

Riots occurred in Madrid on Sunday afternoon and evening. The Prefect, who was witnessing the Easter Sunday bull fight, promptly left the ring, and by energetic measures

prevented a serious outbreak. The demonstration was made by Carlists, Republicans, and Romerists, and a number of the leaders were arrested.

Meanwhile, the delay in the message gave the needed opportunity for the withdrawal of Americans from Cuba. When the excitement was running high, General Lee left on the *Fern*, reaching Key West Saturday evening, and with him came most of the other American officials and residents in Cuba and many Cubans who believed their lives in danger at Havana. A deplorable but necessary result of the withdrawal of Americans from Cuba was the immediate cessation of our efforts to relieve the reconcentrados, for Miss Barton and the other Red Cross agents took General Lee's advice and left the island. No consular officials remained in Cuba to supervise the distribution of supplies, and the regular freight and passenger service between Cuba and the United States ceased. Considerable supplies of provisions were left in Cuba, and it was the belief of the officials of this country that they would be used for the army, the Spanish taking no interest in relieving the reconcentrados. Indeed, nothing had occurred to indicate that Spain had taken the slightest step to use in charity any of the \$600,000 voted by the cabinet several days before. The move was regarded as insincere and made only to gain time.

Notwithstanding the apparent change in Spain's attitude, it was evident that another postponement of the message would not do. Spain's crafty and insincere diplomacy might be kept up till doomsday. Having failed to accomplish anything by it, nothing remained but to pass the issue over to Congress. So not far from noon on Monday, the 11th, the message was delivered substantially as drafted the week before, but supplemented with a statement of Spain's latest action.

The message opened with a long, thorough, and convincing historical review of the entire subject. The President pointed out that the existing revolution was only one of several such disturbances which had caused the United States enormous loss in trade and had "by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and

uncivilized practices of warfare shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people." He then referred to the efforts of President Cleveland to bring about peace, and their failure; to the institution in October, 1896, of "the policy of devastation and concentration," and to the fact that by March 18, 1897, the mortality among the reconcentrados from starvation and disease exceeded 50 per cent. of their whole number — adding, "it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave."

The history of the attempts of his administration to improve the condition of affairs in Cuba were next considered — the overtures made to the Spanish administration which succeeded that of the assassinated prime minister Canovas; the successful demand for the release of American citizens imprisoned in Cuba; the appointment of a Cuban relief committee; the appeal to the American people for contributions, and the action of the Red Cross Society; finally, Spain's revocation of the order of concentration and appropriation of money for the relief of the sufferers. Still, he said, the situation remained unendurable, and on March 27th he had made propositions through Minister Woodford looking to an armistice until October 1st. To this Spain replied, offering to entrust the effort to make peace to the Cuban autonomous parliament. This was quite unsatisfactory, as the parliament was not to meet till May 4th and its powers were indefinite.

Then the President came to the question of what action the government should take. Forceful annexation, he said, would be "criminal aggression"; recognizing belligerency would "accomplish nothing toward the end for which we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island"; recognizing the independence of Cuba had no historical precedent clearly applicable to the situation. He added: "From the standpoint of experience, I do not think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called

Cuban republic." As to intervention, he held that there were good grounds for such action: first, in the cause of humanity; second, for the protection of our citizens in Cuba; third, from the injury to our commerce and the devastation of the island; fourth, from the constant menace to our peace in many and unexpected ways, arising out of such a war at our doors. The last reason was illustrated and enforced by this reference to the destruction of the battleship *Maine*:

"The destruction of the noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-three brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death; grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. . . . The destruction of the *Maine*, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there."

After referring to his statement in his message of the year before, that the time might come when it would be necessary to intervene with force, the President closed with these forceful and manly words:

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

"The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."

CHAPTER XXVIII

RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL LEE AT WASHINGTON—EXCITING DEBATES IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE—OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN—BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

How the President's Message was Received—A Plain, Unimpassioned Statement—Congress Expected Something More Fiery—General Lee's Arrival at Washington—Ovations on the Route—A Warm Welcome—Resolutions for Intervention—The Question of Recognizing the Independence of Cuba—The Tension of Feeling—Coming Together on the Final Vote—Report of the Senate Committee—A Time to Drop Party Differences—An Amendment to Recognize the Cuban Republic Passed—Disagreeing Action and a Conference—The Final Draft—Wisdom of Going to War Without Recognizing Cuba—The President Prepares His Ultimatum—Signing the Resolutions—Minister Polo Demands His Passports—Spanish Ministry Withhold the President's Despatch to Woodford—Riots in Madrid and Barcelona—Woodford Given His Passports.

THE message was very coldly received by Congress, which, for weeks, had been so wrought up over the anticipation of it that they were disappointed to find only a plain, unimpassioned statement of facts which had long been familiar. But once did the message strike the high note suited to the war party's ears, and that was when it said, "*This war must stop.*" But Congress expected that the President would lead the way, and that it could follow on, shouting for war, but taking no responsibility in the premises. The President, however, cast the responsibility squarely upon it. "The issue is now with Congress," he said. "Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action." This was a plain assurance that the President would now stand by Congress, though Congress had only with great difficulty been induced to stand by him in his serious efforts to settle the trouble by diplomacy. In this situation there was but one thing for Congress

consistently to do, and the message was, without debate, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

On the evening of the day the message was presented General Lee arrived at Washington. His progress northward was in the nature of a triumph, being lustily cheered along the way and at Richmond loyally received by Governor Tyler. Great was the enthusiasm at Washington; crowds were at the depot when his train rolled in, and lined the street as he was driven to his hotel, to which a vast number of people flocked, some with torches, in procession. A patriotic serenade was arranged, and in spite of his wearisome trip he had to step out on the balcony and address the multitude.

While the matter was in the hands of committees the world waited in almost breathless suspense for the outcome, but it did not wait long. The House was the first to act. On the 13th a resolution was introduced by the acting chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee following the recommendation of the President, authorizing and directing him to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, that permanent peace might be secured, and that a stable and independent government might be established by the people of Cuba, and empowering him to use the land and naval forces of the United States for that purpose. There were those who desired more radical action, and insisted that there should be a recognition of the Cuban republic, but the administration forces held together admirably, and the resolutions of the majority of the committee were carried on a final vote by 322 to 19, on Saturday the 16th.

The debate was extremely exciting at times. Though there was an agreement between the Democratic and Republican members of the committee as to the presentation of the resolutions and the minority substitute, an unfortunate misunderstanding arose among the members of both parties which cast a blot on the historic proceedings of the day. During the excitement a personal quarrel occurred between two members, but explanations were made and the incident only serves to show the tension of feeling in Congress.

In the final vote both parties came together and the unity of North and South and the common feeling at the last were worth remembering. It was certainly remarkable that out of that great body of men only nineteen were in opposition. The long-expected crisis had come and been met in a strong one-minded way and generally with dignity. The resolution as passed by the House was understood to meet the desires of the President, which was another remarkable feature considering the severe criticisms to which he had been subjected by members who at last voted for the desired resolution.

In the Senate on the 14th the Foreign Relations Committee reported resolutions in harmony with those of the House, accompanied by a strong and brilliant report prepared and presented by Senator Davis, the chairman of the committee. It is probable that the resolutions of the majority would have been passed in short order but for the introduction of a resolution recognizing the Cuban republic, and conspicuously advocated by Senators Foraker on the Republican side and Turpie on the Democratic side. A long debate followed, some of the Senators making severe attacks upon the President, declaring that his message was inconclusive, that his course had been vacillating, and that he had been under the influence of Senators interested in stocks and bonds. It was unfortunately apparent that certain leaders were anxious to make capital for their party. These criticisms were repelled with emphasis by both Republican and Democratic Senators. A very few still thought we had no cause for intervention.

Just before the vote was taken, Mr. Gorman, the Democratic senator from Maryland, made a very impressive speech, defending the President, declaring that his course had been wise and patriotic, and that both branches of Congress ought to uphold him; that it was a time to drop all party differences and to act, not as Republicans or Democrats, but as American citizens. He wished that the record of division already made

could be blotted out and only a united people presented to the world. He added:

"I pledge myself to forget that McKinley was elected by the Republican party because I know and believe that as President of a united people he will bear his country's flag aloft, and that no nation, Spain or any other, will receive from him aught else than that fair, manly, and brave treatment of an American President."

The vote on the amendment recognizing the Cuban republic was 51 in favor to 37 against. The affirmative vote was made up of 29 Democrats, 6 Populists, 5 silver Republicans, and 11 regular Republicans; the negative vote consisted of 32 Republicans and 5 Democrats, the latter being Gray, Caffrey, Gorman, Morgan, and Faulkner.

The Senate resolutions came before the House on Monday; Mr. Dingley moved concurrence with an amendment striking out the clause concerning the recognition of the Cuban republic, and upon this motion called for the previous question, which was ordered, thus shutting off debate. The Republican leaders had made preparations for the division, using all the influence they had to bring radical Republicans into line. The Democrats and Populists, who, with a single exception, were solidly arrayed in favor of the Senate resolutions unamended, hoped for sufficient Republican help to carry their point; but in this they were disappointed. When the vote was taken Dingley's motion was carried by 178 to 156. Fourteen Republicans broke over party lines and voted in opposition. Four of them were from Wisconsin, two from Indiana, seven from Illinois, and one from North Dakota.

The resolutions as amended then went back to the Senate, and, before they were received, ten of the Republican senators who had voted with the Democrats and Populists on Saturday had a conference and decided to work against concurrence in the House amendment. The Senate by a vote of 46 to 32, showing no change in the attitude of the two parties, resolved to adhere to its resolutions and sent them back to the House, which again voted to non-concur and returned the resolutions

to the Senate with the independence clause again stricken out; it resolved to insist on its amendment and asked for a conference. The vote was 172 to 148, showing a majority of two more than on the former vote. At 1:10 A. M. on Tuesday the conferees of the two Houses reached an agreement. On the part of the Senate, the clause recognizing the independence of the Cuban republic was yielded, and on the part of the House the paragraph declaring that Cuba is and of right ought to be free was accepted. The two Houses then passed the resolutions in the following form:

“WHEREAS, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore be it resolved:

“*First.* That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“*Second.* That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“*Third.* That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

“*Fourth.* That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.”

It was not without considerable difficulty that enough Republicans were held to the defense of the President's position. The feeling in behalf of Cuba and against Spain was so bitter that it required the greatest parliamentary skill and the strong hand of the Speaker to prevent concurrence with

the Senate. The great majority felt that the Cuban republic had won its freedom, and in their excitement they failed to grasp the legal reasons against such action. Recognition of the Masó government might follow later, but at the outset of intervention the recognition of that government would have undoubtedly hampered our efforts. Had we acknowledged it, our only logical course would have been to form an offensive and defensive alliance with this new sovereign power, and then, in a strictly subordinate way, co-operate simply with General Gomez. It was much better for us to enter upon the conflict upon our own responsibility. Under the resolution, as adopted, our demand that Spain withdraw her troops and relinquish sovereignty in the island could mean nothing but that she should relinquish the sovereignty to the United States. This left us free to establish the Cuban government as seemed best for the Cuban people, but the same resolution distinctly avowed that in taking upon ourselves the responsibility of restoring order in the island we should relinquish authority as soon as we had been able to establish an independent Cuban republic. Recognition of the Masó government would not only have hampered our military operations, but it would have been humiliating to have taken the field simply as an ally of the Cuban army, reserving no authority over the determination of results. The shrewdest men in Congress saw this plainly, although all their feelings were for the Cuban republic. If we had recognized the republic months earlier and allowed the Cubans to win their own independence, if they could, the case would have been different.

The resolutions were sent to the President late on Tuesday, the 19th. As there was reason to believe that if they were promptly signed diplomatic relations would be broken off before an ultimatum could be sent, the President delayed the act of signing till an ultimatum had been prepared. Shortly before noon on the 20th the ultimatum was delivered to Señor Polo, the Spanish Minister at Washington. About an hour earlier it was sent to Minister Woodford as an open dispatch,

accompanied by an order that it be presented to the Sagasta ministry at once.

Immediately on receiving the ultimatum Señor Polo demanded his passports, which were sent to him promptly by the State Department, and he closed the legation, leaving at once for Canada. The ultimatum arrived at the Madrid telegraph office in due time, but by direction of the Spanish government was withheld from Minister Woodford till the following day. Spain, having learned the contents of the dispatch, decided to give Minister Woodford his passports before he had an opportunity to present the ultimatum, and this she did, seeking by a characteristic trick to win a technical advantage. But this she lost, as the ultimatum had already been officially communicated through Minister Polo.

The ultimatum, a paraphrase of the resolutions of Congress couched in diplomatic language, was as follows:

"To Woodford, Minister, Madrid:

"You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th inst., approved to-day, in relation to the pacification of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act the President directs you to immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the United States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step, the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people, under such free and independent government as they may establish.

"If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into effect."

In view of the swiftness with which the quarrel had come to a head the new Spanish Cortes was called by the Queen to meet on April 20th, a day somewhat earlier than that originally

set. The party groups held preliminary meetings on the 19th, by which time the action of the American Congress had become fully known in Madrid. Sagasta at the head of the Liberal party made statements of the most uncompromising character, and war was declared inevitable alike by all Spanish statesmen and the press. The belief prevailed in this country that Spain would endeavor to resort to another evasive diplomatic scheme, but she knew quite well that the President had resolved to listen no longer; he would approve the resolutions of Congress, and she resolved to let the war come. It had the desired effect of bringing all parties together and of strengthening for the time the position of the Queen. Don Carlos was forced to join the warlike procession, but he believed that his opportunity would inevitably come later.

In her speech to the Cortes on the 20th, or at the very time President McKinley was signing the resolutions, the Queen declared "the unalterable resolution of my government to defend our rights whatsoever sacrifices may be imposed upon us in accomplishing this task." She added: "Thus identifying myself with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore in accepting the Regency, but I follow the dictates of a mother's heart, trusting the Spanish people to gather behind my son's throne and defend it until he is old enough to defend it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to defend the honor and the territory of the nation." She ascribed the most unworthy motives to those in the United States who had urged interference in Cuban affairs.

"Sagasta, in his opening address to the Cortes, used even stronger language, and amid universal enthusiasm said: "Acts, not words, are required. . . . We are resolved not to yield in anything touching the national honor or the integrity of Spanish territory, because we admit no negotiations in question of honor and we do not make a traffic of shame."

Minister Woodford left Madrid promptly after receiving his passports, having notified the United States consuls through Consul-General Bowen at Barcelona to close their

consulates. There were some demonstrations at his departure, but he was carefully guarded at the instance of the Spanish authorities. At Valladolid, the train was attacked and stoned and windows were broken; but the civil guards protected Minister Woodford's carriage with drawn swords. At Tolosa, the Spanish police made an attempt to arrest Mr. Woodford's colored servant, claiming that he was a citizen of Spain. Woodford protested and declared he would only allow the servant to be removed by force, and this was not attempted. It was a relief to him and his party when they finally reached French soil. The Spanish minister and his suite left Washington without molestation or any hostile demonstrations, and made his way to Canada without receiving insults of any kind.

The day after General Woodford left there were a number of enthusiastic processions in Madrid, and a mob gathered in front of the Equitable Life Insurance building, tore down the American escutcheon, and gleefully broke the American eagle in pieces. The civil governor allowed the mob full liberty, mingling with the crowd and saying in an address to the populace: "The Spanish lion is aroused from his slumber. He will shake his mane and disperse the rest of the brute creation."

At Barcelona, Consul-General Bowen reported that during the week before he left, eight angry mobs of over 8,000 persons each made violent demonstrations before the consulate. Once he was compelled to face a mob for some time before the police came, and the night before he left, a mob, including some of the most influential citizens, came to the building determined to secure the Eagle and Shield. On finding they had been removed, they were very angry and it required force on the part of the police to disperse them.

The series of events indicates clearly enough that peace between the two countries was broken by the act of Spain. She considered the approval of the joint resolutions of Congress a virtual declaration of war, and at once broke off relations with this government. The Cuban question became our war with Spain.

CHAPTER XXIX

OPENING OF THE WAR—THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES—DEPARTURE OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON FOR CUBAN WATERS—THE FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR—THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Beginning Operations — Plans for Offensive and Defensive Action -- Comparison of the Spanish and United States Navies — Spain's Armored Cruisers — Superiority of Our Guns and Gunners — The Spirit of the Navy — Lieutenant Commander Wainwright's Plea for a Chance to Fight — Peculiar Positions of Antagonists — Spain's Best Ships neither in Cuban nor Philippine Waters — The Cape Verde Squadron — Speculations as to Naval Results — Spaniards Suspected of Dark Designs — Commodore Howell's Auxiliary Fleet — Blockading Cuban Ports — Departure of Admiral Sampson's Imposing Fleet — Commodore Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila — Caution of the Naval Strategy Board — A Spanish Ship Sighted — The First Shot of the War — The Spanish Flag Comes Down — Other Prizes Captured — The Call for Volunteers — Prompt Response — A Conflict between Amateurs and Professionals — Reorganizing the Army — A Cause of Delay.

WHEN on Thursday, the 21st, the news of General Woodford's dismissal was received at Washington, it was considered as sufficiently marking the beginning of hostilities. No further answer could be expected to the ultimatum, and the administration felt free to begin active operations at once. In adopting plans for the war the government was obliged to consider the requirements of both offensive action and of defensive precautions. The President at first kept strongly in view the possibility of carrying supplies to the reconcentrados, an object at once requiring a convenient base of operations on the Cuban shore, which was in the hands of the Spanish, whom it was proposed to drive from the island. While, to accomplish these objects, an army would be very soon required, it was evident that the initial steps would be taken at once by the navy, and it was decided to direct it towards two ends — a blockade of Havana and the destruction of Spain's fleet. The idea of taking Havana at once was dis-

carded as too risky, though it was, doubtless, less risky than the cautious strategists of the government supposed. The fear of incurring the loss of some of our fighting ships and the suspicion that Spain might await a good opportunity to strike our navy, when weakened by the loss or by absence of ships for repairs, or to strike at our extensive seaboard, led the government quite naturally to the conclusion that the safer and surer course would be to blockade Havana and await Spain's attempt to relieve the city, in the meantime seeking a convenient base of operations on the Cuban coast as near Havana as possible.

A comparison of Spain's navy with ours showed but one first-class Spanish battleship, the *Pelayo*, to our four. Spain had two old second-class battleships, the *Numancia* and *Victoria*; we had a modern one, the *Texas*. But if we were superior in battleships, Spain was ahead in armored cruisers; while we had but two, the *New York* and *Brooklyn*, she had no less than eight — the *Vizcaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Carlos V.*, *Cardinal Cisneros*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Cataluña*, *Maria Teresa*, and *Princess de Asturias*. In protected cruisers, however, the tables were again turned; Spain had eight, the United States had more than twice as many. In gunboats and dispatch boats, Spain's great number of eighty represented but small and weak vessels far inferior to those of the United States. Of monitors she had none; we had five modern and thirteen old-fashioned boats of this type, and one dynamite monitor or cruiser, the *Versuvius*, whose utility, however, remained to be tested. Spain's torpedo-boat destroyers numbered six; we had none except such vessels as were armed in the auxiliary fleet. Spain's entire torpedo outfit numbered about sixty vessels, and ours about twenty. Many naval experts considered armored cruisers and torpedo craft the two most effective engines of war and, therefore, regarded our navy as behind that of Spain in real effectiveness; but this was only a theory. As a whole, taking account of tonnage, speed, and armament, our navy was far better than Spain's. This was especially noticeable in guns, of which we had more than twice

as many as Spain had. Taking into account our auxiliary fleet of eighty vessels, many of them of superior speed, we certainly possessed a good advantage over Spain in striking power. But the greatest advantage we had was in the superiority of American sailors, even if in number they were less than Spain's. The Spaniards had never had much drill in squadron maneuvers or in gun practice.

We did not appreciate at this time as it deserved the fact that no matter how marvelous the gun it is really the man behind the gun who decides the contest. The modern gun had become a complicated machine, terrible if used effectively, but the chances of missing had been greatly increased unless skill had kept pace with the development.

The spirit prevailing in our navy is well illustrated by the appeal of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who was executive officer of the *Maine*, to be allowed to go into active service again. He was formerly Chief Intelligence Officer of the navy, and Secretary Long had decided to restore him to his old duties. But he did not wish to stay on shore duty; he wanted a chance to fight the men who had been responsible for the destruction of the *Maine*, and he said so. The authorities finally gave way to his appeal, and he was placed in command of the fast yacht, *Corsair*, which had been purchased from J. Pierpont Morgan and renamed the *Gloucester*. He looked eagerly for opportunities to meet the enemy, and, in time, they came.

Like the Spanish military service, the naval service was in bad condition. As a matter of fact, the Spanish had hardly mechanical skill enough to handle the new fighting craft which on paper gave her a fair strength. But this was not appreciated at first, not even in Spain, and certainly the United States government could not with wisdom place confidence in any apparent or theoretical weakness of the enemy.

The naval position of the two antagonists was certainly peculiar at the beginning. Spain had no large, heavily-armored vessels to guard her interests either in the West

Indies or the Philippines. The *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* had a few days before, or when war appeared inevitable, sailed from Havana, and were supposed to have gone to join the Cape Verde fleet. As far as the Navy Department knew, the old cruiser *Alfonso XII.* and a number of small gunboats were all that remained in Cuban waters. At Puerto Rico there were a few gunboats, but nothing formidable. The most formidable and first available Spanish squadron was in command of Admiral Cervera, at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde islands, which belong to Portugal. This comprised the armored cruisers *Maria Teresa*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Vizcaya*, and *Almirante Oquendo*, with three torpedo-boat destroyers, three torpedo boats, the transatlantic steamer *City of Cadiz*, armed as an auxiliary cruiser, and a coaling vessel. As naval reckonings went, this squadron was considered to be a fair match for our flying squadron at Hampton Roads.

Spain was apparently forming a second squadron at Cadiz, consisting of the battleship *Pelayo*, the armored cruisers *Carlos V.*, *Cardinal Cisneros*, *Numancia*, *Vittoria*, *Princess Mercedes*, and a few gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Philippine squadron consisted of four cruisers, none of them armored, and several gunboats and small craft.

A torpedo-boat destroyer, the *Temerario*, was in the Rio de la Plata on the South American coast, and it was even considered possible that she might be waiting there to make a night assault upon our battleship *Oregon* and the gunboat *Marietta*, which were on their long journey around Cape Horn. Two Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers were also being repaired in the British Isles.

What Spain proposed to do with these ships was a matter of pure speculation; what the United States could do against them was quite as much so, for, with the exception of the short and sharp battle of the Yalu, in the war between Japan and China, there was little in the history of actual warfare to judge modern warships by. All calculations had been theoretical and based upon the size of vessels, their speed, the number and



PROMINENT AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICERS IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN

Captain Charles E. Clark,
Commander of the "Oregon."
Commander Richard Wainwright,
Commander of the "Gloucester."

Captain Charles D. Sigsbee,
Commander of the "Albatross."
Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson,
One of the heroes of the "Merrimac."



character of their guns, and the qualities of their armor. It was admitted that there might be undreamed-of possibilities in the action of such fighting machines; the ease with which the *Maine* had been blown up suggested the dangerous character of torpedo boats, and among the general public any fears were apt to be exaggerated.

Moreover, we had grown into the habit of always suspecting the Spaniard of dark designs, and it was a notable fact that owing to the strict censorship of the Spanish press and the concentration of authority in Spain, it was difficult to know for a certainty where any of the Spanish ships were, or what strategy the wily Spaniard might invent. On the other hand, our plans of campaign were at first published openly in the papers, so that the Spaniards, if they cared to know, could easily perceive what we were thinking of and doing. Indeed, the Spanish minister, Señor Polo, instead of departing for home, at once took quarters in Toronto, where he carried on a spy system and bureau of information for the Spanish government. An enemy in the dark is usually smaller than one in the open, but he always looks larger, and consequently our strategy board proceeded with the utmost caution, never with reckless bravado, though sometimes with apparent fickleness.

In view of the possibility that Spain might send one of her squadrons either to harass our shipping, which was mostly coastwise, or to attack our coast cities, some of which were not supposed to be well defended, though harbors were being rapidly mined, it had been early decided to equip a patrol squadron under the command of Commodore Howell, composed largely of well-built liners which had been purchased and converted into armed cruisers. Conspicuous among these were four admirable ships of the Morgan line, which had joined the navy under the picturesque names of the *Yankee*, the *Dixie*, the *Prairie*, and the *Yosemite*. The splendid American-built transatlantic liners *St. Paul* and *St. Louis* had also been impressed into the naval service, and Captain Sigbee, of the ill-starred *Maine*, had been given the command of the

former. The liners *New York* and *Paris* were also taken and rechristened the *Harvard* and the *Yale*. The attempt to buy warships abroad had brought a very small aggregate of results. The transformation of merchantmen and yachts into a naval auxiliary fleet had, however, been accomplished in a remarkably successful manner. This auxiliary fleet did away with the necessity of keeping Schley's flying squadron at Hampton Roads, and left it free to strike for any point, while the main fleet, under Sampson, could at once begin operations on the Cuban coast, awaiting the movements of the Spanish fleet, if it should come in that direction.

The necessity of these extensive preparations was made more conspicuous by the uncertainty as to what Spain would do as to privateering. The government of the United States at the beginning announced its intention of adhering to the declaration of Paris, though not a party to it, and of maintaining its four cardinal principles: abolishment of privateering, neutral flag to exempt an enemy's goods from capture except contraband of war, neutral goods under the enemy's flag not to be seized, a blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain, on her part, issued a decree recognizing that a state of war existed, breaking off all treaties with the United States and promising to observe the rules of the declaration of Paris, except that she maintained her rights to grant letters of marque to privateers. But to carry on privateering after the old-time methods would have been to fly in the face of European sentiment, and that Spain could hardly afford to do, great as was the temptation to prey upon American shipping, inflicting expensive injuries, though she might not overcome us in war.

Regarding the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations as a virtual declaration of war, the President, without waiting for time limit set in his ultimatum to expire, ordered the Key West fleet to move at once to Cuba and form a blockade, and the same day, the 21st, he issued a proclamation declaring that the United States government "has instituted and will maintain a blockade on the north coast of Cuba, including

ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba." The proclamation added that neutral vessels approaching such coasts or attempting to leave them without knowledge of the establishment of the blockade would be duly warned by the commander of the blockade forces and released, but upon attempting the second time to enter any blockaded port they would be captured and sent to the nearest American port as prizes. Neutral vessels lying in blockaded ports were allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

In accordance with this order Rear Admiral Sampson's fleet, the most imposing that had ever been gathered in this country, departed on the following morning in two columns for the Cuban coast. At the same time Commodore Schley of the flying squadron was ordered to put his ships in readiness for instant action, and a little later two of his fastest cruisers were ordered off to sea to cruise in search of Spanish ships, especially off the New England coasts, for there were various stories afloat of the presence of Spanish cruisers near those waters, a fair illustration of the uncertainty even in official circles of the probable movements of the Spanish navy.

On the 21st also, orders were sent to Commodore Dewey, whose squadron was mobilized at Hongkong, on the opposite side of the globe, to proceed at once to Manila, the chief port of the Philippines, institute a blockade and destroy or capture whatever Spanish fleet existed there. To follow up these steps it was decided to call for 100,000 volunteer troops as soon as Congress could authorize it, and steps were taken to charter a large number of transports and supply ships as quickly as possible.

It seems to have been the plan of Spain to hold the flower of its navy at the Cape Verde Islands in the hopes that Admiral Sampson's squadron would at once attack Havana and suffer considerable losses under the guns of its forts, whereupon the Spanish ships could hurry over and attack our fleet in a weakened condition. Some of the more warlike newspapers

in the country, less proficient in naval strategy than in the issue of extra editions, were raising the cry, "Smash Havana!" but our naval strategy board were too wise to risk their fleet while the Cape Verde ships were in prime condition, and orders were issued to Sampson not to attack Cuban ports for the present, though he could use his discretion if fired upon.

The Key West fleet had proceeded but a short distance on the morning of the 22d, the flagship *New York* and the battle-ships *Iowa* and *Indiana* leading in one line to the southward, and the gunboats *Helena*, *Machias*, *Nashville*, and *Castine* in another to the northward, when smoke was seen on the horizon to westward. By seven o'clock it was discovered that she was a merchantman flying a Spanish flag. The *Nashville* suddenly left the line and headed at full speed for the Spaniard. As she approached a shot was fired from her port battery, striking the water some distance ahead of the merchantman, which held her way as if nothing was happening. For a few minutes the *Nashville* continued the chase and then fired another shot which apparently passed within a rod of the Spaniard's bow, and the captain quickly reversed the engines and hauled down the Spanish ensign. She was boarded by a half-dozen men from the *Nashville*, and was found to be the steamship *Buena Ventura*, plying between New York and West Indian ports. The captain said he did not know that war had been declared, but she was sent to Key West, where much excitement prevailed over the first shot of the war.

The blockading squadron arrived off Havana towards evening of the same day; the red light was lighted in Morro Castle tower and three shots were fired as a signal that the Americans had appeared. Havana armed itself at once in anticipation of attack, not understanding our more peaceful intentions for the time being. Some shots were fired from the fortifications during the night, falling far short of our ships, which lay quietly out some distance working their searchlights and keeping a sharp eye for blockade runners. On the 23d and 24th several other Spanish vessels were taken, including the

steamers *Jover* and *Catalina*, all being rich prizes, especially the latter, a large new vessel. Two ships were taken at the mouth of Havana harbor, indeed almost under the guns of Morro Castle. The President was disposed to release all Spanish prizes taken during these first days of the war in consideration of the notice given by Spain allowing American vessels in Spanish ports freely to depart, but he waited to see if Spain were acting in good faith. As a matter of fact, there were no American vessels in Spanish ports, except possibly a few pleasure yachts, and Spain's action might have been for effect and for the very purpose of placing our seizures of Spanish ships in as bad a light as possible.

On the 20th, or immediately after the resolutions for intervention were disposed of, the House passed promptly and without division a bill authorizing the President to call for army volunteers, and defining the terms on which volunteers from the state militia forces could be enlisted and officered. The bill was passed in the Senate the next day, but owing to defects it was sent back to both houses and did not become a law till the 23d, when the President, in conformity with its provisions, issued a proclamation calling for two-year volunteers, the total number apportioned among the states according to population. Measures were taken for the enlistment of as large a proportion as possible of the National Guard in the United States Army, the purpose being to amalgamate the regulars and volunteers as soon as possible.

The requisitions made by Secretary Alger on the state governors calling for 125,000 volunteers, met with instant and adequate response, but also not a little adverse criticism from the National Guardsmen, whose jealousy of the regular army had much to do with the defeat of the first Hull bill for its reorganization to meet requirements. By the provisions of that measure, the regular army's war strength would have been raised to 104,000 men. In his telegraphic call Secretary Alger declared that preference would be given to regiments of the National Guard or state militia, for the reason that they

were armed, presumably equipped and drilled. In issuing his confirmatory letter, however, the Secretary of War said that the men called for were to be enlisted in the United States service, their state organizations being preserved as long as they remained in their own states. The result was that many regiments manifested a decided reluctance to act under an uncertainty as to the necessity of giving up their organizations.

It was not so much a conflict between State and Federal elements as a conflict between amateurs and professionals, and when the fact was thoroughly understood there was no uncertainty as to results. Whatever the influence of the National Guard, the Federal government could ill-afford to have men enlisted as volunteers who would not serve unconditionally under army orders. It was very soon shown that while the National Guard in some states was in a high state of efficiency, in others it was far from being prepared for war. Some of the Western regiments came into the Eastern camps almost destitute of equipments. Even the New York state militia, ill-provided with overcoats and blankets, were sent to an unprepared camp, and the control was so poor that at first there were scenes of rowdiness in the villages about the camps. Had United States army officers been in charge there would have been nothing of this kind permitted. It was a useful lesson to state authorities, for it revealed the fact that the organizations which had been maintained with so much expense, and which had been so often admired in parades, were not in a condition to meet a sudden call in defense of the country.

Soon after gathering in their respective state rendezvous, the volunteers were forced to undergo the somewhat trying ordeal of examination by United States army surgeons before they could be accepted and mustered into service. In not a few of the states the percentage of men rejected, both officers and privates, was so large that state officials endeavored to induce the Federal authorities to be less rigorous in their demands, but, for reason obvious enough, the Federal authorities declined to relent.

If the militia in some states had permitted officers and privates to come to look upon the militia organization as a social institution existing chiefly for the pleasure of the men enrolled, it was certainly a fortunate event that disclosed the weakness at this early day of the war and at a time when not faced by a foe more dangerous than Spain. The Federal authorities were quite right in insisting that men entering the army should be unlikely candidates for the hospital and pension roll, and, in spite of the influence of the National Guard in some states, the Federal authorities were supported by public opinion.

On the 25th was passed a modified bill for reorganizing the regular army, giving it a maximum strength of 61,000, creating the three-battalion form, and providing for the enlistment and promotion of the requisite number of officers. The imperative necessity for passing the reorganization bill was that, owing to the complicated machinery of modern siege guns, it would be impossible to entrust volunteer forces with the coast defenses within three months. But considerable jealousy was shown between the amateur and regular forces, and it soon became apparent that the formation of the army would be responsible for delay in the war.

Among the people who had not an adequate idea of the requirements of war there was the greatest optimism as to the promptness with which it would end — a naval battle or two and it would all be over with, they thought; and the idea was also extensively held in official circles, though not among the army and navy. But the co-operation of the Cubans was exaggerated, and, besides, the troops immediately available for military operations in Cuba were only those which could be spared from the small regular army. None of the National Guard regiments were fitted at once for such campaigning as would be required in Cuba. At the best, from one to three months of preliminary training and seasoning was needed. It was shown unmistakably both in the Mexican and Civil War that training and drilling consuming months of time were absolutely necessary to get raw recruits into shape.

CHAPTER XXX

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED—THE BOMBARDMENT OF MATANZAS—EXPERIENCES ON A MODERN WARSHIP—COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA.

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States—College Patriotism—Prompt Action by the Women of the Country—Red Cross Nurses—The Dangers of Yellow Fever—Surgeon-General's Warning—Rejoicing in Havana—Blanco's Grandiloquent Manifesto—Congress Formally Declares War—Spain Talks of Scandalous Aggression—Troubles in the Cortes—Importance of Securing a Base on Cuban Coast—Havana Ignored—Advancing to Matanzas—The Nature of the Bay—Waiting for the Word to Fire—A Shot from the Batteries—Engagement Becomes General—A Thrilling Sight—Following the Powerful Projectiles to the Target—Clouds of Smoke—Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Minutes—The *Puritan's* Remarkable Shot—Terrible Destruction—The Concussion of Great Guns—General Blanco's Report of Casualties—"A Mule Killed"—The Cape Verde Spanish Fleet Sails—Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet towards Manila—Significance of His Orders.

ON every side existed abundant evidence of patriotism and generosity. Of course, as in every war, there were avaricious speculators who figured how much personal wealth they could grab from the national treasury, which required so much for the equipment of the forces. But the great multitude of the rich and poor alike had no such sordid ambition. Enlistments came in rapidly from every quarter, and from every station in life. The Federal Treasury, the Post-Office Department, the boards of aldermen in many of the cities, presidents and directors of great railway corporations and many patriotic employers of labor put their employes at ease by either guaranteeing that all of them who cared to volunteer should be paid in full while away and reinstated when they returned, or that they should be reinstated merely. Prominent and rich people offered money and services to the government and valuable steam yachts were tendered for its use. John Jacob Astor, having offered free

transportation for troops over his railroads in Ohio and Illinois, and having put his yacht, the *Nourmahal*, at the disposal of the government as an auxiliary cruiser, then offered to furnish and equip a battery of artillery for service in Cuba or in any place where the government might wish to use it. At the Colleges the enthusiasm was great, and mass meetings addressed by the presidents and professors were held in many of the leading educational institutions. Many students volunteered. As a recognition of the contributions of Yale and Harvard to our national glory in years past, the *Paris* and the *New York*, the fast steamers impressed into the service of the navy, were renamed after those institutions.

The expression of patriotism from the women of the country was what was to be expected. In several cities they had early organized, forming auxiliary corps to make comforts for the soldiers going to the war. These auxiliaries were independent, being formed without any immediate connection with regiments, and others were formed connected semi-officially with companies and regiments of the National Guard.

The volunteers, nurses, and honorary members of the Red Cross Society received instructions at the hospitals. A detachment of the nurses of this society sailed from New York on the *State of Texas* on the 23d to be in readiness in Cuban waters. The nurses of the Red Cross Society, and others who maintain an independent organization, were not governed by the Surgeon-General's ultimatum that the government would not accept the services of any nurse who had not had yellow fever or passed through one or more epidemics of that disease. In the judgment of the Surgeon General, it would be adding burdens, and making more demands on the hospital resources of the government in Cuba and Key West, to send out nurses who were not immune. The male nurses meeting the government requirements were the only government nurses at first sent out. This decision changed the character of the services rendered to the soldiers and sailors by the volunteer women and nurses, but did not lessen their enthusiastic determination to serve.

The Surgeon-General, who was considered one of the highest authorities in the world on enteric diseases, strongly advised against the immediate invasion of Cuba, predicting that the mortality among volunteers from yellow fever alone would be between 35 and 50 per cent. if undertaken before October 1st. This fact, together with the other that many of the regiments from the different states were slow in recruiting and came to the national camps poorly equipped, led the authorities to delay any large military operations on the island for a time, though it was desired to secure a base for distributing provisions to the reconcentrados if possible, and arms to the insurgents. But, as in most wars, it was found that plans had to be changed to meet new conditions.

The news of the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Spain appeared to be received in Havana with rejoicing. No further attempt to secure a conference with the insurgents in the interests of autonomy was made, and the Captain-General declared the island to be in a state of war. He annulled all his former decrees granting pardon to insurgents, and placed under martial law all accused of rebellion. Spanish forces in the western provinces began to concentrate in Havana, burning and destroying the country as they came in. In a grandiloquent manifesto, Blanco declared his intention of shedding his blood for the honor of Spain, and he called upon all to vigorously repel the invader. The Correspondent of the London *Times*, whose reports were as impartial as any sent from the island, was expelled, and other steps taken to prevent the exact state of things from being known.

While no doubt as to when the war began was entertained by the administration, it was deemed best that Congress should adopt a resolution formally declaring the time when the state of war began to exist. In a message to Congress on the 25th, the President asked that, in view of the measures already taken by him and with a view to the adoption of other necessary measures, Congress take formal action at once "to the end

that the definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be assured." Congress acted with the utmost promptness and passed a resolution declaring that a state of war existed and had existed between the United States and Spain since, and including, April 21st. The vote in the House was unanimous.

The Spanish government followed up its circular of the 18th by another on the 26th, in which it expressed its regret at being compelled to appeal to force to expel the "scandalous aggression" of the United States and defend the national dignity and historic integrity of the fatherland.

It was the evident purpose of the United States government at this time, while the intentions of the Cape Verde fleet were uncertain, to effect a landing in Cuba promptly and as near Havana as possible, in order to hold communication with the insurgents, to form a base for our own military operations and to carry relief to reconcentrados.

All reports indicated that the Spanish army in concentrating their forces had seized all available food in the large centers, and the reconcentrados were in a worse predicament than ever. A base for our own military operations was quite as important. General Grant had pointed out many years before, or when the *Virginus* case seemed likely to lead us into war, that the conquest of Havana could best be undertaken by an army landed somewhere east of the city while a blockading force held the approaches to the harbor. This plan was evidently in the minds of the government and it was the expectation that such an expedition might lead the way in a short time.

In carrying out this policy it became Admiral Sampson's duty to ignore the fortifications of Havana, keeping the blockade effective at all times, while preparing a suitable base for landing troops. The city of Matanzas presented a convenient point for such a base, but the blockading fleet could see that

the Spaniards were very busy in placing new fortifications and more modern guns about the harbor, and consequently, Admiral Sampson set out to destroy them on the 27th.

It was a very interesting event, drawing the first blood of the conflict. For the first time in thirty years our warships en-



MAP OF HAVANA, ITS HARBOR AND DEFENCES.

tered upon the serious business of war. In the afternoon Admiral Sampson on his flagship *New York* reached the harbor of Matanzas, where the monitor *Puritan* and the cruiser *Cincinnati* were maintaining the blockade. The city lies at the head of a bay about four miles from the sea and the mouth of the bay is about three miles wide. On its west side is Point Rubalcaya and on the east side Point Maya, both having a high elevation above the sea and giving their batteries a very commanding position. Stretching back from these batteries are commanding hills, in the shrubbery of which the Spaniards had been busy placing concealed batteries.

The *New York* led the way into the bay, followed a hundred yards astern on the port side by the *Puritan*, while the *Cincinnati* was about the same distance behind on the star-



W. F. Sampson

board. The crews were all at their quarters waiting for the "music" to begin, the orders being to open fire when the batteries fired their first shot. At a few minutes before one o'clock there was a puff of smoke from the east shore and an 8-inch shell whizzed toward the *New York* and fell considerably short. The range to the east shore was still over three miles, but the flagship promptly opened fire with one of her heavy guns. The engagement in a few minutes became general and shore and bay were covered with the wind-swept smoke while the hollows below the hills roared with the cannonading. The *New York* steamed quickly in and circled around to the westward toward Point Rubalcaya, while the *Puritan* swung eastward to engage the Maya batteries.

It was the first opportunity the gunners of the *New York* had enjoyed for target practice of this kind and it was a stirring sight to see. As a big puff of smoke rose from her side, the eye turning to the battery on shore would behold a cloud of dust and fragments flying high in the air, indicating the terrific force of modern projectiles. The *New York* soon reduced the range to about a mile and a quarter, and was tossing shells into Rubalcaya at the rate of about three a minute with wonderful precision and apparently with great destructiveness.

In the meantime the *Puritan* was taking care of Point Maya. It was a long shot to that battery and it was so well masked that the only target was the infrequent smoke of a gun, but when the *Puritan* found the range her shells burst every time within the fortifications, great clouds of dust and fragments rising high in the air with every explosion. Up to this time the *Cincinnati* had received no order to join in the action and her crew and officers could hardly contain themselves. Finally, Captain Chester himself signaled asking permission to engage, and it was granted by the flagship. The *Cincinnati* quickly steamed up to within two thousand yards broadside on and all her guns seemed to go at once. But this grim sport was of short duration.

At the end of eighteen minutes, the batteries apparently

having been silenced, the *New York* gave the signal to retire, but soon after a last defiant shot was fired from the shore. Almost instantly one of the big guns of the *Puritan*, which was in line, replied. It was the best shot of the day and excited the admiration of every witness. It struck the battery just where the smoke had showed the gun, tore its way into the earthworks and exploded with terrible destruction. Then the ships stood out to sea.

The display of marksmanship on the American vessels was superb; the firing was rapid and every one of the three hundred shots fired seemed to do its work of destruction to the new forts, but not one of the enemy's shots hit the ships; they were absolutely unharmed except from the usual results of the concussion of their own guns. A correspondent wrote: "When a 10,000-ton ship, usually as steady as a rock, shakes and trembles like a frightened child; when firmly-fitted bolts start from their sockets and window-panes and woodwork are shattered; when the roar peals up from port and starboard and you feel your feet leaving the deck and your glasses jumping around your forehead, while blinding, blackening smoke hides everything from sight — then it is that you first realize the terrible power of a modern warship's batteries."

Not one of our men was hurt, and the gunners and their assistants were delighted to embrace the opportunity they had so long waited for to "pump a little iron," as one of them expressed it, "into those Spaniards." It is not known what the casualties were on shore, but it is difficult to see how those who manned the batteries could have entirely escaped unless they ran away. Captain-General Blanco sent home a report of the usual Spanish color. No lives were lost, he said, except that of one mule. Our vessels were injured by the Spanish fire, and he was quite sure a smokestack was hit.

On the 26th the President issued an order proclaiming our policy regarding the rights of Spanish vessels and the rights of neutrals, indicating an intention to pursue a liberal course least calculated to irritate foreign powers, and giving Spanish

merchant vessels within the ports of the United States until May 21st for loading their cargoes and departing. The right of search was to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and mail steamers were not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of having contraband goods or of violating the blockade. This proclamation was followed within a few days by decrees of neutrality from most of the foreign nations. Great Britain was one of the first to declare her neutrality, sending notices to all ports in all colonies under her dominion. This, of course, necessitated a prompt departure from the port of Hongkong of Dewey's fleet, and it moved to Mirs Bay, a Chinese port, where also it could remain but twenty-four hours.

Portugal, having dominion over the Cape Verde Islands, at which the Spanish fleet was concentrated, delayed for some days to define her position, and it was at one time suspected that she might make common cause with Spain. At last, however, she took a neutral position, daring no longer to disregard the obligations of neutrality, and the Spanish fleet, which had been reported as having sailed several times, actually sailed on the 29th, two days after Commodore Dewey sailed from Mirs Bay to Manila.

Public attention in the United States was so completely taken up with the situation about Cuba, especially after the news of the departure of Cervera's fleet from St. Vincent, that little was thought of Dewey's movements. In a general way, it was thought that neutral declarations having shut our Asiatic squadron off from Hongkong, it would be necessary for our fleet to secure a base for coal and supplies nearer than Honolulu or San Francisco, and, as the Spanish Philippines lay but two or three days' sail from Hongkong, and as we were at war with Spain, it would be a stroke to secure a coaling station there. Very few in the discussion which preceded the actual outbreak of war had for a moment supposed that the armed intervention for the pacification of Cuba would begin with a campaign of conquest in islands on exactly the opposite

side of the world. It had been the declared purpose of our government to free Cuba and extend a helping hand to the starving people of that island, and it had begun by establishing a pacific blockade which for the time shut off supplies not only from the Spanish but from the reconcentrados, and all were expecting that as speedily as possible we would use the navy to strike at any naval force Spain sent to the defense of the islands, and also to assist in landing troops near Havana, establishing a base of supplies for ourselves and for the suffering Cubans. Incidentally, we were at war with Spain, and it was, of course, our business to strike Spain wherever we found her. While we were thinking of other things, and wondering at what point Cervera's fleet would appear, Dewey, obeying orders the significance of which had not occurred to the American people, struck a blow that in a day changed the opinions of the nation and, apparently, the course of its policy.

The revolution which had been proceeding in the Philippines against Spanish authority, for very much the same reasons as in Cuba, had up to this time attracted little attention in the world and least of all in the United States. Agreeably to the traditions of a hundred years, we had viewed with little concern the troubles of others in far-away lands. Having rigorously kept to the doctrine that the destiny of all peoples on the Western Hemisphere was a subject for our immediate concern, and having upheld it whenever occasion demanded, we had confined our efforts on the other side of the world to the support of enterprising and daring missionaries, satisfied to take the heathen under our religious influence under whatever flag of authority the exigencies of European colonization imposed upon him. As a government, we had grown into the habit of keeping our hands off. Spanish oppression and brutality would never have tempted us to assume the duty of a maker of peace and a bearer of freedom of the Philippines had Cuba not been at our doors. But the conception of our duty quickly enlarged after Commodore Dewey pointed his ships for Manila.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—THEIR EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND NATIVE LIFE—REBELLION OF THE FILIPINOS AND ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS—THE TRAGIC DEATH OF DR. RIZAL—AGUINALDO AND COMMODORE DEWEY.

Magellan the Navigator Hears of the Wonderful Spice Islands—Persuades the Spanish King that they Might Belong to Spain—Sailing Westward Instead of Eastward—Wonderful Voyage—Discovery of the Philippines—The Natives—Early Importance of Manila—The Slaughter of the Prosperous Chinese—Depressing Results—A Long and Ugly History—Character of the Islands—Peculiarities of Spanish Government—The Uprising of 1896—The Catapunan Society—Appealing to the Filipinos—A Bloody Conflict—Outrages on Both Sides—A Hundred Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night—Public Executions—Dramatic Incidents—The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal—His Love Affair—Sentenced to Death—Married in his Cell Just Before his Execution—His Death—Patriotic Verses—His Widow Joins the Insurgents and is Welcomed as a Joan of Arc—Insurgent Leaders Leave the Country—Insurrection Breaks Out Again—General Aguinaldo's Exile.

WHEN Pope Alexander VI. divided the world between Portugal and Spain by a line from pole to pole some three hundred miles west of the Azores, as related in an early chapter, he did not imagine that one navigator sailing east and another west might meet somewhere on the other side of the globe. Yet this very thing happened, and, in consequence of it, for three hundred years the Spanish had one day too many in their calendar and the Portuguese one day too few. It happened that Magellan, who was a Portuguese, had begun his career as a navigator by sailing under Portuguese commanders eastward around the Cape of Good Hope to the Indies, and he had a desire to lead an expedition to the rich "spice" islands about which he had heard. But his king treated him ungratefully, so he transferred his allegiance to the Spanish flag, and finally persuaded Charles V. of Spain that the wonderful islands would lie within that part of the world the Pope had given to Spain, if only good care

was taken to sail westward instead of eastward. Thus it happened that Magellan made that wonderful journey — “the most wonderful in history,” as John Fiske, the historian, calls it, “doubtless the greatest feat of navigation that has ever been performed.” His ships were the first to circumnavigate the globe, though Magellan himself was killed by natives in the islands which were claimed by Spain and which were named the Philippines, in honor of Philip II., one of the most dishonorable kings who ever reigned in Spain.

Antonio de Morga, writing about eighty years later, or in 1609, put this maritime achievement in this way: “Having won America, a fourth part of the earth which the ancients never knew, the Spaniards sailed, following the sun, and discovered in the western ocean an archipelago of many islands adjacent to further Asia, inhabited by various nations, abounding in rich metals, precious stones, and pearls, and all manner of fruit, where, raising the standard of the faith, they snatched them from the yoke and power of the devil and placed them under the command and government of Spain.”

Manila was an important commercial center while Liverpool was only a fishing station and while the Indians were still occupying Manhattan Island. Formerly, the islands had been under Chinese dominion, but the yoke was shaken off by an invasion from India, and it was these invaders with whom the Spaniards chiefly had to deal. But the Chinese still maintained a brisk trade with the Philippines in cotton, silks, metals, and quicksilver. From time to time a great many enterprising Chinese landed in the islands, and early in the seventeenth century they came in large numbers, but the Spaniards became jealous of their strength and began to persecute them in many ways till at last they were goaded into rebellion. Several times the Spaniards endeavored to exterminate them, but they continued to arrive and to thrive till finally it was decreed that every Chinaman on the island of Luzon should be killed. Twenty-four thousand of them were put to death with one curious result, according to the

historian of that day: "When the war was at an end, the want and difficulties of the city began because there were no Chinese who exercised various arts and brought all the provisions; neither was any food to be found to eat nor shoes to wear, not even for very excessive prices. All this weighed down the spirit of the Spaniards."

We need not follow the long and ugly history of the Spaniards in these islands; in many respects it is similar to that of Cuba. It was the purpose and the endeavor of the Spanish government to make all the money possible out of the people, giving to them little in return but "the faith," which was always rather obstinately declined.

Lying wholly within the tropics, the islands, big and little, number nearly a thousand, varying in size from Luzon, which is somewhat larger than Cuba and about the size of the State of Illinois, to tiny islets hardly worth a name. Altogether their area is twice that of New England. The tropical scenery in the forests of this archipelago is of unsurpassed splendor, the heat and moisture combining to produce vegetation of a magnificence which beggars description. Gigantic trees towering to a height of two or three hundred feet are festooned with graceful vines. Splendid tree-ferns rise thirty or forty feet into the air, while underneath are smaller varieties and exquisite orchids. So dense is the vegetation in some of these forests that the fierce tropical sun hardly penetrates to the ground beneath them and the dense undergrowth constantly drips with moisture.

The mountains, rising to a height of 7,000 feet, are covered to their very tops with forests of immense trees, yielding excellent timber and many of the most valuable sorts of wood. Teak, ebony, cedar, and gum trees, iron and sapan wood are interspersed with breadfruit and cocoanut trees, oranges, citrons, mango, tamarinds, and other varieties of fruit trees. On the extensive slopes and in the valleys is cultivated hemp, of which about 65,000 tons are annually exported. In 1890 8,000 tons of tobacco and 110,000,000 cigars are exported.

The other products are cotton, sugar, coffee, indigo, rice, wheat, maize, pepper, ginger, vanilla, cinnamon, cocoa, etc.



MAP OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Of dangerous wild beasts there are none; oxen, buffaloes, horses, goats, sheep, and swine are extensively reared; deer,

wild boars, pheasants, ducks, and fine fish are abundant; the forests swarm with monkeys, squirrels, parrots, sunbirds, and bees; the jungles with lizards, snakes, tarantulas, mosquitoes, and other insects. Gold is found, also iron, copper, coal, vermilion, saltpeter, quicksilver, sulphur (in large quantities, both pure and mixed with copper or iron), mother-of-pearl, coral, amber, and tortoise shell.

The islands contain some 10,000,000 natives of different tribes, many of whom the Spaniards were never able to bring under their authority. The main population consists of the Tagals. They, together with the various mixtures of half-breeds, bore a burdensome taxation and other unhappy conditions for many years, and, so long as the only educated people on the islands were the rulers, there was little trouble. Little by little, the natives and half-breeds became educated, some of the young men of the richer families going abroad, and with greater education came greater ambition. The natives began to desire some voice in the government, the abuses of which they began to understand; and, of course, the proud Spaniard and the power-loving friar looked with as pronounced disfavor upon the demands of these people as they did upon those of the Cubans.

The church organization became very powerful in the hands of the various orders of Dominicans, Augustinians, Recoletanos, and Franciscans, and even the Governor-General himself dared not oppose them. The Archbishop received a salary of \$12,000 a year, though to conduct the whole ecclesiastical establishment cost no less than \$1,000,000 a year. The Archbishop lived in a palace in considerable state, and on the great feast days he was the only one allowed to ride in a carriage.

The Governor-General received a salary of \$40,000, though the cost of his office to the colony was no less than \$1,000,000 a year. As in Cuba, governors came with empty pockets and went away with full ones. It was asserted that Weyler put \$6,000,000 to his credit during the short time he

had control of the Philippines, and the sub-officials stole in like manner. The peculations amounted to millions of dollars annually, and absolutely nothing was done for internal improvements. The budget showed that only \$6,000 was appropriated for new improvements in this whole archipelago, and yet \$60,000 was set apart for the Manila Cathedral, \$4,000 for the choir alone.

If a bridge was destroyed by a flood or earthquake, it was never repaired. And so it went on for year after year. Had Spain been actuated by the spirit of internal improvement that characterized the administration of England and Holland in adjacent countries, had she subordinated her religious fanaticism and her avarice to a desire to better the natives, the commerce of the islands might have been fifty times as great, for in natural productiveness there is no land on the globe surpassing the Philippines.

The beginning of the end of it all came in 1896 while General Blanco was Governor-General of the colony. Rebellion broke out, and Spain, whose forces in Cuba under General Campos had just been swept back to Havana, was called upon to face the brotherhood of the Katapunan in the Philippines. This society was the strongest political society in the islands, having a membership of about 50,000 "Filipinos" in Luzon alone, and through it the munitions of war were mostly contributed to the insurgents. They issued an appeal in which they said: "We make no racial distinction. We call upon all possessing honor and national dignity. All are sufferers, the Filipino, and the Asiatic, the American, and the European. We invite all to help raise a down-trodden and tormented race — a country destroyed and hurled into the slough of degradation. We except no one, not even a Spaniard, because in our ranks there are some noble Spaniards, lovers of justice, free from prejudice, who are supporting our demands for individuality and national dignity."

Native Filipinos, residing in Madrid, expressed their grievances in an address to the Spanish people, containing ex-

tracts from the Philippine budget for 1896-97. It showed that the Philippine treasury was compelled to pay a heavy contribution to the general expenses of the government at Madrid; pensions to the Duke of Veragua and to the Marquis of Bedmar, besides providing for the entire cost of the Spanish consulates at all the important Asiatic ports. It contributed, like Cuba, a large amount of money for the office of the colonial minister, and for a purely ornamental and purely Spanish body called the Council of the Philippines. It paid the expenses of the penal colony of Fernando Po in Africa, and all the pensions and retiring allowances of all the civil and military employes who had ever served in the Philippines, a sum amounting to nearly \$2,000,000 annually.

The real fighting began in August, 1896, and repeated bloody conflicts followed. At first the natives were poorly armed; indeed, the majority bore no weapons at all. But after a while the organization was improved, *bolos*, or long sharp knives somewhat like the Cuban machetes, were distributed to the men, and a few secured firearms which were brought in from Hongkong and Singapore. Gradually, the area of discontent widened into the province of Cavité, where most of the fighting took place. Before reinforcements could be brought from Spain, the insurgents had practical control of that province.

The rebels were not as wisely controlled as the Cubans and many outrages occurred on both sides. The Spanish authorities, with their usual stupidity, endeavored to prevent the foreigners in the islands sending out information, but, in spite of all precautions, a few details reached the outer world, showing that the rising was a serious one, that horrible outrages were committed by the rebels, and that the Spanish troops retaliated with almost corresponding brutality.

A hundred rebels, or suspected rebels, were suffocated to death in the "Dark Hole of Manila" in one night. This place is an old inquisitorial prison, in the base of the main fortifications on the Pasig River, which flows through Manila,

a dark and unsanitary hole below the ground level, unused for more than a hundred years before this revolution, with stagnant water, poisoned, stifling atmosphere, and infested with rats and vermin. Spanish officers on guard during that long and awful night heard the piteous cries of the miserable creatures who had been thrown into this horrible pit, and their condition was made more terrible when, acting upon the orders of a lieutenant, the sentinel in charge covered up the only air hole in the dungeon, "because it rained," he said.

The public executions were made greater fêtes even than in Cuba. An American who was present in the country at this time wrote:

"These executions were generally made the occasion for quite a jubilee—a turnout of the *élite*, a gala day, a time for rejoicing. The fact that there was to be an execution was prominently, joyously announced, officially and otherwise, in the local newspapers. There was at least one military band in evidence, and the morning when unfortunates who had protested against Spanish misrule were to be shot found the Spanish colors flying from a great many buildings, and the warships in the harbor 'dressed.' The Philippine capital had a holiday aspect.

"The deadly work was generally performed in the cool of the morning. That these events were fully appreciated was shown by the presence on the Lunetta of thousands of people. Hundreds of fashionably-dressed ladies and gentlemen 'graced' the occasion with their presence. For the most part these fashionables came in their equipages. These ladies would stand in their vehicles, determined not to miss any part of the ghastly show. The signal from the commanding lieutenant that the victims were dead was the signal for these delighted lady spectators to wave their handkerchiefs or parasols as evidence of their satisfaction."

As in Cuba, this bloody work abounded in dramatic incidents, many touching examples of heroic martyrdom; and the fate of Dr. Rizal will have an enduring place in the history of these troubled isles. He was one of the prominent leaders in the secret organization which supported the insurrection against Spanish tyranny; a man of culture, an experienced and able physician, once the president of the Manila University, a leader in the educational and scientific as well as social life of his "beloved Filipinos." He was a lover of equality, and while Spain's yoke did not chafe his own shoulders severely,

he had pity for the less fortunate natives about him, and his love of his native country took precedence of all else in his strong and impulsive nature.

Although he did not appear directly in connection with the organization of the rebellion, the Spanish secured evidence to show his intimate relations with the most active leaders of the insurrection. Two years before, because of his political views, he had been sent into exile in the island of Mindanao, where he practiced his profession with profit, and where he met the lady who finally became his wife and his widow in a single day. Upon promise of freedom Dr. Rizal seems to have been tricked, late in 1896, into returning to Manila, where he was at once placed on board the Spanish cruiser *Castilla* and conveyed to Spain.

Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities had seized certain papers of the Katapunan society which were thought to implicate Dr. Rizal, and to show that he had been in constant communication with the insurgent leaders in Luzon. Arriving at Barcelona, he was arrested and sent back to Manila for trial. Once there, he was speedily condemned to death. The time for his execution was fixed for December 6th. At six o'clock on that fateful morning, Miss Taufer, his betrothed, was admitted to his cell. In two hours the execution would take place. A priest was in attendance upon the condemned man. Dr. Rizal proposed that a marriage ceremony be performed then and there, and the lady assented. There, while the rays of the early tropical sun streamed through the little barred window of the cell, were spoken the solemn words which joined the lovers in wedlock. The wife remained with her husband till the summons came, and then they led her away. The execution was attended with the usual formalities and was a sad but imposing spectacle. Great crowds of Spaniards, including many ladies, attended, but the natives were not so numerous as on former occasions. Rizal displayed great fortitude, walking from the prison with firm tread and head erect, his arms pinioned behind his back.

With his eyes fixed upon the rippling sunlit waters of the bay, he received the volley of eight rifles, swayed and fell. Another bullet was put into the body at short range to make sure of death, and the band struck up the usual lively airs.

The execution caused a great sensation in Manila because of his prominence and his romantic marriage, and a week later the widow set off on foot for the rebel camp at Imus, where she was hailed as a modern Joan of Arc and was received with great demonstrations. She followed the insurgents into many of their victorious engagements.

During the long struggle many wealthy half-castes were implicated. Many fled the country and their estates were turned into the coffers of the government. More troops were hurried out from Spain, earthworks were thrown up at Cavité, and 8-inch guns looked out over the bay. New batteries were planted behind the walls of Old Manila, stretching from the river south along the bay to the promenade, and families living in the suburbs pitched tents in the streets of the old city. Thus Spain held the insurgents in check, while the commercial interests of the islands suffered greatly.

In December, 1897, General Primo de Rivera, who above all Spanish generals had an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the situation untenable for both parties. It appeared to be somewhat like the Cuban situation: Neither party could drive out the other, the rebels being secure in their mountain fastnesses and the Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Rivera, therefore, sent two well-known Philippine natives occupying high position in Manila to propose terms of peace to Emilio Aguinaldo, a young Filipino at the head of the military movements of the insurgents. A council of the revolutionary government was held in which it was agreed to lay down their arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal ones which the Spanish authorities agreed to were: the secularization of the religious orders and their inhibition from all official vetoes in civil administration; a general am-

nesty for all rebels and guarantees for their personal security and from vengeance of the friars after returning to their homes; radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration; freedom of the press; representation in the Spanish parliament; abolition of the system of the deportation of political suspects.

If the Philippine insurgents had had the benefit of as much experience with the Spanish government in such agreements as the Cuban insurgents had, they would have known that no such arrangement would have received the necessary sanction at Madrid; but Rivera agreed to the reforms, making the significant condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during the pleasure of His Majesty. As these leaders had lost all their property either by confiscation or plunder, Rivera agreed further to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil. He was very glad to get them out of the way so cheaply, and it was generally regarded as a bribe. To what extent the leaders were influenced by this offer it is difficult to say.

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so and had returned to their homes than the religious orders began again to persecute them and to trump up imaginary charges to procure their arrest. The Spanish government, on its side, imagining itself now secure, desisted from carrying out the proposed reforms, a trick like that played on the Cubans at Zanjón in 1878. The Filipinos, however, refused to be duped, and again rose in rebellion, not only around Manila but all over the neighboring islands, but they necessarily had to begin all over again, their arms having been surrendered and their leaders having left the country.

General Agninaldo, accompanied by his aid-de-camp and private secretary, had gone first to Hongkong, then to Saigon in French Indo-China, and then to Singapore, arriving there incognito at about the time matters came to a crisis between Spain and the United States. The purpose of his visit to

Singapore, as the story goes, was to consult with some of his Philippine friends, and particularly with Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend for ten years resident in the Philippines, about the affairs of the islands generally, and particularly as to the advisability of lending his aid to the Americans in the Philippines in case of war. The repudiation of the reforms which Rivera had promised to immediately carry into effect left Aguinaldo and other leaders, many of whom had gone to Hongkong, free to act. Meanwhile, Mr. Bray was introduced to Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at Singapore, who was anxious in view of the contingencies to learn as much as possible as to the conditions in the Philippines.

Soon after Aguinaldo arrived, therefore, an interview was arranged at which Bray acted as interpreter. Aguinaldo explained the nature of the co-operation he could give in the event of the American squadron operating on Manila, and said he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline among the native troops, preventing them from committing outrages upon defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for the Philippines as the United States proposed to give Cuba.

The Consul-General placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Commodore Dewey at Hongkong, and as a result of the interchange of messages Aguinaldo at once left for Hongkong. When the *McCulloch* went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavité, and the admiral allowed them to take guns, ammunition, and other stores.

CHAPTER XXXII

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS SQUADRON — INCIDENTS OF THE CRUISE TO MANILA — SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY — THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER THE MINES — ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE.

Commodore Dewey's Squadron — Its Guns and Armor — Dewey's Service in the Navy — Admiral Porter's Tribute — Proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippines — Bombastic Encouragement — Dewey's Cruise to Manila — Rolling in the China Sea — "Prepare for Action" — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships — All Unnecessary Articles Thrown Overboard — A Look into Subig Bay — Movements of the Spanish Admiral — Why He Retired to Manila — The United States Squadron Holds a Council of War — Dewey Announces His Purpose to Enter Manila Harbor that Night — Engines Started Again — Men Quietly Sent to Their Guns — In Sight of the Forts — Increasing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last — A Flash of Light, a Rocket, and then the Boom of a Gun — Dewey's Orders — Silencing a Battery — Silently Onward — Breakfast at the Guns — The Morning Breaks over Manila — The Enemy Sighted at Cavité — Heading for Battle — The Spanish Squadron — Its Advantage.

THE United States squadron which sailed out of Mirs Bay on April 27th was not made up of "ironclads" or armored battleships. They were the four protected cruisers, *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, *Boston*, and *Raleigh*, and the two gunboats, *Concord* and *Petrel*. The *Olympia*, which was the flagship, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding, carried ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and four 8-inch guns mounted in barbette turrets, with armor of four inches in average thickness. This was about all the armor there was in the whole squadron. In her secondary battery were fourteen 6-pounders, seven 1-pounders, four Gatlings, and one field gun. The *Baltimore*, Captain N. M. Dyer commanding, had four 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles, and four 6-pounders, with several smaller rapid-fire guns. The *Boston*, Captain Frank Wildes commanding, carried two 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles, and two 6-pounders, with other smaller guns. The *Raleigh*, Captain J. B. Coughlan commanding, had one 6-

inch and ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and eight 6-pounders. The combined tonnage of the last three cruisers is less than that of the battleship *Iowa*. The tonnage of the *Olympia*, the largest and strongest of the squadron, is about one-half that of the *Iowa*.

The 1,700-ton gunboat, *Concord*, carried six 6-inch rifles and two 6-pounders; the 900-ton gunboat *Petrel* carried four 6-inch guns. The combined tonnage of these boats was 19,100. Accompanying the squadron was the revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, which had just arrived at Hongkong, having been ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Commodore Dewey as a dispatch vessel. She carried four light pieces. Two merchant steamers, the *Nanshan* laden with 3,000 tons of Cardiff coal, and the *Zafiro*, carrying 7,000 tons of similar coal, having been purchased by the Commodore, went with the squadron, regarded merely as transports owned by the United States. It should be remembered that all these steps, including the concentration of these vessels at Hongkong, had taken place in the interval following the destruction of the *Maine*, and is a clear indication of the expectation of war which prevailed at Washington, and also of the expectation that the Philippines would figure in the conflict which had become inevitable. It was due to the prudent foresight of the authorities at Washington, seconded by the prompt and energetic action of Commodore Dewey in the Orient, that he was able to sail out of Chinese waters within a week after war was opened.

Commodore George Dewey was a good type of the American naval officer. He had been faithfully performing the tasks allotted to him for thirty years and the time of his retirement was approaching. In person he is slightly built, of medium height, with finely-chiseled face, firmly-set lips, and clear eyes. He was known as a man quiet in manner, sparing and incisive in speech, and decisive in action. He was just beginning his naval career at the time of the Civil War, and at the time of the capture of New Orleans was a lieutenant on

the old *Mississippi*, which, when trying to run the batteries of Port Hudson in March, 1863, ran aground. The enemy had her in range and poured shells into her hull till her commander, seeing she could not be saved, ordered her fired. Captain Smith and Lieutenant Dewey were the last to leave the ship. "It is in such trying moments," said Admiral Porter in his official report, "that men show of what metal they are made, and in this instance the metal was of the best."

When, late in 1897, changes were made in the command of some of the squadrons, Commodore Dewey did not wish to go to the Orient. He much preferred a station where there would be fighting if war came, for no one then thought of active hostilities in the East. He was, nevertheless, assigned to the Asiatic squadron and raised his flag on the *Olympia* on January 3, 1898.

When information that Commodore Dewey would proceed to threaten the Philippines reached Manila, the Spanish Governor-General issued several proclamations, one of which included the following:

"The American people, composed of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with perfidious machinations, acts of treachery and outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

"A squadron manned by foreigners and possessing neither instructions nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with the rufianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty.

"The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives and daughters, shall not cover you with dishonor, shall not appropriate the property your industry has accumulated as provision against old age, and shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish this miserable people, that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the unhappy natives of North America instead of bringing them to a life of civilization and progress."

Owing to the necessity of economy in the use of coal as well as the danger of driving into the rather heavy sea that was running, a speed of about eight knots was maintained in making the trip to the Philippines. Even at this slow speed

the heavily-laden *Nanshan* and *Zafiro* made a decidedly wet voyage, and the *Petrel* pitched and rolled deeply. Gun-drills and other exercises kept the officers and men occupied continuously during this run, and from the time the squadron left Mirs Bay until it came into the presence of the enemy there was not an hour in which preparations for battle were not under way.

When the tired ship's company had finished its day's work on Wednesday, the first day out, and the *Olympia* had settled down to the quiet of the first watch, the stillness was broken with abrupt harshness by the blare of the bugle, and red and white lights flashed up and down the masts of all the ships in response to the Commodore's peremptory signal: "Prepare for action."

In two minutes each vessel was alive with men, who, but a moment before, had been soundly asleep, or were supposed to be. From the bridge of the flagship sharply-uttered orders proceeded, and in seven minutes the executive officer was able to report to Captain Gridley:

"The ship is ready for action, sir."

Looking back along the line of ships dimly visible in the moonlight it was easy to see that every one of them were stripped for battle, and the Commodore was naturally greatly pleased with the quick and thorough response to his signal, for he knew that such readiness was very soon to be in serious demand. He was preparing for the first naval battle of the new navy of the United States.

Search-light and night-signal exercise took place during a large part of the first watch on Thursday night, and the progress made in working both the lights and the signals was very satisfactory. Friday was passed without incident, except that the weather became very warm and muggy, and the work of the men below deck was exhausting, but in spite of the heat and the heavy sea the ships kept their positions with precision.

The island of Luzon was sighted early Saturday morning, and being, as was supposed, in close proximity to the enemy,

the whole squadron began its final preparation for battle. Chain-cables were coiled around the ammunition hoists to give them further protection. Nets of tough Manila rope were stretched beneath all the boats and drawn across the ward-room bulkheads to protect the woodwork, flying splinters from which, when struck by shot or shell, might become deadly missiles. All unnecessary material was thrown overboard and went swimming off on the tossing China Sea.

When a few miles distant from Subig Bay, a rather deep opening in the bold and rugged coast, about forty miles north of Manila, the *Boston* and the *Concord* were sent ahead to learn whether any part of the Spanish squadron was hidden there. Later, they were reinforced by the *Baltimore*, the three vessels moving at a speed of about fifteen knots, while the other three remained with the transports and steamed at only six knots. In the afternoon the three scouting vessels returned, having explored Subig Bay without finding any craft there except a few small sloops and schooners which were overhauled, but not otherwise disturbed.

It had been reported from Manila several days before Dewey sailed that Montojo, the Spanish Admiral, had taken his fleet to Subig Bay and assumed a position favorable for giving the Americans a warm welcome, and while the Commodore was taking no Spanish reports for granted, he took the precaution to look in. The bay is one of the best harbors on the coast, being used by steamers in the typhoon season in preference to Manila Bay. The latter is surrounded chiefly by lowlands, so that the fury of the storm is not diminished by the surroundings, while Subig Bay is amply protected by the Bataan Mountains on the east and a coast range on the west. About half way up the bay is Grande Island, commanding both sides of the entrance, which, at this point, is but about two miles wide, and if the island were properly fortified it would be an absolute protection to the city of Subig, a place of about 12,000 inhabitants at the head of the bay. Montojo went to the bay at about the time of the

drawn to Manila with the intention of holding against him the mouth of the harbor, which is about ten miles wide, between flanking chains of low mountains that start upward from the water's edge, each point being occupied by a fort. Dividing this entrance into two channels are two islands, Corregidor and Cadallo, both fortified, and lying so far to the north that the northern channel is narrow, while between the islands and the forts on the southern point there is a sweep of water over eight miles wide. The usual course for vessels going and coming from Chinese ports is through the narrow channel, which Dewey knew was well mined, and while the other channel was supposed to be mined, it presented less dangers because of its width and, though there were some shallows, deep water could be followed by an experienced navigator.

Dewey halted his squadron a short distance from Subig Bay, and, while the vessels lay motionless on the calm sea, the commanding officers were summoned over to the flag-ship for instructions. He told his astonished captains that he intended to enter Manila Bay that night in spite of the forts and in spite of the mines. He felt confident that the Spaniards would not expect him to make such a move, and, therefore, he was resolved to make it. He stated the details of his plans and gave his directions. The officers went back to their ships, the engines were started again, and the squadron idled along at a speed of about four knots, not wishing to appear at the entrance of Manila Bay too early. The moon had risen, and, although it was occasionally obscured by light clouds, the night was not one in which a squadron ought to have been able to run through a well-defended channel without drawing upon itself a hot fire. Something of the kind was expected, and at a quarter to ten o'clock, as the ships drifted quietly along, the men were sent to their guns, not by the usual bugle call, but by a whispered word of mouth.

Every man was ready and the final steps of battle-clearing were completed in silence in a very few minutes — and they were dramatic moments. Off to port could be seen the sullen

“loom of the land,” where, for all they knew, the enemy was already watching their approach, and were preparing their guns for a terrific fire at the right moment. Closer and closer they crept, a long line of dark hulks with the transports in the rear. Not a light was permitted to show in any vessel except one at the very stern, which was necessary as a guide to the following ship, and these lights were shaded on each side.

As they approached the entrance and the first fort, the speed was increased to eight knots, and quietly the line slipped past the batteries on the north point of the entrance without any evidence that the enemy had discovered them. Every man was silent, but on the alert; every eye was fixed on the somber forts; every nerve was strained; every pulse beat strongly. Then Corregidor Island came abeam to port and every glass was turned on its frowning point. But not until the long line had swung into the broad channel — the Boca Grande as it is called — did the outlooks of Corregidor catch sight of it. A little flame flared up from the smoke-stack of the *McCulloch*. In a moment a bright light flashed up in the center of the island, and it was answered by a similar one on the north shore. Then a rather feeble rocket staggered aloft over Corregidor, and the American sailors standing by their guns felt sure every moment that the batteries would open. But they did not. The Spaniards were evidently taken by surprise. No one had been at the guns, and it took time to get the batteries ready for action. On went the American squadron deeper and deeper into the bay. And not until the leaders of the squadron had passed out of easy range did a gun greet the long line of silent ships.

It was nearly half-past eleven when there was a bright flash from the batteries off to port, the boom of a heavy gun, and the vindictive whistle of a shot far overhead. It came from a battery too far astern to enable the leaders to return the fire to advantage, but the Commodore was somewhat uneasy about the three non-combatant ships in the rear. He, therefore, signaled to the *Hugh McCulloch* to lead the trans-

ports up to a position where they would be protected by the cruisers and less exposed to attack. As the *Hugh McCulloch* was coming up she signaled that her chief engineer had been taken with a stroke of heat prostration and medical consultation was asked for. He died in twenty minutes of heart failure, due, perhaps, to the strain of those thrilling moments, during which all stood silent in the constant expectation of an exploding mine or a hail of shell from the shore. But the minutes dragged by and the ships crept onward.

The *Raleigh*, which was steaming along third in line, fired the first reply to the shot from the batteries from a 5-inch gun, and presently the *Boston* followed suit. Another shot flew from the batteries, and, as the Commodore's ships were on the close lookout for the flash to obtain an idea of where to aim, the *Concord* placed a 6-inch shell so exactly over the spot where the flash had occurred that an exclamation of admiration was heard on all sides. It was a marvelous shot. Dewey's sailors did not know it then, but that shot disabled the gun and killed nearly every man in the group of Spaniards about it.

There were no more shots fired from the shore, and as the Commodore did not wish to waste time on the batteries or to make any more "fuss" than necessary in approaching Manila, where he now supposed the Spanish fleet must be, the squadron kept on its silent course. Speed was reduced to less than three knots, as there was no haste. The Commodore wished to arrive off Manila at the first break of dawn, but no earlier. The men lay down beside their guns to get what sleep they could, but the time was not conducive to sleep, and the strictest lookout was kept for the enemy's ships and torpedo boats.

At four o'clock coffee and hardtack were served out to the men, and the officers were glad to get the same frugal refreshments. No one felt like sitting down to a formal breakfast. The lights of Manila had long been in sight. The dawn of that Sunday morning began at half-past four when the squad-

ron was about six miles from the city, lying on the low alluvial plains which form a sort of huge doormat to the main range of mountains running along the eastern coast of Luzon. As the sun came up exactly behind the city, the shadow cast by the land obscured the harbor foreground, but finally the city became clearer, looking like a white chalk-line on the low shore, and its domes began to glisten against the mountains fifteen miles beyond. Then the presence of a group of vessels in the foreground could be made out, but before five o'clock it could be seen that they were nothing but merchant ships. Where was the enemy?

The cruisers were creeping up in close battle order, the flagship leading, followed by the *Baltimore*, the *Raleigh*, the *Petrel*, the *Concord*, and the *Boston*. They had passed up the broad bay to the northward of Manila, and had turned toward the south, which position they were holding when the Spanish squadron was sighted in the little bay of Cavité, under the guns of the forts of that arsenal, the larger ships lying outside the breakwater, while inside could be seen the smaller gunboats. The enemy was found and the American squadron was holding a course directly towards him. It was about five o'clock.

The vessels under Admiral Montojo's command consisted of the cruiser *Reina Christina*, the flagship, 3,500 tons, and with a battery of six 6.2-inch, two 2.7-inch, six 6-pounders, and six 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Castilla*, 3,300 tons, with a battery of four 5.6-inch, two 4.7-inch, two 3.3-inch, four 2.9-inch, and eight 6-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Isla de Cuba* and *Isla de Luzon*, 1,030 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-inch, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Don Antonio de Ulloa* and *Don Juan de Austria*, 1,130 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-inch, two 2.7-inch, and two 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *General Lezo* and *Marques del Duero*, 524 and 500 tons respectively, with batteries of small rapid-fire guns. The *Velasco* was also in port, but was undergoing repairs and her guns were mounted on

earthworks on the shore. There were also four torpedo boats and two fine transports, the *Manila* and the *Isla de Mindanao*.

While the Spanish ships exceeded those of Commodore Dewey's attacking squadron in number and in the number of its men, they were less in aggregate tonnage. Neither were they as well protected as Dewey's ships, although their guns could readily pierce the steel sides of the American cruisers if well aimed. If the Spanish squadron had been compelled to come out in the open sea and fight it would have had little chance even in the hands of experienced gunners. But what gave the Spaniards an equalizing, if not a superior, advantage was the position they held under the protection of the shore batteries. Experts have estimated that one good gun mounted on shore is worth several aboard ship, having a fixed platform, and, therefore, able to fire with greater accuracy. Another advantage the enemy had was the perfect knowledge of the harbor and the exact distance of our ships at all times. The American fleet was compelled to maneuver in strange waters with a Spanish chart which they dared not trust.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY — A TERRIBLE STORM OF SHOT AND SHELL — SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE — ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — COMMODORE DEWEY'S GREAT VICTORY.

Commodore Dewey's Squadron in Battle Array — Advancing Silently towards the Enemy — Mines Exploded in Front of the *Olympia* — "Remember the *Maine!*" — The Time for Action Comes — Torpedo Launches Venture an Attack — Rapid Guns — The *Rina Christina* Attacks the *Olympia* — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of the *Boston* — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages — The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Fighting Desperately — Defiant Gunners Swallowed Up in the Bloody Water — Escape of the Spanish Admiral — A Gruesome Sight — Ships Burnt, Sunk, and Deserted — Surrender of the Fort — Care of the Wounded — Experiences on the American Ships — Cutting the Cable — Commodore Dewey's Modest Despatches.


MANILA Bay extends in a northeasterly direction, its greatest length being some thirty-five miles and its circumference about one hundred and twenty. The city of Manila lies to the extreme east side on both banks of the muddy Pasig River. On the south bank is the old city surrounded by a moat and massive walls, constructed in the sixteenth century and crowned by some antiquated guns and a few modern and high-power guns recently added. New Manila on the north bank is entirely defenseless. Eight miles distant and on the southern shore of the bay is Cavité, having a small bay of its own, formed by a projecting neck of land. This was well fortified by large guns and contained an arsenal and slips for large vessels. Under these heavy guns and drawn up in fair order for defense were the fourteen ships of the enemy, and apparently they had been taken by surprise, for they were in no position to maneuver as a squadron; indeed, some were making hurried efforts to get up steam.



Engraved by J. H. Smith from a photograph by J. H. Smith

George A. Demmey

As the *Olympia*, followed by the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, and *Boston* in the order named, steamed towards the enemy, every man was on the alert. Trim and fresh looking in their paint, gay with fluttering signals, they presented a real holiday aspect as they cruised along, but clustered about the decks at their guns, stripped for hot work and impatient for the signal which would mean a plunge into an experience entirely novel, were eager, gallant men, while down out of sight in the bowels of the ships at the ammunition hoists and at the boilers



MAP OF THE BAY AND HARBOR OF MANILA.

were others equally eager who could not see what was going on outside but felt that every moment they might hear the boom of a gun and the rattle of projectiles. On the bridge were the commanding officers; in their proper stations were the signal officers, the range-finders, the navigators, all performing duties of the utmost importance upon a modern fighting ship.

At intervals the range was called out. Nearer and nearer they were approaching the enemy. Yet the minutes, minutes of fearful tension, passed and not a sound broke the stillness of that Sabbath morn whose flaming light was breaking over the mountains back of Manila.

Commodore Dewey's orders were to hold the fire till an effective range had been reached. He did not propose to waste any more powder than necessary. On they went, the transports holding off out of range and their crews crowding the decks to watch the spectacle.

At 5:15, when about five miles from the Spanish fleet and

about four miles from the Old Manila guns, two batteries from the former and three from the latter opened fire. But it was ill-directed. Shot followed shot, churning up the water about Commodore Dewey's squadron, on board which, as it steamed ahead, all was as silent as if the ships were empty, except for the whirr of the blowers and the throb of the engines and an occasional order.

At intervals the range-finders exhibited their signal flags, and as each range was called the gunners lowered the sight bars. The range from Cavité was decreasing fast and the shots from its guns and from the Spanish cruisers, which now opened fire, began to shriek through the air and lash the water about them. Faster and faster they came, when suddenly, some distance ahead, a great column of water shot into the air, and then another close by. The enemy had fired two mines, but they were too far away to do any damage, and the ships pushed on. "The air seemed full of things," as one of the officers expressed it. The heat was intense. Stripped of all their clothing except their trousers, the gunners waited impatiently at the port guns to line them on the enemy.

When about three miles from Cavité, the *Olympia* began to swing her port batteries towards the Spanish line, and just then a shell burst directly over her. From the boatswain's mate at the after 5-inch guns came a hoarse cry: "Remember the *Maine*!" And then the cry arose from the throats of every man on the decks.

The time had come. The gunners had the range. One after another the ships followed after the *Olympia* with their port batteries to the enemy. At exactly nineteen minutes to six, or more than twenty minutes after the enemy had opened fire, Commodore Dewey, who stood on the bridge closely watching events, turned to the captain of his flagship and said:

"You may fire, when ready, Captain Gridley."

In an instant one of the *Olympia's* 8-inch guns sent a shell screeching into Cavité fort three miles away. Big guns and little guns chimed in from all the ships before the roar had

died away. A hailstorm of iron flew at the Spanish ships from the rapid-fire guns, while large shells dropped upon the fort. It was one continuous roar. The fire from Cavité and the Spanish ships was redoubled. Shot and shells flew all about, splashed the water about the ships, throwing it over the decks and drenching the men. Occasionally, they came whistling through the rigging and rattling about the sides of the vessels. A great cloud of smoke enveloped them, for there was very little wind, and signaling became difficult. Still the terrific fire was poured into the enemy as the squadron steamed by. It was a scene of awful magnificence.

"Another unpleasant thing about the Spanish shells," said an eye-witness on the *Olympia*, "was the way they had of coming at us even when they had not been properly aimed. Thus it often happened that a projectile which had not only fallen short, but which was not even a good line shot, would be upset by its impact with the water and would come tumbling end over end, far out of its original direction. And how these fellows did roar, plainly visible if they came anywhere near us, and as they rose from the water and spun round and round, they seemed to be about the size of a barrel, especially if an observer happened to be close on the line of their eccentric flight." But all these flying missiles did no serious execution, while our sailors could see through the rifted smoke that the broadsides poured by our vessels were making some impression on the Spanish ships.

Having passed the line firing the port batteries, the *Olympia* came around, taking a course back and closer to the enemy's ships, and the others followed, a great roaring, smoking, flashing, shrieking procession, and, as it passed along, the starboard batteries blazed away at the enemy.

The roar of the steady thunder of cannon was terrible. When the fort was pouring its terrific fire upon our ships it looked to those on the *McCulloch* and the transports as if our vessels could not possibly endure the fusillade. Heavy shells and solid shot fell about them like hail from the clouds, and

many exploded immediately over the ships. At one time the Americans were anything but sure of victory, and this was after the fire had been kept up for an hour. It looked as though every gun of the Spanish ships had been turned loose on Dewey's cruisers, and the shore line was a veritable blaze of fire from the batteries. The din was simply indescribable.

Tons and tons of shot continued to fall over our ships, whose salvation was the bad marksmanship of the Spaniards. Most of their shots were high, falling over into the bay beyond. This was especially noticeable after the American ships had swung about and run back nearer to the enemy's line. The Spanish gunners did not change their range except on the forts, where the marksmen were better trained, or had the advantage of a solid platform and a better defense.

In the midst of the terrific din a couple of torpedo launches were seen leaving the shore and heading for the American ships. Quickly the gunners turned their rapid-fire guns on them, and in the terrible hail of shot and shell which fell upon them one was immediately sunk and the other so badly damaged that she ran on the beach to save herself. That was the first and last venture of the Spanish torpedo craft.

Round came the *Olympia* again, after having passed the enemy's line to the eastward, and nearer still toward it the procession retraced its course, using again the port batteries. Then the *Reina Christina* was seen coming out towards the *Olympia* to give her battle. Admiral Montojo stood on the bridge, and his vessel made a gallant assault. But the fire of Dewey's squadron was concentrated upon the reckless Spaniard. Shells riddled her sides and swept her deck, and just as the admiral stepped from the bridge a shot struck it and carried it completely overboard. She quickly turned back towards the harbor, and, while speeding in, the *Boston* sent an 8-inch shell into her stern, sweeping through the vessel, creating terrible havoc, and setting the ship afire. Many of the men were killed. Yet through his glass the American

commodore could see the Spanish admiral calmly walking the deck while the Spanish sailors were keeping their guns hot, discharging shells which flew all around the *Olympia* and her followers, doing very little damage to the flagship, but how much to the others he could not tell.

Round swung the line again, giving the starboard batteries another chance, and this time closer still to the enemy. From the beginning of the engagement, the three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire, which the American squadron had not returned, paying its attention entirely to the Spanish fleet and the Cavité batteries. At this point, Commodore Dewey sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the Manila batteries did not cease firing he would shell the city. It had the effect of silencing them. The Governor-General could not fail to appreciate Commodore Dewey's advantages in the situation, for, if he withdrew his ships from in front of the Cavité batteries to Manila, eight miles away, he could shell the city without probable interference from the Spanish fleet, whose admiral would not dare to attack Dewey unaided by the strong forts at Cavité after what he had seen of American gunnery. Dewey would doubtless have been very glad to have enticed the Spanish admiral away from the Cavité forts so that he might speedily finish his ships in open battle. This would have left him free to return to Cavité and devote his undivided attention to its batteries.

After steaming past the Spanish line the fifth time, Commodore Dewey, at 7:35, gave orders to withdraw across the bay for breakfast. The men had been fighting for two hours on nothing but the coffee and hardtack which they had at 4 o'clock. The commodore also wished to take account of his damages and the loss of life.

When the American "Jackies" realized that they were being withdrawn from the fight, there was a wail of disappointment at first, illustrated by the almost tearful appeal of one gun captain to Commander Lamberton of the *Olympia*:

“For God’s sake, captain, don’t stop now. Let’s finish ’em up right off. Damn breakfast!”

In passing the last time by the enemy’s line the American cruisers had gone within very close range, and while the officers could see that they had wrought sad havoc with some of the Spanish ships, the batteries and vessels were still firing vigorously. One shot passed through the *Baltimore*, and the *Boston* was hit not far from the water line. Dewey did not at this time appreciate how nearly he had the enemy whipped, and the Spanish did not realize as yet the straits they were in.

Seeing the storm of shells striking about the *Olympia* and bursting close aboard the ships of the squadron, the Commodore had reason to fear that our loss had been heavy. He knew that the *Olympia* had escaped without serious casualties, but as she had had a dozen hairbreadth misses, it did not seem possible that the others had been equally fortunate. On the other ships the situation was similarly regarded; indeed, it was thought that the *Olympia* had been seriously damaged when she pulled away.

It was not long before it was discovered that no serious harm had been done his ships and not a life had been lost. It seemed nothing less than miraculous that they should have come out of such a hail of iron so little damaged.

When it was found that not a man had been killed, and that none of the vessels had been seriously harmed, an old gunner on the flagship remarked: “The Spaniards couldn’t hit a flock of barns.”

But the lack of precision in the aim of the Spaniards was not more remarkable than the small damage done when their shots did hit, for in such a rain of iron some could not fail to strike, even if the aim had been poor or at random. The escapes were wonderful. The shell which pierced the *Boston* went crashing into the wardroom and exploded within five feet of Paymaster Martin. He was not hit, though it set fire to the lockers and did considerable damage before the fire was extinguished. The fragments of a single shell struck within

a radius of fifteen feet of Commodore Dewey. An armor-piercing projectile struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition on board the *Baltimore*, exploded it, and the whole discharge passed between two groups of men so near together that it was difficult to see how all escaped, and yet but a half dozen were wounded and that only slightly.

The Spaniards knowing that the *Baltimore* and *Boston* had been hit, and thinking that all their firing must have done some damage, when they saw the American ships draw away concluded that they had been obliged to give up the attack. They set up a cheer, and the story at once went to Manila and from there to Madrid that the American squadron had attacked, partially destroying the Spanish fleet, and had finally been obliged to retreat. But the American sailors were only resting on their guns and taking a little well-earned breakfast; and as they did so the damage they had done the enemy began to appear. The *Reina Christina* was seen to be burning fiercely and two of the other ships were on fire.

In telling his own story afterwards, Admiral Montojo said: "I observed fire on my ship forward and our steering gear was damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable. We were subjected to a terrific hail of shell and shot. The engines were struck and we estimated that we had seventy hits about our hull and superstructure. The boilers were not hit, but the pipe to the condenser was destroyed. A few moments later, I observed that the after part of the ship was on fire. A shell from an American ship had penetrated and burst with deadly effect, killing many of our men. My flag lieutenant said to me: 'The ship is in flames. It is impossible to stay on the *Christina* any longer.' He signaled to the gunboat *Isla de Cuba*, and I and my staff were transferred to her and my flag was hoisted. Before leaving the *Christina* my flag was hauled down. My flag-ship was now a mass of flames. I ordered away all the boats I could to save the crew. Many of the men jumped overboard without clothing and succeeded in reaching the shore several hundred yards away."

As the Americans looked through their glasses they could see that the enemy's fleet was done for. In a little time the *Reina Christina* was a mass of flames, and the *Castilla* and the *Don Antonio del Ulloa* were burning fiercely. It would be an easy matter to rush in and finish the fleet, but the Cavité fortress remained to be silenced, and there was no telling what its guns might do at close range. Commodore Dewey decided to run in and do his worst. What followed is thus concisely told in his official report:

"At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.30 the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced, and the ships sunk, burned, and deserted."

This modest statement gives a very inadequate idea of the fury of that final attack. This time the *Baltimore*, which the enemy supposed had been disabled, took the lead, followed by the *Olympia*. The *Baltimore* had orders to attack the shore batteries furiously, and hers was one of the most daring deeds of the engagement. The batteries mounted 10-inch guns, a shot from one of which, had it struck her, might have sunk her immediately. But, using the lead for soundings, she dashed in at high speed until she was close under the blaze of the guns on shore, when she swung around and let them have her big shells with all the fury they were capable of. She was the admiration of the whole fleet. Cheer after cheer went up from the *Olympia's* men, who had borne the brunt of the first battle.

The other ships turned their rapid-fire guns upon the Spanish fleet, particularly the *Isla de Cuba*, to which the admiral had transferred his flag. The *Don Antonio del Ulloa* made a magnificent show of desperate bravery. When her commander found that she was so torn by American shells and swept by fire that he could not keep her afloat, he nailed her colors to the mast and she sank with all hands fighting to the last. The *Isla de Cuba* was soon on fire, but her men were fighting with desperation. This soon left the *Don Juan de Austria* practically to make the fight alone, the gunboats



ADMIRAL DEWEY'S GREAT VICTORY. ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET IN MANILA BAY, MAY 1, 1898.

being already disabled or withdrawn to the little harbor behind the fort. For a few minutes this cruiser received the hail of Dewey's rapid-fire guns, when suddenly a shell struck her and exploded in her forward magazine. Like a fan, splinters, men, guns, parts of the superstructure, and thousands of movable things shot high into the air. The next moment the *Don Juan de Austria* was sinking. Still the men aft worked their guns, and as the ship sank they went down in a frenzy of impotent rage, shrieking defiance as the blood-stained water closed over them, and still the American ships relentlessly advanced.

The *Isla de Cuba* sought refuge behind the pier at Cavité, where, recognizing the futility of fighting any more, Admiral Montojo prepared to disembark, and he gave orders for the evacuation of the remainder of the ships. His last signal to the captains of his fleet was, "Scuttle and abandon your ships." Then he escaped in a small boat into Bakor Bay, and finally to Manila. The American vessels closed in and rained a deadly fire upon the forts, and at 12.15 the Spanish flag was hauled down and a white flag went up, amid great cheering from the decks of the American vessels.

One gunboat was sunk at the end of the engagement. Her crew had left her with her colors flying and she went down thus — a very impressive picture.

It was a gruesome sight which the bay presented. The smoking hulks of the Spanish vessels which had not fully sunk were seen to be strewn with corpses and wounded men, and bodies were floating about in the water.

At 12:30 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the *Petrel* being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller vessels, which had run in behind the point of Cavité. This duty was performed in the most expeditious and complete manner. There was plenty of material for discussion among the gallant sailors of Commodore Dewey's squadron that night. They had experienced their first battle, the first battle of the new navy. They realized, as only men

after such a battle can, the dangers from which they had escaped unscathed. Even when no shots entered the ships the experiences were anything but pleasant. The concussion of the big guns when fired across the deck made havoc with the breakables on board. "Bookshelves were torn out," said one officer in speaking of his room, "and everything — clothes, electric fans, books, tobacco, curios, and the rest — was on the floor in one mass."

An American officer, writing home a few days later, said: "I have often wondered, as I dare say everyone has, how people in a scrap would feel and behave; have wondered whether calm, deliberate action would be possible to a tender-foot. Personally, I sincerely hope I have seen my last, as well as my first, battle. All the same, I was delighted to see that, so far from being rattled or excited, we seemed to do what was to be done as deliberately as on parade. I have more respect for the Spaniards than ever before. Their fighting their ships as long as they did in the condition in which they were is wonderful. I said as much to one of them in a party on board yesterday. He replied, with a bow:

" 'We but did, or tried to do, what you did; we did our duty.' "

Early the next morning the squadron returned to Cavité to take possession, but when the officers, sent in on the *Petrel*, approached the shore, they were surprised to find the arsenal still occupied by a force of Spaniards with Mauser rifles. As the white flag had been hoisted the day before, Commander Lamberton of the *Olympia*, who had been sent ashore to represent the Commodore, could not understand what the Spaniards intended to do. On landing he was met by Captain Sostoa of the Spanish navy and they went to the arsenal headquarters, where they were at once surrounded by an armed guard. When asked why men were under arms when they had surrendered the day before, Captain Sostoa replied that they had not surrendered, but had merely hoisted the white flag to enable the women and children to repair to

places of safety. There was some further parley, and finally Commander Lamberton said that they were not there to discuss past events, but to take possession of the arsenal, and if all the Spaniards there did not surrender their guns and persons as prisoners of war the American ships would open fire.

The Spanish captain asked for more time, and finally Commander Lamberton said that he would give them two hours, and if the white flag was not hoisted over the arsenal by noon fire would be reopened without any more parley. He then returned to report to the Commodore. While they waited the crews from the ships rowed about the wrecks and observed the destruction they had made. But the Spaniards wished to parley further, and in a little while army officers came out to the flagship and said that the navy would surrender, but the army could not. They were told that they must or take the consequences, and a general recall was sounded for the men off in the boats. The *Olympia* offered the Spanish officers coal for their launch to take them back, and while they stood on deck they were given an object lesson. A small steamship was reported leaving Cavité for Manila. "Give her a shot," was the order to the *Olympia's* gunners, and in less than a half-minute a shot was tossed across her bows. She did not stop, but another caught the range exactly and she was at once beached.

At quarter to eleven the white flag was hoisted on the arsenal, but when a landing party was sent to take possession in the afternoon they found that every seaman had marched off to Manila, taking his Mauser rifle with him. As they had been announcing that the Americans would kill everyone in Cavité, the landing party was met by a long procession of priests and Sisters of Mercy, begging them not to injure the wounded men in the hospital. As a matter of fact, the Americans had already rescued about 200 Spaniards and sent them ashore, but they had been so misled by the priests and friars that they expected to be killed. Our men proceeded to take care of the wounded, to bury the dead, and to defend

the place from the swarm of native looters that had rushed in on learning that the Spanish guard had withdrawn. The same day the *Raleigh* and the *Baltimore* went down the bay and secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroled the garrison, and destroyed the mines and torpedoes past which the squadron had had the good fortune to sail unharmed.

Having learned that the Governor of Manila had refused to allow the cable company to transmit his message announcing the result of his visit to Manila, Commodore Dewey sent the *Zafiro* a short distance to cut the cable, which was done, thus making the world dependent for several days upon the first Spanish report for information as to the situation. On Thursday the *Hugh McCulloch* sailed for Hongkong, and so ended the first chapter of the Manila campaign.

Commodore Dewey's own modest account of the conflict, which he sent to Hongkong on the *McCulloch*, and which arrived in Washington six days after the battle, was as follows:

MANILA, May 1st.

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following vessels: *Reina Christina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marques del Duero*, *El Gano*, *Velasco*, transport *Isla de Mindanao*, and one other vessel and water battery at Cavité. Squadron is uninjured. Only few men were slightly wounded. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong. I shall communicate with him.

DEWEY.

CAVITÉ, May 4th.

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité, Philippine Islands, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortification at bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely and can take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss is not fully known, but very heavy; 150 killed including captain, on *Reina Christina* alone. I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded. Two hundred and fifty sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign residents.

DEWEY.

The orders which Commodore Dewey had received from his government were to destroy the Spanish fleet. He obeyed. Seven thousand miles away from a home base of supplies he set out calmly to run the gauntlet of mined harbors and land fortifications. His answer to his government's instructions was in the brief dispatches above, brief, but as impressive as anything in naval history.

The losses of the Spaniards included ten warships, several torpedo boats, two transports, the navy yard, and nine batteries. About 1,200 men were killed or wounded, and the estimated value of the Spanish property destroyed or captured was \$6,000,000. On the American side the total loss was eight men slightly wounded, and \$5,000 damage to the ships.

The moral of it is that unskilled bravery is no match for bravery mated with skill in the use of the modern machinery of war. Civilization has advanced beyond the crude instruments that in their management demanded nothing so much as a strong arm and a brave heart. The modern fighting machine requires training and skill.

Neither squadron contained an armored ship. The American vessels had their vitals covered by what are known as protective decks, while but two of the Spanish ships were so built. But for all that they might have riddled or sunk some of our squadron; the forts might have done this alone had they been able to shoot straight. The little *Petrel*, secure in their wild inaccuracy, danced up to within a thousand yards of their forts.

Nothing but audacity that was much more than bravado could have accomplished so much; an audacity born of the conviction that they had vessels which were honestly constructed, guns that had been tested in target practice, gunners that had become so expert in sub-caliber practice that they scarcely ever missed fire. The Spanish were overborne by the torrent of metal which rained down on their ships, their guns, and their men. They fought desperately with pure animal courage and sank with their ships rather than surren-

der them. The Spaniards were without skill, fired in the old fashion, blazing away with only general aim, while every American gunner was an expert sharpshooter, trained by target practice, and their shots told with terrible effect.

The international effect of the victory was at once to give the United States prestige among the nations of the world as a naval power. Its effect in the United States was to give a good degree of sober self-confidence as to the result of any engagement in American waters between the Spanish and American fleets. Another Spanish fleet might be more formidable than that at Manila, but there would be the same difference between the Spanish and the American gunner.

No wonder the President, without waiting for further action, promoted Commodore Dewey to be acting rear admiral, and Congress promptly complied with the suggestion to create him a rear admiral and to extend the nation's thanks. Beautiful was the spirit of the comments of brother officers upon the valor and glory of the officers and crew of the Asiatic squadron. Not the slightest trace of jealousy, naught but joy in the result and entire willingness that honor be given to those to whom honor is due. As for the carping critics of the navy at home, they became as dumb as the Sphinx.

In the combined sagacity and boldness of Commodore Dewey this naval engagement was unsurpassed in the naval history of the world; in the results achieved, unequaled. Never before had an entire fleet been destroyed without the loss of a ship or even of a single life on the part of the attacking forces. The silent sail at midnight past the fort which was supposed to command the entrance to the bay, the almost contemptuous disregard of the mines placed in the harbor for its protection, the calm pushing forward after two mines had exploded in front of one of the vessels, the silent receiving without return the earliest fire of the enemy, the terrible fire poured upon the fleet and shore batteries when the Commodore had reached the point where he could make fire most effective, the stopping after two hours of cannonade for break-

fast, and taking account of damages, and then the resumption of the battle, the sailing closer to the shore by the aid of the lead to make the fire more effective, the brave, but hopeless, resistance of the Spaniards till their every ship was absolutely destroyed or placed entirely *hors de combat*, the quick and chivalrous attention to the Spanish wounded by Commodore Dewey as soon as victory was complete, the report wired to the government at home as modest as the deed was heroic — all combine to make this naval engagement one of the most dramatic, as well as one of the most decisive, in the world's history.

CHAPTER XXXIV

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS SPANISH FLEET— ANXIETY FOR THE BATTLESHIP *OREGON*—CERVERA'S UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AT MARTINIQUE.

A Period of Uncomfortable Uncertainty — Where would Cervera Appear? — Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons — Three Theories as to Cervera's Probable Course — Plausibility of the Theory that He Might Intercept the *Oregon* — The *Oregon* at Rio Janeiro — Captain Clark has no Fear of Spanish Fleet — Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast Cities — General Opinion that Cervera would Steer for Puerto Rico — Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him — His Formidable Fleet — The Anticipated Battle — Days of Anxious Waiting — Strategists all at Sea — Renewed Concern for the *Oregon* — Strength of the Spanish Cruisers — Astonishing Announcement that Cervera had Returned to Cadiz — News from London — Spanish Denials Disbelieved — Sudden Preparations for Invading Cuba — Cervera Sighted off Martinique — Sampson Shells the Forts of San Juan.

THE month of May, which opened so gloriously for our arms in the Orient, produced a most exciting period of uncertainty on this side of the world, where we were supposed to be immediately engaged in war. So crushing was Dewey's victory that, while hardly a blow had been struck in the west, many began to speak of peace, assuming that Spain could not possibly be so rash as to pursue a warlike course with such unfavorable prospects; but, by her naval strategy, which consisted of dodging under cover of misleading reports, for many days she kept not only our people, but the government, in a state of uncertainty, at times bordering upon fear, and in the end her maneuvers resulted in a complete change of the government's plans for the invasion of Cuba.

When it was definitely known that the Cape Verde fleet under Admiral Cervera had actually sailed on April 29th, Admiral Sampson's squadron was maintaining without notable incidents the Cuban blockade, and Commodore Schley's flying

squadron was impatiently awaiting orders, with steam up, at Hampton Roads. It was reported that some of the Spanish torpedo craft when sailing out of the Cape Verde harbor had taken a northerly direction, as if bound for the Canaries, while the four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers had taken a westerly direction. A dispatch boat in the service of a New York newspaper followed the main fleet for some hours, and, when it was seen to continue in a westerly course after nightfall, returned to St. Vincent, the information being cabled to this country. Apparently, this was the only information the government had of the intended course of the Spanish squadron, and the question before the naval strategy board at once became: Where will Cervera appear?

The nearest Spanish port in western waters was San Juan, Puerto Rico, which is 2,300 miles from the Cape Verde Islands. It is also about 1,100 miles from Havana, off which lay Sampson's squadron, and about 1,300 miles from Hampton Roads, where Schley's sailors were pining for Spanish targets. It is something over 3,000 miles from St. Vincent to important ports on our Atlantic seaboard, and on the other hand it is only about 1,600 miles from St. Vincent to the eastern point of Brazil, towards which the battleship *Oregon* and the gunboat *Marietta* were making their way, convoying the unarmed *Nietheroy*, which had been purchased in Brazil, and was to become the cruiser *Buffalo*.

To the government and to everyone in the United States obliged or disposed to speculate upon what Cervera would do, there appeared three courses, more or less rational, open to him. He might adopt the shortest trip, that to the Brazilian coast, and attempt to take or destroy our battleship and its attendants; or he might proceed at once to Puerto Rico to replenish his stock of coal and supplies and learn the situation; or, he might count upon our looking for him in these more southerly ports, and, therefore, embrace the opportunity to take the longer journey to the New England coast or to ports further south on the Atlantic seaboard.

All three of these theories had their supporters, but the fact that the enemy, if wise, is apt to appear where least expected added its share to the spicy uncertainty of the problem.

Some plausibility was given to the theory that Cervera would endeavor to intercept the *Oregon* and her consorts, because he had deferred sailing till a date which would naturally be adopted if having in mind the accomplishment of that object. The *Oregon*, which had left Callao, Peru, on April 7th, had on the 17th arrived at Punta Arenas, the Chilian port in the Straits of Magellan, where the *Marietta* was waiting. They delayed two days taking on coal and proceeded on their way northward. By making the same speed as on the trip from Callao, they would naturally arrive off the easternmost point of South America at about the same time that the Cape Verde fleet would reach it, if steaming in that direction. The force of this conjecture was strengthened on the 30th, or the day after Cervera's squadron sailed, by the arrival of the *Oregon* and *Marietta* at Rio Janeiro. He who studies the map will observe that the eastern point of South America, around which the American vessels would be compelled to sail, is about half-way between Rio Janeiro and the Cape Verde Islands, whence Cervera's fleet sailed.

The government strategists regarded such a Spanish purpose as a possibility, and when Captain Clark of the *Oregon* reported from Rio Janeiro, he was at once informed that he might possibly meet the Spanish squadron unless he took an out-of-the-way course. Even then he might be caught, as the Spanish cruisers were fast, while the battleship could not be expected to make much better than ten knots an hour. But Captain Clark was made up of material similar to that in other American naval officers. He intimated that he did not wish to be hampered by instructions, and added: "I am not afraid of the Spanish fleet."

The possibility that Cervera would sail northward and suddenly appear at some poorly-defended, yet important, port of the Atlantic seaboard, was grounded simply in the belief

that Spain was too crafty to risk her fleet in an encounter with the strong squadron Admiral Sampson had in Cuban waters, but would confine her hostility to spiteful efforts to inflict damage to American coast cities, withdrawing in time to run away from any ships sent northward to attack her fleet, and possibly adopting the opportunity to make Havana when the blockade force had been weakened by vessels sent to the defense of the coast. In other words, by such a policy Spain might hope to prevent the concentration of our fleet.

The more general opinion was that Cervera would proceed directly to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and that locality was selected by the strategists of the press for a great naval battle about May 9th, for it was calculated that Cervera would require that time to make the voyage. This opinion was evidently held by Admiral Sampson, to whom, as commander of the United States naval forces, was committed the important task of meeting and destroying Spain's fleet, for when informed of its departure from St. Vincent, he gathered his larger vessels at Key West to be coaled, and prepared to proceed to Puerto Rico. His instructions left him free to use scouts and to go in any direction in which he had reason to suppose the Spanish fleet lay; if possible, he was to prevent the fleet from entering San Juan and departing with fresh supplies, and under no circumstances was he to endanger his ships by a fire on forts till Cervera's fleet should have been destroyed or captured.

Accordingly, at daybreak on May 4th, Admiral Sampson left Key West, sailing eastward with the flagship *New York*, the battleships *Tora* and *Indiana*, the two monitors, *Amphitrite* and *Puritan*, the protected cruisers *Detroit*, *Montgomery*, and *Marblehead*, and the torpedo boat *Porter*, and other smaller vessels. Thereupon, the United States waited breathlessly for the great naval battle of the war. It was calculated that Cervera would arrive near Puerto Rico about the 9th and that Admiral Sampson would arrive there at about the same time.

The *Oregon* and her consorts left Rio Janeiro on the same day Sampson's fleet left Key West, and the opinion was that she would not reach the waters of Puerto Rico for at least twelve days, or too late to participate in the great battle, unless Cervera went after her.

Nothing further was heard of the fleets till the 8th, when the cruiser *Montgomery*, which was acting as a scout for Sampson's fleet, put into the port of Cape Haytien, on the island of Haiti, sending dispatches to Washington, and receiving messages for the admiral. The fleet had been making very slow progress, because of the monitors, which, while expected to give a good account of themselves in close fighting, had small coal capacity, and were being towed by nimbler vessels, the others accommodating themselves to the reduced speed. The date of the anticipated battle was, therefore, postponed; it was then expected that Admiral Sampson's fleet would arrive off Puerto Rico by the 11th, and that the battle might take place the following day, but nothing was being heard of the whereabouts of the Spanish ships, which were already ten days out from St. Vincent. The exciting mystery was further enhanced by the orders of the Navy Department that nothing concerning the movements of the vessels should be given to the public for the time being.

Two days more passed, and nobody was able to answer the question which everyone was asking as to the whereabouts of Cervera. The *Oregon* and her attendants arrived at Bahia, Brazil, on the 9th, having seen nothing of the Spaniards. The New England coast became concerned because it was reported that a Spanish fleet had been sighted off Nova Scotia, heading for the shores of Maine. Key West became anxious because it was reported that Cervera had sailed for the Florida coast. There were many reports of battles and of Spanish fleets, not all of which could possibly be true, and none of which proved to be true.

It was evident that the government was working in the dark. On the morning of the 10th the ships were all at sea,

and so was our strategic board. As the hours passed and nothing definite was heard of the Cape Verde fleet, the strategists inclined to the theory that it had gone to intercept the *Oregon*, and at once the news from Brazil was breathlessly awaited, for if Cervera had gone in that direction, he must now be in striking distance of our battleship and gunboat.

The possibilities of such a contest could not but be regarded with some concern by our government. It was true that the *Oregon* was one of the most powerful of her class afloat, but there were plenty of naval experts in this country and abroad who declared that we had no ships in our navy equal in real efficiency to the swift armored cruisers of Cervera's fleet. The *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, and *Vizcaya* were sister ships of a class not found in the American navy — cruising battleships. They carried battleship armor, 12-inch side belts and 10-inch gun protecting armor. The armor was much inferior in quality to the *Oregon*'s, but sufficiently heavy to keep out all but the heaviest shells. The armament of these ships was much superior to that of our cruisers, but inferior to the *Oregon*'s. Each ship mounted a pair of 11-inch guns, ten 5.5-inch guns (the *Vizcaya*'s being rapid-fire), in addition to sixteen small guns, similar to those on the *Oregon*. The *Colon* was a less formidable ship, but she, too, was a fighting cruiser. She carried 6-inch armor and her heavy guns were a pair of 9.8-inch rifles. She was remarkably strong in rapid-fire guns, mounting ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns of this type. She had been built but a short time, and was regarded as one of the finest cruisers afloat.

Certainly, four heavily armored cruisers, carrying two dozen torpedo tubes, would be a formidable fighting force against the battleship *Oregon*, the unarmored cruiser *Buffalo*, and the little unarmored gunboat *Marietta*, with but ten torpedo tubes on all three. The unarmored boats would be of little value in a fight against armorclads. The *Oregon* would bear the brunt of the fight, and upon the fighting qualities of her officers and men would depend the issue of the battle.

But late on the 10th, when Admiral Sampson was supposed to be drawing near to the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, and when Admiral Cervera was supposed to be very close to Captain Clark off the coast of Brazil, came the surprising announcement from London that Cervera's fleet had returned to Cadiz! Cervera had apparently been afraid to cross the Atlantic, and avoiding the frequented lanes of commerce, so that he might meet no one to tell of his cowardice, had at length, when in need of fuel, been compelled to swallow his pride and go home to Spain.

The statement made by Admiral Bermejo, Minister of Marine, denying that Cervera's fleet had returned to Spain, and declaring that it was actually where it ought to be in accordance with the instructions given to its commander, had little effect because of the general belief that the crafty Spanish strategists deliberately misrepresented everything, and owing to the close watch kept in Spanish ports it was impossible, apparently, to verify the reports from Cadiz. The opinion was general that the government was seeking in every way to delay operations so that the troops of the United States would not make a landing in Cuba till the summer should be well advanced and the dangers of sickness increased many fold.

Relying, apparently, upon the news from London that the Spanish fleet had wholly deserted the western side of the Atlantic, the government formed the opinion that there was no longer reason for delay in proceeding to occupy Cuba with a large force of men. A few days previously the plan had been to begin occupation with a small advance guard to co-operate with General Gomez and other Cuban commanders, to whom it was also intended to send a large quantity of repeating rifles and ammunition, so that they might be prepared for rendering assistance when the real invasion should come.

But in view of the improbability of naval interference from Spain, preparations were at once begun for moving the regulars and the available volunteer troops to convenient places for embarking. Chickamauga was abandoned as a place for

receiving the greater part of the army, and instructions were given on the 10th for mustering in the volunteers as rapidly as possible and sending them to Tampa and other points on the Gulf for speedy transportation to Cuba. It was announced that General Miles himself would go to Cuba, General Wesley Merritt, who, it had been supposed, would be the leader of the forces in Cuba, having been selected to lead the expeditions to the Philippines. It was proposed to send General Shafter with a force of regulars in his command to secure a base on the Cuban coast, which he should hold till reinforcements enough to warrant an attack upon Havana could be taken over. There was the greatest excitement at the camps at Tampa, Mobile, and New Orleans, and hurry orders were sent to some of the state governments for mustering in troops. On the 11th everyone was looking for the immediate movement of the army.

But all this was changed in a single day. The plans of invasion were suddenly and indefinitely postponed. Just before midnight of the 12th the Navy Department received a cipher dispatch from Captain Cotton of the *Harvard*, from Fort de France, Martinique, and dated the day before, saying that the Spanish fleet was off that place. An intimation that the fleet might be in those West Indian waters had come to this country early on the 12th in the form of a dispatch from Madrid giving an official statement of the Minister of Marine to the effect that the Spanish fleet had that day touched at the French Island of Martinique, which is one of the Windward Islands forming the eastern fringe that encloses the Caribbean Sea. The fast cruisers, *Yale*, *Harvard*, and *St. Louis*, had been patrolling the waters about Windward Islands for days, and were doing so at the time Cervera was approaching Martinique, but, unfortunately, just at that time none of them were in that particular vicinity.

The authorities had considered Guadaloupe the most likely place for Cervera to put in for news, if he put in at all, and for that reason the *St. Louis* had cruised in those waters. Commander Goodrich remained about the islands till the 11th, and

indeed, steamed by Martinique a little before Cervera's fleet came into sight. Martinique has good cable connections, and thus Admiral Cervera was at once in communication with Madrid, and, presumably, with the very active Spanish agency which Señor Polo had been maintaining in Canada since his retirement from service as Spanish Minister at Washington. It was, of course, fair to suppose that Admiral Cervera's dispatches, which had been received and held for him by the Spanish consul at the port of Martinique, duly informed him of the position of the United States squadrons, of the exact condition of the Cuban blockade, and of the fact that Admiral Sampson had called for him with some rather good fighting ships at Puerto Rico, and not having found him as expected, had shelled the forts of San Juan on that very morning of May 12.

CHAPTER XXXV

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN — THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION — SKILLFUL AMERICAN GUNNERY — SAMPSON'S WITHDRAWAL.

Admiral Sampson's Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat — San Juan Learns of Sampson's Approach — The *Iowa* Becomes the Flagship — Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson's Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into the Bay — The Duty of the *Wompatuck* — Sampson, Finding Cervera Absent, Decides to Shell the Forts — The First Shot — The Music of the Projectiles — Spaniards Return the Fire Vigorously — Bravery of a Spaniard at an Old Gun — Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts — Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises — "Threaten, Puff, Splash!" — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the *New York* and *Iowa* — One Man Killed — The Withdrawal — Admiral Sampson's Official Report — Spaniards Think They Have Driven Him Off — Not even a Spanish Gunboat in the Harbor — Criticism of Admiral Sampson's Attack.

THE cruise of Admiral Sampson to Puerto Rico seems to have been undertaken in the confident expectation of meeting Cervera and destroying his ships in those waters. San Juan being a well-defended Spanish port, the nearest point for Cervera in western seas, and being well supplied with coal, the admiral, not without good reasons, supposed that Cervera would certainly try to make that port about the 9th of May, and he planned to make his own appearance there at about the same time. After making preparations to leave Key West on the afternoon of May 3d, the fleet was held till midnight, and the flagship did not start till the next morning. Going direct to the blockading squadron off Havana the admiral was there joined by the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, and, proceeding westward, they arrived off Cardenas at dark, where they came up with the rest of the fleet, including the cruisers *Detroit* and *Montgomery*, the monitors *Amphitrite* and *Terror*, the torpedo

boat *Porter*, the tug *Wompatuck*, and the collier *Niagara*. In order to make better time the *Iowa* took the *Amphitrite* in tow, and a little later, the *Terror's* speed proving too slow she was taken in tow by the *New York*. On approaching the port of Cape Haitien the *Montgomery* was sent in to receive any dispatches from Washington, but, obtaining only the information that Cervera had not been reported anywhere, the 8th and 9th were spent in filling some of the exhausted coal bunkers of the fleet. Meanwhile, preparations were going on aboard the fighting ships for a battle. The sailors pitched through the portholes all sorts of movables, and over the sides into the sea flew doors and parts of wooden bulkheads. Piles of sand-filled bags were also arranged to give increased protection to some of the gunners against the fragments of Spanish shells that were expected to fly about the decks a little later on.

But it seems that while lying off Cape Haitien the shipping lookout on top of the mountain west of the town had seen the squadron and reported the fact at once, and the Spanish consul immediately wired the information to Puerto Rico and Madrid. When, on the 9th, Admiral Sampson learned this he turned the squadron about and headed for Key West again until the Cape Haitien mountains were well out of sight, then he put out to sea, and gradually headed back for San Juan, hoping that the Spaniards had been thereby deceived; but whether they were or not made very little difference, as a cruel chance ordained that Sampson should appear at San Juan just in time to have the fact known to Cervera as he sailed into the waters of Martinique.

Admiral Sampson led his fleet on without further interruption till about five o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th, when about fifty miles northwest of San Juan. The flagship hove to in a smart sea, a boat was lowered, and the admiral and his staff were rowed to the *Iowa*, and the two-starred blue flag soon fluttered from the top of her military mast. The admiral had concluded to make the battleship *Iowa*, instead of the armored cruiser *New York*, his flagship, and every one knew

from this that he expected soon to smell powder. That afternoon the admiral distributed among his vessels the plan of procedure he had adopted, based, as will be seen, upon the expectation of finding the Cape Verde fleet in the harbor of San Juan, which is a bay projecting into the north shore and is formed by a small island which runs along the shore, ending in Morro Castle at the mouth of the harbor. This island, which at its eastern end is separated from the mainland by a tidal stream only, and is, therefore, more of a peninsula, is something in the shape of a human leg, having a stubby foot at the west end, on which San Juan lies, Morro being at the extremity of the toes. This old castle, with its thick frowning walls, has stood here since the days of the old corsairs, but the Spaniards have in the course of time run another line of defense along the sea, ending in another old fort. The sole of the foot also has another line of defense enclosing the town on the west.

Across the mouth of the harbor on the opposite point of land is Fort Cañuelo, and between Morro and this fort, and a little out to sea, is Cabras Island. Several miles further west on the main shore is Point Salinas, behind which the American vessels were steaming up.

The admiral's instructions were that the squadron was to pass near Salinas Point and then steer about east to pass just outside the reefs off Cabras Island, the column to be formed with the flag-ship *Iowa* in the lead, followed by the *Indiana*, *New York*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror*. While approaching, a close watch was to be kept on the coast for torpedo craft, and when near Cabras Island the *Porter* was to rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and stand close under Morro to the westward, screened from the fire of Morro's western battery, and if the old guns on the north side of Morro were opened she was to have the enjoyment of silencing them. Both the *Detroit* in front and the *Montgomery* in the rear were also to keep a sharp lookout for any torpedo boats coming out of the harbor.

There were to be two objects of attack — the batteries upon Morro and the men-of-war. If it was clear that the Spanish

vessels were lying in port, fire was to be opened upon them as soon as they were discernible over Cabras Island, the action of the flagship being followed in this regard. If, however, it should be evident that neutral men-of-war were in line of fire, a flag of truce would probably be sent in before fire on the vessels was opened, and the *Porter* was to hold herself in readiness for this service. Care was to be used to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island, and if it became necessary to silence the Morro batteries a portion of the fire would be directed with this object, but the principal object was to destroy the ships.

The plans of Admiral Sampson had been worked out with extreme care, and a definiteness which had been entirely impossible for Commodore Dewey in searching about the great bays of the Philippines for Admiral Montojo; they were worked out in the faith, shared by his gallant captains, that Cervera would by that time be in the harbor of San Juan.

With the first flush of color in the eastern sky on the morning of the 12th and while the ornamental bows of Cervera's cruisers were courtesying to the shores of Martinique 500 odd miles away, the *Detroit* and *Wompatuck* led the way in unmo-lested, while the torpedo boat *Porter* ran off to the eastward, and stopped about a mile from the shore. About 1,400 yards from Morro the *Detroit* turned eastward and steamed slowly along the beach, while from the *Iowa* fluttered the signal for the hoisting of the American ensign on every ship. Up to every masthead and every staff-head fluttered the Stars and Stripes, a picture worth a long voyage for any American to see. For a few minutes the vessels sped in towards the bay, and shortly after 5 o'clock the little *Wompatuck*, having accomplished her purpose of fixing a small boat at the proper place to indicate the depth of the water, a mark to steer by later if the smoke obscured the marks ashore, scurried back to where the non-combatants lay. By this time, Admiral Sampson, standing on the bridge and peering anxiously into the harbor, saw to his great disappointment that Cervera's fleet was

not there. He still believed, however, that Cervera would try to make the port, and he concluded that the best thing to do was to test the batteries with which he should have to contend if he later fought the Spanish in that harbor. If he could destroy them, so much the better. So, at 5.17, the admiral gave Captain Evans of the *Iowa* the word to fire, and a long 6-pounder at the starboard end of the *Iowa's* bridge was fired at Morro. The battle was on. The forward turret had already been turned so that the great 12-inch guns pointed directly at the old castle walls, and very soon after the order, with a mighty report and a roar like that of an angry lion, a great projectile flew towards one of the batteries, and then another and another, with such deadly aim that no shots were fired from that battery during the remainder of the engagement.

Then while the big guns smoked, the 8-inch guns took up the work, and sent their lean projectiles with an eager, whining cry to hunt for Spaniards. The little *Detroit*, unarmored though she was and with only 5-inch guns in her battery, joined in. For days the gunner in charge of a rifle on her quarter deck had carried a tiny flag over the breach of his gun, to the joy of every one who saw it; but he took it down now, rolled it up, shoved it into his shirt, and, bending low over the breech, he looked clear-eyed through the sights, pulled the trigger, and drove a shot straight into the porthole on the face of Morro. In quick succession his shipmates of the other guns, six clean, 5-inch rifles, followed his lead. The boom of the huge guns had awed, but the sound of these rifles was like the music of "Yankee Doodle" played on a snare drum; and it thrilled the spectators on the non-combatant's boats till they involuntarily shouted aloud for the glory of the flag and the honor of the American gunner.

Then came the *Indiana* with the solemn thunder of her 13-inch volcanoes to take the place of the flagship that, with her stern turret hurling winged death to the fort, was by this time steaming out to sea. Her 8-inch guns took up the cry

as well. Indeed, every gun of whatever caliber that would reach from either vessel was engaged.

Soon after our fire began, the forts began to reply vigorously on the squadron. On top of the front wall of Morro and near the west end, stood an old-fashioned gun, under the charge of a man worthy of a better training and of a more generous nation. His was a useless task, for no shot from his old smooth-bore could harm the battleships; but there he stood, aimed, fired, swabbed, loaded, aimed, and fired again, while the shots splashed in the water half way to the ships, as a rule, though now then one exploded in the air because the time fuse was short. Never but once did they come near a ship, but save for brief intervals, when the rapid-fire batteries afloat drove him to the bomb-proofs, this Spaniard worked on with delirious energy and spirit.

But there were other guns of a less harmless character. In the Morro itself were pieces which could not be counted because the smoke kept the wall so obscured. Moreover, they were worked irregularly because the gunners on the American vessels, having rapid-fire cannon, had the range of the embrasures and portholes, and at times made it too uncomfortable for the Spaniards. On the crest just east of Morro and back of the cemetery two 10-inch guns were diligently worked. At the barracks a little further east was another battery, and over at the east end of the town was an old stone fort, its face towards the west, and there were at least four modern rifles of large caliber, and still further east, on a point, were other large guns. All these batteries, save the last, opened on the fleet within five minutes after the first gun from Morro.

But the marksmanship was Spanish. "Never," wrote an eye-witness, "will an American see hostile guns make a more pleasing spectacle than these; for they stood on emplacements forty to sixty feet above the sea on the crest of a hill, whose lower slopes were green and the upper slopes house-covered. The green sea was below and the fleecy trade wind clouds above and behind them. They gleamed like wicked Spanish



GUN CREW OF A BATTLESHIP WORKING A MONSTER 14-INCH GUN IN ACTION.

eyes and then puffed white like Spanish cigarette smoke. The song of the projectile was like the music of the fandango, and the marksmanship as worthless as Spanish promises. Threaten, puff, splash! Not since modern rifles with gun sights were invented has any one seen such shooting as from these crest batteries. Shot after shot, dozens and scores, and at last the count rose into hundreds, were fired with never a hit, and, indeed, with every shot flying above and beyond huge targets. High as the *New York* stood above the water when she rounded to before Morro, third in the moving line; broad as the *Iowa* lay on the water as she headed the procession, not a shot struck them as they passed before the fort. Even the *Detroit*, lying perhaps, 1,200 yards from the nearest battery, and too busily engaged firing to think about getting hit, remained wholly untouched. Quite as interesting as the position of the *Detroit* was that of the torpedo boat *Porter*. She was recognized, of course, soon after the engagement became general, and the guns at the eastern end of the island began sending greeting. The gun on the point at the extreme east end of the Spanish works was so placed as to be unable to reach either the *Detroit* or the line of battleships, but it found the *Porter* within easy range, and with deliberation that indicated a sober desire to hit something, the captain worked the piece. He was aided at times by the guns from the higher fort near by, but for hours he kept his eyes on the *Porter*. As a rule, no shot fell more than a half-mile wide of the target, though now and then one would strike as much as a mile short or three-quarters of a mile beyond. At rare intervals a shell would by accident get within 200 or 300 yards, and then Captain Freemont would turn his little 1-pounders loose and fire back as John Paul Jones fired his pistol at British batteries at White Haven."

The marksmanship of the American squadron on the first round was not up to target records, for while a majority of the shots hit Morro, some fell considerably short, but there was no more of this after the first round. After passing the forts the column turned to the left and made a complete circle,

The *Iowa* came in again as the monitors were passing out, so that there was a constant fire. As the *Iowa* came down the second time the Spaniards worked their guns with increased fury and with increased wretchedness of aim, until she reached the turning point and once more began her 13-inch practice, with the *Indiana* following. Shell after shell passed through or over Morro to land in the city behind it, and many of the Spaniards fled from their guns, while the Americans were as cool as at target practice.

One of the first shots to fall over into the city struck the huge barracks east of Morro, and a cloud of brick-dust rose high in the air, obscuring the building till the flames were seen to burst from it. Within ten minutes a half-dozen other shots had fallen elsewhere in the town, and by the time the *New York* had turned out to sea on the second round, as many different fires were seen in the western portion of the city. The forts were now more obscured by the bursting of American shells than by the firing of their own guns, for most of the Spaniards had by this time fled for shelter. The guns at the east of the city, however, continued to work, as they received only occasional attention from the ships.

Meantime, the *Detroit* had turned away to the westward, and, running close under the guns of Morro, attacked a new earthwork built on an island on the west side of the channel. Two 8-inch guns there might have destroyed the cruiser at the first round had they been properly handled, but she ran in to a range of less than 1,000 yards, firing as she went; and the Spaniards scampered away from their great guns. There was no more trouble from that battery. It was an impressive lesson in the effectiveness of rapid-fire guns intelligently and bravely handled. Undoubtedly, the work of the cruisers was risky with such large guns on the forts, and they were then ordered to follow the battleships out, and to stay out after the second round; but they fired as long as they could, and their sailors were evidently disinclined to give up the dangerous sport. The *Porter* also reluctantly withdrew.

A few minutes after seven o'clock the *Iowa* opened fire on the third round, and the others followed in another blaze of fire and smoke. As the *Iowa* turned away she aimed her last shot at the big fort east of the city and knocked a hole in it. Five guns had been working steadily from this fort, but only two continued after the *Iowa's* shot, and these were silenced when the *New York* came along and fired her broadsides; but about eight o'clock, just as the *New York* finished, and was setting out to sea, a 6-inch shell from the eastern batteries came aboard over the port quarter, struck the top awning stanchion and exploded in the cutter, which was in the port after-cradle on the superstructure deck. The fragments killed one man and wounded four. Parts of the shell went in all directions; the cutter was an absolute wreck, parts of it flying higher than the smokestack. A searchlight was destroyed and some damage was done to other small boats. At about the same time a 10-inch shell struck a gallows frame on the *Iowa* and burst, hurling fragments in all directions, slightly wounding three sailors. Both these shots were plainly accidental, coming on board at long range and being apparently aimed at vessels which were still nearer in action. No damage was done the *Indiana* nor the monitors, which had maintained a destructive fire during the three rounds, and though shells had burst over them they were not in the least injured.

Admiral Sampson's purpose in attacking the fortifications was, according to his official report to the government, simply to learn their character. "Upon approaching San Juan," he said, "it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels was in the harbor. I was considerably in doubt whether they had reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination, or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and as it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I decided to attack the batteries defending the port in order to develop their position and strength, and then without waiting to reduce the city or to subject it to

a regular bombardment, which would require due notice, turned to the westward. I commenced the attack as soon as it was good daylight. It lasted about three hours, when the signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the squadron stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when the course was to the westward with a view to communicating with the department at Port Plata and learn if the department had obtained information as to the movements of the Spanish vessels."

Whether Admiral Sampson could have continued the attack and taken the city then is a question which has been disputed, but as he still had Cervera's four armored cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers to meet he naturally avoided doing anything to weaken his own vessels. It was the general opinion among the officers of the fleet that it would be a difficult matter to reduce the forts with ships alone; but, according to reports which came from San Juan later, they had done much more damage than they supposed, and the Spaniards could not understand why they should have withdrawn, unless they had been compelled to by losses. They were, therefore, inclined to rejoice. Impartial witnesses from San Juan said that several of the large guns in Morro were completely disabled. It is a curious fact, in view of the general understanding of the superiority of smokeless powder, that the Spaniards excused their poor marksmanship on the ground that the Yankee ships were so enveloped in smoke that it was impossible to get a good aim at them.

When one of the monitors ran in close to Morro with her decks awash, the Spanish gunners, occasionally getting a glimpse of her through the smoke her big guns were making, supposed that she had been hit and was sinking, and they set up a great shout of joy. But they were puzzled when the same vessel continued to pour enormous shells into the forts with deadly effect. The loss of life in the city was not great, though considerable damage was done to buildings and a little to shipping.

It is a curious fact that Sampson not only missed the Spanish squadron he had gone on his long cruise for, but missed the Spanish war vessels which were supposed to be stationed there. It appears that the troop vessel, *Alfonso XIII.*, had been sent over from Cadiz, and was expected to arrive at Puerto Rico at about the time the Cape Verde vessels did. A few days before Sampson arrived the Spanish men-of-war, *Isabella II.*, *Concho*, and *Ponce de Leon*, had left San Juan eastward to meet the troop ship and conduct her in. She arrived alone, however, the day before the bombardment, having missed the gunboats, which came steaming in shortly after Sampson had finished the bombardment and turned westward.

Some criticism was made of Admiral Sampson for attacking the forts when he knew the fleet he was looking for was not there, and when he had no intention of taking the city. The Spaniards complained that he had bombarded the city without the notice which is customary in war. But the guns were at no time directed upon the town, and whatever damage was done to it was incidental. Moreover, the rule which requires previous notice applies to undefended cities, and to those whose defenses are so placed that they cannot be attacked without endangering the city. It is possible that had the admiral waited outside and out of sight till he had sent scouts in to discover whether the ships were in San Juan harbor, Cervera might have endeavored to make that port after leaving Martinique. Then Sampson would have had the Spanish fleet where he had expected to find it. As it was, he left the forts just as two of his vessels had been struck, left the Spaniards boasting that they had driven him away, and convinced Cervera that it would be wise for him to sail for Cuba while Sampson was waiting for him at Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER XXXVI

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE—FIRST AMERICAN BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS—THE BRAVE AND BLOODY FIGHT OF THE TORPEDO-BOAT *WINSLOW* AT CARDENAS—SWEEP BY SHOT AND SHELL.

The Blockade in Early May—The Capture of the *Lafayette*—Recklessness of Some of the American Vessels—Work of Cutting the Cables—Eager Volunteers for a Dangerous Task—Advancing Close to Shore in Launches and Cutters—Fire from the Spanish Masked Batteries—Men Drop at their Oars—Ship's Guns Drive the Spaniards to Shelter—Dead Men in the Cutters—Shelling the Lighthouse—First Adventure of the Torpedo Boat *Winslow*—Laying a Trap for the Spaniards—In a Nest of Red Buoys—A Spanish Trap—Deadly Fire Pours in on the *Winslow*—The *Hudson* to the Rescue—A Fatal Shell—Death of Ensign Bagley and his Men—Terrific Fighting—Brave Act of the *Hudson*—Getting the *Winslow* Out—Spanish Gunboat Disabled—Scattering a Spanish Garrison.

DURING the weeks following the inauguration of the blockade of Cuban ports there was little of incident except the early capture of prizes till attempts were made to cut cables in different ports and to tempt out some of the Spanish gunboats, which timidly remained behind the protection of the forts and mines.

The most important incidents of the blockade during the first week in May were a renewed short bombardment of the fortifications outside of Matanzas and the capture and release of the French vessel *Lafayette*, which was boarded, told that a blockade had been established, and forbidden to enter Havana. But as soon as she was released she made all haste for the harbor, and again was brought to and taken as a prize to Key West. The government, however, ordered her immediate release, as the State Department had promised the French embassy to give her a safe conduct, a fact unknown on the blockade line. Thus the danger of arousing French

antagonism was averted. One of the amusing features of the chase for Spanish prizes was the capture of the steamship *Panama* by the little *Mangrove*. The *Panama* was trying to run the blockade and had a valuable cargo. The *Mangrove* happened to fall in with her, and the ridiculous thing about it was that the *Panama's* guns were superior to those of the *Mangrove*, but the latter's commander boldly dashed in and the Spaniard surrendered without firing a shot. At about the same time the *Argonauta*, a Spanish ship with supplies, 100 soldiers, and General de Corlejo and staff, was captured by the *Nashville* while trying to run the blockade at Cienfuegos.

Many of the American vessels had acquired such a contempt for Spanish gunnery from such exhibitions of it as they had seen that they somewhat recklessly ran within close range of some of the fortifications, and as our sailors were brave and eager for action which should distinguish them they welcomed any orders which would take them into the line of danger. One of the tasks devolving upon the blockading fleet as well as upon some of the scouting vessels was the cutting of the various cables which afforded Havana communication with Madrid and with other Cuban ports. In pursuance of this object, an attempt was made early on the morning of the 11th of May to cut the cables running out of the harbor of Cienfuegos on the south coast to Santiago, which was connected with European lines, an attempt which resulted in the first loss of life among American forces.

The naval force on the south coast of Cuba, Captain McCalla commanding, was composed of the cruiser *Marblehead*, the gunboat *Nashville*, the revenue cutter *Windom*, the converted yacht *Eagle*, and the collier *Salurn*. Commander McCalla placed Lieutenant Cameron McR. Winslow in charge of an expedition to cut the ocean telegraph cables. Second in command was Lieutenant E. A. Anderson. A call for volunteers was made, to which the whole of the crews of both the *Marblehead* and the *Nashville* eagerly responded, even after a warning that the service would be especially dangerous.

A steam cutter containing twelve men and a launch containing sixteen were manned from each ship. In addition to the crew, a sergeant of marines and half a dozen men to man the guns of the cutters were put on board. In the meantime the *Marblehead* took a position 1,000 yards off shore opposite the Colorado Point lighthouse, which is on the east side of the narrow entrance of Cienfuegos' harbor and just to the east of the cable landing, and with the *Nashville* a little further to the west began shelling the beach, upon which were the signal-station, barracks, and cable-house. The rifle pits behind the cable-house were deserted by the Spaniards as fast as the ships' fire reached them, and, as their answering fire slackened and died out, the boats were ordered in shore.

At five minutes to seven, the boats headed for the land, the steam cutters, in command of Ensign T. P. Magruder, towing the launches. The ships were firing upon the cable-house, which soon fell in ruins. When three or four hundred feet from shore the cutters stopped, and the launches worked ahead, protected as far as possible by the fire from the cutters, which followed about a hundred yards astern. The cable leading to Santiago was picked up about a hundred feet off shore, but no sooner had the work of cutting began than the Spanish fire was renewed, the soldiers skulking back to their deserted rifle pits through the high grass. The cutters replied to this fire, and the fire from the ships quickened. But, though the Spanish fire slackened momentarily, every now and then it became stronger.

The men in the boats succeeded in lifting and cutting the first cable, a laborious and perilous task, and coolly proceeded to grapple for the next, which led westward to Batabano. Meantime, the Spaniards were firing low in an evident endeavor to sink the cutters, but many of their shots fell short, while close over the heads of the men flew the shells from the *Marblehead* and *Nashville*. The second cable was finally grappled. Several men were kept at the oars to hold the cutters in position, and the first man wounded in the fire was one of these.

No one else in the boat knew it, however, till he fainted in his seat from loss of blood. Others took the cue from this and there was never a groan or complaint from the two boats as the bullets came thicker and faster, the men going on with their work with unflinching courage.

The second cable was finally cut, and the third, a smaller one, connecting the cable-house with Cienfuegos, was grappled and hoisted to the surface. The fire of the Spaniards had reached its maximum, the bullets from the Mauser rifles falling like hail about the boats.

"Use shrapnel," came the signal for the ships, and then can after can exploded over the Spaniards, who broke and ran to cover behind the lighthouse, and to this place they dragged a number of the machine guns and again opened fire on the cutters. This fire could not be answered so well from the launches, and the encouraged Spaniards fired the more rapidly. Man after man in the boats was hit, but not one let a sound escape him. Like silent machines they worked, grimly hacking and tearing at the third cable. For a half-hour they had worked on it, but the fire from behind the lighthouse was becoming too deadly, and, reluctantly, at Lieutenant Anderson's signal, the cable was dropped and the boats retreated.

The work had lasted more than three hours; one man was killed, one mortally wounded, six men seriously wounded, and one officer slightly injured. The loss among the Spaniards was much greater, at least three hundred being killed or wounded. As the boats withdrew, the *Marblehead* began to shell the lighthouse, which had not been fired on before according to the usages of international law, though it had been used as a shelter by the Spaniards. The *Windom* steamed in, and at close range took part in the bombardment. The tower of the lighthouse was cut through by the shells, and, falling, demolished the light-keeper's house. With the collapse of their protection the Spaniards fled to escape the screaming shrapnel.

On the day following, or the day on which Admiral Sampson was shelling the forts of San Juan, a similar and somewhat

more bloody engagement occurred on the opposite side of the Cuban coast. In the bay of Cardenas there were three Spanish gunboats, which the Americans hoped to capture, but their commanders carefully kept them out of reach within the harbor. On the 8th the torpedo boat *Winslow* had been ordered to steam in and, if possible, entice the gunboats within reach of the United States gunboat *Machias*. The little torpedo boat steamed boldly into the channel, where the *Machias*, drawing more water, could not go, and succeeded in rousing one of the Spanish gunboats, whereupon the *Winslow* hurried back, followed by the Spaniard. At the same time the enemy at the signal station on Chalupa Key, thinking an opportunity was offered for overcoming the two American vessels, signaled to two other gunboats to come out. The little *Winslow* fired sixty rounds from her 1-pounders and succeeded in getting one of the Spanish gunboats far enough out so that the *Machias* hit her with a 6-pounder. This was too much for the courage of the Spaniards, and they put back into the harbor, while from the shore a small submarine mine was exploded near the torpedo boat, but not sufficiently near to do any damage.

But this little affair whetted the appetites of the Americans for a better chance at the gunboats, and plans were laid to force them out. The Spaniards, evidently mistrusting that the attempt would be made, laid traps of their own, by placing concealed batteries along the shore of the entrance at night, while the operation could not be discovered by the blockading fleet.

Early on the morning of the same day, while the torpedo-boat *Winslow* was coaling from the gunboat *Wilmington*, Commander Merry of the *Machias*, the senior officer of the station, conferred with the other officers as to destroying the Spanish gunboats, and the *Winslow*, with the revenue cutter *Hudson*, was ordered to sound the little-used channel between the Romero and Blanco Keys. The other channels into the harbor were known to be mined, but this third was sounded and dragged, and found to be safe and deep enough for all except the *Machias*. When this was reported to the *Wilmington* it

was resolved to make the attempt in the afternoon. Therefore, at about two o'clock the three vessels started up the bay, the *Winslow* to the east, the *Wilmington* in the center, and the *Hudson* to the west. When about three thousand yards from the water front of the town of Cardenas, a Spanish gunboat could be plainly seen lying alongside the wharf.

The *Winslow* was ordered by Commander Todd of the *Wilmington* to run in and cut out this gunboat, with the heavier guns of the other American vessels to protect her from the distance. So Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou of the *Winslow* ordered his little vessel ahead, while the *Hudson* followed some distance behind. There was no thought of real danger, for no batteries were supposed to exist at that point. When within 1,200 yards from the shore the men on the *Winslow* noticed bobbing about them a number of red buoys which were supposed to mark the channel, but in reality they were range buoys which had been put there for the guidance of the masked batteries on a jutting point a little to the left of where the Spanish gunboats lay. Suddenly the gunboat opened fire.

The gallant little crew of the *Winslow* were taken entirely by surprise. The first shot of the engagement was the signal for the batteries to open a continuous and long-sustained fire. The shells came thick and fast, churning the water into foam.

The Spanish trap had caught its victim; the decoy gunboat had lured the brave little fighter to the very point where the Spaniards had deliberately calculated the range. It was then a fight to the death, and the three little 1-pounders of the torpedo boat, whose steel shell was but half an inch thick, began to pour their missiles into the shore and into the gunboat, which had also opened fire ahead of them.

But it was a sadly unequal contest. Again and again shells crashed into the little *Winslow*. One went through the top of the forward coming tower, cutting the steam pipes, disabling the steering gear, and knocking the wheel from the helmsman's hands. A fragment struck the brave commander of the little craft in the thigh. He tied a towel about the

wound and went on with his duties. At that moment a water-tender came up from below and coolly reported, "The for'd boiler 's gone, sir." A shell had exploded in the boiler, destroyed the tubes, thrown open the doors, filled the boiler-room with steam and dust, and scattered the fire over the floor. Another shot wrecked the blower engine. Others struck the deck, went through the smokepipe, wrecked the forward engine, and disabled the forecastle gun. But the brave men kept firing away with their remaining 1-pounders. Help was coming, for the *Hudson* was steaming ahead at full speed, and the *Wilmington's* 4-inch guns were dropping shells into the murderous battery ashore.

So far, although the *Winslow* had been completely disabled, not a man had been killed in the terrible rain of shot and shell. Amidships near the ammunition stand was Ensign Worth Bagley, directing the engineer to steam alternately ahead and astern with the one remaining engine in an effort to thwart the Spanish aim. All the electrical contrivances had been wrecked, so orders had to go by word of mouth, while the screeching shells were filling the air. By the ensign was standing four men of the fire-room force. Then came the fatal shell. It struck the deck, glanced, and exploded. The *Hudson* was then so close that her crew could plainly hear the words of the brave men as they went to their death.

"Save me! Save me!" shouted one poor fellow whose face was partly torn away, as he staggered back and nearly fell into the sea. Someone reached an arm to him, caught, and pulled him back, and laid him on the deck. Ensign Bagley threw his hands into the air, tottered forward, and fell against the signal mast, around which he clasped his arm, sank slowly down in a heap, and died instantly.

Two others were killed outright, an oiler and fireman. Two others, a fireman and a cook, were so badly injured that they died within an hour. They had come up on deck to pass ammunition and get up the hawsers.

The *Hudson* had by this time reached a position to extend

aid to the *Winslow*. Her gunners were doing nobly, indeed, while in that trying position endeavoring to get the *Winslow* out, her guns fired 135 rounds in a half-hour. Barring a few scratches, none of her men were hurt, though the water about them was continually lashed by shells. "Every man and boy on board," said one of the *Hudson's* gunners afterwards, "acted with coolness, and placed each shot just right, until the time when trying to get the *Winslow* in tow, and the fatal shot fell in the group about Ensign Bagley. Then they cried and yelled, and the way the shells flew into the guns was terrible. It was a wonder the shell man's hands were not cut off by the way No. 2 threw the breech lock in and out. The gun became so hot it could not be touched. Cartridges began to jam, and they were pushed in by main strength."

A long line was thrown from the *Hudson* to the *Winslow* and made fast, but the latter being disabled would not tow easily, and as the *Hudson* backed away the line parted. Another line was made fast after twenty minutes' work, under the constant fire of the enemy, and the *Winslow* towed to a point near the *Wilmington*. The bravery of the *Hudson's* captain and crew in rescuing the *Winslow* from her perilous position was unsurpassed even by that of the men on the torpedo boat.

The *Wilmington*, in the meantime, had played havoc with the city of Cardenas. By the time the smaller vessels were in safety, the town along the shore was on fire; the Spanish gunboats also caught fire, and soon the shore batteries ceased to answer the *Wilmington's* guns. Many of their guns were wrecked and their artillerymen were killed.

When the firing ceased, Lieutenant Bernadon signaled to the *Wilmington*. "Many killed and wounded. Send boat."

A surgeon at once put off in a boat and took the wounded into it. Among them was the cook, terribly mutilated, but brave, and while his comrades were rowing him across the bay from one ship to the other, he died with these last words: "Tell them I died like a man."

Another wounded man died soon after being put aboard

the *Wilmington*. Of the crew of twenty-one men, five were killed and five were wounded.

While all this was going on in the bay, the *Machias* was knocking to pieces the signal station on Diana Key, where there was a blockhouse and a small battery. This was two miles southwest of where the vessels entered the bay. The Spaniards fled to the mainland and Commander Merry sent a boat crew ashore on the key, and having searched the blockhouse and found a quantity of arms and some official papers of the Spanish commandant, they set it on fire. The American flag was unfurled from the key and remained there undisturbed.

The Spanish reports, of course, claimed the day as a victory, and the Cardenas garrison was warmly congratulated by Blanco and eulogized at Madrid. The usual complaint was made as to the town being fired on without notice, but in this case the fire was abundantly justified. Notwithstanding the loss of life and the damage to the *Winslow*, it was really an American victory, for the Spanish gunboats were disabled, two of them being riddled and sunk.

The lesson of the day was a rather wholesome one, in that it made the blockading fleet more cautious. Torpedo boats were not intended to run in under the heavy guns of hostile shores, and there had already been much criticism of the unnecessary daring displayed by their commanders. After some of the larger vessels were withdrawn from the blockade about the north shore to join Admiral Sampson in his cruise to Puerto Rico, the Spanish gunboats at Cardenas had become venturesome in the face of the smaller craft left. Their capture or destruction would put an end to the possibility of their interference with the maintenance of the blockade. This was accomplished by a brave and daring deed.

During the second week in May an attempt was made to put a large quantity of arms and ammunition into the hands of the insurgents, one of our daring army officers having secretly made his way to the insurgent headquarters and arranged for

a meeting place. The expedition sailed in the steamer *Gussie*, under Captain Dorst, with two companies of United States regulars, and a landing place was made west of Cardenas bay under the protection of the gunboats. Evidently, the Spanish forces had received warning of the expedition, for when our soldiers landed a lively fight ensued, and the enemy were driven back with considerable loss, while our soldiers were uninjured. But the insurgents failed to put in an appearance, and our forces finally re-embarked and returned to Key West.

CHAPTER XXXVII

CHASING CERVERA'S FLEET — THE FLYING SQUADRON — DAYS OF EXCITEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY — SAMPSON AND SCHLEY AT KEY WEST AND CERVERA AT SANTIAGO.

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists — Schley Receives Orders to Leave Hampton Roads — Cervera Reported at Curaçao — He Seeks Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day's Sail from Santiago — More Days of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same Direction — Sampson and Schley arrive at Key West and Cervera at Santiago — Cervera's Luck as a Dodger — How He Entered Santiago while our Scouts were away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of Cuba — Unaware of Cervera's Arrival at Santiago — Schley Prepares to Attack Cervera at Cienfuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes on to Santiago — Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There — Sampson Turns Back — Schley Steams up before Santiago.

AUTHENTIC information that Cervera's ships were in the waters of Martinique was received from Captain Cotton, whose auxiliary cruiser, the *Harvard*, injured her machinery and put in to a Martinique port for repairs. Captain Cotton's dispatch was delayed for twenty-four hours, so that the United States did not receive official information till some hours after Cervera had taken on board some required supplies and a full complement of advices and departed, but the French government of that island officially denied that it had been unfairly detained. The problem presented by Captain Cotton's dispatch, which arrived near midnight of the 12th, constituted a very fascinating strategic puzzle, and the navy strategists were credited with a rather sleepless night.

To the best of their information, Admiral Sampson was cooling his guns somewhere off San Juan, which is about 520 miles from Martinique, 1,100 from Havana, and 700 from Santiago. Commodore Schley was still in Hampton Roads,

where he had been impatiently waiting with steam up for nearly a month; he was over 1,000 miles from the Cuban coast and about 1,000 miles further from Martinique than Sampson; Commodore Watson was about Havana and the other blockaded ports of Cuba with the smaller unarmored craft which Sampson had left him, and which was no match for Cervera's armored cruisers and large guns.


The general opinion of the naval strategists was that Cervera had left Martinique with the intention of either proceeding along the southern route to Cuba, putting in at Santiago or Cienfuegos, hoping to catch some of the weaker blockading vessels there, or of moving through the Windward Passage between Cuba and the island of Haiti to strike the blockading fleet on the northern coast of Cuba. It was not thought that he would run to San Juan, though he, doubtless, would have done so had he not heard of Sampson. Cervera's ships were as a squadron the fastest in the world, and hampered only by the torpedo-boat destroyers, which might have to stop to be coaled, and it was calculated that he could probably reach Cienfuegos by the evening of the 15th, or the blockading vessels on the north by the morning of the 16th. He might reach Santiago the 14th, but little thought was given to that port. Admiral Sampson's fleet was, on the other hand, slow, being hampered by the monitors. The machinery of the battleship *Indiana* was unreliable, and there was an insufficient supply of coal. As Cervera had already started and would be nearly two days out before the government had the good fortune to get word to Sampson, it was not probable that the latter would catch Cervera unless he happened to run upon him. Schley's squadron hardly deserved the name of flying squadron, as it was hampered by the battleship *Massachusetts*, which could make but about thirteen knots an hour, but it might reach the north coast of Cuba at about the time Cervera would arrive there, supposing that was his purpose.

In this state of affairs, the authorities promptly abandoned the plan for the immediate dispatch of a large expedition to

Cuba. Early on the morning of the 13th Sampson's dispatch from St. Thomas telling of the San Juan bombardment and of the non-appearance of Cervera there reached the naval board, which immediately returned to the waiting *Yale* information of the appearance of Cervera, who might at that moment be steaming through the Caribbean within 200 miles of Sampson. With this startling information and instructions the *Yale* hurried back after Sampson's squadron, which was well off the coast of Haiti. Early that same morning sailing orders were sent to Commodore Schley, whose sailors jumped with joy when told that their long idleness was over, and that evening, the 13th, the squadron was off southward with instructions to call the government up at Charleston.

Assuming that Cervera had been fully informed at Martinique of the location of the American squadrons, his best policy would seem to have been to have sailed direct for either Santiago or Havana, the latter if he had been disposed to inflict any damage on our blockading fleet while the armored vessels of the United States were away. With a start of over 200 miles he would have stood a fair chance to have broken the blockade about Havana, and even if Schley caught him in the act of breaking it, Cervera had four armored ships to Schley's three. If the Spanish admiral was informed of the speed of Sampson's squadron he must have seen that his chances of getting through the Windward Passage before Sampson could arrive there were excellent. But Cervera's movements were evidently directed from Madrid and it was the apparent purpose of the Spanish government to postpone as long as possible the operations of the United States against Havana by diverting attention to other points till the rainy season approached, for in that season the difficulties of offensive action were greatly increased, while the advantages of defensive action were correspondingly increased. On the other hand, the United States authorities desired to prevent Cervera from getting under the strong guns of Havana.

On the 14th Cervera was reported at the Dutch island of



H. S. Schley

Curaçao, which is about 500 miles further west than Martinique, but three degrees further south, indeed, it is about fifty miles from the coast of Venezuela. On the same day Sampson, returning westward along the north coast of Haiti, and making the best time possible, having left the monitors behind, sent the torpedo boat *Porter* into the harbor of Puerto Plata, San Domingo, for news, but the government not being certain then as to the location of Cervera, the *Porter* put in the next day at Cape Haitien, about a hundred miles further westward. By this time the reports were that Cervera's ships were surely and still at Curaçao taking on coal and supplies.

On the evening of the same day Schley's fleet arrived off Charleston, S. C., or less than half the distance from Hampton Roads to Havana. Running into a fog soon after departing, the squadron had made but nine knots. Dispatches had been sent to him at Charleston and were taken out to him on a revenue cutter, so that there was a delay of only an hour, and as night fell the squadron was cruising on southward.

It was certain by this time that Cervera could not reach Commodore Watson's fleet about Havana before Commodore Schley did. Assuming that Cervera intended to make for a Cuban port, it was calculated that he could hardly cruise through the Windward Passage to the north coast without being in danger of encountering Sampson, and he could hardly pass westward through the Yucatan channel without encountering Schley, though it was possible for him to pass either fleet at some distance away without being detected, even though both American commanders made the best use of their scouts.

It seems to be clear that Cervera's fleet was in a bad way; at least he desired to pick up all the coal and supplies he could before making for a Cuban port. He had asked permission from the Dutch governor to bring his whole fleet into the harbor for coal and provisions. The United States consul had protested, though in doubt at first, considering that it might be best to allow them to come in while Washington had

a longer time to plan the capture. The governor had finally decided that he would allow two of the vessels to come in for necessary provisions, and at noon of the 14th the *Maria Teresa* and the *Vizcaya* dropped anchor in the harbor. The other vessels were two and a half miles out.

The consul set about learning all he could concerning the condition of the Spanish squadron, and heard that they were so short of rations that the officers had been living on beans for four days, and the crew had been put on half rations. The vessels stood very high out of the water, indicating that they were short of coal. The torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* had been left behind at Martinique for repairs.

The Spanish officers started at once to get in all the coal and provisions they could, but all the fuel to be had was 300 tons of slack coal, condemned by the Dutch government, and it had been lying there for about two years waiting for a purchaser. They took this and an enormous stock of provisions, all to the value of \$16,000, which they were required to pay in gold or drafts on London. All day Sunday they worked loading up. Towards night a cable dispatch was received by the Spanish officers, and they began to make preparations for immediate departure. They got away at 6 o'clock in an evident hurry, for they left behind two lighter loads of coal and some provisions they had purchased. They also left behind the idea that they were bound for Puerto Rico. It transpired afterwards, according to Admiral Cervera's reports, that this cablegram came from General Blanco, ordering Cervera to hurry at once to the port of Santiago. Apparently alarmed by the approach of Schley's squadron, Blanco considered Santiago the best port for Cervera to hide in while taking on supplies. Cervera thought otherwise and disliked the order.

On the same day, therefore, and indeed at about the same hour, that Sampson left Cape Haitien westward, and Schley left Charleston southward, Cervera left Curaçao, and, according to reports, westward. Thus Sampson was about 500 miles from Cervera; Schley about 1,500. Sampson and Schley

were each about 600 miles from Havana; Cervera nearer 1,000. Cervera was about 600 miles from Santiago; Sampson only about 200, and Schley considerably over 1,000 by either route. The *Oregon*, though well-nigh forgotten in the excitement of the moment, was actually about where Cervera had been four days before, off the Windward Islands. The public had the impression, and naturally so from this arrangement, that Schley was simply going to the relief of the blockading squadron, the danger to which had been greatly lessened by Cervera's trip to Curaçao, while Sampson, who had been looking for Cervera for two weeks, and was now so near him, would with little difficulty find the Spaniard and have his desired encounter.

Had Sampson sailed westward a day through the Windward Passage along the south coast of Santiago province, and there quietly dropped his anchor and waited, Cervera would have come sailing directly into his presence. But Sampson was of the opinion that Cervera intended to make for Havana, and destroy the blockade, which was then weak, so many large vessels having been withdrawn in the hope of meeting him.

If Cervera's immediate destination had been Havana, however, he would hardly have lost the opportunity he had of reaching there before either of the American squadrons could have prevented. It was strongly suspected that one of Cervera's objects was to land munitions of war for General Blanco, but this he could accomplish by running into Cienfuegos on the south coast, and joined by railroad with Havana. But, as already related, the cable at Cienfuegos had been cut on the 11th, and that left Santiago as the most available point for him to touch for further advices from Madrid. It would have been natural to suppose, therefore, that he would, on leaving Curaçao, at least look in at Santiago, although Sampson had his magnificent fighting ships within a day's sail of that port.

Then followed four days of the most exciting uncertainty and rumors of battles. The government advised all its consular offices in West Indian and South American ports to make

every investigation possible and report at once any information of the Spanish squadron. Scouts were sent to watch different ports. Admiral Sampson was supposed by some to be lying in wait in the Windward Passage. Schley was supposed to be hurrying about the western end of Cuba to guard the Yucatan channel.

As a matter of fact, both Cervera and Sampson were sailing in the same direction — to the northwest, with Cervera's bows pointed towards Sampson's sterns. On the afternoon of the 18th Sampson arrived at Key West in the *New York*, where he found Schley, who had arrived that morning, and who left the next day for Cienfuegos. On the evening of the 19th Sampson learned by cable from Havana that Cervera had reached Santiago on the morning of that same day. It was believed by both Sampson and Schley that Cervera would make for Cienfuegos with munitions of war for Havana, Cienfuegos being within easy communication by rail with the capital. On the 19th Cervera sent the following message to Madrid:

SANTIAGO, 19.

This morning I have, without incident, entered this port, accompanied by the squadron.

CERVERA.

Had this information been kept a state secret, it is impossible to say when Cervera would have been found. Owing to the conditions of the harbor of Santiago, it was impossible for a ship on the outside to have any idea of what was inside. Cervera had entered a blind pocket unobserved by the enemy, and, if Madrid had kept still, our ships having not the slightest clue to his whereabouts, might have sailed around the whole Cuban coast and been none the wiser, until, possibly, Cervera saw his opportunity to slip out. But the fact that he had been able to get into a Cuban port without incident was considered at Madrid as too good news to keep. The Minister of Marine immediately called at the residence of Sagasta, and then at the

palace to lay the dispatch before the Queen Regent; the Queen at once dispatched her congratulations to Cervera, and the whole proceeding was given the greatest publicity.

The naval strategists, who had become somewhat sensitive over the thoughtless criticisms of their conduct, were not sure whether they should be pleased or otherwise with Cervera's alleged appearance in Santiago. They could not fail to be a little nervous over his possible escape from that place as soon as he had coaled, for with nearly all the American naval vessels at the other end of Cuba, Cervera had ample opportunity to make another quick movement with his fleet ships, and be out of reach of either Sampson or Schley before either could get to Santiago. The opinion still prevailed that he would endeavor to come to Havana's relief, possibly by sending munitions from Cienfuegos, or, probably, by watching his chance to steam direct to Havana.

The cruiser *St. Louis*, which, under command of Captain Goodrich, had been scouting about West Indian waters since May 1st, had met Admiral Sampson on the 14th, while he was hurrying westward off Haiti, and, receiving orders, had arrived off Santiago on the 18th, without any intimation that Cervera's four armored cruisers were at that time pointed for the same port and not a day's sail away. The *St. Louis's* orders were to cut the cable connecting Santiago and Jamaica. She began the search with the armed tug *Wompatuck*, commanded by Lieutenant Jungen, who had escaped from the *Maine* disaster, at about six o'clock on the evening of the 18th, gradually working nearer the forts at the mouth of the harbor, expecting every moment to draw their fire. About noon, having reached a position less than two miles from Morro, the grapnel caught the cable, and the Spaniards seem to have then discovered the purpose of the Americans, for a battery on Morro opened fire, which was returned by the *St. Louis's* 6-pounders. The engagement became quite fierce and the *St. Louis* was in some danger of the fire from a mortar battery which her guns could not reach; but, fortunately, the cable was brought

up and cut in time to allow them to get away uninjured, and that night she steamed off eastward to cut the cable from Guantanamo, about thirty miles east of Santiago, to Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, a work at which Commander Goodrich was engaged when Cervera slipped into Santiago, and this gave rise to the Spanish report, so joyously received at Madrid, that the American warships had disappeared on Cervera's approach. Had the *St. Louis* and the little *Wompatuck* loitered about Santiago a few hours longer they would have had early information of the whereabouts of Cervera, and possibly more than they could have successfully carried away, in view of their lack of armor and their inferior guns, though they were commanded by skillful and vigilant officers.

Acting upon the news of Cervera's arrival at Santiago, the *Harvard* was ordered to go at once to Santiago and watch for the possible departure of the Spanish fleet. As soon as the government at Madrid perceived that our naval board were proceeding to work on the supposition that Cervera was at Santiago, fresh batches of Spanish reports began to arrive, reports that Cervera had departed, that he had been sighted off Costa Rica, and even that he had not been at Santiago at all. Nothing was wanting to make it one of the most uncertain and exciting problems of naval strategy, entirely without precedent in history, and, if anything were lacking to give the finishing touch to the exciting mystery, it was the remarkably varying reports of the movements of the American squadron under the stress of enterprising journalism hampered by the censorship at the convenient cable stations.

It should be understood that Schley did not know when he sailed that Cervera had reached Santiago. That information had been reported late in the day, soon after Schley had departed in the expectation that he would most probably find Cervera at Cienfuegos, and in the hope that he might find him cruising into the Yucatan channel, and there settle which was the best man. The news being repeated over the cable it was sent to Schley, with instructions to go to Santiago. It reached

him on the 23d, and he left Cienfuegos on the 24th, arriving off Santiago on the evening of the 28th.

Admiral Sampson again prepared some of his ships for action, and departed with them to the blockade line in front of Havana, where he spent the 21st and 22d in reassembling his fleet, which came in one by one, starting some of the slower ones on ahead for another cruise eastward. In order to receive the latest news from Washington he waited till Monday morning when, with his fleet vessels, he started on after those he had sent ahead.

Meanwhile Schley, still without any information that Cervera had been reported at Santiago, was making his way around by the longer route through the Yucatan channel, expecting to meet the Spaniard at any moment. Guns were loaded and the men slept at their stations. The east end of Cuba was sighted on the afternoon of the 20th, and shortly afterwards, while bearing through the channel, the squadron felt sure the enemy was at hand. Men were sent to quarters, and the ships were cleared, but the vessels turned out to be friendly. As the squadron approached Cienfuegos early on Sunday morning, Commodore Schley signaled “We will blockade Cienfuegos. Have steam up to-night and be ready for anything. Do not know if enemy is in port.”

Just as the flagship passed the promontory at the entrance to the harbor, the rest of the squadron being about two miles off, five shots were fired from the shore. They were apparently rifle shots, but the commodore signaled to clear for immediate action. Everything movable went overboard to the sharks, guns were manned, and up went the battleflags. But as the squadron swung by the mouth of the harbor, nothing could be seen from the foretops but the masts of three sailing vessels and the gray funnel of a steamer. A small coast steamer came out towards the mouth of the harbor, but quickly turned and hurried back out of sight. Somewhat disappointed, the vessels swung out from the coast, the men were dismissed from the guns, and the battleflags were hauled down.

The commodore was not disposed to waste any ammunition in bombardments unless the Spanish fleet were really there.

Whether there or not, Schley could not make certain by a simple reconnoiter, for the topography of Cienfuegos is somewhat similar to that of Santiago. Both harbors have long, narrow entrances, protected by high land, and a whole fleet can lie in the inner harbor and be invisible from the outside. But Schley determined to make sure, and found a way to communicate with some Cubans ashore on the following day. The result was that he was satisfied, though disappointed, that Cervera was not there. Then came Sampson's instructions to proceed to Santiago.

Meanwhile, the swift *St. Paul*, which, having arrived at Key West on the 18th, in advance of either Schley's or Sampson's squadrons, and having received orders there to proceed to Cape Haitien, had on the way picked up the *Yale*, and together they reached the cape on the 21st, where the *St. Paul* was ordered to hurry to Santiago to watch for the possible escape of Cervera from Santiago, that is, if he were there. Reaching the waters off Santiago, she fell in with the *Harvard*, which had arrived there shortly after Cervera without seeing him, and the *Minneapolis*, which had been cruising about the Caribbean for several days with similar results. For the next four days, or from the 22d to the 26th, they cruised about the mouth of the harbor hoping to catch a glimpse of what was within, sometimes running in close, and again running far out to sea in the hopes that the Spaniard, if he were there, would be bold enough to show himself. But all their maneuvers were apparently in vain.

As soon as the Washington strategists learned that Schley was approaching Santiago on the south, while Sampson was about the same distance away on the north, they appear to have become alarmed over the fact that most of the strength of the fighting navy was concentrating on the eastern end of the island, when they had not the slightest official assurance that Cervera was there. The government was not disposed to

put any credence in Spanish reports after the Cadiz rumor, and felt anything but sure that the reserve Spanish squadron, under Camara, which had been reported so persistently at Cadiz by Spanish advices, might not be approaching the Atlantic coast at some point or seeking Havana by some out-of-the-way route. With Sampson and Schley both converging on Santiago, therefore, the strategists became alarmed at the serious possibility that either Cervera or Camara might break the blockade and upset all the plans of war.

The result was that Sampson came about again. When night closed in on the 24th, or the day Schley sailed from Cienfuegos, Sampson's magnificent fleet of fifteen vessels was plowing its way eastward off the coast opposite Santiago; when the sun came up on the 25th the fleet was plowing its way along the same coast — but to the westward, back towards Havana, where he arrived at about the same time that Schley steamed up before Santiago's frowning Morro. The slow-going monitors had been towed back and forth for the service they might render in a battle which could not be brought about, and when at last the battle did come, neither the admiral nor the monitors had an aggressive part in it.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

IN THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO — ADMIRAL CERVERA'S ALLEGED STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE HE HAS THE ENEMY — CERVERA "BOTTLED UP."

A Beautiful Harbor — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody Scenes — The Winding Channel and the Bay — Irrational Movements of the Spanish Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities — Opportunities which He Refused to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera's Presence in the Harbor — All Doubts Removed — Schley's Attack on the Forts — Cervera's Ships Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports from Madrid — Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera "Bottled up" — The Government at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — Admiral Sampson Arrives at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley — The Monitors Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the *Oregon* — Thirteen-thousand-mile Run and then to Battle — Admiral Sampson Takes Command — Organizing the Army — Found Unprepared at the Last Moment — The Departure at Last.

THE harbor of Santiago has often been called one of the most beautiful in the world, but it must be admired from the inside, not from without. Approaching from the sea, it is utterly impossible to make out the mouth of the entrance even from comparatively close quarters. A long range of high and steep mountains seems to form an impenetrable front. But coming near the coast a rift appears in the ramparts, disclosing a passage only 180 yards wide, with a picturesque castle on the eastern bluff, a relic of the sixteenth century. Like Havana and San Juan, Santiago has its Morro, but it antedates all others. It is an antique, yellow, Moorish-looking stronghold, with crumbling honey-combed battlements and queer little flanking turrets, grated windows, and shadowy towers. Built upon the face of a lofty dun-colored rock, upon whose precipitous side the fortifications are terraced, the light and shade formed by the time-stained walls make a strikingly artistic picture. A flight of

well-worn steps winds from the water's edge up the side of the grim old walls, while the moat, drawbridge, and other surroundings make up the charming picture, more suggestive of the days of gallant knights and imprisoned maidens than of modern seacoast fortifications.

It was a formidable defense in the days of the buccancers, but its old guns have lain there in the sun, wind, and rain of the tropics for years and years, and for as many years Morro has been little used except as a prison for political offenders. Those who visited Santiago before the war with the United States could, as they sailed past its frowning walls, see pallid faces at the grated windows; but prisoners generally remained there but a short time. They were either taken out on the ramparts, shot, and thrown into the sea, as the morning sun streamed along the picturesque shore, or were carried off to the African penal colonies. Old Morro has been the background for many a bloody scene in the pages of Spain's history of bloodshed and torture.

On the mountain to the left of the entrance is the Castle Socapa, also presenting a very picturesque appearance, while a little further inland and on Morro's side is a small fortification resembling a star in shape, and for that reason called the *Bateria de la Estrella*. Still further in to the left is a little island, on the hillside of which is built the hamlet of Smith Cay, of late years patronized by the best families of Santiago as a watering place. Then comes a narrow winding channel, a mile in length, between the mountains and broad meadows covered with rank verdure, cocoanut groves, and little fishing hamlets. Thrifty laurels, palms with their graceful plumes of foliage, and banana trees line the way, while here and there upon the banks appears a pleasant country house in the midst of a pretty garden of flowering shrubs. Then a sharp angle in the hills was passed, from which look the guns of the Punta Gorda battery, and the broad sheltered bay of Santiago lies in full view, with the quaint rambling old city on a hillside at the northern end.

It was in this unique harbor that were fought many bloody battles in the old days; here was a three-days contest between a French corsair and Spanish vessel; here, too, was brought the *Virginus*, and here were slain the members of her crew; in these regions began the Cuban struggle for independence, and here it was that the United States, because of Cervera's alleged strategy, was first to plant its flag.

Assuming that Cervera had brought his armor-clad vessels over for the practical purpose of fighting, his entrance into Santiago was deemed a reckless or irrational move, but his continuing there for a week without anything to bar his way except two or three converted merchantmen and liners, was considered inexplicable, and, therefore, improbable. Spain was manifesting considerable elation over the notion that her fleet was accomplishing great things. Some of the expert nautical critics of Europe wrote learnedly of the way Spain was out-maneuvering us. Cervera acquired a brief reputation as a strategist, when, as a matter of fact, he does not seem to have been able to exercise sufficient option to make strategy possible. He had steamed from Martinique to Curaçao, and from Curaçao to Santiago, and it was due more to his good fortune for the time than to any strategy he exercised that every American vessel in those waters happened to miss him. Guided largely by his necessities, he acquired the reputation of an artful dodger, much to the disparagement of his reputation as a brave fighter; for it was fair to suppose that he had brought his armored vessels over here to fight, not to incapacitate them in a land-pocket; and had he had the inclination to fight, the favorable opportunities were not lacking. In view of the swiftness of his vessels, he could readily have engaged either Sampson or Schley while separated. How he would have come out of such a fight with either of the American commanders, it is impossible to say, but if he stood any chance at all of success it was in taking the American naval forces when separated. But these opportunities, which chance afforded him, he took good care not to embrace even after he

had entered the harbor of Santiago, "without incident"; for eight days his exit was opposed only by ships, all of which any one of his cruisers, properly handled, could have sunk, if they had ventured any opposition. There was coal at Santiago, as it turned out, and he could in two days have filled his bunkers. With his four fast cruisers he could have run to Puerto Rico while Sampson was running to Key West; having coaled at San Juan he could have run back to Cuban waters, or, possibly, have intercepted the *Oregon*, which he could not fail to know must by this time be approaching Cuban waters. But, for some reason, which must, perhaps, remain a mystery until some future historian has the privilege of delving among the archives of the Spanish government, Cervera remained in the trap as if indifferent to the possibility of its closing upon him. As a good sailor he must have known that on the 27th, when the lookouts on the forts saw Schley's squadron steaming by the entrance to the harbor, the trap had closed. It seems probable that Cervera had really intended to send out a couple of vessels for the attack upon the unarmored scouts, for the log of the *Cristobal Colon* shows that the vessels moved down to the mouth of the harbor on the 25th, and on the 27th, as Schley steamed by he saw through his glasses at least one vessel, which he took for a member of Cervera's fleet, the *Cristobal Colon* having a peculiar construction, a military mast between the smokepipes.

"He will never get home again," Schley is reported to have remarked as he took his glasses from the tell-tale mast; but while the American commodore was pretty well satisfied himself that he had the Spaniard in a pen, he needed more evidence to convince the strategists at Washington, or Sampson, who had arrived back off Havana. There was the possibility that even if one or two of the Spanish vessels were in the harbor that Cervera had left them there as a decoy, and gone elsewhere, possibly to effect a junction with the Cadiz fleet, and with the intention of dropping on the blockade line when all the American fighting vessels had concentrated be-

fore the Santiago decoy. But by the 28th Schley was able to report to Washington that he had made out three of Cervera's fleet in the lower part of the harbor, and the Naval Board began to make its plans accordingly.

Schley, however, manifested a disposition to have it out with the enemy then and there if possible. On Sunday, the 29th, or the day when his first dispatches reached Washington, he ordered the *Marblehead* to run in close to Morro in order to see as far as possible into the winding entrance. The cruiser started, and as she approached within range of Morro's guns, she was going at a speed which would have required far better marksmanship than the Spaniards had yet displayed to hit her. She kept a course that carried her clear of the shoal water which extends from Morillo Point, and, as she went by the entrance, those aboard of her obtained a fair view of the harbor nearly as far as Punta Gorda, and caught a further glimpse of Spanish cruisers. To make assurance doubly sure, Commodore Schley had the benefit of the services of Lieutenant Blue, who went ashore, and, without guard, bravely worked his way to high ground, till he was enabled to secure a full view of the harbor, and to clearly see the four Spanish cruisers and two torpedo boats. He returned from his dangerous trip unharmed. It was one of the most daring and successful deeds of the war. All doubt having been removed, Commodore Schley determined to draw the fire of the forts in order to discover their position and the locality of any masked batteries, and also, if possible, to draw out Cervera. If he had crossed the ocean with the desire of fighting for his country, Schley determined to gratify it.

At noon of the 31st the Commodore left his flagship *Brooklyn*, which was coaling from the collier *Merrimac*, two miles out to sea, where lay also most of the other vessels occupied in routine duties, and hoisted his flag from the battleship *Massachusetts*, which soon headed for the entrance of the harbor, followed by the cruiser *New Orleans* and the battleship *Iowa*. Near the mouth of the channel could be seen the

Cristobal Colon, lying with her port broadside towards the American ships, and flying an immense ensign. The Spaniards had their awnings up fore and aft, and the crew were moving lazily about the decks, apparently taking the movement of the American ships for another parade by the forts, such as had taken place before. Behind the *Cristobal Colon* could also be distinguished the *Vizecaya* and the *Almirante Oquendo*, while close by were the destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor*.

As the *Massachusetts* passed the entrance she opened fire upon the *Cristobal Colon*, using her forward 8-inch guns on the port side and her 13-inch rifles. The Spanish cruisers and four batteries, two on the east side of the entrance, one on the west, and one on Smith Cay, began to reply. Some of the guns on the batteries were 10 and 12-inch Krupps, and the fire on both sides was so well sustained and the reverberations were so thrown back by the mountains that hardly an interval in the roar could be distinguished. Both sides showed bad judgment in getting the range, as the American ships made their first maneuver past the fortifications, but on the second round the Americans showed a decided improvement, and ancient Morro was struck again and again, each shell tearing great rents in the yellow walls and sending skyward masses of masonry which had lain undisturbed for three centuries. The Spanish artillerymen also began to show a surprising accuracy of aim on the second round. Several of their shells burst over the *Iowa*, and three fell dangerously near the *New Orleans*. The Spanish vessels seemed to be firing over the hills at random, but they did not venture out. After the cannonading had lasted for a half-hour three of the batteries ceased firing, having been badly demolished, and a few minutes later the American ships desisted and sailed contentedly away. But the *Cristobal Colon* and the battery on the western shore kept up a weak and harmless fire for about twenty minutes longer. Altogether, the firing lasted less than an hour, but it satisfied Schley still further of the presence of the Spanish cruisers

near the mouth of the harbor. One of the shells of the *Iowa* had struck the *Cristobal Colon* and started a fire, which was, however, quickly extinguished. The latter fired the last shot, and the Spanish reports claimed in the customary manner that the Americans had been driven off. Señor Aunon, Minister of Marine, declared in the Senate that the news was a good augury for further victories that would be gained by the courage and merit of the Spanish sailors, and the Senate unanimously adopted an expression of satisfaction at the striking victory gained by the Spanish fleet. Thus were the exigencies of domestic politics in Spain met. But what was more remarkable was the official information from Madrid the same day that only the *Cristobal Colon*, which was repairing her boilers, was at Santiago, the others had gone!

But the time for maneuvering under cover of false reports had passed. Satisfied of the correctness of Schley's reports, the United States government was already preparing for the campaign. The troops which had been hurried to the southern ports two weeks before in the expectation of striking at Havana, were now to be headed for Santiago. Cervera had changed our plans of invasion by allowing himself to be, in the popular expression of the day, "bottled up." Finding ample field for the exercise of his genius, the cartoonist represented the Spaniard in traditional garb crouching at the bottom of a bottle, labeled "Santiago Preserves," while over the mouth of the bottle hung Uncle Sam's old beaver hat, and Uncle Sam himself, resting after a long and somewhat arduous chase, was seated close by, looking contentedly at the agonized Spaniard within.

Admiral Sampson, having again reached Key West at about the time Commodore Schley had assured Washington of the presence of the Spanish ships in Santiago harbor, at once made preparations for joining Schley and taking command of the naval operations. But in this trip he left the monitors behind. Having been helped back and forth in search of Cervera, these unfortunate vessels were in the end

denied the opportunity of showing their efficiency in a real naval battle, while the *Oregon*, which had been steaming for three months, and had arrived at Key West a little ahead of Admiral Sampson, was destined to proceed at once to the scene of operations and take a glorious part in the destruction of Cervera's fleet. Her cruise and successful arrival excited the admiration of the world. It spoke volumes for the efficiency of a battleship which could make a 13,000 mile run, throw in fresh coal, and steam off ready for battle without even stopping to tighten a crank pin. Her achievements were among the most notable in the whole war, and no crew of American sailors had more right to be proud than the crew of the *Oregon* when she set out with Admiral Sampson for Santiago, before which they arrived on June 1st.

Had the government of the United States arranged the movements of Cervera in its own way, it could have hardly distributed them to better advantage for its own convenience; for not simply was the Spanish fleet placed where it could neither help the Spaniards in Cuba nor hurt the Americans outside, but the weeks of uncertainty in locating him had been of considerable advantage to the army department. It was one of the peculiar features of the situation at this point that while the steps had been taken to mobilize a large army as soon as war was declared, and while the government had planned an immediate invasion of Cuba in the middle of May, when Cervera was supposed to be at Cadiz, the army was actually far from ready to move by the 1st of June, when its presence at Santiago became an imperative necessity, the harbor of Santiago having been fixed so that Cervera could not get out nor Sampson get in. It had been supposed that the army had been waiting for the navy; but when the navy had Cervera "bottled up," it had to wait for the army.

In preparation for the organization of the army, both regular and volunteer, it had been decided during the first week in May that it should be divided into seven army corps, and that into these should be put both regular and volunteer

regiments. In order that there might be a sufficient number of major-generals and brigadier-generals to officer these corps, the President had on the 4th sent to the Senate, which had promptly confirmed it, a long list of nominations. For major-generals he named for promotion eight regular army men and four civilians; the former being Joseph C. Breckinridge, Elwell S. Otis, John J. Coppinger, William R. Shafter, William M. Graham, James F. Wade, and Henry C. Merriam. The civilians raised to this high rank were General Fitzhugh Lee, Congressman Joseph Wheeler of Alabama, J. H. Wilson of Delaware, and Senator Sewell of New Jersey. This list, as well as the longer list of nominations for brigadier-generals, was notable as containing, so far as could be seen, no political nominations, though great stress had been brought upon the President to secure such appointments. Of the four civilians who became major-generals, two served in the Union and two in the Confederate army during the Civil War. The appointment of two Confederate veterans was conclusive evidence that sectional feeling had become a matter of past history, and the wisdom of the President in securing trained leaders had, doubtless, been derived from his own four years' experience in the Union army in the field. The North had spent two years in learning how to fight and in discovering and educating its generals, and at the end every man who had secured a first place in either army was a graduate of West Point. The President proposed to secure the results without incurring the perils of a season of education. He, therefore, selected men of expert training and experience, not amateurs and politicians. The great majority of men were graduates of West Point, who had spent all their lives in the profession of arms, and those who were not graduates, and who came from civil life, had had the training of one of the most terrible wars of modern times.

Up to the latter part of May no thought had been given to Santiago, which, while an important port, was in a province largely controlled by the insurgents, and there the reconcen-



START OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF INVASION FOR CUBA FROM CHI KAW WOA.

trado order had not taken effect. Miss Clara Barton had arrived at Key West in a very few hours after the declaration of war with over 2,000 tons of provisions, ready to advance with the army, and, finding that there was no army there at that time, nor likely to be for some time, she sought permission of Admiral Sampson, who was maintaining the blockade, to take her provisions to the starving reconcentrados. But the admiral pointed out to her that it would be useless for him to blockade Havana if the Red Cross took in provisions for the people, who, however much they needed it, would be thrust aside by the Spaniards, the supplies being taken for the maintenance of the Spanish army, to cut off which the blockade was proclaimed. She appealed to the President, but, while he sympathized with her purposes, he agreed with the admiral that nothing in the way of relief should be done. So Miss Barton whiled away the time about Key West, feeding Cuban refugees and prisoners on the prize boats. And as time went on the public interest became absorbed in Cervera, the reconcentrados slipped out of mind and, to a large extent, out of this world and into the next.

And now Havana itself was to lose its importance in the public interest, except to the weary lookouts on the blockading fleet, which had been rolling in the sea for a month with nothing more exciting on hand than the chase of an occasional fishing smack. Santiago had become the center of operations. But while the delay in definitely locating Cervera had been of considerable convenience to the Department of War engaged in the monumental and novel task of not simply recruiting an army, but of providing for its sustenance, it was at once apparent that a little longer delay would have been useful. The regulars had been moved up promptly, had taken to camp life naturally, and a large part of them had been at Tampa for weeks, "marking time." Gradually, as the volunteers were mustered in and equipped, they had been moved up from State encampments to Camp Alger, across the Potomac from Washington and Chickamauga, the volun-

teers moving in as the regulars moved out for Tampa. As the volunteers were moved on to Florida, the operation of amalgamating them with the regulars proceeded, and a new camp was located at Jacksonville, under the command of General Lee.

As the number of troops sent to the Philippines was much larger than was originally contemplated, and as many of the regiments of the volunteers under the first call remained incomplete, it was deemed advisable to have more men mustered in, and on May 26th the President issued a call for 75,000 additional. Up to the 1st of June about 118,000 of the 125,000 called for in the first proclamation had been mustered in and recruiting for the regular army had raised it 30,000, making 155,000 in all. Including the 10,000 men authorized to be enlisted as immunes, this provided for an army, when fully mustered, and the regular army when increased to its legal limit, of over 260,000.

Yet, when the campaign was suddenly transferred to Santiago and the order came for an expedition of about 12,000 under General Shafter to invest the city, it was found impossible for it to get away promptly. The men were ready, had been ready for some time, but when it came to the point of putting them on transports, it was found that the commissary department was weak. Line after line of freight cars loaded with supplies came into Tampa, but for a time there seemed to be no one who knew what was in the cars or where it was to go. Not having had a war for nearly forty years, the officers in charge of the commissary arrangements had not risen to the emergency, however efficient they were in the routine of times of peace. The little, but very important, problems of fitting out even a small army with all essentials, uniforms, ammunition, tents, picks, spades, shovels for throwing up intrenchments, food, medicines, and so on to the end of a very long list, had been unfamiliar to our army officers, and, while it was disappointing, it was not surprising. It was fortunate that we were dealing with an enemy no livelier than Spain,



THE INVASION OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS MARCHING ON TRANSPORTS AT EMMA HAVEN

and it provided a very profitable lesson to be kept in mind in future.

But the officers worked untiringly, with the result that by the 8th the troops were on board the transports, and the expedition had actually set out under the convoy of the *Indiana*. It had gone but a little distance when it was peremptorily recalled, much to the disgust of the troops, who were crowded into rather close and warm quarters. At the last moment the War Department considered that it would be rash to set out without a stronger convoy. There had been repeated rumors that Spanish ships of war had been seen in the neighborhood of Cuba. They had generally been regarded as only new editions of similar rumors and reports that had been circulated from the very beginning of the war. These rumors gave Spain the credit of having a fleet almost everywhere on the Atlantic coast; but at just the moment the expedition was to set out for Santiago, where the navy was impatiently awaiting, came a circumstantial story declaring positively that a Spanish battleship, a cruiser, and two torpedo boats had been sighted sneaking about in the proposed path of the expedition. It was difficult to see where such a fleet could come from, unless the Cadiz fleet had slipped over unannounced; but the department proposed to take no chances, and back the expedition came, to await other war vessels.

At last, however, on the 15th, the expedition got under way for good. It consisted of sixteen infantry regiments of the regulars, two volunteer regiments (the Seventy-first New York and the Second Massachusetts), detachments of heavy and light artillery, engineer and signal corps, and a part of the First Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, a division of expert horsemen and sharpshooters, which had been organized by Roosevelt, and which was popularly known as the "Rough Riders."

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW — GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EXPERIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE.

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera's Fleet — Hobson Presents a Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent — Preparing the *Merrimac* for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Volunteers — Drawing Lots — Details of Hobson's Plans — Preparations Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances of Success — Battleships take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The *Merrimac* Moves in — Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the Shore — A Blaze of Fire — The Search of the Little Launch — Hobson Given up for Lost — How He Steamed into the Sheet of Flame — A Mine Explodes under the *Merrimac* — On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Spanish Launch Appears — An Offer to Surrender — "It was Admiral Cervera" — Prisoners in Morro — Their Fate Made Known.

FROM the time the authorities at Washington became confident that Cervera was at Santiago, plans for tightening the cork of the bottle, so to speak, were considered. Having the Spaniard there, every effort should be made to prevent his escape. Realizing his situation, as he certainly must have done, it might fairly be expected that on a dark, foggy, or stormy night he might work his way out sufficiently far to escape before being recognized. The Caribbean is noted for the fierceness and suddenness of some of its tropical storms, and in one of these the American fleet might be separated, or at least obliged to lie off at a great distance from the shore to ensure safety. At once, therefore, inquiries had been set afoot for some available old vessel which might be taken to Santiago and, possibly, sunk in the channel. In view of the defenses at the entrance, however, the dangers of the proposed operation seemed to render it impracticable, but Admiral Sampson kept it in mind when he set out for San-

tiago, hoping that when he had looked over the defenses a way might be found for such an attempt, and one of the first persons to claim an audience with him on his arrival on June 1st was Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson, a native of Alabama, twenty-seven years old, a graduate of the Naval Academy in 1889, a student of naval construction abroad at one time, and at this time holding the rank of lieutenant in the navy, and attached to the *New York*.

He had looked over the mouth of the harbor and laid before Admiral Sampson a plan which he claimed would effectually block the channel, so that a large part of the fleet would be at liberty to cover the landing of the expected troops elsewhere. It was a daring expedition which he proposed, and with true courage he offered to lead it himself, indeed, he desired the privilege of doing so. His plan was to select a volunteer crew of just sufficient number to navigate the collier *Merrimac*, to strip the old ship of everything of value except the coal remaining in her, and then under cover of darkness, while the fleet engaged the forts, to run her straight towards the narrowest part of the channel, swing her across it, and sink her by firing explosives in her bottom. He and his crew would jump overboard as she sank and endeavor to make their way out so as to be picked up by the torpedo boat *Porter* or a steam launch from the *New York*, which should lie in close to shore for that purpose. It was a startling proposition, an expedition which the admiral could not feel justified in ordering, as it would seem like sending men to certain death; but when one of his subordinates offered and begged to undertake it and urged the plan in eloquent and persuasive language, the admiral determined to put it into execution if possible. He had seen evidences of the cool bravery of Hobson at San Juan, where he had stood at the *New York's* range-finder throughout the bombardment.

Hobson was ready to act that night, and he received his commission to prepare the *Merrimac* for the ordeal immediately. While the officers of the collier were contentedly eat-

ing their lunch, Hobson appeared on board and made the startling announcement that he was going to sink their ship that night in the channel, and he proceeded to fit her for the emergency. The four transverse bulkheads were located and their positions marked on the outside at the rail. A belt line was run along the port side of the ship parallel to and under the water line, and on this suspended line in 8-inch copper cases were hung seven charges of brown prismatic powder, each weighing seventy-eight pounds. An igniting charge of four pounds of quick black powder was placed in the center of each can, and the whole covered with a mixture of tallow and pitch for protection against the water. Each torpedo also had a girth-line extending completely around the ship to hold it firmly in place. The wire and battery for exploding the charges were made ready, and as far as possible all stores were removed, leaving little in the ship except 2,000 tons of coal. The anchor chains were laid out on deck so that they would run out without hitch. The men worked merrily, singing as they prepared the collier for her fearful mission. At sunset a thunder storm blew up, covering the mountains about Santiago with dense clouds, which were rifted by brilliant flashes of lightning. The echoes of the thunder peals rolled off to the fleet in dull rumblings, like distant cannonading, and in the intervals could be heard the voices of the men on the *Merrimac* as they sang "The Star Spangled Banner" and "Home, Sweet Home."

These preparations took time, and Hobson and the crew were busy all that afternoon, and far into the night. Meanwhile, the admiral was making other preparations. Shortly after Hobson had gone to the *Merrimac*, the ships' crews of the fleet saw the following signal flying from the *New York*:

"An attempt will be made to-night to sink the collier *Merrimac* at the entrance to the harbor. One volunteer, an enlisted man, is requested from each ship."

Immediately the men were mustered on the quarter decks,

and the captains laid the plan before them, carefully explaining the unusual risks that the volunteers would incur, but practically the entire companies of the ships volunteered for the dangerous work. On Commodore Schley's flagship, the *Brooklyn*, alone, 150 men volunteered; on the *Texas* 140 signified their desire to go; Hobson and the admiral really had the pick of the men of the fleet. Sailors, machinists, firemen, engineers, petty officers, junior officers, all begged to be allowed to go. Commander Miller of the *Merrimac* was particularly anxious to go, and only left the ship after the admiral's formal order. The *New York's* launch was selected to run in shore and pick up survivors. There was intense rivalry among the volunteers for this service.

The volunteers, their comrades envying them as they departed for a task that meant certain glory, but almost as certain death, were taken to the *Merrimac*, where Hobson and a large force were busily at work, and where the admiral came aboard to examine the preparations. The squadron was moved down to the entrance of the harbor, lying off in a semicircle, and there they awaited the *Merrimac*. Hobson and his men worked away with a will. Realizing that in such a hazardous undertaking a mistake might prevent success, every detail was carried out with precision.

It was Hobson's purpose to creep in and approach the entrance from the westward until he could shape his course as near as possible directly for Estrella Point. He wished to put the bow of the boat near this point and then swing her across the channel. When the ship was sufficiently near, in his judgment, the helm was to be put hard aport. This would swing the ship across the channel and stop her headway. When she began to swing, the starboard bow-anchor would be let go with sixty fathoms of chain; then the starboard stern-anchor would be let go to check her, and the mines exploded. The strong flood tide was to be relied upon for assistance. The powder charges were about thirty-five feet apart and ten feet below the waterline.

The signals to the men at the anchors were to be given by ropes attached to their wrists and leading to the bridge, where it was Hobson's purpose to stand till he felt the ship settle. The other men, as soon as they had done the duty assigned to them, were to jump over the side and make for the lifeboat. Each man was carefully instructed in the duty he was expected to perform, and fully appreciated the desperate nature of the undertaking.

At last all preparations were completed, but by this time it was dawn. Hobson headed his ship in at about a 10-knot speed, but had been running but a few minutes when she was signaled to make for the flagship. This recall was a great disappointment to Hobson, and, in answer to the admiral's order, he signaled, requesting that he be allowed to make the attempt, late though it was, feeling certain that he could succeed. But the admiral feared that daylight might spoil the chances of success, and a positive order was given Hobson to stop.

So the fires were banked, and it was decided to postpone the attempt till the following night. The men left their stations and the vessel steamed further off shore. The strain had been very great on the men, who had nerved themselves for the trying moment, and the reaction was most depressing. One of the crew, named Mullen, boatswain of the *Merrimac*, assigned to peculiarly hazardous duty, and who had been at work all night and the previous day, was so much exhausted that Captain Chadwick forbade his going. His substitute was selected by the crew of the *Iowa* as their representative. The crew was then made up as follows:

Lieut. Richmond Pearson Hobson.

Osborn Warren Deignan, a coxswain of the *Merrimac*

George F. Phillips, a machinist of the *Merrimac*.

Francis Kelly, a water-tender of the *Merrimac*.

George Charette, a gunner's mate of the *New York*.

Daniel Montague, chief master-at-arms of the *New York*

J. E. Murphy, a coxswain of the *Iowa*.

Randolph Clausen, a coxswain of the *New York*.

The men lay around the *Merrimac* most of the day, attempting to secure a little rest, and some slight changes were made in the plans. Additional batteries were obtained, and an additional powder charge was made ready on the port side. The large catamaran of the ship was slung over the side by a single line. Hobson decided that it would be safer to explode each charge separately, and directed that the men below, as soon as their duties were performed, should assist in this work before jumping overboard.

Hobson, who had spent most of the afternoon on the flagship, boarded the *Merrimac* again at seven o'clock, went below and tried to secure a little rest, of which he stood sadly in need.

At sunset the fleet again took up its formation before the entrance to the harbor, in an arc of a circle of five miles radius, with Morro Castle in the center. Beginning to the westward they stood in this order: *Vixen*, *Brooklyn*, *Marblehead*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *New York*, *New Orleans*, and *Mayflower*. The other boats remained outside the circle, while the *Dolphin* and *Porter* acted as dispatch boats. The evening wore away slowly. A full moon bathed the quiet waters of the Caribbean in a splendid luster of silver, and the high mountains in front of Santiago lay in a robe of white mist. The scene was beautifully peaceful.

On the decks of the ships lay the crews, with only rubber blankets beneath them. The men are numbered, and when in the presence of the enemy the even and the odd numbers sleep alternately, two hours at a time, with their guns and small arms at their sides. In the event of a torpedo attack each man slaps on the shoulder the man next to him who is sleeping, and then the guns are turned on the enemy. So they were sleeping on the moonlight night of the 2d of June, into the moonlight morning of the 3d.

At about 1:30 A. M., Hobson came up on the bridge of the *Merrimac*. All the men who were to go with the ship were called up and given final instructions. Everything was made

ready below. Hobson's men took their positions, and at about 2:30 o'clock the ship began to steam slowly towards the entrance.

Every man on the fighting ships, odd or even, was awake now, and the progress of the big black hulk of the *Merrimac* was watched with breathless interest. On towards the misty entrance she moved, followed by the launch of the *New York*, with a crew of five, in command of Cadet Joseph W. Powell. The moon sank behind a bank of clouds near the horizon, and then the *Merrimac* could no longer be distinguished from the ships. The lower shore line was indistinguishable in the haze which hid the entrance; still the crews on the big ships watched and waited, expecting to see a burst of fire from the forts.

The crew in the steam launch had a nearer view and saw the *Merrimac* heading straight in; Lieutenant Hobson stood on the bridge; the other men were at their posts, in a uniform of underwear, with life preservers to aid in their escape if they should be compelled to swim a long distance. The watchers saw the old collier head straight for Estrella Point, saw her swing across the channel, apparently undiscovered, for not a sound had as yet broken the stillness, heard two of her seven charges explode, and then began a screaming, flashing, death-dealing fire from the Spanish ships and batteries. The rest was hidden from the view of the ships and the launch.

It was about 3:15 when the first gun flashed out in the misty entrance, but it was followed by a fusilade of rapid-fire guns. Some of the batteries near the entrance directed their fire at the little launch, but in the face of it all Cadet Powell and his crew continued to wait and search for Hobson and his gallant heroes. They saw the guns of the *Cristobal Colon* and the *Reina Mercedes*, which had been supposed to be gunless, turned on their launch and thundering in their ears. Still they searched and waited. Those on the line of battle-ships could see only the sheet of flame ahead. At last the fire slackened somewhat, and by the light of the dawn, now tinge-

ing the sky and land, the little launch was seen steaming from west to east near the mouth of the entrance.

Then she steamed back from east to west and began skirting the coast to the west of the entrance. The batteries were still firing at her, but she went as far as a small cove on the shore, then put about and steamed for the flagship.

It was broad daylight by this time. As the launch came alongside Cadet Powell shouted:

“No one has come out of the entrance of the harbor.”

His words seemed like the death knell of all who had gone in on the *Merrimac*, and as it grew lighter they could see the tops of the old collier's masts in the center of the channel, about where Hobson said he would sink her.

It seemed incredible, almost impossible, that any of the *Merrimac's* heroes could have lived through that awful fire. There were few men in the fleet who did not think that all of the crew had perished. Still they hoped against hope.

But we must return and follow the *Merrimac* as she disappeared from the view of the ships, first in the mist and then in the blaze of fire which broke out from both sides. Hobson, standing on the bridge, kept his eyes fast fixed on the channel ahead, every nerve strained, waiting for the time when he could sink the ship. That was the work before him. He could pay no attention to the fire and he was not there to answer it. The shells from the large guns on the hills first roared about the ship and then the rapid fire from the Spanish cruisers joined in, their shots screaming through the rigging; troops from some of the camps in the hills came rushing down, and as the collier approached the Estrella battery the soldiers lined the foot of the cliffs; rifle bullets whistled above them, but Hobson could see that they were firing wildly at him; the Spaniards were actually killing each other with their cross fire, those on one bank shooting down those on the other.

The *Merrimac's* steering gear was disabled when she reached Estrella Point, and a large projectile cut the anchor lashing. Only two of the torpedoes exploded, but a large sub-

marine mine fired by the Spaniards exploded directly beneath her. Her stern instead of her bow ran on Estrella Point and she began to sink slowly and steadily. She was just across the channel, going just where Hobson wished her to, but as she settled the tide drifted her around.

After firing the torpedoes and getting the ship in place, Hobson and his men all ran aft and lay down on the deck waiting for the water to reach it. Shells and bullets were making a terrific din about them. The air seemed full of fire.

Torpedoes from the *Reina Mercedes* came tearing into the collier, crashing into the wood and iron, while the plunging shots from the forts broke through her decks, riddling it all about them.

"Not a man must move," shouted Hobson to those lying beside him; and it was largely owing to the splendid discipline of the men that they escaped the terrific fire. As the shells rained over them, minutes seemed hours of suspense; the old vessel seemed to sink very slowly. The men's mouths grew parched, but they dared not move.

"Hadn't we better drop off now, sir?" a man would ask as he lay prone on the deck expecting the next shell to come their way.

"Wait," said Hobson. "We must wait till daylight, perhaps."

Wait in that hail of shot and shell! But Hobson knew it would be impossible for them to escape in the life-boat to any place but the shore, which was lined with soldiers. He hoped that by daylight some of the fleet might rescue them. Fortunately, the Spaniards fired mostly at the bow of the old *Merrimac*. It was being riddled and she was sinking faster. Still Hobson and his men lay there motionless. Finally, the water came to the decks where they were. It had become daylight; the Spaniards thought no life remained on the *Merrimac*, and the firing ceased. Then the men slipped off into the water and clung to the sides of the catamaran, which was floating amid the wreckage but still fastened to the old hulk.

Only their heads were above the water, and the boats that were out with lanterns looking for refugees did not find them. The Spaniards seemed to have overlooked them.

As it grew lighter they noticed a Spanish launch coming towards the *Merrimac*, and Lieutenant Hobson hailed it. A squad of marines filed out and pointed their rifles at their heads.

"Is there any officer on that boat to receive a surrender of prisoners of war?" shouted Hobson.

An elderly man leaped out from under the awning and waved his hand. It was Admiral Cervera. The marines lowered their rifles; and Hobson and his men, two of them in the last stages of exhaustion, were helped into the launch, objects of admiration and awe to the Spanish marines. The lieutenant surrendered himself and his men, and they were treated with the kindest courtesy. They were taken ashore and put in cells in that Morro upon which they had looked so often from the sea, and now through their barred windows they beheld the fleet where officers and crews were wondering and perhaps despairing of their fate.

The day dragged on. Hobson and his men were given up for lost. Finally, in the afternoon, a Spanish launch flying a flag of truce was seen coming out of the harbor. Had it come to tell them that Hobson and his men were dead? Or had it come to tell them that they were alive? Out went the *Vicen* to meet the tug; a Spanish officer was taken on board and the *Vicen* hurried off to the flagship. Then every man's eyes were on the *New York*, and at last they read a signal:

"Collier's crew prisoners of war; two slightly wounded. All well."

A mighty cheer went up. The Spanish officer informed the admiral that the prisoners were confined in Morro Castle and that Admiral Cervera had considered their adventure an act of such great bravery and desperate daring that he deemed it proper to notify the American commander of the safety of the men. Whatever the motive for sending out the officer

under a flag of truce, the act was considered a very graceful and courteous one, though the suspicion at once crossed the minds of the American officers that the prisoners might have been placed in Morro to save the fort from attack. The Spanish officer is reported to have said in reference to the sinking of the *Merrimac*: "You have made it more difficult, but we can still get out."

From the bearings taken of the *Merrimac*, whose masts and smokepipes only could be seen, it was plainly evident now that she had swung around so that she was not lying across the channel; so far as completely blocking the channel, the attempt had not been wholly successful. Still, the event deserved a place in history as one of the bravest and most daring deeds in naval annals.

No parallel to the achievement could be found in naval warfare. Somers had shown a magnificent daring when he blew up the ketch in the harbor of Tripoli and Cushing's dash upon the *Albatross* was likewise heroic. But both of these crept to their destination in little vessels. Hobson steamed into a narrow channel with a huge 4,000-ton ship, in plain view of the batteries, almost under the muzzle of their guns; he moved to a particular spot, maneuvered his vessel in a particular way and worked to sink her in a particular position, under a hail of shot and shell which rendered the chances of success infinitely remote. To conceive that the thing could be done was an inspiration; to be willing to do it was the highest heroism; to do it coolly, deliberately, and with professional skill under the fearful fire was marvelous. The men who went with Hobson should not be forgotten, and when it is recalled that hundreds of others were ready to follow his lead, and were greatly disappointed that they could not, there need be no discounting the valor of Americans.

CHAPTER XL

LANDING OF MARINES IN GUANTANAMO BAY—SUR- ROUNDED BY HIDDEN ENEMIES—SPANIARDS CAUGHT AT LAST—SHARP NAVAL FIGHT AT SAN JUAN.

Spaniards Strengthen Their Position—Bombarding the Forts at the Harbor Mouth—The *Reina Mercedes* Wrecked—Looking for a Possible Place for the Army to Land—Pluck of the Naval Reserves—Landing the Marines—Preparing Camp McCalla—Its Peculiar Position—Fatal Search for the Enemy—No Sleep for the Marines—Mauser Bullets Continually Whistling Through the Camp—Bravely Facing the Foe—Untenable Position of the Camp—Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortége—Driving Them Back and Resuming the Services—Attacked from a New Quarter—A Critical Situation—The Enemy Caught in a Trap—Slaughtered without Mercy—The Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position—The Blockade of San Juan—Arrival of the *St. Paul*—The *Terror* Makes an Attack—A Broadside from the *St. Paul*.


DURING the long wait for the appearance of the army upon which it was proposed to place the burden of taking the city, the navy was much of the time lying idly off Santiago, and Cervera's ships were apparently as idle within the harbor. The Spaniards, however, being fully informed of the intended military expedition and of the purpose of the United States to reduce the city and capture the Spanish fleet before doing anything more, became very busy in strengthening the land fortifications, so that altogether, from a theoretical point of view, their position was impregnable. Admiral Sampson, who was opposed to any rash experiments endangering his fleet, endeavored to make some preparations likely to be of advantage when the army arrived. He was compelled to bear in mind the fact that Cervera might at any time seek to escape, for it was now understood that Hobson's heroic act had not been entirely successful. Either in a battle with Cervera at the entrance of the harbor or in co-operating

with General Shafter, who was to command the army, the forts might give some trouble, and he, therefore, set out to weaken or reduce their batteries on June 6th.

The fleet was formed in a double line about six miles from shore. They approached to within 3,000 yards of the batteries, pouring in a tremendous fire for an hour with generally fine marksmanship, driving the Spaniards from their guns, crushing down masonry and earthworks, and receiving unharmed the fire of the Spanish Krupp and Armstrong guns. As Mr. Hobson and his men were then confined in the Morro, written orders were given not to fire upon it, but it was occasionally struck by stray shells. Only one man on the fleet was injured, and he but slightly. During part of the engagement American vessels went within 1,000 yards of the forts and drove the Spaniards from the guns. The *Reina Mercedes*, which lay near the mouth of the harbor, was practically wrecked, but the Spaniards had already removed most of her guns and mounted them on shore.

In searching for a favorable place for the expected troops to land, Admiral Sampson's attention was attracted towards the harbor of Guantanamo, about forty miles east of Santiago. To clearly understand the problem which General Shafter was to meet when he came to consider the landing of his troops, it should be borne in mind that the coast of Cuba between Santiago and Guantanamo is in a general way formed of three parallel ranges of hills. First there is the rampart on the sea front, a high flat-topped ridge very steep in most places, and broken into terraces by outcropping ledges of limestone; behind this are foothills rising out of the wooded valleys, and behind that and another line of valleys or ravines are the high mountains of the coast range, about six miles from the shore. In the vicinity of Santiago the rampart or outer ridge along the sea front is about 300 feet high, stretching eastward and westward like a great stone wall. At two places this wall is cut down to the sea level in two narrow clefts or notches about 100 yards wide at the bottom, and

these appear to be the only openings through which the interior of the country is accessible to an invading force. In one of these and the nearest to Santiago lies the village and railway station of Siboney, and in the other the village which takes its name from the Daiquiri River emptying at that point.



ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF GUANTANAMO.

Showing Camps of the Marines, where the first Engagements between the American and Spanish forces occurred.

But it could not fail to appear to Admiral Sampson or to anyone that a landing in either of these places would be difficult, perhaps impossible, if opposed strongly by a daring enemy. Even without artillery, 1,000 men with Mausers on the heights surrounding the notches and the approaches might keep back a strong landing force for days, for, if driven from the tops of the bluff, the Spaniards could fortify the foot-

hills beyond and be out of reach of the heavy guns of the war-ships.

If General Shafter should, upon examination, prefer not to land his troops in Guantanamo Bay, because it would imply a march through the foothills of forty miles to Santiago, the harbor would at least be very useful as a naval rendezvous and coaling station. The ships had lain out to sea a long time, and at times had been obliged to coal under extremely unfavorable conditions. Guantanamo Bay afforded a splendid shelter for the fleet, and it was believed that a small party of marines could establish themselves there and control the entrance.

On the day after the attack on the forts about Morro, therefore, Admiral Sampson sent the *Marblehead*, with the *Yankee* and *St. Louis*, to shell the defenses of Guantanamo Bay, cut the cables, and prepare for a landing. The Spanish fortifications were battered to pieces, and while the Spaniards stood by their guns for a time they soon retreated. The naval reserves, who manned the *Yankee*, acquitted themselves with great credit under the fire. A Spanish gunboat had the temerity to come down and fire upon the American ships, but the *Yankee's* guns quickly drove her back, and soon afterwards the *Marblehead* took a position to hold the harbor till the landing party should arrive.

It arrived on the 10th of June, a body of 600 Brooklyn marines on the *Panther*, and with them came the *Oregon*, *Dolphin*, and *Yosemite* to protect their landing. The marines, who had been chafing under inaction for nearly a month, joyfully jumped into the boats and were landed without a shot being fired. The Spaniards had apparently deserted the landing point, which was chiefly occupied by the huts of the Guantanamo fishermen and pilots, and these huts, as well as the blockhouse, which had been partly destroyed in the previous bombardment, were burned as a precaution against yellow fever. The Stars and Stripes were quickly raised on the bluff by Color Sergeant Silvey, and the marines set merrily to



THE FIRST BLOODY ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS IN CUBA.
United States Marines at Guantanamo repelling a midnight attack of Spanish soldiers with the aid of the sea in light of the "Maine".
Sunday morning, June 12, 1898.



work getting their tents and other appliances ashore and laying out a camp to be called Camp McCalla, in honor of the commander of the *Marblehead*.

All the land, except that on the top of the bluffs selected for the camp, was covered with woods and thick tropical bushes, and the only road was a mule path skirting the mountain. The landward approach was on the south side, and here the hill fell away to a foothill, backed up against the high ridge or rampart running along the shore of the Caribbean. West of the camp was the bay, to the north was Fisherman's Point, where the landing was effected, and to the east was a lagoon putting into the foothills above mentioned. All that night and the next day the marines worked with energy in establishing their camp, and incoming sentries on the morning of the 11th reported that none of the enemy had been seen. The worst foe they had encountered were the mosquitoes, which abound in the chaparral or thickets.

But at about 5:30 o'clock that afternoon a weather-beaten old insurgent rushed into camp from the road leading from the valley over to the tall hills three miles distant, and reported that a skirmish line of Spaniards was advancing. He was not a moment too soon, for a bullet from a Mauser rifle came hot on his trail. Before the camp could make any preparations, the Spaniards were making a fierce attack on the outposts from the bushes near the lagoon.

Fully fifteen minutes of lively firing followed. Every marine in the camp wished to dash into the bushes and at once chase the hidden foe, but Colonel Huntington and his officers kept their men in check, and prepared to resist the attack on the camp. Trenches had not been dug and the only shelter for the few sick men and non-combatants was in the ruins of the blockhouse. So fierce was the firing that Commander McCalla of the *Marblehead*, thinking the Spaniards were attacking the camp with a large force, hurried his marines ashore, and fifty or sixty of the camp marines, who had been refreshing themselves by a bath in the bay, ran half-naked up the

hills, caught up their guns, and went to the aid of their comrades. For nearly three-quarters of an hour shots were exchanged, now brisk, then a scattering fire across the lagoon, or out of the thickets. It was nearly dark when the outermost sentries came in, hot, wearied, and panting. Three of their men were missing, but one of them appeared later all right. Two had been killed in the bushes.

There was a hasty meal of hardtack and coffee, but no sleep for the men that night. The enemy continued to harass the sentry lines, and Mauser bullets constantly whistled through the camp. Commander McCalla kept the search-lights of his vessel trained upon the dense thickets, but the Spaniards concealed their movements. At least a dozen different attacks were made on the camp between dusk and dawn, the heaviest and the best organized being made about one o'clock in the morning. Then, apparently, the Spaniards had completely surrounded the camp, and they poured in volley after volley. But the marines, though hemmed in, bravely kept their faces to the foe, and maintained a lively return fire. At no time was it possible for the marines to see objects twenty yards away, and only by the flash of the enemy's guns could the whereabouts of the attacking party be learned.

During the hottest of the fighting, four of the little camp force were killed, including Dr. Gibbs, a New York physician, who was picked off by a guerrilla as he stood near the hospital tent. The enemy's loss proved to be heavy, but the marines at the time could judge nothing of the effect of their volleys, as the bushes seemed to be full of Spaniards, maintaining an exasperating fire, first from one side and then the other. The *Marblehead* and other vessels in the harbor dropped shells into the thickets from which the Spanish fire seemed to come, and this caused its temporary cessation from that quarter, only to be soon and suddenly renewed from another.

At last the officers were convinced that the camp was untenable; while it was on high ground and ought to be advantageous in case of attack, little could be done against the Span-

iards hiding in the surrounding thickets and having a full view of the exposed camp. It was decided to remove it to another location on the hillside near the sea, and this work was vigorously prosecuted on Sunday, the 12th, while the Spaniards maintained their annoying attacks, well illustrated by their fire upon the little party attending the funeral services of those who had been killed the day before.

The bodies of the dead marines were wrapped in black oilskins taken from their tents. Graves were dug on the edge of a hill overlooking the bay to the northward of the camp. A squad of marines from the *Texas*, under command of Lieutenant Radford, acted as escort to the cortège as it passed slowly along to the field where the dead were to be laid to rest. It was impossible for all the men to attend the funeral. They had other work to do, work on which depended the safety of every man ashore. While some of the marines took the bodies of their comrades to their graves, the others proceeded with the main work, some continuously on the lookout for the enemy, others busy with the details of removing the camp.

There had been a lull for a few minutes in the firing, and the men had a chance to look about and see what was going on. One by one, as they observed the little funeral procession stumbling over the loose stones on the camp ground, those who could do so hurried forward, fell in behind and grouped themselves about the empty graves. The stretcher bearing the bodies was lifted to its place, and Chaplain Jones of the *Texas* was about to begin the reading of the burial service, when the Spaniards, who could see plainly what the men had gathered for, gave a remarkable exhibition of their boasted chivalry. Concealed in the bushes and trees of the western thickets, they began shooting at the party, and this action convinced the marines, if conviction were needed, that the stories told of Spanish barbarism were true.

The graves were deserted by all save the chaplain and the little escort, who still stood unmoved. Everywhere men sprang to arms and placed themselves behind the rolled tents,

their knapsacks, the bushes in the hollows, or boxes and piles of stones with rifles ready and eyes strained into the brush. The little Colt's guns which had been brought up from the ships began their clatter, howitzers roared, blue smoke arose where the shells struck and burst in the chaparral, and rifles snapped angrily. There was trouble for the Spaniards in that particular place whence their bullets came, and shortly the firing ceased everywhere in the brush and the funeral was resumed. The *Texas* kept using her smaller guns on the chaparral near the camp, and once more the men gathered about the grave and Chaplain Jones began reading the Episcopal service. He had nearly finished when the rifles of the enemy cracked again, this time to the east.

A dozen men in the pits by the old blockhouse answered and the chaplain kept right on with the solemn service. When he had finished, the men again took their rifles and resumed their watching, and the *Panther* shelled the brush to the east. From that time on less trouble was experienced. In the afternoon, the tents were all struck and carried to the low stretch of land rising from the beach, but were not again pitched, because they made too good targets while the Spaniards were in the brush.

The situation for a time seemed decidedly critical. The marines were obliged to forego all sleep and the skirmishing was incessant day and night. The vessels in the harbor dropped shells into the bushes, but the Spaniards kept reappearing at different places. In the end, however, the incomparable superiority of the Americans in marksmanship, in coolness, and steadiness of nerve was triumphant. On Tuesday, the 14th, Colonel Huntington abandoned defensive tactics and sent out four scouting parties with orders to make an aggressive fight. This they did in a most effective manner. Each detachment fell in with the skulking Spaniards and gradually worked them between their fires. Early in the afternoon, Captain Elliot drove the main body of the Spaniards over the crest of the third hill, where Lieutenant Magill had

another division, which poured a deadly fire into them as they descended. They ran back to the crest of the hill, and this the *Dolphin*, which was in position, swept with a murderous fire of 4-inch shells. The Spaniards rushed down the hill again, and again fell into the clutches of Captain Elliot's men, including some Cubans, who fought their old enemies like demons. Spaniards were falling all along the line, and they rushed back, endeavoring again to escape along the crest of the hill, and there they were again met by the *Dolphin's* shells. Turn which way they would, they were face to face with an American fire that had no mercy in it. As the Spaniards rushed along the crest of the hill, they came face to face suddenly with a third scouting party under Captain Spicer. Then in desperation they turned back and ran into the marines under Captain Elliot and Lieutenant Magill. Thus they fought desperately, refusing to surrender till more than 200 lay dead on the hill. And the only casualty that day on the American side was one Cuban killed. The Americans left their Cuban allies to pursue the remnant and returned to camp with a score of prisoners and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. They had no more serious trouble with the enemy at Camp McCalla. In view of the dangers to which the camp had been exposed for five days, almost constantly under fire, it is certainly remarkable that no more than five lives were lost.

On the 15th, the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, and *Suwanee* steamed up the bay and attacked the fortifications at Caimanera, about three miles above Camp McCalla, and a bombardment of a few minutes was sufficient to drive the Spaniards from their guns, and an hour completely destroyed the forts and earthworks which formed the main defense of the inner bay.

But it was plain to the eyes of the officers that the place was not a good one for the landing of an army for the investment of Santiago forty miles away. No roads existed, and it would have been a difficult undertaking to have handled heavy artillery in such a mountainous country, which had been so well adapted to the Cuban guerrilla warfare. It was near

Guantanamo, it will be remembered, that Goulet and his bands had their early successes in the Cuban revolution.

Little was left for Admiral Sampson to do until the army arrived, but he did not leave the Spanish forces at Santiago unoccupied. On the 16th, he again shelled the enemy's batteries and demolished some new earthworks within his reach. Having received information that Hobson and his men had been transferred from the Morro prison to the barracks in the outskirts of the city, he no longer felt any hesitation as to breaking down the historic walls of the old castle. Again the wretched marksmanship of the Spaniards saved the fleet from any damage. One of the most interesting features of the work before the harbor at this time was the successful practical trial of the gunboat *Vesuvius*. This boat, which threw through her pneumatic guns charges of guncotton varying from two hundred to four hundred pounds, would fire her three guns in quick succession. The explosive force of her shells was tremendous. They wrought havoc where they struck, and the performance was repeated several times, much to the terror of the Spaniards.

The war was not without some important and interesting incidents in other quarters at this time. From the beginning it had been the purpose of the government to operate in Puerto Rico, and arrangements for sending an expedition to that island were under way even while the one to Santiago was causing so much trouble and delay. In accordance with this plan, a blockade had been declared against the port of San Juan, and the *St. Paul*, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, was sent to institute it. In the interval between Cervera's arrival at Santiago and the beginning of operations against Santiago, the torpedo boat-destroyer *Terror*, which Cervera had left at Martinique for repairs, had made her way to San Juan, and as there was no way of her reaching Cervera then, there she remained. The *Isabella II.*, an old cruiser, and one or two gunboats, were also in the port.

When the *St. Paul* arrived before the harbor on June 22d,



AN ALARM NEAR THE SPANISH LINE AT SHONEN. CREAN SCOUTS RALLYING AROUND A UNITED STATES
DESPATCH BEAKER.

the Spanish lookouts took her for the *St. Louis*, which they knew was lightly armed, and the commanders of the *Terror* and *Isabella II.* figured that they could run out and destroy the former liner before they were within reach of her guns. So confident were they that they boastingly made public their plans, and as a result the Spanish people in the city gave the officers a great ovation, and the commander of the *Terror* made a speech in the public square, declaring that he was going out to engage the Yankee warship and inviting the people to ascend the hills and watch the fight. This they did, and the cloud of witnesses were noticed through the glasses of the officers on the *St. Paul* before they knew what it meant.

About 1 o'clock, when the men were at mess, the lookouts discovered a steamer coming out of the harbor. The *St. Paul* was then about seven miles out, but she was turned towards the approaching vessel and steamed at full speed to meet her. The character of the vessel had not been made out as yet, but the prospects even of holding up a merchantman was sufficient to bring every man to the deck. The strange craft wasted little time in informing the *St. Paul* of her character, for she dropped a shell within a thousand yards of the liner, which was immediately put around so that the *Isabella II.*, for she it was, might have the benefit of a broadside when she approached near enough. But the Spaniard decided to come no nearer, much to the disgust of the men at the guns of the *St. Paul*. It was at this moment that the lookout reported the little destroyer sneaking out of the harbor under cover of the cruiser. Under all the recognized rules of naval warfare, it was rather dangerous for the converted liner to attack a cruiser reinforced by so dangerous a craft as the *Terror* was supposed to be, but our sailors were eager for a fight.

The *Isabella II.* continued to throw shells in the direction of the *St. Paul*, but Captain Sig-see paid little attention to her at this time. Instead, he worked along with the *Terror*, endeavoring to separate her from the cruiser and to keep her in the trough of the sea if she undertook to run for the *St.*

Paul. This she did when her commander saw that the *St. Paul* was thus maneuvering. It was a dangerous moment, for everything depended upon the gunnery of the *St. Paul's* men. Unless stopped by well-directed shots, there was nothing to prevent her from getting close enough to launch a torpedo, and then no one on the *St. Paul* might live to tell the tale. But Captain Sigsbee and his men were perfectly cool; they allowed the *Terror* to get within 6,000 yards, and then they let go the whole starboard battery.

The *Terror* had evidently been hit, and both Spanish vessels began to act as if they were rather sorry they had come out. The *St. Paul* worked up closer, and the Spaniards at once made preparations to retreat. After putting two shots into the *Terror* and knocking her after smokestack into the sea, Captain Sigsbee turned his attention for a moment to the *Isabella II.*, which had been wasting hundreds of dollars worth of ammunition in a wild fire. Then another gunboat came out of the harbor and the *Terror* began to show further signs of fight. Her gunners were beginning to get the range, and were dropping a few shots uncomfortably near the *St. Paul*. But as soon as the latter's guns were again trained on the saucy torpedo boat, she turned about and started full speed for the harbor. At this juncture a remarkable shot was made from one of the *St. Paul's* 5-inch guns. A shell struck the retreating *Terror* on the port side near the stern, and went clear into the engine-room, killing the engineer and wounding several others, wrecking the machinery, and placing the boat in a sinking condition. Her propellers stopped working, and she drifted in a westerly direction, signaling for help. In a few moments a vessel came out and took her in tow, but it was too late to run her into the harbor; she was taken ashore and beached in shallow water. The people on the cliff who had come out to see the Yankee sunk saw her still afloat, while the wreck of the *Terror* lay on the sands.

CHAPTER XLI

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT DAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY— THE ADVANCE THROUGH CUBAN THICKETS—A MAG- NIFICENT CHARGE AND A DECISIVE VICTORY.

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter's Army—Admiral Sampson and General Shafter Consult—Meeting the Cuban Leaders—Enthusiastic Cubans—Daiquiri Selected as a Landing Place—Plans and Preparations—Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera—Incidents of a Difficult Landing—Unfurling the Stars and Stripes—On the Road to Santiago—Yankee Ingenuity—The Enemy's Retreat to Guasimas—General Wheeler Decides to Attack—Moving Ahead on Difficult Trails and under a Burning Sun—The Music of a Mauser Bullet—Rough Riders Attacked—A Fierce Battle is On—Deploying Through the Thickets—Death in the Ranks—A Relentless Advance—Victory and a Well-earned Rest—The Dead and Wounded—Camara Leaves Cadiz—His Trip to the Suez Canal.

WITH flags flying and the guns of Admiral Sampson's flagship booming a salute to General Shafter commanding, the army of invasion steamed grandly up almost to within range of the guns of Morro, or what was left of them, at a little after noon on June 20th, just two months after the opening of the war, and one month after Cervera had entered Santiago harbor. The great transports and their convoys presented an impressive sight, stretching out over eight miles of the Caribbean Sea and gently moving with the heavy ground swell as though courtesying to the grim warships which had so long awaited their coming. The decks were thronged with soldiers gazing at the remarkable scene before them. The line paraded in single file past the warships, each vessel dipping her flag to the admiral as she passed. The battleship *Indiana* was in the lead, followed by the gunboats *Bancroft*, *Castine*, *Machias*, and *Annapolis*. Then followed the transports, while the rear was brought up

by the cruiser *Detroit* and several other smaller convoys. General Shafter was immediately taken to the flagship, where he informed the admiral that the trip had been without incident of note, and plans were at once considered for the landing of the troops, eager to leave the crowded transports.

The admiral had already made arrangements for a consultation with the Cuban leaders, and that afternoon a preliminary landing for this purpose was made at Aserraderos, a point about twenty miles west of Santiago, which the Cuban General Rabi had occupied a few weeks before and was still holding. Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, with but a small escort, were rowed to the beach in a small boat, which was met by a mounted force of Cuban officers. The party was conducted to General Rabi's headquarters, where a conference was held, General Garcia, the Cuban commander in the province, being present. The camp was a curious collection of shelters made of palm leaves after the Cuban fashion, situated on the crest of a rugged hill. The soldiers, though only half clothed, were well equipped with arms.

It was evident that Aserraderos was no place for a landing, for the so-called road leading to Santiago was only a mule path over which it would require many days of hard work to transport artillery, and the city was on the opposite side of the bay. Guantanamo, on the east, Shafter considered equally bad, and still further away. It was agreed that Daiquiri, about fifteen miles east of Morro, would be the best place, though it was admitted that it would be difficult to land there if the Spaniards made a very stout resistance. With the aid of the ships and a plan for diverting the attention of the enemy to other points, however, General Shafter thought it could be done without great loss.

The plan as finally agreed upon was to begin the landing at Daiquiri soon after daylight the 22d. General Castillo was ordered to bring a thousand Cubans to flank out the Spanish on the east of the landing, while four vessels were to shell the beach and blockhouses, the *Detroit* and *Castine* on the west-



BLACK HORSE AT SIMONEY WHERE THE UNITED STATES TROOPS FIRST HOISTED THE STARS AND STRIPS.
AFTERWARDS MADE A BASE OF SUPPLIES.

ward flank and the *New Orleans* and *Wasp* on the eastern flank. In order to deceive the enemy, feints were arranged for other points; vessels were to take positions at daylight in front of Siboney and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Morro and somewhat nearer than Daiquiri, and also in the bay of Cabañas to the westward of Morro. In the latter place a feint of landing would be made. The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* were to retain their positions in front of the mouth of the harbor. The last clause of Admiral Sampson's order to his vessels was significant. It read:

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward—both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon."

The plan as outlined worked at first with satisfactory success. The feints deceived the Spanish; the bombardment by the ships was described in the Spanish reports to Madrid as terrific and insupportable; the Cubans did their share in distracting the enemy, which fled from Daiquiri's blockhouse to posts along the coast towards Sevilla, a town about six miles east of Santiago and about three miles from the shore. Before they fled from Daiquiri an attempt was made to burn the town and the supplies, but much of it was left unharmed, even food was found cooking for the Spaniards' breakfast. The only damage suffered by the fleet in the engagement was on board the *Texas*; a shell from Socapa battery happened to strike her, killing one sailor and wounding eight.

When the signal for landing was given, scores of rowboats, steam launches, and dispatch boats crowded with soldiers made for the little pier belonging to the Spanish-American Iron Company. The men at the oars pulled hard in a desire to be the first to land, the steam launches rolled and pitched and puffed, while over them flew the shots from the gunboats, tearing off the roofs of the huts and battering the blockhouses

to pieces. The waves ran high and as the first of the launches approached the pier it was suddenly lifted and the men, in attempting to spring out, were thrown violently to the wharf; others were scrambling out of rowboats through the surf; then a cheer arose and was caught up by the sailors on the warships and the soldiers on the transports; men waved their hats, jumped up and down and cheered. But the noise was even louder when a little later four men were seen scaling the sheer face of the mountain up the narrow trail to the highest blockhouse; for a moment they were outlined against the sky by the side of the blockhouse and all was still; then up went a flag, out flashed the Stars and Stripes against the blue sky at the very top of the ridge. Sailors, Cubans, and soldiers, on land and on sea, shouted and cheered again, and every steam whistle for miles around shrieked and tooted and roared in a pandemonium of delight and triumph.

Throughout the day smoke was issuing from the burning buildings of the town. Outside were the transports, ranging from the huge coastwise steamer to side-wheelers and nondescript vessels. All were constantly moving to overcome the drift of the current. Among them and spread out to either shore were the convoys whose keen-eyed lookouts scanned the beach and hills beyond. Small boats were everywhere. They came and went singly, in pairs, in groups, in long lines, rowed and towed. They clung to the ships, they lined the landing wharf, and they filled the space between.

The men, after landing at the low wharf inside the iron pier, straggled up a level bit of sand beyond it. Then they fell into companies, and, marching away, were soon lost to view in the tangle of tropical underbrush. Of the thousands who landed, not more than 200 were in sight at any time on shore.

All day long and all the next day the boats went back and forth, landing the soldiers at Daiquiri without resistance, and the Spaniards having evacuated Siboney, that place was taken for the landing of other troops and the horses and mules; the

latter were pitched overboard in the expectation that they would swim ashore, and most of them did so, though a few swam directly out to sea and were drowned. Landing 15,000 men, with arms and equipment and all the paraphernalia of war, on such a beach without the aid of lighters was a long and difficult undertaking even when unresisted. If the Spaniards had made a bold stand at the first it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, but they feared the guns of the fleet and fell back to the hills.

General Lawton, who was in command of the advance landing party, occupied the town of Daiquiri the first night, posting sentries about in the hills, and General Young's troops had advanced some distance on the road to Santiago. The next day the head of the column was pushed further on. One road runs along the coast behind the cliffs for some distance, but it was found to be hardly more than a wood path overgrown with bushes and shut in on either side by the chaparral. Another road, but no better, runs to the north of this to Juragua and Seville, where the Spanish general, Linares, had assembled his forces for resistance. Either road was a dangerous one to follow and artillery could be moved up but slowly. Yet the men worked bravely on, the line moving ahead on the roads as it was landed from the transports without a challenge from the enemy.

An interesting incident of the march through the village of Demajayabo on the 23d was the capture of a locomotive left by the Spaniards standing on the track with steam up. Before they scampered away they attempted to disable the engine, but their efforts merely served to again illustrate Spanish lack of mechanical skill and the ingenuity of the Yankee. The railroad employes had hurriedly taken off the connecting rods, throttle gear, and other important pieces of the machinery, concealing them behind fences and under cars, and even burying some of them. Then, after blocking the piston guides with pieces of wood, they ran off in the firm belief that they had put the locomotive permanently out of commission.

But in the Yankee forces were half a dozen old railroad engineers and mechanics who shouted with joy when they saw the engine. In a few moments they were clambering all over the machine, and it took them but a minute to discover its condition. A search was started for the missing parts, some of which were found; clever makeshifts were resorted to in place of those not found, and in a short time the locomotive was puffing away in the direction of Juragua drawing a train of ore cars filled with Yankee soldiers.

On the 24th the end came to this peaceful prologue and war began in earnest. The hot sun came up from behind the mountain peaks, lifted the curtain of morning mist and revealed the advance line of the army scattered along the narrow valley which traces irregular paths between Daiquiri and Sevilla. Two miles to the rear were the tents of the second division marking with a white line the road to Demajayabo, to which General Wheeler had moved and established headquarters during the night.

General Lawton's headquarters consisted of a cluster of half a dozen huts two miles inland from Siboney, whose little harbor was crowded with transports, launches, and small boats still engaged in landing troops. The third division was clustered about the beach, some bathing, others gathering the scattered equipments, and still others making preparations for breakfast. Far to the front was the thin line of Castillo's Cuban outposts, their flags faintly moving in the morning air.

According to reports brought to General Wheeler, who was in command of the forces which had already landed, while General Shafter was still on his ship, the Spaniards, after their evacuation of Siboney, had retired to a point three miles away near Sevilla, and had intrenched themselves at a junction of two roads or trails called Guasimas. From that point a single road leads to Santiago. General Wheeler had in this locality the Twenty-third Infantry, four troops of the First Cavalry, four of the Tenth Cavalry, and the troops of the Rough Riders — in all about 1,000 men. After making an examination of

the country in which the enemy was supposed to have halted, he returned to his headquarters and notified his officers that he proposed to attack. Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders was ordered to approach the enemy from the left while the force under General Young followed the road to the right, the two meeting at Guasimas.

Gradually the sun chased the lingering shadows out of the ravines and began to scorch the hillsides. Camps were broken, columns of soldiers were formed, and the advance was resumed. Blazing blockhouses here and there indicated that the enemy was still in full retreat, hastening to the shelter of the entrenchments nearer the city. Not a Spaniard could be seen, although hundreds of field glasses scrutinized every part of the landscape in a vain effort to penetrate the thickets. Early in the morning General Young started towards Guasimas with the First and Tenth dismounted cavalry, and, according to the agreement of the night before, he took the trail to the right of the Rough Riders, who as yet had not come into possession of their horses and were therefore dubbed the "Rough Walkers." They left their camp at 5 o'clock, and at 7 entered the village of Siboney. After a short halt they began a long climb up the steep western trail toward the rendezvous. By this time the heat of the sun was beginning to be keenly felt by the men. Laden with full marching equipment, they toiled slowly up the rocky path in single file. Not enough air was stirring to make a leaf flutter. Along the hillside several halts were necessary before the men could reach the mountain. A dozen mules carried the reserve ammunition and the scanty hospital supplies. The beasts were seriously affected by the heat also, but despite these obstacles the toilsome ascent was finally made and a refreshing sea breeze afforded a trifling relief. Before the Rough Riders stretched for nine miles a comparatively level plateau half a mile in width, dotted with chaparral thickets and frequently broken by small ravines.

Meanwhile, Young's men were slowly winding their way

along about a half mile to Wood's right, but the bushes were so thick in every direction that neither line could see the other. Skirmish lines had been sent ahead to prevent a surprise. The men advanced in high spirits, but the heat was so intense that at last some began to fall out of the ranks and drop exhausted under the shade of convenient bushes.

Still no sign of the enemy. The columns labored along over the narrow uneven path for an hour and a half, when Wood called another halt and rode forward to meet Captain Capron, who had been sent on ahead and who was now coming back. He had gone within sight of the enemy's outposts, and the officers knew that a battle was at hand. The Rough Riders had not been ambushed, but they had been ordered ahead to attack the enemy, whose position was known in a general way, but it is doubtful if such a battlefield was ever seen before. The place where the Rough Riders were halted was where the trail narrowed and proceeded downward. On one side of it was a stout barbed wire fence and on both sides was a dense chaparral, which in places was absolutely impenetrable. Wood and Capron came back and said to Roosevelt: "Pass the word back to keep silence in the ranks," and then they disappeared again towards the front. The men had no knowledge of what was ahead and merely welcomed the opportunity for a little rest and a chance to shift their packs. As a matter of fact they had little expectation that an enemy which had made no resistance to their landing would oppose the march very seriously till in force before Santiago.

After waiting about ten minutes, Wood returned and gave orders to deploy the troops at either side of the trail. Capron's troops were ordered down the trail itself; Troop G into the bushes on the right, and K and A were sent down into the hollow to connect with Young's column across the valley, which had also come up with the enemy and had begun firing. Troops F and E were deployed in skirmish line to the left.

But the movement had hardly begun when, with surprising unexpectedness, there was a sharp crack which seemed



THE ROUGH RIDERS FORMING TO CHARGE A SPANISH BUCK-HORSE AT GUASIMAS

very near, and the peculiar music of a Mauser bullet sounded over the Rough Riders' heads. There was no more gossip in the ranks, but the men scattered in the directions in which they had been ordered, Roosevelt leading the men to the right and Wood down the grassy slope to the left. The music of the bullets at once became constant; the enemy's fire was heavy. While the Rough Riders had not been strictly taken by surprise, the lay of the land placed them at a terrible disadvantage. But no one seemed frightened. Though a moment before they had scarcely been able to realize that they were actually at war, they now rushed forward with an excitement which amounted almost to ecstasy. Whether the Spaniards could see our men or not, our men could not see the Spaniards, and yet the fire was not more than eighty yards away and was so hot that our men could only lie in the grass and fire in that position. As they rose up to rush a little further towards the enemy, some dropped not to rise when the next order for an advance came. The advances were made in quick, desperate rushes, and sometimes the ground gained was very slight. There was but an occasional glimpse of the enemy, and our men could only fire their volleys into the places whence the shots seemed to come, but they fired with perfect discipline and the advance was steady. Gradually the line became divided by the trail into two wings, that in the valley and that on the left, swinging around on the enemy's right flank.

When the fighting had lasted about an hour, the line reached a more open country in front of a slight hill. Meantime, the troops that had pushed out in the direction of Young had joined his line, which was meeting a desperate resistance and which had thus far been unable to dislodge the enemy from his rifle pits. By this time also the troops in the rear, the Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-second Infantry, hearing of the battle ahead, had hurried forward to reinforce their comrades. Both Wood and Roosevelt led their men in a charge up the incline, and the enemy, thinking that the whole army was behind them, retreated. The Rough Riders, re-

inforced by the men hurrying up from the rear, pressed their advance relentlessly, throwing away everything that could impede their progress and rushing on regardless of danger. Such an advance in the face of terrific volleys was past the comprehension of the Spaniards. "When we fired a volley," said one of the prisoners later, "instead of falling back they came forward. That is not the way to fight, to come closer at every volley." Many striking incidents occurred. One private continued firing after being hit by three bullets and retired only when the fourth had disabled him. One who had been sent to the rear seriously wounded caught up a rifle, and, running back, joined in the charge. It was a magnificent dash, and when the enemy had disappeared towards Sevilla, the Rough Riders and their comrades rested on the ground they had gained and where some of their bravest men had fallen. The Spanish force engaged has been variously estimated, but numbered at least 2,000. When the battle began, the American force at the front was less than a quarter of that of the enemy, which, moreover, had a marked advantage in position. The Rough Riders had made a night march the evening before, had secured but about three hours' sleep on the wet ground, and had been marched under a burning sun and over a difficult trail right into action. Few of them had ever fired a Krag-Jorgensen rifle before, as they had secured their arms but a short time before leaving Tampa, and probably not over 80 per cent. had been under fire before. Of the Rough Riders, eight were killed and thirty-four wounded, and of General Young's force there were eighteen killed and eighteen wounded. Among the officers killed were Captain Allyn Capron and Sergeant Fish, a grandson of the Secretary of State under Grant. Both Wood and Roosevelt were in the thick of the fight, and walked calmly about the lines encouraging their men, but neither was hit, though they had many narrow escapes.

The Spaniards had not simply lost many men, but their courage. From this time they acted simply on the defensive.

In their retreat they passed beyond many places where they might have secured a terrible advantage over our advancing troops, and devoted themselves entirely to an ingenious defense of the outer intrenchments of Santiago.

Shortly after General Shafter's expedition had departed from Tampa it was announced that Admiral Camara's fleet had left Cadiz. Having derived some satisfaction from the manner in which Cervera had eluded Sampson the month before, Spain apparently decided to use similar tactics at this important time, when the better part of the American navy was engaged in holding Cervera. Admiral Camara's ships departed after the most solemn ceremonies, the blessing of flags by the bishops, and a brilliant procession. For some days its destination was mere guesswork. It was considered probable that Camara was coming to the relief of Cervera. While the number of the ships was considerable — sixteen altogether — but two were really formidable, even in theory. These were the battleship *Pelayo* and the armored cruiser *Carlos V.* With them were three new torpedo-boat destroyers and two auxiliary cruisers. The remainder were gunboats and colliers.

On the 25th, Sagasta announced that the fleet was bound for the Philippines, and the movement was considered as of little importance except as a sop to public opinion in Spain, for the people complained that the government was weak in not relieving Governor-General Augusti at Manila. They still supposed that Cervera was preventing the United States from doing anything in Cuba, and were inclined to think that Camara could easily redeem the Philippines. On the 26th he reached the north end of the Suez Canal and acted as if he intended to go on. While the United States government saw nothing to seriously fear in the Cadiz squadron, as the *Monterey* and *Charleston* would arrive at Manila before Camara possibly could, it announced on the 27th that an American squadron under Commodore Watson would prepare for immediate cruise to the coast of Spain. The Spanish coast cities

at once became alarmed and fortifications were strengthened in a hurry. But Watson's fleet did not sail at once. Indeed, the announcement seemed to be mainly intended to divert Camara's ships from the Philippines and back to Spain. If such was the strategy, it proved entirely successful, for, after hovering about the entrance of the canal for some days, paying toll money amounting to \$250,000, and, after taking the fleet to Suez, he turned about, paid return toll, and eventually started homeward, to the amazement and bewilderment of everybody. This return movement, however, did not occur till after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed and the capitulation of Santiago had become inevitable.

CHAPTER XLII

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS - GENERAL SHAFTER ARRIVES AT THE FRONT - PREPARATIONS FOR A GENERAL ATTACK - INGENIOUS SPANISH DEFENSES.

Advancing the American Lines — The Spanish Retreat — Trials of the Trail — Soldiers Pushing Ahead Faster Than Supplies Could be Brought Up — Impossible to Land Heavy Guns — Cutting a Way Through Tropical Jungles — General Shafter Leaves the Ship — The Cuban Soldiers — A Remarkable Collection of Warriors — Famished and Naked Patriots — No Understanding of Organized War — Their Value as Scouts and Guides — Their Aversion to Spades and Picks — Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack — Dangers of the Climate — Stretching the Line Northward — Within Rifle Range of the Enemy — Traps Laid by the Spaniards — Disguised Sharpshooters in the Treetops — Rifle Pits Trained on the Openings through Which our Troops Must Advance — Riflemen Placed Like Machine-Guns — The Block Houses and Masked Batteries — Expecting to Take Santiago in a Day — Inadequate Hospital Arrangements — The Greatest Land Battle of the War.

AFTER the engagements of the 24th, General Wheeler pushed forward his command through the valley and Generals Lawton and Kent with their commands occupied the adjacent hills as fast as troops were landed. By the night of the 25th there were about 8,000 American and Cuban troops in and about Sevilla, which the Spaniards had evacuated without resistance. On the following morning the advance guard, led by the Seventh Infantry under Colonel Benham, pushed forward about three miles, halting and camping near San Juan on the Guamo River about four miles from Santiago. During the day the entire First Brigade moved forward and camped within two miles of the Seventh Infantry, while the Cubans, whose knowledge of the country surpassed that of the Spaniards themselves, were kept a little in advance of the most advanced American lines. They were indeed within two miles of the Spanish outposts in the hills, a short distance east of the city. The scouts had explored the terri-

tory between the head of the column and the Spanish outposts and no considerable body of Spaniards was reported. The remainder of our army was camped along the hills between the front and the landing places at Daiquiri and Siboney. These detachments were being moved forward as rapidly as possible, but in the face of the most unfavorable conditions. No opposition was met from the Spaniards, however, who seemed to have been dazed by the rapidity and daring of the American advance. They had abandoned position after position with scarcely a show of resistance. If they had fought every inch our army would have been in a very difficult position. One who has not gone over the trails in this section of Cuba in a pouring rain or burning sun cannot understand the sufferings to which the American troops were subjected and the heroism with which they bore it. These infantrymen from cool northern climes toiled hour after hour along these so-called roads and paths, through jungles of cacti, poison vines, and high grass which cuts like a razor, in a blistering sunlight which made the horizon waver before the eyes, or in a torrent of rain which drenched to the skin, while from the stagnant pools gray mists arose, and everywhere vultures with outstretched wings looked greedily down.

And yet all the men were anxious for the fighting to begin, many of them as yet without any adequate idea of what real fighting was like. They chafed at the delay caused in bringing up supplies, which was, of course, a very hard task in such a country, especially when the commissary department had been mismanaged. General Shafter had hurried forward the light guns as fast as he could and did not wish fighting to begin till he had the batteries in position, but the heavy guns were still on the transports. There was only one lighter to take off supplies. The spirit of the men was such that they would have rejoiced at an order to carry the city by assault, big guns or not. But General Shafter had no intention of attacking till the subsistence department had become able to provide three days' rations for the soldiers' knapsacks, and it appeared

impossible to work the provisions along as fast as the eager soldiers advanced. With a high sea running it was dangerous work even to land the supplies, and yet the soldiers at the front, often obliged to wait a disagreeably long time for their rations, were ready to throw away their knapsacks and rush upon Santiago. Tired, footsore, drenched as they were, they were eager for any order involving some daring deed without any consideration of what might follow.

On the 26th, General Shafter left the ship on which he had made his headquarters during the work of landing the expedition and went along the road and among the camps, consulting with his generals and the Cuban leaders. He was informed that General Linares, who was in command at Santiago, was about to be reinforced by a division from Manzanillo, and he decided to send a detachment of Cuban troops to intercept them, or at least keep them at bay till the city could be completely surrounded. When General Shafter reached the front on the 29th, having had abundant opportunity on the way to observe the obstacles under which the transportation of military supplies had been made, he found that a large part of his troops had reached a position so close to the Spanish lines before Santiago that only the intervening hills remained to be taken. In view of the difficulties of the country, General Shafter had reason to feel proud that in a week's time his army had made such headway. The soldiers were in good form; the Cubans added greatly to the numbers, and while they had not as yet been tested in regular battle, they had proved of great advantage in scouting. General Garcia was working cordially with him and seemed to be ready to do whatever was ordered.

Up to this time the Cuban soldiers had been regarded with something like enthusiastic interest. They were the most remarkable collection of warriors which our army officers had ever seen. On the morning of the 29th, for instance, one of the transports had landed at Siboney 2,000 insurgents which had been brought around from Aserraderos under the com-

mand of General Sanchez. They were landed through the heavy surf and lined up emaciated, half naked, and in some instances almost entirely nude; but, weak as they were, they stood up proudly and shouted "Cuba Libre!" much to the astonishment of the foreign military representatives, who were utterly at a loss to understand the enthusiasm of men in their miserable condition. These famished men fell to devouring the rations served to them like starving wolves; some of them ate so much that they nearly died, but then they cheerfully prepared to march to the front among the Cuban scouts. The American officers soon found, however, that the value of these allies was mainly confined to their scouting. In a certain way their bravery was phenomenal, but they had no understanding of organized war or discipline. In the excitement of the fighting they paid no attention to orders; they would lacerate the treetops with their bullets, then fling down their rifles and rush through the bushes at a few Spaniards with their machetes. All the work of making intrenchments, of widening the roads for bringing up guns or food was to them a puzzle. They would cheerfully scout, but they would not work with spades and picks; and naturally the Americans became indignant when they saw the Cubans sitting around munching the food brought up with so much difficulty, while hard digging in trenches was to be done. These half clad, lean, and dusky fellows would sneak through the underbrush up under the noses of the Spaniards, and when hit with a bullet would throw up their arms, shout "Cuba Libre!" and drop dead; but all the Cubans in Cuba could not have taken Santiago. Our soldiers could readily understand why the Spaniards had never been able to drive them out of such a country, and why the Cubans had seldom shown a disposition to fight in the open. Gomez's plan of wearing out Spain was the only one in which his picturesque forces had any chance of success.

But leaving the possible assistance of the Cubans out of the question, General Shafter took an optimistic view of the situation as he found it at the front. So weakly had the Span-



CREEPING UP TO A LINE OF SPANISH SHARPSHOOTERS.
A United States trooper accompanied by Cuban scouts nearing the Spanish intrenchments at Santiago.



iards resisted his landing when they might have made it exceedingly difficult, so quickly had they abandoned strong positions and fallen back on their intrenchments, that Shafter thought they could be easily beaten out of their last defense. Nearly everything went to confirm him in this opinion. Deserters from Santiago told him of the desperate condition of the Spaniards in the city. It had been expected that they would make a strong defense of Aguadores near the coast and on the left of the American line, for they had strongly intrenched it and had some artillery there, but on the 30th they deserted it and moved to the seaward fortifications a little to the west and containing the strongest batteries on the coast. But they were within reach of the fleet, and therefore the left of the American line was ordered to move up to the position the Spaniards had deserted.

But while General Shafter had his army within rifle range of the enemy, his heavy guns were still on the transports; his soldiers had forged ahead over roads which could not be made passable for heavy guns for days. It is not altogether strange that he decided not to wait for them.

The country was such that inactivity might prove more fatal to the soldiers than action; sickness due to climatic conditions might in a few days weaken and demoralize such an eager army; in their desire to push on rapidly they had thrown away much that they were likely to need when waiting in their position. They were still in excellent form, but as one or two of the officers had become ill and General Shafter himself began to feel the effects of the climate, prompt attack seemed wise. Moreover, reinforcements were hurrying to Linares from the west and the Spanish near Guantanamo might take advantage of delay to seek a position on the American right. Everything tended to convince Shafter that it might be fatal to wait. Later experience justified his conduct. The risks of the Cuban climate to Northern men, exposed to the furious sun during the days and compelled to sleep through the damp, chill nights with no shelter, were at least as great as could be

expected even from stubborn Spanish resistance. At first the weather had been very good, but rains had begun during the advance and the men suffered discomforts which finally told on their health. But this was after the fight had been won. When they fought they were fresh and vigorous. Had Shafter waited for the heavy guns there might not have been as many lives lost in the furious assault, but he might have had a discouraged and enfeebled army. His decision, which seemed to some so unwise, was really the critical move upon which everything depended. It meant bloodshed, but it also meant victory and a speedy termination of the war.

To the north of the American position lay the fortified village of El Caney, which it was deemed necessary to reduce lest the enemy threaten the rear. The garrison there was supposed to number about 800 men. To the south was Aguadores, where the Spaniards had already abandoned better fortifications than were supposed to exist in El Caney. Directly in front, and all that prevented the Americans from marching up to the city intrenchments, was the fortified hill of San Juan. General Shafter considered that El Caney would make but a slight resistance and that Lawton's (the Second) division of 6,000 men could take it, while Kent's (the First) and Wheeler's cavalry were advancing in the valley towards San Juan hill. Having reached El Caney, Lawton would be able to return and co-operate with Kent and Wheeler before San Juan, which appeared to be the strongest defended. At the same time General Duffield, in command of the Thirteenth Michigan Volunteers, a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and with 2,000 Cubans, could make an attack on the Spanish near the coast and prevent their going to the assistance of those at San Juan and El Caney.

During the 30th the troops gradually assumed the positions convenient for such a general movement. Admiral Sampson was prepared to open fire on the shore battery to which the Spanish on the south of our line had taken refuge, while the land division at Aguadores attacked from that side.

Neither Admiral Sampson nor General Garcia agreed with General Shafter on the weak resistance likely to be expected from the Spanish. Garcia said that in their final intrenchments they would fight desperately, and he was right. But Shafter was justified in hastening operations as much as possible.

The American officers had no idea, nor could they have even after the most effective work of scouts, of the ingenious character of the Spanish defense. While they had been weakly surrendering outside positions, they had been working persistently at devices which they had planned as traps. So, indeed, they were. Against a less courageous and aggressive army, their effect would have been practical annihilation. According to all military rules, the Spaniards had made themselves impregnable and had craftily led the Americans on into the jungle to fall a victim to their devices.

The Spanish plan was to stop our advance by three different methods and at three different stages of attack. It must always be remembered that the roads and trails in this vicinity had all been cut through dense tropical jungles, in some places so wild and tangled with vines and creepers as to be almost impenetrable. Here and there were openings or glades of high grass dotted with clumps of bushes. The first or outer line of Spanish defense consisted of sharpshooters posted in the treetops along these roads and trails. It was the business of these men to harass and, if possible, demoralize our troops by subjecting them to galling cross fires from a series of petty ambuscades. Such a scheme could never have been thought of except by Spaniards and could never have been carried out except in a country of this kind. But it was carried out with thoughtful attention to every detail. These sharpshooters were hidden in carefully prepared nests of leaves in the tops of dense trees; some of them had tunics of fresh palm leaves tied around their bodies from the shoulders down, so that at a little distance they could not be distinguished from the foliage in which they were concealed. They could neither

be seen, driven in, nor dislodged; they used Mauser rifles with smokeless powder and they were posted in the trees in the confident expectation that they could pick off our soldiers as they advanced. After our men had passed by, these skirmishers could still fire at them, shoot them in the back, worry them by an unseen fire, and shoot those bringing up supplies or carrying back the wounded.

But failing in the attempt to check our troops by these petty ambushes, the Spaniards had made careful and elaborate preparations to slaughter them in the glades or openings through which the troops must pass on the way to the city. Almost every one of these openings was within range of either a line of rifle pits or of a substantial log blockhouse, placed in a commanding position on a knoll or hill. The distance between the rifle pits or blockhouses and the openings had been carefully measured and large sheets of what appeared to be metal roofing had been set up back of the glades to serve as aiming guides. Machine-guns had been accurately trained on these sheets of metal and given the proper elevation. In some of the blockhouses firing boards consisting of slightly inclined tables or shelves with deep grooves cut in them for rifle barrels had been prepared as a means of directing the fire of the soldiers to the particular opening in the road which was to be swept when the American troops appeared in it. The inclination of these boards was such that all the Spaniards had to do was to load and blaze away, thus preventing wild random firing in the excitement of battle. It was virtually equivalent to turning a file of riflemen into a machine gun, the range for which had been accurately calculated and which waited only for Americans to appear in front of the target, as they inevitably must if they advanced.

The third and final line of Spanish defense consisted of the blockhouses with a few open or masked batteries of light guns and a network of connecting or encircling rifle pits and the barbed-wire entanglements intended to prevent a rush assault and detain our troops under a murderous fire. These

intrenchments were not continuous along our whole front, but they were at all points in such a way as to command all the easy and natural approaches. It is not strange that the Spaniards after such preparation confidently counted on resisting the American troops before which they had so weakly retired, and as these devices were not suspected by the American officers, it is not strange that they advanced confidently to take a position which, technically, it was impossible for them to take.

So general was this sanguine feeling that when dawn broke they would begin a march which would in a few hours end within the walls of Santiago, that preparations for remaining outside were neglected and preparations for possible fatalities or reverses were inadequate. One small field hospital with equipments had reached the front on the 29th and been placed in one of the glades of high grass near the road and surrounded by a jungle. It provided tent shelter for but about a hundred wounded men. The supply of blankets was very short; and, indeed, no cots or mattresses had been brought forward. So rapid had been the advance of the brave army that it had been impossible to follow up with all the requirements for severe fighting, but as General Shafter apparently did not expect this, nor the army fear it, too little thought was given to it.

Under such conditions was begun the battle of July 1st, the greatest land battle of the war. It was really three battles in one, for the taking of El Caney occupied Lawton's division so long that it was unable to co-operate in the center before San Juan as expected. As the line of battle was so extended and the whole country was so covered with woods and chaparral, those fighting in any one place had little idea of what was going on elsewhere, and it was not till the sun went down that the army knew what a great day it had been. It will be impossible to describe the battle as one general engagement, but the fighting at the three different points must be described separately, the reader remembering that the troops were simultaneously engaged all along the line and all day.

CHAPTER XLIII

DESPERATE AND BLOODY FIGHTING AT SAN JUAN, EL CANEY, AND AGUADORES — INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK.

The Morning of July First — Grimes's Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish Reply — The Advance in the Center towards San Juan — A Tell-tale Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy-first New York — Storming the Hill — General Hawkins' Brave Charge — Capturing the Spanish Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill — Lawton's Attack upon El Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The Dash of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — El Caney Falls — General Duffield's Attack at Aguadores — Inadequacy of Hospital Arrangements — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the Wounded — Provisions Run Short — General Shafter Sick and Disheartened — A Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help — The Spaniards also in Despair — Cervera Receives Orders to Escape.

THE morning of July 1st was hot with tropical intensity. Thickets and overhanging palms were wreathed in vapors. To the north of the forces in the center of the line rose a range of verdant peaks. Along the road leading to El Poso were silently marching the troops. Beyond El Poso was a dense Cuban forest into which regiment after regiment was marching, and, somewhere in that thick undergrowth, was forming a line of battle. Further on rose the green hill of San Juan capped by its blockhouse, and to the right and left along the crest were Spanish intrenchments. Over the uneven valley floated the buzzards waiting for the carnage — "all in a hot and copper sky." On a little hill to the left of El Poso ranch house, an artistic old building with tiled roof, was posted Captain Grimes's battery of four guns, and at twenty minutes to 7 Grimes gave the order:

"Number one, ready! Fire!" This was followed by one gun after another with solid shot and shrapnel, making a

very exhilarating spectacle in the bright sunshine. In the intervals could be heard the boom of Capron's battery, which had opened on the defenses of El Caney far off to the right, and above the palms rose a cloud of smoke marking its position. Grimes's guns had boomed a few times when a voice down in front called out, "Here it comes!" Men instinctively ducked their heads and the first Spanish shell came screaming over the artillerymen and throwing shrapnel into the ranks behind. Another came and burst among our men near the ranch house, wounding several; another exploded in a dip under the hill, where twelve Cubans were torn to pieces. The music of shrapnel is anything but pleasant, but Grimes's voice was as clarion-like as ever, the "Ready! Fire!" coming as regular as clockwork. One of his shots tore through the roof of the blockhouse, others damaged the Spanish battery, and finally their fire ceased. Grimes continued to fire a little longer, and then for a moment all was still, excepting for the occasional crack of a Spanish rifle — no one could tell where.

Far to the front the war balloon was slowly moving down, keeping pace with the firing line of infantry, and suddenly a volley crashed from the Spanish rifle pits; there was an answering crash from the rifles of our men and the great battle of San Juan had fairly begun.

Wheeler's dismounted cavalry had been ordered off the hill to the front, while Kent's infantry moved similarly on the left, but the road narrowed, crossing several fordable streams, and Kent received orders to allow the cavalry the right of way. But, compelled to wade the river and other streams to get into line, the progress was necessarily slow, and it had to be made under a galling fire not simply from the Spaniards on San Juan hill but from sharpshooters in the treetops. The fortunes of the Signal Corps' war balloon were not conducive to the belief in the efficiency of such means in warfare, especially in such an engagement. As it kept pace with the movements of the division, it only indicated its line of march and drew upon it the enemy's fire. Soon the balloon itself be-

came a target for the enemy's gunners and riflemen; it was pierced many times and the occupants of the car gave themselves up for lost. It was finally brought down to the bed of a stream and abandoned.

Whenever the men waded the streams the enemy's fire fell among them like hail, and they went down dead, wounded, and dying on every side without having even seen the face of a Spaniard. The fire increased steadily, coming from all directions, even from the sharpshooters in the rear and from the shrapnel aimed at the balloon. At this point General Kent was informed that a trail or narrow way had been discovered by the signal men in the balloon, leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. Into this he turned the Seventy-first New York Regiment. General Kent, in his official report of the battle, says:

"This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road to the ford. One of my staff officers ran back waving his hat to hurry forward the third brigade who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders sometime before to keep in the rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording the stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could towards the river in column of files of twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wickoff's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 P.M., and hurried on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade (consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth



UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY ON THE WAY TO THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.
From a photograph taken just twenty minutes before the battle opened.



United States Infantry) speedily crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending this movement, Colonel Wickoff was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who immediately fell severely wounded; and then upon Lieut.-Col. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade now devolved upon Lieut.-Col. E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

It was a trying place for volunteers and even for regulars. On the whole, the New York soldiers did not flinch, though thirty or forty fell in a neck of the woods before they had seen a Spaniard, for the cover from which the sharpshooters fired was as dense as a jungle; many of them were firing from the rear while the bullets poured in from the intrenchments on the hill.

The Seventy-first were at a great disadvantage because they were fighting with the old Springfield rifles — "old smoke guns," as the soldiers called them. Every time they fired a volley the Spaniards could easily locate them, and the Mauser bullets would pour a perfect torrent upon the New York boys, doing terrible execution. It was not strange that strong hearts grew faint. It is to their credit that with a few exceptions they did not flinch in that terrible ordeal.

In what was afterwards christened the Bloody Angle, a piece of grassless ground at a ford which encompassing trees made an ideal hiding-place for sharpshooters, even cool-headed officers occasionally sought a sheltering bush. In doing so one of them called out to Colonel Roosevelt: "Colonel, better get down or they'll pot you." To which the acting colonel of the Rough Riders, grimly biting the stump of a cigar, replied:

"I'm not going to lie down for any confounded Spaniard," and he stalked about, fortunately uninjured.

No time was lost in deploying from right and left, but it was clear that the advance was confused, and it was inevitable in such a country. Looking at San Juan hill from El Poso, it appeared to consist of but one very high hill, whereas it was a

series of hills, steep and difficult and forming a veritable Gibraltar against an assault by infantry. From the first the Spanish had every advantage of position. As our men advanced they were met by an ever-increasing cross fire poured from the wooded eminences on both flanks which could not be seen from the road even by the skirmish line. Every little mound, every inch of the country was perfectly known to the enemy and had been measured and filled with sharpshooters. When the Americans had to cross one of the glades or clearings it seemed as if the whole Spanish fire was concentrated upon it; yet the same thing was happening in different places. The Americans were in a continual ambush. Where the volleys came from and why the bullets reached them in such showers they could not realize. It was no wonder that in such a deadly labyrinth some hearts weakened and commands got mixed up, and orders went astray.

The division had thus been pushing desperately on for two hours when the word was passed along to halt, and there was an impression that it was the intention to go into camp on the plain below San Juan, and within range of the Spanish batteries and even of the trenches. But there were only two things to do: to retire or to storm the trenches. A retreat would have demoralized the army and postponed the taking of Santiago indefinitely. An advance was again ordered, and the troops went doggedly on, driving the Spanish outposts back and into their trenches.

At last the little foothill below San Juan was reached and the emergency developed the indispensable hero, in the person of General Hawkins, a tall, well-knit old man with a white moustache and pointed beard. With him were the Sixth and the Sixteenth Infantry; the other regiment of his brigade, the New York Volunteers, was not yet up. Hawkins rode out in front of his regulars, and, drawing his sword, pointed to the hill, and called upon them in ringing tones to follow him.

Then he turned and set his face to the enemy who had marked him for slaughter and were volleying viciously. The

regulars dashed forward with a cheer in which the old rebel yell could be distinguished. Withering was the fire on them, and men reeled and dropped in their tracks. There was some straggling, as there always is in a charge up a steep slope, but the body of men moved on and up. Volley after volley was blazed at them. The Spaniards were now in plain sight. Our men fired as they ran forward — fired at Spanish faces, peering and strained. In a moment it was all over, for the enemy scrambled out of the trenches and ran back to San Juan without looking behind. This was at 1.30 p. m. Gallant old General Hawkins did not get a scratch, but his losses were heavy. Lieutenant Ord, son of the distinguished general of that name and a lieutenant of the Sixth, had been killed by a wounded Spaniard after he had bidden his men to spare the fellow, and Lieutenant Michie of the same regiment had also fallen. Before the end of the day the Sixth lost 100 killed and wounded, and the casualties of the Sixteenth were also serious. To General Hawkins belongs the honor of taking the key of the position and the heart out of the Spaniards.

But in the confusion or mixed condition in which the troops were, owing to their difficult advance, it appears that other regiments of regulars joined in the assault and participated in the glory of the achievement, particularly the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth, or Ewer's brigade. In fact, in the difficult work before them the brave men did not wait for orders. They rushed ahead wherever they could. One colonel found himself on a ridge with the fragments of six cavalry regiments, and he was the ranking officer. One troop of the Tenth Cavalry was found a half mile from the rest of the command.

Under the brow of the hill they had stormed there was a place where a large number of men could lie in safety, and it was soon black with them. During the afternoon the ridges to the right and left of this hill were occupied by our regiments as fast as they could come up, the Spaniards offering diminished resistance, but steadily retiring to their strong in-

trenchments. Two Gatling guns were finally brought into play on the right of the enemy's second line of defense, and Best's battery also moved up and opened fire on the enemy.

At a little before 4 o'clock occurred the second thrilling episode of the day. Under the brow of the little hill a council of war had been held, the question being whether they should push on and take the main hill where the Spanish blockhouses were. Colonel Roosevelt volunteered to head the charge. It seemed a mad rush. A foreign officer standing near the position when the men started out to make the charge was heard to say:

"Men, for Heaven's sake, don't go up that hill. It will be impossible for human beings to take that position. You can't stand the fire."

But with a terrific yell they rushed up to the enemy's works, and the Spaniards, whose courage had fled after the first charge, retired, and when night came they had been driven back upon the city. But it had been a hard experience for our men. They had become drenched not simply from fording streams but by a rain which had set in. Notwithstanding their exhausted condition, they labored during the night digging trenches, furnishing details to bury the dead and to carry the wounded back in improvised litters, often being shot down by some dastardly Spanish sharpshooter left in the rear.

As the sun went down the men in Wheeler's and Kent's divisions fell to wondering what had become of Lawton's and what fighting they had had to capture El Caney. As already stated, it had been thought that after Lawton had taken El Caney a part of his forces could return and assist the center; but Lawton did not advance on San Juan that afternoon because he had found that he had all he could attend to in taking El Caney. It is no secret that General Lawton expected to dispose of El Caney at one blow, and General Chaffee was to have the honor of capturing the place and Lawton was to earn his laurels in an attack on Santiago afterwards. He may have



MEMBERS OF THE RED CROSS SOCIETY CARRYING A WOUNDED OFFICER TO THE REAR DURING THE CHARGE
ON SAN JUAN HILL.

indulged in a hope of reaching the Spanish defenses ahead of Kent and driving the enemy back on the city. At any rate, both Lawton and Chaffee thought El Caney would be an easy nut to crack.

The start was made at dawn, and the march was made as rapidly and quickly as possible to prevent a hasty exit from El Caney, for there would have been no glory in capturing an evacuated town. The Spaniards, numbering over 1,000, as it turned out, had no notion of running away. They did not come out to give battle, but fought mainly in trenches surrounding the fort and blockhouse and in those buildings. From a hill a mile and a quarter from the stone fort, Captain Capron opened the attack with shells fired at 6.35 A. M. at a body of Spaniards who were falling back to the trenches. The infantry was distributed as follows: Chaffee's brigade advanced from the east; Colonel Miles's brigade attacked from the south, and Ludlow's was sent around to make the approach from the southwest. General Chaffee rode up and down behind his firing line encouraging his men. "Now, boys, do something for your country to-day," he frequently said. Chaffee did not think the Spaniards would hold out very long. Ludlow's men made slow but steady progress through a tract of woods running from bush to bush and shooting at a Spaniard whenever they could see one.

The Second Massachusetts Volunteers of this command behaved splendidly, exposing themselves freely and displaying fine marksmanship, but, like the Seventy-first New York, they were at a disadvantage with their "smoke guns."

The Spaniards, shooting from their trenches and from loopholes, kept up a galling fire upon our men wherever they showed themselves. They fired an immense amount of ammunition. It was a continuous fusilade. If not the most brilliant, it was perhaps the most desperate battle of the Santiago campaign. It was demonstrated that the Spaniards were hard fighters in defense. In one little line of intrenchments were fifty or sixty with a young officer constantly ex-


posing himself to our fire as he commanded his men. Time after time, for hour after hour, at his word these Spaniards rose and delivered volley after volley into our advancing ranks. Time after time our men were thrown against the defenses, always gaining ground, but always with terrible losses. So the battle went on all day, none of our soldiers flinching and the Spaniards fighting like demons. Gradually our lines closed in on three sides, driving the Spaniards out of their trenches.

Two companies of the colored Twenty-fifth Infantry, led by Lieutenant Moss, had the honor of storming and taking in two rushes the blockhouse. Many Spaniards in it were killed and the survivors made a rush for the stone fort in El Caney under a hot fire. A company of the Twelfth Infantry, with a newspaper correspondent in advance of it, ran up and took possession of this fort after Capron's shells had made a wreck of it and all but three of its defenders had been killed. These, bespattered with blood and exhausted by the tremendous strain of their defense, were glad to surrender. The Spanish flag was hauled down at 5 o'clock and the American colors went up and floated out bravely. One hundred and fifteen prisoners were taken; wounded were lying about everywhere. The Spanish loss at El Caney embraced most of its defenders, and among them General Linares; the Americans lost some valuable regimental officers and their list of wounded was large.

While the severe fighting had been going on before San Juan and El Caney, General Duffield and his forces had not been idle on the left near the coast. In accordance with the plans he made a feint before the Spanish garrison near Aguadores, consisting of 4,000 Spaniards strongly fortified, and the *New York* and a few other war vessels bombarded the fort from the sea, but doing little damage. The Spaniards selected Duffield's advancing force as their target, and the first shell they fired killed seventeen Cubans on the hill above the railroad. Another shot mowed down two files of fours in the Michigan Twenty-third, killing two men and wounding several others.

Duffield fired several volleys into the fort and accomplished his purpose of preventing the Spaniards there from co-operating with the intrenched army at San Juan.

The Cubans with Kent did no fighting, or, rather, the situation was such that there was no fighting for them to do. Lawton was to have had the assistance of several thousand Cubans, but the truth is that they kept well out of danger, fired their ammunition into the treetops and called for more.




MAP OF SANTIAGO AND VICINITY.

Position of our troops after the battles of El Caney and San Juan, and line of Spanish retreat.

At daylight on the morning of the 2d the enemy resumed the battle, and firing continued throughout the day all along the line, part of the time in a drenching rain. There were many casualties from bullets clearing the crest of our intrenchments and striking men as they were moving up to position or going back and forth with supplies or caring for the wounded. At nightfall the firing ceased, but later in the evening another vigorous assault was made all along the line. This was completely repulsed, and the enemy retired to his trenches, and the almost impregnable nature of his last de-

fenses was beginning to dawn upon our men. According to the official report of casualties for the three days' fighting 231 were killed, 1,283 wounded, and 81 were missing. The Spanish loss, especially at El Caney, was much heavier.

In even a brief history of the fighting before Santiago notice must be taken of an unfortunate condition of things which became conspicuous a little later. Mention has been made of the single field hospital which had been brought up to the advance lines the day before the battle began. Possibly the hospital equipment would have been complete and adequate had the Spaniards made little resistance, as our generals expected, but with our severe losses the condition of the wounded became deplorable. The first of the wounded, most of whom had received aid at bandaging stations just back of the firing line, began to reach the hospital as early as 9 o'clock. As the hot tropical day advanced, the numbers constantly increased, until at nightfall long rows of wounded were lying in the grass in front of small operating tents, without awnings or shelter, awaiting examination and treatment. The small force of field surgeons worked without either rest or food for twenty-one hours, and yet hundreds of seriously wounded men lay on the ground for hours. No organized provision had been made for feeding them or giving them drink. At sunset, the five surgeons had operated upon and dressed the wounds of 154 men; still long lines of suffering men lay waiting, and the number brought in constantly increased. A few more surgeons arrived and the force worked all night, partly by moonlight and partly by the light of flaring candles, which occasionally drew a shot from sharpshooters still nesting in the treetops not far away. These cold-blooded and merciless guerrillas fired all day on the 1st at our ambulances, and it was two days before they were finally driven out of the trees. After being operated upon, there was no place for the suffering but out under the trees, where, weak and shaken from agony under the surgeon's knife, they had to lie in the wet grass, with no one to look after them, no one to give them food



BRINGING THE WOUNDED TO THE FIELD HOSPITAL FROM THE BATTLEFIELDS OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY.

or water, no blankets for them, as only a few had been brought to the front. The scenes of the 2d were like those of the previous day, but worse. Many of the wounded brought in from El Caney had had nothing to eat or drink for twenty-four hours, for they had started with but one day's rations, and some of the boys had shared that with those who had foolishly thrown theirs away so that they might advance faster. And yet these brave fellows uttered no complaint; some would yield their turn with the surgeon to a comrade who seemed to be worse off. Those in charge of the supplies on the transports or at the landing places were working night and day to unload them and hurry them to the front, but over such a country it was slow, difficult work. Soon provisions began to run low, for a strong sea had set in and it was impossible to take off the supplies. The mistake had been made of pushing too rapidly to the front with soldiers and articles needed in fighting, provisions and medical supplies taking second place, and when the attempt was made to move them up the pack trains were cut off by the dastardly Spaniards in the trees, who shot the mules. Men were under fire for forty-eight hours, with scarcely any food and with but little water.

As he had been optimistic before the battle, so now General Shafter became disheartened at the prospect. He had a brave army, but improperly supplied; firing at his army constantly were the Spaniards in defenses such as few armies ever faced. He needed heavy guns, but it would be days before they could be brought up. He was suffering from fever himself, and at any time it might break out in an army in such a trying position, with insufficient food, without shelter, in trenches flooded with rain or steaming in the sun. He had heard that Spanish reinforcements had broken past Garcia, who had been sent to head them off. On the whole, the outlook could not have been darker.

At this critical time it became a serious question whether the fleet could not do something to assist the land forces. There was the Spanish fleet in the harbor, where it had been

for nearly six weeks, and our forces were in a position where they might be liable to a terrific fire from the ships. Even if our army could succeed in storming the city, there was the Spanish fleet ready to make the city a desert as soon as it fell into American hands. There was Admiral Sampson's fleet, which had for two months been longing for a chance to train its guns upon Cervera's vessels, and it had lain outside the mouth of the harbor for weeks with nothing but a narrow channel in the way, a channel mined, to be sure, and guarded by guns so mounted as to threaten a strong plunging fire. But with the army in such a serious position, had not the time come when the risk of running the channel must be taken? If Sampson could only run past the forts, which he had already partly demolished, and dispose at once of Cervera's fleet, the enemy in Santiago could not hold out long.

Admiral Sampson seems to have faced the requirements of the situation somewhat reluctantly at first. Naturally, he did not wish to subject his ships to such serious dangers. He would have welcomed nothing so much as an open contest with the Spanish cruisers, and since the army had landed he had hoped that the Spaniard would attempt to escape; he had expected it and had issued explicit orders as to what the fleet should do in case of such an attempt. But as Cervera was still entrapped, the probability of his attempting to escape steadily dwindled and the hope faded. Admiral Sampson had thought of sending in torpedo boats, but this intention had been abandoned because of the unsuitable condition of some of the small craft, and he then made up his mind that he must force an entrance, and this he was planning to do with two battle-ships to head the line. He had worked the plan out with skill, had ordered the *Massachusetts* to Guantanamo to coal up and had arranged to meet Shafter and his generals at army headquarters on the morning of Sunday, the 3d, to secure a perfect understanding between the land and naval forces for the combined attack.

But neither Shafter nor Sampson dreamed of what was go-

ing on over in the Spanish lines, where the desperate condition of the Americans was not understood. The Spaniards themselves were in despair; they realized that their game was lost; their outer defenses had been taken by a dash that took their hearts away. Blanco had telegraphed Cervera that he must make his escape at all hazards, for Santiago could not hold out; he must escape and run to Havana if possible. Otherwise he must lose his ships with the fall of Santiago, and that would be to lose all. Cervera had not forgiven Blanco for the order which six weeks before had placed him in the Santiago trap, but Blanco's purposes were shrewd enough and would have perplexed us considerably had the news of Cervera's arrival at Santiago been kept a secret, as Blanco had expected. But however much Cervera disliked the orders to escape, he must needs obey, and he planned accordingly at the very time that Sampson was at last contemplating the prospect of running in at all hazards.

CHAPTER XLIV

ADMIRAL CERVERA'S ATTEMPTED ESCAPE—ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET—THRILLING INCIDENTS—THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA AND THE REMNANT OF HIS CREWS.

The Waiting American Squadron—Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult with General Shafter—Watching Suspicious Smoke Beyond the Ridge—The Enemy Appears—Commodore Schley's Prompt Action—The Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor—Pictures of Smoke and Fire—Network of Bursting Shells—Cervera's Tactics—Pouring Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers—The Chase Begins—Appearance of the *Pluton* and *Furor*—Wainwright's Handling of the *Gloucester*—His Quick and Fearless Advance—Destruction of the Destroyers—Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney—The *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Almirante Oquendo* Run Ashore—The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* Have a Running Fight with the *Vizcaya*—Another Spanish Cruiser Beached—Gallant Rescue of the Spanish Crews—Chase of the *Colon*—Working the Spaniard into a Trap—The Surrender—Admiral Sampson Arrives—Schley's Splendid Command.

SUNDAY morning dawned bright and warm, with the American warships slowly rocking in the swell before the harbor of Santiago. During the night the *Massachusetts* had gone to Guantanamo, and shortly before 9 o'clock the flagship *New York* steamed away towards Siboney, where Admiral Sampson was to hold a consultation with General Shafter. The *Oregon* moved up and took the *New York's* place in the blockade line. To the east of her stood the *Indiana*, and between them and a little nearer the shore, indeed almost under the guns of Morro, stood the little *Gloucester*. West of the *Oregon* were the *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, flying the pennant of Commodore Schley, and *Vixen* in the order named. The distance of the vessels from the mouth of the harbor was from two and a half to four miles, and the arc of the circle formed was about eight miles long.

At 8 o'clock a signalman on the *Iowa* went on deck as usual for signal watch. The night before this sailor had had

noticed three distinct lines of smoke beyond the hills to the left of the harbor entrance, and had reported it to the officers. This had also been noticed from other ships. That it came from the Spanish fleet there was no doubt, but by this time little hope that the ships would come out remained. As this signalman came on deck in the morning, he observed the smoke again and kept his eyes intently on it, watching every feature of it as it rolled up. At 9 o'clock he reported that the smoke seemed to be coming up nearer the entrance. He had a belief that the enemy's ships were moving out, improbable though it seemed, in broad daylight. As he watched he saw the smoke work nearer and nearer the entrance, and at 9.15 of his own accord, he bent on the signal, "Enemy's ships coming out," and laid it on the bridge ready to hoist at the very instant it was beyond doubt. With his signal ready, he watched the smoke as a cat would watch a mouse. Fifteen minutes more passed, and then he saw the bow of a cruiser just appearing in the entrance; he reported it to the navigator, who had just come on deck, and who shouted back, "Bend on the signal." Before he had the words out of his mouth, he was surprised to see the signal running up to the peak. A warning gun was fired. Then orders came thick and fast. The watches on the *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn* had discovered the enemy at the same time that he was discovered on the *Iowa*, but the latter's signal, being already bent, first fluttered in the breeze.

Commodore Schley, on whom in Admiral Sampson's absence the command fell, acted instantly. From his flagship flew the signal: "Close in and attack the enemy." On every ship routine discipline showed itself with precision. Orderlies and messengers rushed here and there carrying orders. Men cheered as they sprang to their guns. There was a jingle of bells in the engine rooms; fires were spread, the smoke began to roll up; soon the *Oregon* was under way; others began to move in slowly; every man was at his post, clear-eyed and alert.

The Spanish vessels came filing out of the harbor at a speed of about ten knots, the flagship *Infanta Maria Teresa* leading, and followed by the *Vizcaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and the *Almirante Oquendo*. The distance between them was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of twelve minutes elapsed. Following the *Oquendo* at a distance of about 1,200 yards came the torpedo-boat destroyer *Pluton*, and after her the *Furor*. The Spanish cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the American vessels, which had got under way and were closing in, but chiefly on the *Brooklyn*. They emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke of their guns, while above them thundered the guns of the forts. Then they turned westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines, and in a storm of fire which had opened from the American vessels.

What followed is not easily described. Of the thousands of men who took part in the action or witnessed parts of it, few agree as to details. It is doubtful if a complete story of that momentous morning will ever be written. There had never been anything like it in the world before, and, where such great fighting machines and so many guns are brought into their fearful play, even one so fortunate as to have been a witness from the distance fails to appreciate what he saw, much less to secure any adequate idea of the fierceness and the glory of the details.

This remarkable panorama of modern warfare had for its background the high green hills which skirt the shore of Cuba; in the foreground was the Caribbean shimmering in a summer sun. Out from the little crevice in the hills crept the line of Spanish battleships, forming a great wall of smoke from under which angry streaks of fire shot out towards the American ships, from the prows of which the sea was rolling in foaming folds; another line of foam followed in their wake,


and over them hung the black clouds thrown up from the furnaces. Then their guns answered the terrific thunder of the Spanish guns, and great masses of white smoke rolled away and mingled with the black above. Across the sea there arose a lattice work of water columns raised by splashing shells. Innumerable, they sprang up and fell slowly back, while more slowly there drifted away from each a little spurt of smoke, and these, gradually accumulating, formed a haze on the water in which the flashes of the guns assumed a deeper red while the location of the ships became more and more indistinct. At the eastern end of this fearful picture of smoke and fire, as it moved westward, came the smaller streams of smoke from the torpedo-boat destroyers, their low black forms more distinctly seen than those of the cruisers ahead. More distinct, too, were the columns of water made by the shells landing near them, nearer and nearer, till the miniature flashes of their own guns was joined by the deeper glare of shells exploding right upon them. And over all steadily deepened the dark overhanging canopy of smoke.

Cervera's scouts on the hilltop that morning notified him of the absence of the *Massachusetts* and the departure of the *New York*, and so he concluded that his chance to escape had come. It was impossible, as he stated that same day on board the *Gloucester*, to leave the harbor at night, as the searchlight was continuously maintained and shone straight up the channel, and they could not navigate in its direct beam. He gave orders to destroy the *Brooklyn*, ram her if possible, and sail westward at the highest speed.

The reader will understand that as the blockading line of American ships formed an arc before the harbor eight miles long, and as the Spanish vessels turned westward, the American vessels were not all at equal points of advantage. The escaping vessels turned directly away from the *Oregon* and *Indiana*, which were off to eastward of the entrance, but on the other hand turned in the direction of the *Texas* and *Brooklyn*, which was standing to westward. The *Iowa* was

almost directly in front of the harbor entrance. Cervera, presumably, had the hope that by turning westward his vessels, emerging at full speed, could quickly run out of the range of the heavy battleships *Oregon* and *Indiana*, that after a time he could shake off the *Iowa* and *Texas*, and, though the *Brooklyn's* speed equaled that of any of his cruisers, he could

dispose of her easily when out of reach of the blockading vessels left behind. In theory this was all possible, for every one of Cervera's vessels were capable of steaming 20 knots, and only Schley's flagship was credited with any such speed. Cervera hoped to surprise the American vessels, and to find them unprepared for pursuit, but he was mistaken. As Captain (now Rear Admiral) Philip of the *Texas* said: "We were ready—ready with our men, with our guns, and *with our engines.*" The *Texas*, within three minutes after the alarm was given, was under way, at full speed and firing, with every man at his place. Before the third ship emerged, every



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING VESSELS SOON AFTER THE SPANISH CRUISERS HAD EMERGED FROM THE HARBOR.

one of the American ships was under way closing in, and their projectiles, great and small, were flying at the Spanish admiral from east, south, and west. The *Indiana*, *Gloucester*, and *Oregon*, which had been off to the eastward, headed westward,

pointing in towards the entrance; the *Iowa* started straight north, while the *Brooklyn*, in pointing for the entrance, took a course northeast, using her port battery. In other words, the ships simply converged upon the leading Spanish ships so far as possible, and by the time they were in close range the three leading Spanish cruisers were steaming along close to the shore and the fourth was emerging from the harbor.

While all of these cruisers were subjected to the fire of the American vessels, the first fury of the American shells naturally fell upon the *Maria Teresa*, which was in the lead. The *Brooklyn*, after firing from her port batteries for about ten minutes, wore around, and, taking a course alongside the *Teresa*, emptied her starboard batteries as the vessels plowed along. Commodore Schley stood coolly on the bridge, and his men were encouraged to their best efforts by his cheery words: "Fire steady, boys, and give it to them." The *Texas*, which had rushed in from her position east of the *Brooklyn*, quickly became engaged first with the *Vizcaya*, and then with the *Colon*. The *Iowa*, which had begun firing at the *Teresa* at a range of 6,000 yards, speedily diminished this as she rushed straight for the harbor entrance, until the range was considerably less than a half mile; but when it was certain that the *Teresa* would pass ahead of her and that the *Brooklyn* was to engage her at close range, the *Iowa* turned and delivered her starboard batteries at the *Teresa*, then turned to head off the *Vizcaya* and fired her port batteries, joining with the *Texas*. As the *Vizcaya* drew ahead, the *Iowa* turned again and gave her a broadside from the starboard; after a few minutes of this, she executed similar tactics on the third Spanish ship, while her secondary batteries were turned on the *Pluton* and *Furor*, which had by this time emerged and were at once in a circle of terrific fire.

In the chase which had now developed at the head of the fleeing line, the *Iowa* and *Texas* were dropping astern a little, and the fire of the three Spaniards was concentrated on the *Brooklyn*. But meantime the battleship *Oregon*, coming in

from her position to the southeast, had adopted different tactics. Quickly getting under rapid headway, she steamed directly west, pouring in a fire from her guns upon one ship after another as she came up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all her sister battleships. She was an inspiring spectacle, with a large white wave before her bow, her smoke-stacks belching forth great puffs of smoke from her forced draft, her guns thundering at the escaping ships ahead. She quickly passed the *Iowa*, while her secondary batteries took a share in the fire on the torpedo-boat destroyers, and, gaining every moment on the *Texas*, pushed on to the assistance of the *Brooklyn*.

But while the chase was at this point, or about forty minutes after the alarm had been given, one of the most exciting and glorious features of the engagement was taking place at the rear of the escaping line near the mouth of the harbor. The destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor* were among the finest vessels of their class in the world, and were considered particularly dangerous because of their high speed and their torpedo equipments. Cervera's plan had been to have the fire of his large ships concentrated upon the *Brooklyn* as the only vessel supposed to be able to keep abreast of him, while the *Pluton* and *Furor* were to take advantage of the confusion and the nearness of the attacking vessels to launch their torpedoes. But while the cruisers were concentrating their fire on the *Brooklyn*, now over a mile west of the entrance, the torpedo-boats became the center of a fire from other American ships, which made it impossible for their crews to work their torpedoes, and very quickly destroyed them completely.

Commanding the entirely unprotected *Gloucester* was Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, who had been executive officer of the *Maine*, and who had pleaded so well for active service against the Spaniards that the department had put him in command of the converted yacht. But the moment he saw that the Spanish vessels were escaping, Wainwright determined to make a spirited attack upon the Span-

ish torpedo craft when they should appear. Rushing in at full speed, the little *Gloucester* poured an accurate and deadly fire from all her guns upon the destroyers. Her advances were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. The little vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore, and for the broadsides of the *Colon*, *Oquendo*, *Pluton*, and *Furor*, all at easy range, and the shells flew around her on all sides, but she was not hit. Her skillful handling and gallant fighting excited the wonder and admiration of all who witnessed it, for while other ships were firing their secondary batteries at the destroyers, the *Gloucester*, pushing inside the course of the cruisers, at much closer range, practically rendered the destroyers unmanageable; her gunners could not remain at their posts; they fell in bloody groups about the decks, which were riddled by the *Gloucester's* rapid fire. Seeing the terrible plight of the destroyers, the batteries on Socapa opened fire on the *Gloucester*, but she kept her guns hot regardless of danger. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged the carcasses of the *Pluton* and *Furor* were ended, and two-thirds of their crews killed. Both destroyers were total wrecks. Rough-edged wounds of all sizes showed on the low dark hulls and superstructure. Two of the most powerful torpedo-boat destroyers in the world, of supposedly twenty-eight or thirty knots speed, were cut down, riddled, and wholly disabled in a run of less than three miles, and while they had been fired upon by the battleships as they pushed by after the Spanish cruisers, their destruction was largely due to the terrible, rapid, and accurate fire poured in at close range by an unprotected yacht. Both had struck their colors, and those of the *Pluton* had been secured by Commander Wainwright. He was engaged in saving the Spanish crews when the *New York* came steaming in at her highest speed from the east.

At the time the Spanish cruisers came out of the harbor, the flagship *New York*, bearing Admiral Sampson, was about to put in at Siboney. At the first boom of a gun every one knew that the long-expected was happening at the entrance;


orders were at once given to bring the ship about, and she was started back with all the speed she could muster from the two sets of engines which were in readiness. As she flew along, her disappointed sailors could see the ships come out, watch the sharp attack of the American fleet under Commodore Schley, and by the time she arrived at the mouth of the harbor shortly after 10 o'clock, where the gallant *Gloucester* was engaged, the chase of the cruisers had set far to the eastward. The *New York* went on, taking a few shots at the torpedo boats and joining in the pursuit of the *Colon*. As the *New York* passed the *Iowa*, cheer after cheer was given for Sampson. Says Captain Evans, "I shall never forget the yell that came from her deck, as, in reply to the commander-in-chief's hail, 'How many men have you lost?' I answered, 'Not a man hurt aboard the ship.'

As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron had carried it past the *Iowa* and *Texas* before they could work up to their best speed, but the Spaniards suffered heavily in passing and the first in line, the *Maria Teresa*, and the last, the *Oquendo*, were set on fire by shells during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. The very first shot had cut the main water supply pipe of the *Teresa*, and the second that landed set her afire astern. Several large shells swept through her, and countless others of smaller caliber burst within her. As the *Oquendo* was the last to come out of the harbor, and the other vessels had run ahead of some of our battleships, she at once received their concentrated fire. One of the first shots exploded in her after torpedo apartment, setting a raging fire, and the guns' crews were driven from their guns by the American shells.

During the fight with the destroyers, the *Teresa* had fallen behind with the *Oquendo*, and the *Vizcaya* was leading, followed by the *Colon*, the fire of the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas* being largely concentrated upon the former. The *Iowa* was still in the chase and still firing at long range, but was dropping behind. The *Texas* was gaining speed, but the

Oregon was coming up with a mighty rush. With flames arising from the after-decks of the *Teresa* and the *Oquendo*, both vessels gave up the fight; the former, about twenty minutes after they had cleared the entrance to the harbor, grounded on the beach about six miles west of the Morro; the latter a few minutes later was beached half a mile beyond. The *Colon* had now forged ahead of the *Vizcaya*, towards which the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* were now aiming their guns with destructive results. The *Oquendo* having been beached, the *Texas* also turned her guns at long range on the *Vizcaya*. So the chase continued for about a half hour, when the *Vizcaya* was seen to be in flames, and she ran on the beach at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, at about 11 o'clock, torn by terrific explosions as she sank. She was still flying the Spanish flag from the gaff, and it was not hauled down till almost burned down by the flames mounting up from the riven hull. Some idea of the storm of iron may be gathered from the fact that the *Brooklyn* alone fired nearly 2,000 shots during the engagement.

Meanwhile, the *Harvard* and little *Gloucester*, having settled the fate of the destroyers, had run up and were engaged in the work of rescue about the wrecks of the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*. Some were rescued as they swam; a few were taken directly off the burning *Pluton*, and some from the beach. Nearly all the prisoners were clad only in their underclothes. Such was the case with Admiral Cervera, who, with a small party, had reached the beach near the stranded *Teresa*. The admiral surrendered himself willingly, and was transferred to the *Iowa*. On a signal from the *New York*, which was now coming up, the *Iowa* proceeded to the same work near the *Vizcaya*. Many of the crew of the *Vizcaya* took refuge upon a sand-spit, the water being up to their breasts. From the shore a band of insurgents were firing upon them, while from the other side ravenous sharks were attacking them. Many of the wounded were upon the deck, the flames rolling nearer and nearer them. The rescued were taken on board



POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING VESSELS
AT THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE.

the American ships and treated with the utmost consideration and kindness. This rescue of prisoners was the occasion of some of the most noble and heroic deeds of the day, for the ships were burning fore and aft; some of their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire might reach the main magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just outside the Spanish ships, but no risk deterred our officers and men; the work of rescue was complete. The *Iowa* picked up 38 officers and 238 men from the *Vizcaya*. The *Harvard* rescued 35 officers and 637 men. The *Indiana* was ordered back to the blockade line, and on her way rescued over 200 men from the wrecks of the *Oquendo* and *Teresa*.

Shortly after the chase there was a terrific explosion in the forward part of the *Oquendo*, caused by the fire reaching the magazine. It bulged out the plates in

every direction. The results were altogether different from those on the *Maine*, and the *Oquendo* lay there as mute evidence of the Spanish treachery in Havana harbor five months before. The wrecks were pitiful sights. As fine armored cruisers as there had been in the world lay shattered and blazing. Charred human bodies lying about told the story of the fierce fight.

Of the Spanish ships only the *Cristobal Colon* remained, and she was their fastest ship. She had been so fortunate as to escape the concentration of fire which had riddled the other vessels, and by the time the *Vizcaya* was beached she was at least six miles ahead of the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*. Being thus far out of effective range, it looked as if she might escape. Her funnels belched out great columns of smoke and her forced draft even carried flames at times from her stacks. The *Brooklyn* was hot on the chase, standing well out, the *Oregon* a little astern but inside and gaining fast; the *Texas* was some distance behind but running nobly with the little *Vixen* abreast. The guns were still now and the interest had centered entirely in the contest of speed. If the *Colon* could maintain her superior lead she might escape. But she was forced by the situation to hug the shore; if she pointed out the American vessels would come up into firing range before she could get out to sea. Far ahead the dim blue outlines of Cape Cruz were growing more and more distinct on the horizon, and straight towards this steered the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, while the *Cristobal Colon* was running in close. It was evident by noon that she could not make the point without passing the bows of her pursuers, which were steadily gaining.

After 12 o'clock Commodore Schley saw that the Spaniard was in a trap and could not get out, but the chase continued till ten minutes before 1, when the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were alongside, and the latter dropped a large shell beyond the *Colon*. A moment later one from the *Brooklyn* struck close to her bow. The Spanish commander saw that his game was up, and he began to hunt for a convenient place to beach. He

evidently had no heart for fighting, though but one man had been killed on board and no fire had been started on the ship. The only object of the Spaniards now was to destroy their ship. The breechblocks of the guns were torn out and thrown overboard, and every possible inlet for water was opened. At 1.15 she hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, about forty-eight miles from Santiago. The crews of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were wild with joy, and congratulated each other with ringing cheers. A boat from Commodore Schley's flagship went alongside to receive the surrender, while the gallant commodore ordered the signal to the *Oregon*: "Cease firing. Congratulations for the grand victory. Thanks for your splendid assistance." The commander of the *Colon* was greatly depressed, and surrendered unconditionally to Captain Cook, who remained on board about fifteen minutes, observing the condition of the ship. As he was returning, Admiral Sampson came up in the *New York*, took charge of matters and ordered the vessels to report their casualties. But there was only one to report. A man on the *Brooklyn* had been killed and another wounded. Acting on Cervera's orders, the Spanish ships had concentrated their fire on Schley's flagship, fully expecting to sink her and then run away from the remaining ships. The marks and scars show that the *Brooklyn* was hit twenty-five times, and the ensign at the main was so shattered that when it was hauled down it fell in pieces.

Soon after the *New York* came up, the *Vixen* reported to the admiral that a Spanish battleship was approaching from the eastward, in the distance. The *Indiana* gave chase, with guns trained upon the stranger, which proved to be an Austrian, seeking permission to pass the blockade and bring out from Santiago Austrian residents desiring to leave the town.

After sinking six ships, killing and wounding over 600 men, and making hundreds of prisoners without the loss or serious injury to a single vessel, and with casualties limited to one man killed and two men wounded, and having dispatched the whole business within five hours after the Spanish

flagship had pushed her bow out of the entrance, the Americans took a well-earned rest, and on the next morning awoke the Cuban echoes with such a celebration of the Fourth of July as history had never before recorded.

Commodore Schley's instant action, the dash and vigor with which he met the emergency, and the splendid seamanship with which he headed off and caught the *Colon*, will be famous as long as naval history endures. His is the honor of leading the battle which crushed the power of Spain upon the seas.

The order of Admiral Sampson was: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." His instructions were understood by all, and officers and men were prepared to carry them out by night or day. The absence of the commander-in-chief, in pursuance of duty, altered no plans, delayed not the moment of victory. From the gallant second in command down to the lowest apprentice each man knew his duty, and each performed it with intelligence, courage, and enthusiasm. And when the sustaining excitement of the fight was over, the men took up the hazardous work of life saving with still more heroism, and with a wonderful degree of tenderness and sympathy.

A few days after the battle the Spanish prisoners, numbering 746 and including 54 officers, were sent to Portsmouth, N. H., on the cruiser *St. Louis*. They were dressed in clothing of every description, having come on board practically without clothing of any kind. Admiral Cervera showed signs of the terrible mental strain under which he had been for weeks. The Spanish seamen frankly declared that they had no further desire to fight with Yankees. Every provision was made for their comfort, and Admiral Cervera became quite a popular hero with the people, because of the nobility of his conduct as shown in his treatment of Lieutenant Hobson, and the many evidences of his appreciation of the kindness shown him and his officers.

CHAPTER XLV

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO—TRYING POSITION OF THE ARMY—RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW—THE PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN.

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender—Refusal of the Spanish Commander—Refugees from the City—Fruitless Negotiations—The Exchange of Hobson and His Crew—Their Warm Welcome—American Lines Advanced—Strengthening the American Position—The Truce Ends—Bombardment of the City—Another Demand for Surrender—A Council of Officers—Arrival of General Miles—Alarming Condition of Our Army—Insufficient Provisions—Suffering of the Sick and Wounded—Toral Asks for More Time—An Agreement Reached—Conditions of the Capitulation—The President's Message to General Shafter—Occupation of the City—Looking over the Spanish Defenses—"Yellow Jack" Appears—Obstacles Which Our Army Overcame—Shafter and Garcia—The Campaign in Puerto Rico—General Miles's Easy and Triumphant Advance—Ponce Welcomes American Troops—Last of the Fighting.

THE news of the great victory soon reached Siboney and was carried along the lines, occasioning great enthusiasm among the soldiers whose position, as they lay in their wet trenches in constant danger of Spanish bullets, was anything but pleasant. The lines were being gradually extended, Kent working his division northward, and Wheeler's cavalry moving southward, and this made the formation somewhat thin. But the fortitude of our army in its difficult position and the willingness and enthusiasm with which it joined in the work of hemming in the Spaniards was the admiration of every spectator of the campaign.

On the day following the destruction of Cervera's ships, General Shafter summoned the city to surrender under threat of bombardment, but he received a curt refusal from the Spanish commander, with a request that the bombardment be postponed till the foreigners and the women and children could leave the city. Action was, therefore, deferred till



W^m H. Chapin

noon of the next day, and thousands of people took advantage of the situation to come out of the city, where the food situation had become desperate. While General Shafter could not object to such a step, it increased the difficulties of his situation, even more seriously than was at first realized. Within a few hours it was estimated that 15,000 people from the city became dependent upon the Americans for food, when the subsistence department was by no means in shape to provide rations at the front sufficient to meet the wants of the army alone. But the soldiers in many cases shared their meager rations with half-starved refugees, who came into our camp not simply destitute but bearing germs from a disease-stricken city. This reception of refugees proved to be the worst blow which our brave army received before Santiago.

Before the time allowed by General Shafter for this purpose had elapsed, General Toral, who had succeeded Linares, wounded at El Caney, in command of the city, requested another postponement of the bombardment in order that he might communicate with the authorities at Madrid, and to do this he was obliged to ask permission to use cable in American hands. Upon one excuse or another the truce was extended from day to day till the 9th of July.

During these negotiations one of the interesting events of the war took place. On the 7th the Spanish agreed to effect an exchange of prisoners, the only Americans they held being Lieutenant Hobson and his crew. The scene of the exchange was a majestic ceiba-tree between the lines. Hobson and his men were accompanied by the Spanish Major Yrlés and a guard, and were met by Lieutenants Miley and Noble, aides of General Shafter, with a few prisoners captured at El Caney. A Spanish officer was given for Hobson and fourteen Spanish privates for his seven men. As Hobson and his men neared the American lines they were welcomed with cheer upon cheer. Ranks were broken, officers' orders passed unheeded, and the men were simply borne from one part of the line to another. Even more enthusiastic, if possible, was their

reception by the fleet on board the *New York*. They told of the kind treatment of their captors, and said they had suffered no real hardship. Lieutenant Hobson modestly protested against the warmth of his reception, both in the field and on the *New York*, declaring again and again that the men who were greeting him would have done the same thing in his place. He was the idol of the hour, and the contagious enthusiasm which greeted him was a striking expression of that genuine admiration for the heroism so characteristic of the American soldier and sailor in this war.

Shortly before the expiration of another truce on the 9th, Toral sent to Shafter a letter offering to evacuate the city if allowed to march out with all his troops. This would have meant simply a withdrawal to join the Spanish army further west, ultimately to help Havana, and the offer was promptly rejected by Shafter, who demanded an unconditional surrender.

General Toral then asked that the terms of evacuation he had offered be submitted to the authorities at Washington, and Shafter complied with the request, again postponing hostilities a day, or until a reply could be received from the President. It came at noon of the 9th and was an unqualified approval of Shafter's demand, with instructions to accept no terms but unconditional surrender of the city, the fortifications, and the Spanish forces. As a matter of fact, the Spanish commander was anxious to make the best terms possible, but his government was unwilling to allow him any discretion, and was determined to insist upon the defense of the city to the last extremity. From the standpoint of the Spanish government, the situation had become desperate, for if the fall of Santiago followed swiftly after the destruction of the navy it might mean disaster to the government. Some resistance was essential to the dynasty.

Meantime, Shafter had taken advantage of the delay to strengthen the American position, dig new trenches, and to advance the American lines to within 400 yards of the Spanish

lines. Streams were bridged over, roads were put in condition, reinforcements were landed and brought up, and the heavy siege guns were at last worked to the front and put in position. On the 10th, the truce having expired, the Spaniards again opened fire, but it was soon silenced. Another request for time having been asked by Toral and refused, Shafter began an attack at 5 o'clock of the afternoon of the 11th, and, though continued less than an hour, it was sufficient to demonstrate to Toral the futility of holding out much longer. Not only did heavy guns and mortars pour in shells from the field, but the fleet outside threw destructive shells over the ridge into the city and bay. The Spanish reply was spiritless and weak. The reinforcements had enabled General Shafter to stretch his lines entirely about the city, and its investment was complete. After the bombardment and when the town was on fire in several places General Shafter sent another note to Toral, again demanding unconditional surrender, but no reply was made to it till the following morning, the 12th, when Toral wrote a terse reply, saying that he had communicated the demand to his "superior government."

General Shafter then decided to call a council of officers to determine what should be done. General Miles had arrived the day before, not to supersede Shafter in immediate command, but to observe the conditions before the city. The severe losses in the battle of the 1st had made the government anxious, and Miles had been hurried to the scene in consequence. He attended the council, and so also did Lieutenant Hobson, representing Admiral Sampson. Many of the army men had declared that it was now the duty of the navy to force its way into the harbor, and it was agreed that such an act would bring the Spaniards to terms at once. But Sampson believed that, on account of the mines, it could not be done without the loss of some of the ships. It was agreed by the army officers that the city could be taken in three hours by an assault, but it would cost, possibly, a thousand men, and, naturally, all desired to avoid losses whether of ships or men.

The troops were becoming impatient over the delays, and argued that if the slow process of starving the city into subjection was adopted, more men would be lost in sickness than in storming the place. The officers were much worried over the condition of the army, for the heavy rains on the 11th and 12th had resulted in much sickness, and this was being aggravated by the intense heat which followed. Besides this, the landing of supplies had become so difficult at times that only half-rations could be served at the front, and if a storm came up so as to prevent the landing of supplies for any length of time the situation would become terrible. The condition of the sick and wounded was already deplorable. The hospital service had broken down completely under the strain put upon it. Wounded soldiers were lying about on the grass with insufficient attendance, and often they had to be carried to the rear over rough roads in jolting ammunition wagons. They endured it bravely, but their sufferings were terrible.

Any great delay in taking the city was, therefore, out of consideration. On the 13th an interview was arranged between Shafter and Toral, and the former again impressed upon the Spanish commander that longer delay on his part could only result in the further slaughter of Spanish troops. He must surrender, or a continued bombardment would be begun from all sides, while the fleet would make an attack from the sea. Toral declared that, whatever his personal wishes might be, he would be unable to give up the city till so instructed by his superiors. He asked for more time in which to communicate with Blanco. After consideration, Shafter granted him till noon of the 14th. But, on the morning of that day, an actual agreement for surrender was accomplished, Shafter modifying the terms in some small particulars. Toral was inclined to haggle further, desired his soldiers to keep their arms, and to have the action considered more like an evacuation; but the American generals informed him that he must accept the terms or there would be a general attack, to end only in an unconditional surrender.



PROMINENT AMERICAN GENERALS IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.
 General Jos. E. Wheeler.
 General Adna R. Chaffee.

General John R. Brooke.
 General H. C. Corbin.

The conditions of capitulation included all forces and war material in the territory east of a line from Aserraderos, on the south, to Sagna de Tanamo on the north, General Luque's force of 10,000 men at Holguin, being a little outside the territory. For the United States, General Shafter agreed to transport, with as little delay as possible, all the Spanish troops in the district to Spain, the embarkation being near the points



EASTERN PART OF CUBA.

Showing portion surrendered to the United States at the fall of Santiago.

occupied. Officers were to keep their side arms, and both officers and men were to retain their personal property. The Spanish were authorized to take the military archives belonging to the surrendered district, and all Spanish forces who wished to remain in Cuba might do so under parole, giving up their arms. The Spanish forces were to march out of Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a point agreed upon, to await the disposition of the United States government. This left the question of the return of the arms entirely in the hands of the government. This surrender affected about 12,000 soldiers, against whom not an American shot had been fired, and the troops in the whole district were estimated at about 25,000.

President McKinley gave expression to the feeling of the whole people over the event when he cabled General Shafter:

"The President of the United States sends to you and your army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops

and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to the campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them."

Formal possession of the city was taken on the 17th, an immense concourse of people being present. As the chimes of the old Cathedral rang out the hour of twelve, the infantry and cavalry presented arms. Every American uncovered, and Captain McKittrick hoisted the Stars and Stripes. As the brilliant folds unfurled in a gentle breeze, against a fleckless sky, the cavalry band played "The Star Spangled Banner." At the same instant the sound of the distant booming of Captain Capron's battery, firing a salute of twenty-one guns, drifted in. When the salute ceased, from all directions along the line came floating in across the Plaza the strains of regimental bands and the cheers of the troops.

When the American officers had an opportunity to observe the nature of the entanglement of defenses of the city, they were convinced that General Shafter's patience and moderation in dealing with General Toral's exasperating delays and excuses were wise. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have required a loss of 5,000 men to have taken the city. Indeed, in the face of a determined and well-drilled enemy, it is doubtful if the city could have been taken by assault.

But if the strength of these defenses furnished a sufficient reason for putting up with some delays, there was another development of the case which provided abundant reasons, not simply for declining to haggle further, but for making some apparent concessions to soothe the Spanish pride. Towards the latter end of the truce the dreaded "yellow jack" began to make its appearance in the American camps, and while our soldiers had not quailed before Spanish bullets, they feared the prospect of such a contagion in the ranks. The

conditions under which the soldiers fought, lying in wet trenches, exposed to a fierce heat or to the deluges of the rainy season of a tropical climate, made the appearance of fevers almost a certainty. Toral, undoubtedly, kept hanging off in the hopes that yellow fever would appear in the American camp and enable him to secure better terms. Santiago itself was in a dirty condition; typical Spanish indolence and disregard of common sense in time of peace had left the city undefended against disease, and when the refugees left the city and mingled with the Americans, Toral felt certain that the contagion would be introduced among them. But when he saw no indications of it and he was completely hemmed in, he had no recourse but to yield.

Neither in the Spanish lines nor in the United States was there a realization of the discouraging condition in which our army was placed. It was extremely difficult to get food and medicine. Not only were the facilities for lightering supplies from the transports inadequate, but the road to the front was almost impassable, the mud at times being two feet deep, although Shafter had 1,000 men constantly at work on it. The difficulties almost baffled description. It is doubtful if ever in history an army has encountered such obstacles and accomplished so much. It seemed to some in this country that Shafter was making a mistake in temporizing with Toral, but, in reality, he is entitled to the greatest credit for the manner in which he met the terrible obstacles and won one of the three great victories of the war, the victory which really decided the issue and compelled Spain to hasten a suit for peace. Less than four weeks had elapsed since the first soldier of Shafter's army set foot on Cuban soil, and he had secured the surrender of a city, a large part of the province, and an army of 25,000 men. It would be hard to name a siege of a strongly-defended city carried out more quickly to a conclusive issue. Despite the sufferings of our men, they had shown the highest soldierly qualities — courage, tenacity, cheerfulness, patience.

General McKibben was given the temporary command of the city, and for a few days the surrender of arms and ammunition, the clearing the harbor of obstructions, and the listing of prisoners went rapidly on. Soon the Red Cross steamer entered the harbor and relieved the conditions as to food. American rule was accepted quietly by the people. General Wood of the Rough Riders succeeded to the military command in a few days and carefully looked after the health of the city. Meantime, Spanish commanders from other parts of the district came in and surrendered, the prisoners eagerly awaiting their return to Spain.

Soon after the fall of Santiago, two naval victories were gained — minor actions as compared with Manila and Santiago, but both accomplished with the thoroughness which marked those events. On July 18th, at Manzanillo, Commander Todd, in command of a squadron of seven vessels, the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Scorpion*, *Hist*, *Hornet*, *Wampatuck*, and *Osceola*, approached the harbor, remaining beyond the range of the shore batteries, and after three hours' engagement, burned three Spanish gunboats, drove two others ashore, destroyed three transports, and blew up a store ship and a pontoon. All this was accomplished without a man being wounded or a ship damaged on our side. The same day the little gunboat *Hist*, Commander Lucien Young, entered another Cuban bay, attacked and sunk a gunboat, and subjected a Spanish ship to a lively chase. This left Manzanillo in a condition to be easily taken if the campaign should require it.

Equally complete was the work of our ships at Nipe, a port on the northeast coast of Cuba. It was proposed to take this place as a convenient harbor for use in the expedition to Puerto Rico, and our naval forces consisted of four gunboats — the *Topeka*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Leyden*. In about an hour after they entered the harbor on the 21st the batteries of three forts had been silenced, the Spanish troops driven out, a Spanish gunboat larger than any of the attacking ships sunk, and the harbor occupied.

The relations between the Cuban officers and our generals came to a crisis with the occupation of Santiago, and the exaggerated notion the Cuban leaders had of the part they were playing was apparent. A letter alleged to have been written by Garcia was published, in which he complained of not being invited to take part in the ceremonies of the surrender, that his army was forbidden to enter the place, and that the Cuban leaders had been ignored in every way by General Shafter. He protested against leaving the Spanish civil authorities in the city, and said the officials should be elected by the Cuban people. At the same time he withdrew his forces from the vicinity of Santiago. General Shafter replied in a courteous note, reminding Garcia that he had been invited to witness the surrender, which was made to the American army alone, and he referred him to President McKinley's proclamation as the law for the provisional government of Santiago. This proclamation continued in operation the municipal officers and regulations guaranteeing private and property rights.

In a later dispatch to the government General Shafter said that Garcia had refused to have anything to do with the surrender if the Spanish authorities were left in power, in spite of the fact that he was assured it was but a temporary arrangement. General Shafter then added:

"The trouble with General Garcia was that he expected to be placed in command at this place; in other words, that we would turn the city over to him. I explained to him fully that we were at war with Spain, and that the question of Cuban independence could not be considered by me. Another grievance was that, finding that several thousand men marched in without opposition from General Garcia, I extended my own lines in front of him and closed up the gap, as I saw that I had to depend upon my own men for any effective investment of the place."

The Cuban Junta in this country seemed content to leave the future of Cuba to the American sense of justice and fair dealing, and Garcia's action received no endorsement.

A campaign to Puerto Rico had from the first been a part of the government's program, and it would have been begun long before, had not the War Department been seriously over-

taxed to provide for the expedition to the Philippines, and for the operations about Santiago. The destruction of Cervera's fleet made it possible for the navy to co-operate in Puerto Rico, and preparations were at once made for a prompt and energetic movement. There was the further reason for haste in the fact that Spain was showing a disposition to sue for peace, and our government wished to establish its authority in Puerto Rico before any armistice came, as it proposed to take that island among others in lieu of an indemnity which it was well known Spain would not be able to pay.


Profiting by the experience in the Cuban campaign, the military authorities decided to send a much larger army to Puerto Rico than was used before Santiago; but this was afterwards shown to have been bad judgment, for, while a large army was seriously needed before Santiago, it was not needed in Puerto Rico, whose people were ready to welcome American control. It would have been better if a part of the Puerto Rican force had been sent to Santiago to relieve those who had endured that campaign, and were soon to show the serious results of it. There was but a comparatively small Spanish force in Puerto Rico, and yet it was proposed to send there about thirty thousand troops under the command of General Miles himself. To Puerto Rico, where less resistance was to be expected and where less than expected was really encountered, was sent a well-equipped army; to Santiago was sent a force inferior in numbers, and yet too large for the commissary arrangements which accompanied it. General Shafter had been compelled to meet difficulties without a parallel in warfare, without that support which was sent to Puerto Rico, where Miles simply led a triumphal march in a healthy country and without any serious resistance.

The Puerto Rican expedition, with the *Massachusetts*, *Columbia*, *Gloucester*, *Dixie*, *Yale*, and eight transports, left Guantanamo Bay July 21st. There were about 3,500 troops in the first detachment. The second expedition sailed from Tampa on the 23d, and the third, under command of



Mason S. Miles

General Brooke, embarking in the next three days from Tampa, Newport News, and Charleston. General Miles



THE ISLAND OF PUERTO RICO.
Showing routes and distances to other points.

landed on the 25th at Guanica, a small town on the south coast not far from Ponce, and advanced eastward, meeting with no resistance, except a slight Spanish force at a place called

Yuaco. Meanwhile, the *Dixie*, which had been sent to Ponce, was welcomed effusively by the people of that place. The civil authorities showed no antagonism, and the military commander quickly withdrew his troops towards San Juan. When the leading detachment of General Miles's army reached Ponce, therefore, it found the Stars and Stripes already floating and the people cheering them. His troops were received with an enthusiasm which made the extensive preparations to take the island almost ridiculous. The natives fraternized with our soldiers, loading them down with presents, and thousands of them expressed a wish to enlist against the Spaniards. General Miles issued a proclamation promising the continuance of public security and property rights.

Before the armistice had been declared General Schwan had gained possession of the town of Mayagüez, on the western coast of Puerto Rico; about twelve hundred Spanish troops were in the vicinity, and were driven back after brisk fighting, in which we had two men killed and fourteen wounded. The main advance of the army under General Wilson continued on the road to San Juan, beyond Coama toward Aibonito, while General Brooke advanced northward from Guayama. A demand for the surrender of Aibonito had been refused, and both General Wilson and General Brooke were about to begin a vigorous attack, when the order came from Washington to suspend hostilities.

The military operations of the last week of the war were of a character to convince Spain that delay in agreeing to our terms of an armistice would be foolish. In Cuba, the cruiser *Newark*, with four gunboats, began the bombardment of Manzanillo. A demand for the surrender of the place was refused and the bombardment would have been renewed had not news reached the commander of the *Newark* that an armistice had been declared.

But news of the armistice could not be so promptly sent to the far-off Philippines, which continued without direct cable communication.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES—PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONS—ANNEXATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—AGUINALDO, THE INSURGENT LEADER.

The Philippine Question at Home—Policy of Expansion—A Complicated Situation—General Merritt Designated to Lead the Expeditions—Apprehension of Trouble with Germany—Dewey's Tactful Management—The Archbishop's Proclamation—Circulating False Reports and Sensational Stories—The Insurgents Threaten Trouble—The First Expedition under Way—Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands—General Merritt Takes Possession of the Ladrone Islands—The *Irene* Incident—A Plain Statement from Admiral Dewey—Reports and Rumors—Aguinaldo, the Young Insurgent—His Education and Character—A Clever and Automatic Campaign.

IN pursuing the course of events in Cuban waters, the reader's attention has necessarily been diverted from the state of affairs prevailing at Manila after Dewey's brilliant victory, and it will be essential to return to the time when the smoke of that engagement was clearing away and notice the development of a situation possessing somewhat of the fascination of novelty to the people of the United States. An exceedingly lively discussion at once arose as to what we should do with the Philippines, although, as a matter of fact, we, as yet, held none of the soil of the islands except at Cavité. But with unerring intuition our people at once realized that a new question and one of transcending importance had entered into the war and that in the end, whenever it came, a responsibility for the future of the islands would rest upon this government. Two parties naturally arose, the so-called expansionists, who argued that we should keep the islands, that we could not drop them if we would. To leave the op-

pressed and rebellious islands to Spain seemed out of the question; to sell them to Great Britain or any other power would raise perilous complications; to divide them up would be equally dangerous; to establish a stable and peaceful native government hardly seemed possible, and to keep them might embroil us in an Asiatic question with jealous powers and certainly would mark a decided change in the policy of the government. We need not enter into a more extended notice of this discussion, for wholly outside of that the situation was such as to give the government some concern and immediate opportunity for action.

Manila still remained in the control of the Spanish governor-general, while camped about it, and gradually increasing their advantage, were the insurgents under Aguinaldo. It was perfectly true, as Dewey had reported, that he could take the city at any time, but it would be useless to do so until troops could be sent as an occupying force, sufficient to assume control and jurisdiction. A bombardment simply would have only complicated Dewey's position, which was perfectly safe as far as it went.

Although it had been perfectly understood at Washington from the day when war and operations in the Philippines became inevitable, that Dewey's little fleet, even if successful over Montojo's, could spare no men for the occupation and administration of a country so large as the Philippines, and although plans for sending a force to co-operate with Dewey had been early discussed, it was not till the reports of Dewey's prompt victory came that active steps were taken to send assistance. The possibilities of complications in the far-off islands, in the very region which was the cause of so much concern and jealousy among the European powers, was at once appreciated and the government determined to advance in that direction with as much discretion as energy. In designating General Merritt, who had before been spoken of as the probable leader of the important military operations in Cuba, to take command of the proposed expedition, the government

revealed its desire and purpose to deal with the new problem ably and to send sufficient forces to reduce to a minimum the possibility that some European power might find an excuse for attempting to take our new obligations and opportunities in the Orient off our hands.

From the very first some concern was felt as to the attitude of Germany. Simultaneously with the sending of the ultimatum to Spain in April, and before any power had signified an intention to declare its neutrality, the State Department received information that Spain had made a proposition to Germany, under which the latter would furnish troops for the suppression of the Philippine rebels in consideration of large concessions in the islands. The advantages thus offered to Germany were very tempting in view of the conditions in the East, and there was a fear that the Kaiser might not pass them by, and that complications of a serious nature might arise. Immediately after Dewey's victory all the European powers sent warships to Manila, and Germany seemed inclined to keep a much larger naval force there than her commercial interests warranted.

Admiral Dewey's tact and ability as an administrator under difficult circumstances were quickly demonstrated. While maintaining a vigorous blockade he willingly gave permission to a delegation of British and German merchants to remove their families to Cavité, where he placed United States Consul Williams in charge. He made himself popular among the foreign shipmasters, and aided and facilitated them in carrying on their business so far as it did not interfere with his duties. His praise was in every port in the East.

The Spanish papers and clergy did all they could to undermine his influence by false reports and sensational stories. The Archbishop, late in May, issued a proclamation, in which he said that four Spanish battleships were hurrying on their way to Manila, and stated that God had informed him that in the next engagement the armies of the most Christian Spain would be victorious. To read it, one would have thought the


world had gone back three centuries, and that we were living in the time of the bloody Philip II., after whom these unfortunate islands were named.

Fully three weeks elapsed after Dewey's victory before troops for his support were actually embarked, and as time went on the more apparent it became that the government had entered upon a difficult undertaking. The number of men to be sent was gradually increased; the number of regulars was augmented, for General Merritt was too wise to endanger the expedition by hastily dispatching only an army of untrained volunteers, such as were recruited in the militia of some of the Western states.

The first expedition sailed from San Francisco with the cruiser *Charleston* on May 25th, and it was followed a few days later by the *City of Peking* with two transports. In all the first detachment consisting of about 2,500 men under the command of General Thomas M. Anderson. The monitor *Monterey* was also ordered to make ready to proceed to the Orient, a fact which indicated a desire to strengthen Admiral Dewey's fleet for possible contact with those of other powers.

That the situation of the Spaniards in Manila was desperate was indicated by the published dispatches of Captain-General Augusti. Aguinaldo had aroused insurgents all over the island and was winning in many skirmishes with the Spanish forces. In a despairing dispatch early in June the Captain-General said: "The capital is besieged by land and sea. I shall try to resist to the last, but I have no confidence in the result. Numbers of volunteers and native soldiers are deserting to the rebels."

One of the important questions which Congress had taken up after the disposition of necessary war measures was that of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. The question had not for a moment lost its importance since Queen Liliuokalani had been deposed early in 1893, and the provisional government had offered to cede the sovereignty of the islands to the United States. The leading men of the island strongly




THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
Showing routes and distances to important points.

desired annexation, and resolutions had been introduced in Congress to bring it about. The islands assumed a new importance immediately after the battle at Manila, and when preparations were being made for sending expeditions to the Philippines. That the sympathy of the people was strongly American was shown by the enthusiastic and generous welcome that was given the first expedition when it arrived at Honolulu, a welcome which was repeated as other expeditions touched at that point. The debate in Congress was prolonged by a minority opposition, but the resolutions were finally passed early in June, and five commissioners were appointed to arrange for the future administration of the islands. This step was important in many ways; it established a precedent in the manner of arranging our interests outside of the ordinary boundaries of the United States, and, in case it should become our lot to administer affairs in the Philippines, the sovereignty over Hawaii, as a stopping place in the Pacific, could not fail to be of great advantage.

On June 15th the second expedition to the Philippines departed from San Francisco, 4,200 men being taken in four vessels, in command of Major-General Francis V. Greene. It included three volunteer regiments, one each from Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Nebraska, two battalions of regular infantry, two batteries, engineers, and hospital corps, in all about 3,500 men. The third expedition got away the last of June on six vessels, and with it went General Merritt and his staff. It had thus taken two months to dispatch the force which was deemed necessary to support Admiral Dewey in the future exigencies of the islands, and another month was to elapse before General Merritt could be on the spot. This third expedition numbered about 5,000 men, making a total of some 11,000 troops sent to the Orient up to that time. Preparations for other expeditions were also made, and upon further secret advices from Admiral Dewey, the monitor *Monadnock* was ordered to the Philippines.

On the day General Merritt set out with the third expedi-

tion, the first arrived at Cavité, having stopped on the way to take possession of the Ladrone Islands, which are about 1,200 miles east of the Philippines, and had been in Spanish possession ever since the days of Magellan. The *Charleston* entered the harbor of San Luis Dapia in these islands on the 20th, shelled the fort, and, meeting with no resistance, received the surrender of the town on the following day, taking off fifty-two officers of the Spanish army and ninety-four men. Immediately on the arrival at Cavité a conference took place between the admiral, General Anderson, and Aguinaldo, as to future proceedings.



Map showing routes and distances between the United States, Hawaiian Islands, Philippine Islands, China, etc.

It was reported that one of the results of the arrival of American forces at Cavité was the withdrawal of a part of the large German squadron which had been assembled to protect the persons and property of a very small group of German subjects in the Philippines, but it appeared later that the German ships had not left the archipelago. The insurgents had, meantime, been preparing to seize Grande Island in Subig Bay, which the Spaniards had been fortifying. The German warship *Irene* entered, and her commander refused to allow the insurgents to attack the place, alleging that as Germany had not formally recognized them as belligerents,

he could not, from motives of humanity, allow them to attack the Spanish, as he feared that a massacre might occur. On hearing the situation, Dewey at once sent one of his own vessels, the *Raleigh*, to take the island, and the *Irene's* commander could not very well object to this, as, whatever Germany might think about the insurgents, she had fully recognized that a state of war existed between Spain and the United States. In fact, as soon as the *Raleigh* appeared the *Irene* withdrew from the bay, the Spanish surrendered without firing a gun, and Dewey handed the prisoners over to the insurgents, with the assurance that they would be humanely treated. Dewey made it understood that he was master in the island, that interference, active or passive, would not be brooked, and that the insurgents could trust to his support so long as they deserved it. It was another proof that Dewey was cool-headed and quick-witted. What might have grown into a European complication was settled by him very promptly and without leaving the resemblance of a ground for reasonable protest.

The uncertainty of German intentions in the Philippines occasioned much concern and feeling in this country for a time. There were many reports, particularly from English sources, of Germany's determination to take advantage of the situation to gain a foothold in the islands to the extent at least of securing a coaling station; there were rumors of an agreement between Germany, Austria, and Russia in regard to a common line of policy to be pursued by the three countries in the disposition of the Philippines. On the other hand, the official relations of these countries to the government of the United States was all that could be asked for. Russia intimated quite clearly that she would not interfere with us in the islands; Germany continued in every way to express its friendship for us, and, while it was doubtless true that the appearance of the American navy in the Orient had made the European diplomats extremely anxious, none of the governments could afford to give offense to this country.

But the conduct of the Germans in Manila Bay was not the only troublesome feature of the situation. As the American forces began to arrive, the attitude of Aguinaldo, the young insurgent leader, became more and more unsatisfactory; and the American commanders quickly found that they had a most astonishing character to deal with. He had begun active life as plain Emilio, the servant boy of a Jesuit priest, and the priest had been so treacherous, from a Spanish point of view, as to give to the smart native lad the foundations of an education. In course of time the lad went to Hongkong, studied medicine, saw men, began to realize the difference between Spanish rule and British rule. Returning to his native islands, it was not long before the Spanish masters learned that he had become an educated Filipino with energy and ambition, and therefore a dangerous character. He was exiled; then he sought his revenge, and during the insurrection he had risen to the leadership. Plain Emilio had become Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. He was still a very young man, and his stature was extremely slight, but he had a cold, impassive face, and all the shrewdness, energy, and dash of a born leader; and he had, besides, an ambition as boundless as Napoleon's. Dewey was well aware of the character of Aguinaldo and his men; but until an American army should arrive the admiral could offer no serious objection to the pretensions of the ambitious Filipino, and he discreetly allowed him to proceed, harrassing the pent-up Spaniard and thus indirectly hastening the fall of the city. Thus it was that while the American reinforcements were making their way across the Pacific, Aguinaldo was keeping up a desultory war with the Spaniards, and by the first of July the lines of the insurgents were stretched all about the city to the shore front and within a short distance of the Spanish intrenchments. A constant fire was going on day and night, while Dewey, who was, after all, the real master of the situation, kept his ships quietly in the harbor. He knew very well that the Spaniards would never surrender to the Filipinos; they would burn the

city and die in the flames first; and for this reason he calculated that by the time the American forces arrived, the Spaniards would be in a mood to surrender to the advance of the Stars and Stripes. Thus all the powder the insurgents were using, and the spectacular authority which Aguinaldo was indulging in were really the operations of a very clever campaign on the part of Admiral Dewey. It was a sort of automatic campaign, which Dewey quietly watched, ready to interfere if anything went wrong. But Aguinaldo's opinion of the part he was playing grew into absurd proportions.

CHAPTER XLVII

AGUINALDO AND THE AGUINALDIANS — EQUIPMENT AND ARMS OF HIS MEN — NOT SOLDIERS BUT BUSHWHACKERS — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS.

The Young Insurgent Chief — Proud of His Military Ability — A Council of Young Men Only — The Tagals his Only Supporters — An Army of Boys — White Cotton Uniforms — Taking Turns at Military Duty — A Mauser in One Hand — A White Flag in the Other — No Artillery or Cavalry — Fighting in Trenches — Faith in Talismans — Living on a Handful of Rice — Intelligent Filipinos Desire the Support of a Strong Nation — Unfit to Manage Their Affairs Alone — Dread of Aguinaldo's Mastery — Mental Characteristics of the Filipinos — Rash and Illogical — Exaggerated Ideas of their Ability as Fighters — Mistaking American Kindness for Fear — Sealing Their Own Fate.

EMILIO AGUINALDO was under thirty years of age when he was elected President of the revolutionary party. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster and afterwards *gobernadorcillo* and municipal captain in one of the villages of the province of Cavité. He was not devoid of ability, and he was surrounded by clever writers. He was a successful leader of insurgents, had the confidence of young men in the country districts, and prided himself on his military ability. The Tagals were the only people in the Philippines who supported him, and a large number of the more educated and intelligent among them were opposed to him. The Visayas, who number nearly 2,000,000, took no part in the insurrection of 1896, nor did they ever support Aguinaldo's pretensions.

The assembly which in 1898 framed and adopted a constitution and elected Aguinaldo President — for neither of these propositions was submitted to a vote of the people —

was composed of men equally immature. When men of unripe judgment, swayed by the passions and impulse of youth, both command the army and sit in the council chamber, no better result than what has been seen could be expected. This absence of mature years in their counsels was not due to a wise resolve of the older men to hold aloof from the revolutionary movement, but to the utter absence of wise old men. "Old men for counsel and young men for war," is a saw the Filipinos were not familiar with. There was among them no gray-haired statesman, no "grand old man," no influential adviser rendered conservative by a long life as jurist, legislator, or executive. All the leaders in the movement for independence were young men, many of them scarcely past their majority, while the army was made up of boys and men mostly without family ties. Scores of their so-called soldiers were no taller than the guns they carried. Compared with them, our troops seemed like a race of giants.

Their equipment consisted of a gun, bayonet, and cartridge box; their uniform of a straw hat, gingham shirt and trousers, and bare feet; their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or a week at a time; for quarters they occupied the public building in each village, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches and convents; from these, details were sent out to man the trenches. Their food while on duty consisted of rice and banana leaves, cooked at the quarters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a week of active service they would return to their homes to rest or to work on their farms, their places being taken by others, to whom they would turn over their guns and cartridges.

Their arms were obtained from various sources — from purchases in Hongkong; from the supply which Admiral Dewey found in the arsenal at Cavité; from captures made from the Spaniards. They were partly Mausers and partly Remingtons. Their ammunition was obtained in the same way. They used it freely, and to replenish it they established

a cartridge factory at the village of Imus, about ten miles south of Cavité, where 400 people were engaged in reloading cartridges with powder and lead found at Cavité or purchased abroad. They had no artillery, except a few antique columbiads obtained from Cavité, and no cavalry. Their method of warfare was to dig a trench in front of the Spanish position, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and during the night put their guns on top of the trench above their heads and fire in the general direction of the enemy. When their ammunition was exhausted, they would go off in a body to get a fresh supply, and then return to the trenches.

The inherent fighting qualities of the Filipino soldiers were augmented by the artifices of their leaders. Their superstitions were played upon by giving them amulets. Some of these had the likeness of Aguinaldo engraved upon them, and all promised immunity from death to the credulous wearers. Those who were killed, of course, were past complaining; those who escaped death had their faith in the talisman confirmed. They were desperate fighters, after their own fashion, and compassed marches on rations insufficient to keep an American soldier alive. An occasional handful of rice, supplemented by a chance frog or a mud fish, amply satisfied their hunger, and the uncontrollable thirst which tortured European soldiers they did not seem to feel.

There was no way of telling bushwhackers from non-combatants. All were dressed alike in innocent white clothing, and all possessed a tiny white flag as a sign of peace. White flags fluttered from every native house in the city, and yet the male members of the family were nearly all in the trenches. Indeed, the Filipino seemed to fight with a Mauser in one hand and a white flag in the other. When hard pressed he secreted his rifle and ammunition and made his appearance waving his white flag in token of amity and eternal friendship.

This bushwhacking instinct was the chief weakness of the Filipino army. Individual fighting never can succeed against organized bodies of troops as organizations.

Aguinaldo's government, or the idea of any entirely independent government, did not command the hearty support of the large body of the Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who had property, education, and intelligence. Their hatred of Spanish rule was very keen, and they would co-operate with Aguinaldo or anyone else to destroy it. But after that was done they fully realized that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they would be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. Their ideal was a Philippine republic under American protection, such as they had heard was to be granted to Cuba. But their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it — what portion of the government was to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues were to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses were to be divided — were not clearly defined; nor is it to be expected that they should be, after generations of Spanish rule, without any experience in self-government. The educated natives with property at stake looked upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.

It was generally conceded that the Philippine Islands would not remain one year a peaceful, united archipelago under an independent native government. There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not submit to what they would always consider a Tagal republic, and the Tagals, having procured the overthrow of the Spaniards, would naturally resent a preponderance of Visaya influence. As a people they have little idea of union. The rivalry for prestige at the present day between one village and another on the same coast is sufficient to prove the tendency to disintegrate. The native likes to localize, to bring everything he requires or aspires to within his own small circle. If his ambition were to be a leader of men he would be content to be a king in his own town. Native ideas are not expansive and far-reaching. Then the question arises: Who would be the



EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Leader of the Filipino Insurgents.

F. AGONCILLO,
One of Aguinaldo's Chief Advisers.

A BAND OF FILIPINO INSURGENTS ON THE SANTA ANA ROAD.

electors? The masses are decidedly too ignorant to be capable of voting intelligently. The votes would be entirely controlled by cliques of land-owners.

If the native republic should succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself against foreign aggression. An unprotected united republic would last only until the novelty of the situation had worn off. Then every principal island would, in turn, declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before that took root, America, or some European nation, would probably have interfered; therefore it is better to start with protection.

Mentally the Filipinos are very deceptive. They give a first impression of intellectuality. They are very alert and quick of apprehension, even precocious in their childhood and youth. With rare exceptions the young Filipinos of both sexes are very quick to understand, but they are not capable of deep cogitation or continued logical thought. They have the imitative faculty, but not the inventive. Quick of temper and rash of impulse, their mental processes are warped by their varying sentiments, until such a thing as acting upon settled conclusions from logical deductions is not possible with them.

No better example of this could be given than that of their foolish attack on the Americans on the night of February 4th. Everything was going their way. The President had declared that he had taken the islands from Spain for the welfare of the people of the islands themselves, who were to be aided and taught to maintain a government of their own. Sentiment in the United States was crystalizing in favor of permitting them to attempt self-government, under American tutelage and protection. They were assured of all these things, but they were not able to grasp the situation nor to restrain themselves. Puffed up with their grossly exaggerated opinion of their ability as fighters, contemptuous of the fighting qualities of the Americans, mistaking their courtesy and fair dealing for fear, they grew more and more arrogant and aggressive, until they could no longer brook delay but undertook, by a

sudden attack, not preceded by notice of hostilities, to drive the Americans into the sea. It became necessary to prove to them that fear was not part of the American character, and the results to themselves were most unexpected and disastrous. Thus, by their own folly, in one day they sealed the fate of the constitution upon which they had labored for three months.

An incident which illustrates the attitude of the average Filipino insurgent toward the Americans, at the time; his inability to comprehend the situation, and his unreasoning insolence, is the following, told by an eye-witness:

"A number of insurgent junks and launches were making their appearance in the bay near Cavité, flying Aguinaldo's flag right under the noses of our big warships. For a time the admiral paid no more attention to them than as if they had been water flies; but so numerous did they become, emboldened by the indifference of our ships, that their presence soon stirred up the ire of some of our officers, who complained to the admiral. Whereupon he sent around a tug, and towed them all to Cavité, bringing the natives aboard his ship. After giving them to understand that the Filipino flag was not recognized, and that their presence in the vicinity of the warships was not desired, he dismissed them and told them to go back and get their junks. One of the natives, however, resented the entire proceeding, and, as he turned from the presence of Dewey, muttered and shook his head menacingly. The admiral noticed the native's attitude, and asked his interpreter what the fellow was saying.

" 'He says he will get even with you,' the interpreter replied.

"The admiral, without a second's hesitation, turned to an orderly, and in his quick, decisive tone, said:

" 'Throw that man overboard!'

"The command was executed instanter by the brawny American sailor, and Dewey walked away, never once turning his head as the splash greeted his ears; nor did he afterwards inquire the fate of the Tagal warrior."

CHAPTER XLVIII

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL MERRITT AT MANILA — CONDUCT OF THE WILY AGUINALDO—FIGHTING BEFORE MANILA — THE COMBINED ATTACK UPON THE CITY AND ITS FALL.

Aguinaldo Proves Troublesome to General Anderson — The Filipino Leader Attempts to Dictate to Americans — Arrival of the Second Expedition — The Humiliating Situation of the Spaniards — General Anderson's Curt Note to Aguinaldo — Obstacles Placed in the Way of the American Troops — General Merritt's Narrative of the Situation in which he Found Matters — He Holds no Communication with Aguinaldo — Working in Front of the Insurgent Lines — The Night Attack of July 31st — Planning for a Combined Attack upon the City — The Joint Demand for Surrender — Dewey Begins the Bombardment of the City — The Position of the Fleet — The Advance of the Army — Entering the City — Manila in Possession of United States Troops — More than Three Hundred Years of Spanish Sovereignty Ended — Manila again in Telegraphic Communication with the World.

THE unsatisfactory attitude of Aguinaldo manifested itself as soon as General Anderson's troops landed at Cavité on July 1st. The insurgent was in full possession beyond the navy yard gates. The first unpleasant indication of his presence was when Lieutenant Clark, General Anderson's aid, while walking about Cavité, was told by a Filipino soldier that Aguinaldo wished to see him at once at his headquarters. Clark went there and Aguinaldo asked him what he was doing in Cavité. Clark said he was on General Anderson's business. Aguinaldo said that was very well, but he would have to give him formal permission to go about the place. That night General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo that he was in command at Cavité and that his men must not be interfered with. A part of his letter was as follows :

"In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavité as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

"I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness.

"I have, therefore, the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they cannot visit Cavité without permission."

The reply of the insurgent leader was couched in most courteous and plausible terms, and read thus :

"Brig. Gen THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

"Commanding the United States Volunteers.

"GENERAL: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency.

"I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction whenever occasion represents.

"I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes.

"I beg of your excellency to accept in return the assurance of my most respectable consideration.

"I remain, respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO."

Soon after the 4th Aguinaldo made a formal call on General Anderson, who thought best to receive him with military honors. He was evidently pleased, but he was also very cautious and reserved. Finally he asked what the Americans intended to do in the Philippines. He construed General Anderson's reply to mean that the Americans were there only to permit the Filipinos to set up an independent government. But he had hardly returned to his headquarters when he received a letter from General Anderson informing him that another American expedition was expected, and that Cavité would be needed for these soldiers. There was more correspondence, in which Aguinaldo kept hinting at the question of American intentions, but he finally

moved out of Cavité to Bakor. A little later General Anderson decided to send a battalion of the First California into camp near the shore of the bay south of Manila and practically between Aguinaldo's headquarters and the insurgent lines. Aguinaldo did not dare to show a too unfriendly attitude, but he set about to do all he could to block this movement of American troops. They were landed at Parañaque, about two miles below the proposed camp, and Aguinaldo was informed that the Americans needed labor and material for transportation of men and supplies to the camp. The natives would not work without Aguinaldo's consent, and he did not give his consent. When asked for carts he said there were none. But the American officers found them and took them and finally got into camp.

This was only the beginning. There were similar incidents when General Anderson undertook to move more men into the camp. Meanwhile, the second expedition under General Greene arrived on July 16th and 17th, and preparations were at once made for the debarkation of the troops. It was decided to put all the second expedition, except a few regulars and one battery of the Utah Artillery, into the camp with the Californians without landing them at Cavité. As the stores and ammunition had been loaded into the ships without much regard for the probable order in which they would be needed, and as the landing had to be done in "cascos," the native lighters, through the surf, it was slow and laborious work. The American camp was not far from the old stone fort at Malate, where the Spaniards had some good guns, including 8-inch Krupps, but the Spaniards simply stood by and watched the American army gathering before them. They knew that if they trained their guns on the camp, Dewey would open his guns on Manila. They had no intention of knocking "the chip" off American shoulders. Indeed they seemed to regard the gathering of American forces under their guns as a hastening of the time when they would gladly make a theatrical surrender to the United States to save their honor and to

save themselves from the tantalizing Filipinos. An enemy was never in more humiliating straits.

They regarded the spectacle with far more complacency than did Aguinaldo. Now that native assistance and carts and horses were needed to move the expedition into camp, the chief quartermaster decided to have them without any more palaver. He called on Aguinaldo, but the insurgent general was "indisposed." He waited a while and called again, but Aguinaldo was reported asleep. Then the chief quartermaster, on July 17th, wrote him a letter as follows:

"General Anderson writes me to say that, the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Parañaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army, and shelter it, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We shall want horses, carts, buffalos, etc., for transportation, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we shall be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We should regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes me to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.

"I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible.

"I will await your reply."

The reply did not come, but one of Aguinaldo's aides hastened to General Anderson to know if the letter had been written by authority. General Anderson replied that it was not only by his authority but by his order, and said further that when an American commander was indisposed or asleep, someone was left in authority to transact business of importance. The next day Aguinaldo replied formally to the letter. He was surprised that there should have been any suggestion

of unwillingness on the part of the Filipinos to aid the Americans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans "did not desire a colony," and were only there to drive out the Spaniards. He said the Filipinos did not have as much material as the Americans asked for, and again asked for a definite statement as to American intentions. General Anderson acknowledged the note and said it would be referred to General Merritt when he arrived. The next day it was found that Aguinaldo had caused to be made a list of all the horses and vehicles in the district, and had notified the owners that they were not to engage in any service for the Americans which would interfere with any service for Aguinaldo. They understood, took the wheels off their carts and hid them. Thus our soldiers had to work their supplies up from the beach as best they could, pushing heavy boxes end over end for a long distance. But they succeeded, and Aguinaldo saw what the American soldiers were made of.

In this way matters went on till the 25th, when General Merritt arrived, having gone straight through on the *Neuport*. The other transports and the monitor *Monterey* arrived a few days later. The latter was warmly welcomed, much to the astonishment of the natives, who, because of her low freeboard, decided that she was sinking. General Merritt at once set to work organizing his forces, and as to his impression of the work before him we can do no better than to quote from his report. He says:

"Immediately after my arrival I visited General Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be described. I found General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties in landing supplies the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the

American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accepted the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent, and on the particular road called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork of trenches within 800 yards of Powder Magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right leading from the village of Passay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs — namely, having a line of quasi hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position — was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents.

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupants are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces.

"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31st."

In this engagement the Spaniards, with a considerably superior force, undertook to surprise our troops and turn their right. It appears that there had been a conflict between the Spanish party which was inclined to surrender without much opposition to the Americans and the party which urged the most desperate opposition to the last. To the former party belonged Captain-General Augusti and to the latter the arch-

bishop and General Jaudenes. Soon after Dewey's victory, Augusti had shown a disposition to show the white flag, and for a time Jaudenes had assumed the command. Now he came to the front again, was placed in command, and the Spaniards began fighting vigorously. But our forces gallantly repelled the attack of the night of the 31st. Not an inch of ground was yielded by the Tenth Regiment, Pennsylvania, and the batteries of the Utah Artillery stationed in the trenches, while the First California moved forward to their support under a galling fire with courage and steadiness. Thirteen of our men were killed and several were wounded; the Spanish loss was believed to be about 500. The enemy was driven back upon the city.

General Merritt's report continues:

"Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.

"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to reinforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on July 31st. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be over-estimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavité, five miles from a spot on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head-on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished after days of hard work and hardship, and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

"Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such an action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready."

render of the city might be secured without a serious risk of life, and he had counseled postponing the demand for the city till the Spaniards were in the most desperate straits, and until the monitor *Monadnock* arrived, for there seemed to be always the possibility that the Germans would interfere when the gauntlet was thrown down. But the nightly Spanish attacks on our trenches put a different face on affairs, for it occasioned some loss of life. Then too, some intimation that peace proposals were under way reached the American commanders at about this time, but the Spaniards apparently were ignorant of it. Through the informal assistance of the Belgian consul, the American commanders were able to obtain a clear idea of the Spanish purposes. They would surrender, but there must be a show of fighting. Spanish honor must be satisfied.

General Merritt says in his report :

"Under date of August 6th, Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain-General notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the defenses at Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period. This letter was sent August 7th, and a reply was received the same date to the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children now lodged within the walls.

"On the 9th a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bombardment under such circumstances. The Captain-General's reply of same date, stated that the Council-of-Defense had declared that the demand could not be granted ; but the Captain-General offered to consult his government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communication by way of Hongkong. This was declined on our part, for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the Admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season.

"The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded,

and containing a large amount of neutral property could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy. It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and driven out the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. It was believed, however, as most desirable and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city."

The army was actively engaged in preparation during the 12th, or the day on which Secretary Day and Ambassador Cambon were signing the peace protocol at Washington, and on that day General Merritt issued his order for the combined attack. The general plan was for the fleet to satisfy "Spanish honor" with a spectacular bombardment till such time as the way seemed clear for the army to advance with the least amount of resistance. The chief concern was not in the work of getting in to the city, but in keeping the insurgents out.

The morning of the 13th was like so many others in the Philippines; the wind blew and the rain fell, and a heavy mist lay along the shore, giving a false outline to the range-finders on the fleet. It was about 8:45 when the ships got under way, and at about the same time the foreign vessels began to move in behind to witness the fall of the oldest Spanish city in the Orient.

At about 9:30 the *Olympia* opened on the Malate fort with her 5-inch guns, and the other ships quickly joined in, but the shots fell far short — altogether too short to satisfy Spanish honor. The little *Callao*, a Spanish gunboat which had steamed into Manila Bay a few days after Dewey's great victory, unaware of what had taken place, and which was quickly surrendered and been converted into a more serviceable American gunboat, stood in nearer the shore line, and, unaffected by the mist, did some accurate shooting with her

small guns. The bombardment had continued but a few minutes when the shots began to fall in the forts and the Spanish lines, and at 10:25 Dewey ceased firing. At this point we may well take up again the narrative of General Merritt's report.

"At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder magazine, fort, and trenches flanking it, deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malat , by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others, the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malat  and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Migueka, as contemplated in his instructions.

"In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Passay road, encountered a very sharp fire coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the road and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malat , as was contemplated in his instructions. The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malat , a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon Lieut.-Col. C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers of my staff, and Lieut. Brumby, United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers representing the two forces. Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cav , was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the Colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy, driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed



H. Merritt

and standing in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred."

Thus the 350 years of Spanish sovereignty in Manila was ended.

The insurgents made every effort, doubtless by Aguinaldo's orders, to get into the city, and once or twice sharp conflicts were narrowly averted. Small bands of 100 or 200 worked their way in behind some of the American troops in the lead, but were caught and disarmed. A few got into the suburbs with arms and did some looting. That night General Anderson sent to Aguinaldo a peremptory order to remove all his men from the city, and for an answer Aguinaldo sent forward one of his generals with 1,000 men. They were surrounded and disarmed, and Aguinaldo protested. He asserted that the American troops had landed by his permission, and, therefore, he was entitled to some of the spoils. Such was the situation when General Merritt left to confer with the peace commission. The cable which Dewey had cut when he destroyed Montojo's fleet was reunited and Manila was again in communication with the world.

CHAPTER XLIX

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE—SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL— STORY OF THE PARIS PEACE COMMISSION AND ITS LABORS—THE FINAL TREATY OF PEACE.

Spain's Reluctance to Yield—Her Embarrassed Condition—Don Carlos and Weyler—Cortes Dissolved in Disorder—Overtures through the French Minister—Reply of the United States—Terms of the Protocol—A Swiftly Decisive War—Condition of Our Army in Cuba—Commissions for the Evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico—Evacuation of Havana—A Day to be Long Remembered—The Stars and Stripes Everywhere—Simple but Imposing Ceremony—The Flag of Spain Lowered—Grief of the Captain-General—"W Aere no Longer Enemies"—Cubans Beside Themselves with Joy—General Brooke Becomes Governor of Cuba—The Peace Commission and its Work—Spain Wishes the United States to Assume the Cuban Debt—Dispute as to the Disposition of the Philippines—The Treaty Signed.

MUCH of the time since the war began Spain had been passing through a ministerial crisis. The defeat at Manila had been followed by symptoms of revolution and anarchy. In the long debates in the Cortes the most bitter attacks had been made on the ministry for its failure to meet the situation. Several provinces were placed under martial law. The premium on gold rapidly advanced and the Bank of Spain was becoming seriously crippled in its efforts to finance the government. The ministry held together because every one feared the result of its disappearance. It became no longer possible to secure credence in reports of Spanish victories or to conceal Spanish defeats. By the first of July the Spanish people were beginning to face the facts. There were petitions for peace from several sections. But Don Carlos was threatening trouble, and Weyler, with characteristic perversity, was inflaming the military spirits. The Cortes was dissolved the last week in June amid great disorder and with outspoken

attacks upon the dynasty. To have sued for peace then, while it would have been better for Spain, might have endangered the Queen, so Sagasta held off with nothing to gain. He was required to wait till the Spanish mind was prepared for peace. The pressure of the war was felt more and more, and after the fall of Santiago peace proposals were daily expected.

The overtures finally came on July 26th, or three days after General Miles landed in Puerto Rico. The French Minister at Washington, M. Cambon, called upon the President and presented a letter from the Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs, asking upon what terms the United States would be willing to make peace. President McKinley at once called his cabinet into consultation for the purpose of framing a reply. The result was that on the 30th a reply was sent to Madrid to the general effect that this country would enter into negotiations for peace provided Spain agreed to certain conditions. This answer Spain received on the 31st. On the following day some explanation was asked as to some of its terms, and the Spanish cabinet finally accepted the conditions on August 7th. With the signing on the 12th by Cambon on the part of Spain, and Secretary Day on the part of the United States, of a formal protocol as a basis for peace, the war begun on April 21st was brought to a close. The protocol, embodying the conditions above mentioned, was as follows:

PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, AUGUST 12, 1898.

PROTOCOL.

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:

ARTICLE I.

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

ARTICLE II.

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladronez to be selected by the United States.

ARTICLE III.

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

ARTICLE IV.

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint Commissioners, and the Commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the detail of the aforesaid evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

ARTICLE V.

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

ARTICLE VI.

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL]	WILLIAM R. DAY.
[SEAL]	JULES CAMBON.

Thus, in all points but one or two, Spain was absolutely pledged in advance to yield to the demands of the United States. It left the formulating of instructions to the peace commissioners in regard to the Philippine question, the most important matter before the two governments.

Thus, after less than four months of warfare, ended a conflict which drove Spain from the last of her once great posses-



M. Thibault,

H. C. Corbin,

A. A. Able,

George B. Cortelyou,

Thomas W. Cullen,

M. Jules Cambon,

Adjutant-General,

Sec. of State,

Third Asst. Sec. of State,

French Embassy,

William R. Day,

President,

O. L. Prudden,

AN EVENT OF GREAT HISTORIC IMPORTANCE—SIGNING THE PEACE PROTOCOL,

John B. Moore,

President,

First Sec. to the President,

Secretary of State Day signing the Peace Protocol in the presence of President McKinley, the French Ambassador, and others.

sions in the Eastern world, which gave the promise of independence to the struggling Cuban, which established the United States as a world-power of the first magnitude and enlarged its territory in both hemispheres, which opened to the American people new opportunities and new responsibilities. An English paper called it "one of the most swiftly decisive wars in history." It is true that when the protocol was signed, Spain was still in possession of Havana, Manila, and San Juan. But Manila, as we have seen, fell the day after, San Juan would have been taken in a few days, and Havana, Spain well knew, must surely fall into our hands in the end. It was, however, one of the peculiar features of the war that the Cuban capital, to which all eyes were directed when war was declared, in which was the main strength of the Spanish army, around which it was supposed our armies would at once gather, and into which our navy would first throw its shells, escaped all actual hostilities. The blockade had been continued from the beginning, and the condition of the people had become more and more desperate. Relief from the sufferings of the blockade mitigated the bitterness of defeat among the Spaniards, who had once been so boastful and had treated our interests so contemptuously. As they looked upon the wreck of the battleship *Maine* in the harbor, they must have felt that the penalty for that treachery had been swift and harsh.

As was the case after the Mexican and civil conflicts, the cessation of hostilities was followed by severe criticisms of the management of the war. There seemed to be provocation for this in the condition in which the army in Cuba found itself soon after the taking of Santiago, though it is a question if such a quick and severe campaign could have been carried out in such a country in such a time without the epidemic of sickness which followed, and it is not strange that in such an emergency the provisions for the troops were not all to which they were entitled. The truth was that the government had been hurried without preparation into a war the very nature of which

compelled prompt and aggressive action at two points on opposite sides of the world. But the state of being unprepared "is one of the penalties which republics pay, more than any other form of government, for the want of precedent military organization sufficiently large to embrace all the purposes and cover all the requirements of war." Late in August the greater part of Shafter's command was brought north to Camp Wikoff on Long Island, and the persistence of the demand from some quarters for an investigation into the management of the campaign led the President to appoint a commission of well-known and responsible men from both parties for such an investigation. The agitation could not fail to make the work of the Peace Commission more difficult.

In accordance with the provisions of the protocol, the joint commissions for the Spanish evacuation of the West Indies were appointed within ten days. As members of the Cuban Commission, President McKinley appointed General James F. Wade, who had been in command of the great encampment at Tampa, Admiral Sampson, and General M. C. Butler. The Spaniards had sought the service of General Blanco as the head of their commissioners, but he refused to serve, being indignant at the surrender his government had made, and so General Parrado was appointed in his place. The other members were Captain Landera and the Marquis Montoro. The American members of the Puerto Rico Commission were General Brooke, who accompanied General Miles to the island next in command, Admiral Schley, and General Gordon; the Spanish members were General Ortega, Captain Vallarino, commander of the naval station of Puerto Rico, and Senor Sanches Anguilla.

Our commissioners met with few difficulties in Puerto Rico. The Spanish associates were sensible and business-like, and the Spanish soldiers were repatriated as fast as transportation could be secured. On October 18th General Brooke took absolute command of the island. The evacuation of Cuba was beset with more obstacles. The Spanish commissioners

claimed that it would be impossible for them to remove the soldiers before the first of February, and the American commissioners were instructed to insist upon the occupation by our troops by December 1st, and that the Spanish evacuation should be completed by the end of the year. In spite of Spanish delays, the American commissioners succeeded in carrying out their plans.

After four centuries of misrule in Cuba, Spain relinquished her claim to sovereignty in the island on the first day of January, 1899. The hauling down of the Spanish flag and the raising of the Stars and Stripes over the public buildings of Havana was a simple ceremony in itself, but it meant that Spain had lost the last mile of all her vast territories in the western hemisphere.

The day of the final evacuation and surrender had been looked forward to by the people of the island with both interest and anxiety. Those whose loyalty had remained with the Spanish government throughout the struggle for supremacy looked upon it as a day of humiliation; the Cubans as the day upon which would be born the independence of Cuba and the beginning of its history as one of the nations of the earth. For days the city had worn a gala appearance. Upon the roof-tops, nearly without exception, floated from the flagstuffs either the Stars and Stripes or the lone star of Cuba.

Thousands of people from the many cities of the island had come to Havana to be present at the celebration of the evacuation. Many Americans had also arrived from the United States. The increase of the city's population was particularly noticeable on New Year's morning. Places of vantage from which to view the triumphal entry of the United States soldiers, coming from their camp a few miles to the westward of the city, were occupied early, and it seemed to the spectator that the chivalry and beauty of Cuba had congregated from its furthestmost ends to assist in making memorable the greatest day in Cuba's history.

There was only as much ceremony as the necessities of

the case required. Captain-General Castellanos, at noon, in the hall of the Palace at Havana, in the names of the King and the Queen Regent, formally delivered possession of Cuba to General Wade as the head of the American Evacuation Commission under the terms of the protocol. General Wade in turn delivered the control of the island to General Brooke, lately appointed by the President to become Military Governor of the Division of Cuba. The red and yellow flag of Spain, symbol of tyranny and cruelty, was lowered from the Palace, Morro Castle, the Cabaña Fortress, and the public buildings, and instantly replaced by the Stars and Stripes. Brief but affecting was the ceremony, and then booming cannon from the ships in the harbor and from the forts surrounding the city told the world that a new era was beginning in Cuba.

At the moment of the change of national flags, the Captain-General, a strong and dignified man, showed sincere and natural sorrow. With tears rolling down his cheeks, he said:

"Gentlemen, I have been in many battles, and have been near death many times, but never before have I lost my self-possession; never before have I felt such deep emotion as I am feeling now."

And afterwards, when he heard the twenty-one guns salute the Stars and Stripes waving over Havana, the Captain-General's voice shook with sobs as he exclaimed: "This is the bitterest moment of my life. I hope none of you will ever suffer what I am suffering now."

Thus did a loyal Spaniard express grief at Spain's humiliation. The Americans, on the other hand, were elated, but scrupulously courteous, as became them as victors, and the solemn transfer of sovereignty. An informal incident occurred at this time, pleasant in itself and of hopeful meaning: Three Cuban generals were present, and on being presented to them at his own request, General Castellano said, "I am sorry, gentlemen, that we are enemies, being of the same blood." General Menocal responded, "We fought only for Cuba, and now that she is free, we are no longer enemies." After the ex-

Captain-General had left the Palace, with the American band playing the royal Spanish march out of compliment to him, and the American national hymn had been played amid tremendous cheering in the streets, Major-General Brooke, the military Governor of Cuba, at once held a reception in the throne-room of the Palace. He was surrounded by Generals Chaffee, Ludlow, Lee, Wade, Butler, and Clous, Senator Daniel of Vermont, and others. The commission next proceeded to the Central Park and the Hotel de Inglaterra, where General Fitzhugh Lee, the military Governor of the province, held a review of the troops under Generals Keifer, Williston, Hasbrouck, and Colonel Armfield, consisting of the Second Louisiana, First Texas, Eighth Regulars, Fourth Virginia, Sixth Missouri, Forty-ninth Iowa, Second Illinois, and One Hundred and Sixty-first Indiana.

There was no disturbance in Havana; the crowds in the streets were reasonably orderly, although intensely enthusiastic. The chief celebrators throughout the city were the Cubans. They were beside themselves with joy, for in the American flag floating over the public buildings they saw the realization of their dream of Cuba freed from the yoke of Spain. Their own flag was everywhere, even over Morro Castle, suspended on the string of a kite, where it waved all day high above all else. Taking it all in all, January 1st, 1899, in Havana was a proud day for the United States, a joyful day for Cuba, and for Spain a day of gloom and humiliation.

General Brooke at once issued a proclamation assuring protection to the persons and property of all the inhabitants, and encouraging the resumption of agriculture, traffic, and commerce. The organization of the Havana police and sanitary forces was pushed rapidly forward, and the military organization perfected in detail.

Meantime, the commissioners appointed to arrange the terms of peace assembled at Paris and began their sittings on October 1st. The American members consisted of William R. Day, who resigned his office of Secretary of State,

Senators Cushman R. Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*.

In Mr. Day, the head of this important commission, the President had the confidence derived not simply from a long acquaintance at home, but from the able and judicious manner in which the difficult affairs of the State Department had been managed throughout the preliminary diplomacy and subsequent struggle with Spain. As chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Davis was also well-equipped with knowledge and experience for the work of the commission. Senator Frye, who is a good example of New England enterprise and trustworthiness, had taken a progressive attitude in reference to the questions raised by the war during the struggle in the Senate, and he became a natural exponent of the President's ideas. Senator Gray, the Democratic member, was naturally inclined to hold a less progressive policy than Senator Frye, while Whitelaw Reid was credited with holding a middle position. But whatever their individual views, they cheerfully followed the instructions of President McKinley as given from time to time during the negotiations, on the nature of which Mr. Day reported.

The Spanish commissioners were among the ablest men in the kingdom. Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, the president, held the exalted position of president of the Spanish Senate, and was one of the most eminent jurists in Spain. He had been an advocate of reforms in the Spanish colonies for a long time, seeing with a clearer eye than most of his countrymen the inevitable result of the policy Spain was pursuing. General Rafael Cerero was also a progressive Spaniard who had charge of the coast defenses of his country. Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza had served his country in various capacities, among them as Ambassador to France. Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa Urrutia, the youngest member of the Spanish commission, was the Minister to Belgium, and was held in high esteem as a diplomat. Perhaps the strongest member of the commis-

sion next to Señor Ríos, was Don José de Garnica, who enjoyed a wide reputation as a political economist and as a master of international law.

The secretary of the Spanish commission was Don Emilio Ojeda, Minister to Morocco, and of the American commission Professor J. B. Moore of Columbia University, who had had a long training in international law and had held the position of First Assistant Secretary of State during the war. Both commissions employed several clerks, messengers, and other assistants.

Through the courtesy of M. Deleassé, the French Foreign Minister, the commissioners were permitted to hold their joint sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They occupied two salons in what is known as the *Galerie des Fêtes*, which are nationally and internationally historic. At a large table in the center of one of these rooms sat the peacemakers, the American president at one end and the Spanish president at the other. All communication with the rest of the Palace was cut off and the doings of the sessions were kept absolutely secret. The record of the various propositions and the papers submitted during the long negotiations would alone make a volume, embracing, as they do, all the various arguments, some of them of great diplomatic subtlety.

It at once appeared that the Spanish commissioners were disposed to insist upon an interpretation of the protocol peculiarly their own. While that document apparently left little more than a settlement of the Philippine question to be determined, the Spanish commissioners took the view that, in renouncing all claims to sovereignty and all rights in the island of Cuba, Spain renounced them to the United States, which, therefore, became liable for the Cuban debt of nearly \$500,000,000. That the victor, naturally seeking an indemnity from the vanquished, should be coolly asked to shoulder a debt which had been contracted largely in behalf of Spain, and which amounted to more than the island was worth in its ruined condition, seemed a preposterous proposition, but the

Spanish commissioners insisted on it for a long time, even going so far as to assert that an indemnity could not be claimed from Spain because she had not initiated the war. The American commissioners bore patiently with these representations, arguing in opposition that the United States had taken to arms because Spain would not surrender her sovereignty to the Cubans to secure peace, and that now the United States did not propose to assume permanent sovereignty in the island, but as soon as possible to turn it over to the Cubans, and that the United States government would not bind either itself or the Cubans to the payment of a debt which in all justice ought not to be charged against the islands. As a large part of this so-called Cuban debt was held in France, the press at Paris naturally supported the Spanish contention. The Spanish commissioners endeavored to secure some admission from the Americans that the United States would actually assume sovereignty over Cuba, in the hope that they might thus establish a legal responsibility for the debt. But after long discussion and delay, the American commissioners ceased arguing and asserted earnestly that their government did not propose to assume nor in any way to guarantee the Cuban debt. Then the Spanish commissioners quietly accepted the inevitable, pretending to be comforted by the forlorn hope that the debt would still be assumed by whatever sovereignty ultimately prevailed in the island.

The question of the disposition of the Philippines, which was reached about November 1st, also led to a long struggle. After a careful consideration of the problem as set forth in the reports of Admiral Dewey and General Merritt, who had meantime reached Paris from Manila, the administration at Washington became convinced that the islands must be taken under the sovereignty of the United States. The cession of Puerto Rico alone was not considered a sufficient indemnity; Spanish authority in the Philippines was well-nigh extinguished; the islands were naturally fertile and fruitful, and in an advantageous position for Oriental trade, and it was out of

the question to leave the islands to the mercies of Spain with every prospect that they would become a disturbing element in the East. But the Spanish commissioners took the position that the United States could not lay claim to the sovereignty of the islands under the protocol. It was apparent, however, that they were chiefly concerned over the financial side of the question, and it was intimated that Spain would cede the islands provided the United States would assume the indebtedness of \$40,000,000 and in addition give Spain a substantial money consideration. This was another preposterous claim, and the Spanish commissioners were plainly informed that the United States and not Spain were entitled to indemnity as a result of the war. Following tactics employed earlier in the session, the Spanish authorities inspired the report that if the United States did not agree to the Spanish conditions, Spain would withdraw from the conference, declare to Europe that she lay helpless at the feet of a greedy and unjust victor, and implore the powers to come to her rescue. This was her last desperate effort to arouse Europe against us, but it failed. The American commissioners calmly declared that it was the purpose of the United States to take the entire group of the islands, assuming only such proportion of the debt as had been expended for the material improvement. A deadlock of several days followed, in which the Spanish government sought in vain to secure European support against the United States. She asked that the meaning of the protocol be arbitrated, her claim being that Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized as the basis of the peace negotiations.

Finally, the American commissioners, under instructions from Washington, presented a formal statement of terms in which a definite answer from Spain was requested by November 28th. According to these terms the proposition for arbitrating the meaning of the protocol was rejected, the demand for the cession of all the Philippines was renewed, the sum of \$20,000,000 was offered as a partial compensation in lieu of assuming the so-called Philippine debt, and explicit avowal

was made of the purpose of the United States to maintain "an open door" to commerce at the ports of the islands. It was also announced that the United States wished to treat for the religious freedom of the Caroline Islands, of the acquisition of one of them for a naval station, and also of some other matters not named in the protocol. Spain was informed that if these new terms were accepted it was proposed that there should be a mutual waiving of all claims for indemnity, national and personal, between the two countries, the release dating back to the beginning of the Cuban insurrection. At first the Spanish commissioners gave the public to believe that they would never accept such terms. But by December 1st, despairing of all help from Europe, they completely yielded, President Ríos saying that, while the American propositions were, in Spain's opinion, inadmissible on legal grounds, still Spain for "reasons of patriotism and humanity and to avoid the horrors of war resigned herself to the power of the victor."

This practically settled all matters mentioned in the protocol, and after some discussion of minor points a treaty was drawn up and formally signed on the evening of December 10th, after more than two months of constant negotiation. It was a historic occasion. To the Americans it was the happy ending of war; to the Spaniards it was evidently a bitter tragedy, marking another step in Spain's long national decline.

CHAPTER L

THE TREATY OF PEACE—SPAIN RELINQUISHES ALL TITLE TO CUBA—IMPORTANT AND VALUABLE TERRITORY CEDED TO THE UNITED STATES—THE FINAL ACT— END OF OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.

Articles of the Treaty—Our New and Rich Possessions—Islands in Both Eastern and Western Hemispheres—Twenty Million Dollars to be Paid to Spain—Spanish Troops to be Sent Home—Prisoners of War and Political Prisoners to be Released—Civil Rights to be Determined by Congress—The Treaty Ratified—Exchange of Documents at the White House—Impressive Ceremony—Message of President McKinley—An Eventful Year—Genuine Heroism of our Soldiers and Sailors—What the War Brought to this Nation—A Lesson to Spain—Patriotic and Prudent Policy of the President—A Rich Legacy for the Future.

THE Treaty of Peace was prepared by Secretary Moore in behalf of the United States commissioners, and by Señor Villa Urrutia for the Spanish commission. Each copy contained the English and Spanish texts in parallel columns. The document is as follows:

A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, DECEMBER 10, 1898.

The United States of America and her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have, for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries :

The President of the United States,

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ;

And Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown ; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the Supreme Court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary

and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division ;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under international law, result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ARTICLE II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrões.

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Government of the United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain, and the Government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

ARTICLE VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

ARTICLE VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property, which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills, and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sover-

eignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

ARTICLE XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines, and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other.

ARTICLE XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[SEAL]	WILLIAM R. DAY
[SEAL]	CUSHMAN K. DAVIS
[SEAL]	WILLIAM P. FRYE
[SEAL]	GEO. GRAY
[SEAL]	WHITELAW REID
[SEAL]	EUGENIO MONTERO RÍOS
[SEAL]	B. DE ABARZUA
[SEAL]	J. DE GARNICA
[SEAL]	W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA
[SEAL]	RAFAEL CERERO

The Peace Treaty was ratified by Congress on the 6th of February, 1899. During the week immediately preceding the final vote there was great uncertainty as to the decision. Petitions against the ratification were presented by Senator Hoar, the petitioners protesting against the extension of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands. Twenty-eight Senators were opposed to ratification unless it should be accompanied by a resolution disclaiming any purpose on the part of the Government to hold the Philippines permanently as a part of the national territory, or declaring an intention to permit the Filipinos to govern themselves. On the 4th only fifty-eight votes for ratification could be counted upon, but the news of the outbreak at Manila, as related in following chapters, when the Filipinos attacked the American forces, only to be driven back with great loss, probably turned the scale in favor of ratification. The vote was taken with closed doors, and after an hour and ten minutes in executive session it was announced that the Treaty was ratified by the affirmative votes of fifty-seven Senators. The actual number of votes cast was fifty-seven ayes and twenty-seven nays.

The final act in the re-establishment of peace between the United States and Spain was performed when the American and Spanish ratifications of the peace treaty were exchanged at the White House. Secretary of State John Hay and the Ambassador of France, M. Cambon, signed the protocol of exchange, and then the duplicate copies of the protocol and of the treaty were exchanged by President McKinley and the Ambassador as the representatives of the two governments.

The exact time when the Spanish war may be said to have legally ended was 3.35 p. m., April 11, 1899, for then M. Cambon handed to President McKinley the Spanish draft of the treaty bearing the signature of the Queen Regent, and the President in turn delivered to the Ambassador, who acted as Spain's representative, the American draft of the Paris convention.

Ambassador Cambon and M. Thiebaut, First Secretary of

the French Embassy, were met at the White House by Secretary Hay and Sidney Smith, Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau of the State Department, who acted as the official representative of the department proper in the interchange. The party was admitted to President McKinley's office, which is the large room on the south side of the Executive mansion, between the Cabinet Room and the "War Room," or telegraph office. The formal ceremony took place in this room for the reason that the Cabinet Room, where the peace protocol was signed December 10, 1898, was too small to accommodate comfortably the number of witnesses invited to be present.

The first business was the reading of the protocol, which consisted of a memorandum printed in parallel columns in French and English. Secretary Hay read the English copy and Ambassador Cambon the French. Secretary Thiebault then affixed a seal at the foot of each column of one draft of the protocol, and Mr. Smith attached similar seals to the other copy. As soon as this was done Ambassador Cambon, with a pen handed to him by Secretary Hay, attached his signature on behalf of the Spanish Foreign Office to the two copies, and Secretary Hay signed the papers subsequently with the same pen. This completed the preparation of the necessary documents for exchange. The two copies of the treaty proper had already been signed by the President and by the Queen Regent.

After the signing of the protocol President McKinley handed the American draft of the protocol and the American copy of the treaty, bearing his signature, to the French Ambassador for delivery to the Madrid Government, and M. Cambon promptly handed over the Spanish copies to the President. There were no formal speeches. The President merely remarked at the conclusion :

"Mr. Ambassador, I shall now issue the proclamation of peace," and M. Cambon replied, with a bow :

"Thank you, Mr. President."

The protocol is as follows :

"On the eleventh day of the month of April, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, the Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States, having been authorized for this purpose by the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington, Commander of the National Order of the Legion of Honor, Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Charles III, etc., having been especially authorized for this purpose by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, met at the White House for the purpose of effecting the exchange of the ratifications by the President of the United States of America and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris December 10, 1898, between the United States of America and Spain. The two Plenipotentiaries, having produced their respective full powers, which they have found to be in good and due form, read the original instruments of those ratifications, which they found to be exact and in conformity with each other, and then proceeded to their exchange.

"In testimony whereof the undersigned have prepared this statement and have thereunto affixed their respective seals.

"Done in duplicate in English and French at Washington, April 11, 1899.

"JOHN HAY.

"JULES CAMBON."

Immediately after the exchange had been effected the President proclaimed the treaty in a proclamation of the regular form, countersigned by the Secretary of State. The proclamation is as follows:

"Whereas, A treaty of peace between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by the respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, the original of which convention being in the English and Spanish languages is word for word as follows: [Here follows the text of the treaty.]

"And whereas, The said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on the eleventh day of April, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine;

"Now, therefore, Be it known that I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith in the United States and the citizens thereof.

"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington the eleventh day of April, in the

year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

“WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

“By the President.

“JOHN HAY, *Secretary of State.*”

At the Cabinet meeting that morning the fact was brought out and discussed with much satisfaction that it was the first anniversary of President McKinley's message to Congress declaring the purpose of the United States to intervene in behalf of Cuba and presenting to Spain the ultimatum of relinquishing Cuba or going to war with the United States.

Thus from the beginning of the war to the re-establishment of peace a little less than a year had passed. In the conflict our arms suffered no reverse, though the natural advantages were seldom on our side; and the loss of life, both from casualty and disease, was small in comparison with the loss in other wars. Our soldiers proved themselves as valiant after battle in saving the lives of their foes as they were heroic in battle in hazarding their own. It is doubtful if in any war that was ever fought could be found so much genuine heroism.

The war brought to this nation a world-wide renown for ability in warfare that cannot fail to be of inestimable value to it in the great international struggle for life. It has brought to it territory of immeasurable value, military and commercial, in the West Indies and in the East Indies. To Spain it brought the honor of bravery shown in defeat, and the warning to stamp upon the dishonor which reduced the nation to the decay in which war found it.

With its heroes the people did not forget to place one man whose work began long before war came and was not lessened by its close. The President who had united all parties in support of his patriotic and prudent policy, whose patient diplomacy deferred war till it could be deferred no longer, whose courage carried it through to a successful issue, and whose gentle firmness at its close secured a peace on honorable conditions with a rich legacy for our future, proved himself one of the great American statesmen of this generation, and amply justified the trust which his people placed in his hands.

CHAPTER LI

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES — MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS IN COMMAND AT MANILA — FIRST SIGNS OF HOSTILITY FROM THE FILIPINOS — SANDICO'S TREACHERY — PROCLAMATION BY PRESIDENT McKINLEY — AGUNALDO AND HIS FALSE CLAIMS.

Brief Sketch of the Career of our Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines — His Characteristics — Aguinaldo's Pretended Sympathy — He Disappears from His Headquarters near Manila — Sandico and His Secret Clubs — Discovery of a Regular Army Organization of Treacherous Filipinos in Manila — Sandico Hastens Away — Size of Our Army — Delay in Issuing President's Proclamation — Terms of the Message to the Filipinos — Its Effect on the People — The Rebel Chief Issues two Manifestoes — Conference at Manila — Aguinaldo's False Claims — Never Promised any Assistance — What Admiral Dewey Said — Allowed to Take Arms and Ammunition — Size of the Filipino Army — Attitude of Native Press Hostile.

WHEN General Merritt left Manila to go to Paris, where the peace commission was in session, the command of the American army in Manila devolved upon Major-General Elwell Stephen Otis, who proved to be an ideal coadjutor for Admiral Dewey. General Otis went into the war for the Union when he was twenty-four years of age. He was twice promoted for gallant conduct, once at Spottsylvania and once at the battle of Chapel House in the Virginia campaign.

General Otis was educated for the bar and he had always maintained his studies in the law, being also a deep student of military affairs. His figure was spare, and he was always in fighting trim; he was wiry and quick of movement. His eyes were a piercing gray, and his face tanned like red leather by exposure to the sun and wind of the Western plains. During the Civil War a bullet struck him in the nose and came out at the back of his head, but the scar it left was scarcely notice-

able. In his manner of speaking he was abrupt, sharp, and imperative. He was a strict disciplinarian, noted for being extremely wary and vigilant, and troops under him were never taken by surprise. He proved more than a match for Sitting Bull, who was a master of strategy as practiced on the Western plains. A straightforward, clear-headed, just, discreet, and shrewd man was the American military commander in the Philippines. He proved himself more than a match for the wily Filipinos, both in war and diplomacy.

It soon became apparent that if the United States, as a result of the negotiations at Paris, undertook to retain control of the Philippine Islands and establish a government there, the insurgents under Aguinaldo would offer all the resistance in their power. The wily chief of the Tagal rebels — for such they were from the time they took measures to resist Spain's authority, simply transferring the object of their hostility with the transfer of authority over the islands from Spain to the United States — at first pretended sympathy with the Americans. But his actions soon aroused suspicion, and measures were taken to ascertain just what his opinions were and precisely what he was doing, both in and out of Manila, to counteract the plans of the United States government.

About the first of January Aguinaldo disappeared from his headquarters. Previous to that time he had been going in and out with more or less frankness, frequently meeting Americans and being seen by American officials. The insurgent army lay encamped about the city. The policy of this government was to avoid a conflict with the Filipinos if possible. Every precaution was taken to prevent any occurrence that might lead to trouble. Great patience and forbearance were exercised, and Aguinaldo, by his annoying tactics, often put that patience and forbearance to a severe test.

An example of the sort of thing the Americans had to encounter may be given here. A young man named Sandico had been in the provost marshal's office. He was a clever half-caste, who, through his knowledge of the people and the



Robert

country, was able to render great assistance in the administration of the affairs of the city. To all appearances he was an ardent believer in annexation, and a strong friend of the Americans. In order to propagate his views among his people he said it was necessary to form societies among them, which could be devoted to the cultivation of annexation sentiment. General Hughes, who was in charge of the administration of affairs in the city of Manila, began to suspect that this too friendly native might bear watching and investigated the so-called clubs. He discovered enough to make it certain that they were not for the good of our government.

An interview between the general and the clever half-caste followed.

"Señor Sandico, you must stop forming these clubs," said the general.

"But why?" asked Sandico, innocently.

"We know what you are about, and you must stop," answered the general.

Soon after this Sandico left Manila to join the new cabinet of Aguinaldo, and became one of the most rabid anti-Americans in the Philippines. His work in Manila had already been done; how thoroughly subsequent events proved.

When Sandico left the city he had laid the foundation for an organized army in Manila itself. Our generals were informed of this movement, but did not interfere with it so long as the leaders showed no hostile intention. The muster-rolls of one regiment of this army were dug up near Tondo church by our secret police. The army was called the corps of the "Arma Blanca," or Bolo-men. On paper the organization was perfect — one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, and twelve companies commanded by three officers each. The title of this regiment was the anticipatory one of the "Victorious Regiment of Arma Blanca."

It was the desire of our government, however, that if a clash had to come it should be between the forces under Aguinaldo's immediate command and the troops under General

Otis at Manila. When, therefore, the Tagal leader disappeared, considerable anxiety was caused at American headquarters and at Washington. It was soon learned that he had gone to Malolos, where the Filipino parliament was in session. It was reported that fears of assassination by some of his own men led him to leave his headquarters near Cavité, but the fact is that he learned that his plot against the United States had been discovered and that he was likely to be put under arrest at any time.

At that time General Otis had at Manila about 19,000 men, while Aguinaldo was reported to have somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 followers. The insurgents lost greatly in effective strength through the capture by Admiral Dewey of the steamer *Abby* with 4,000 stand of arms and ammunition for Aguinaldo on board. In regard to their lack of equipment an American official remarked very pertinently: "It is pretty hard to tell where the army leaves off and the mob begins."

General Otis delayed the issuing of our government's proclamation somewhat because of the Filipino Congress which met at Malolos. It was a shrewd move, for the proclamation that the Philippines were under American control and government would make those who set up an independent government rebels against the United States, and as there were many Filipinos who wished to retain the friendship of this country, Aguinaldo would find considerable opposition among the representatives upon whom he relied to give him authority to resist the Americans. It was also thought the provisions of the proclamation were so liberal and so moderate that the conservative element would be easily won over to the side of the Americans.

The proclamation was as follows:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 27, 1898.

General OTIS, Manila:

By direction of the Secretary of War I have the honor to transmit

herewith instructions of the President relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands :

“EXECUTIVE MANSION,

“WASHINGTON, D. C., December 21, 1898.

“*To the Secretary of War :*

“SIR : — The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands, and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

“With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th inst., and as the result of victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired, and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila, is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

“In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the security of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations.

“It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons, who either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States, to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible.

“Within the domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands.

“While the control of all the public property and the revenue of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all

public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use it shall be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given.

"All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, not prohibited for military reasons, by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

"Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mildest way of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of his high mission supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

"WILLIAM MCKINLEY."

Acknowledge receipt.

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General*.

The effect of the proclamation upon the Filipinos was not all that had been hoped. Many accepted it, but the majority did not. The governors of the various Tagal provinces of Luzon sustained Aguinaldo and offered their unconditional allegiance to the Filipino republic, declaring that the people were willing to give up their lives and property in a struggle against the forcing of foreign domination upon them. Several hot-headed Filipino chiefs urged Aguinaldo to fight the Americans. The *Independencia* and other insurgent newspapers said that America would have a dark road to travel if she persisted in claiming sovereignty over the Philippines.

Aguinaldo also took a hand at issuing proclamations. The

first was published within a few hours of the appearance of the American message, and the second appeared on January 9th.

The first stated that the rebel chieftain had accepted the friendship of the Americans solely as a means of gaining the independence of the Philippines. He claimed that the American leaders had deceived him by stating that they had come to help the Filipinos to overthrow the Spaniards, and had led him to believe that when the islands were free the Americans would return from whence they came and leave the natives to enjoy their independence. He further declared that the Americans saluted the Filipino flag, and recognized the insurgents as a people fighting for their freedom, and not mere rebels resisting their government.

He continued this remarkable proclamation with the statement that he could prove that he was induced to return to Manila by the solemn assurance on the part of the American leaders that they would help him to gain the independence he desired, if he would only return and lead the natives. He had taken refuge in Hongkong after the close of the first rebellion, when the Spaniards agreed to pay the Filipinos a certain sum of money to restore peace.

Having denounced the Americans as faithless, he proceeded to call upon all his followers to help overthrow them, and begged them never to cease fighting until they secured their liberty.

The second proclamation was even more bitter in tone than the first, and made the most violent accusations against the United States. A few copies of the second proclamation were posted about the city of Manila, but they were torn down by order of General Otis. In the meantime, Agoncillo, the envoy of the Filipino Junta, was at work at Washington, trying in vain to secure recognition from the government, and doing all he could to stir up anti-annexation sentiment in the United States.

At the instance of Aguinaldo, an important conference was held at Manila on the evening of January 9th, between

commissioners appointed by himself and General Otis. Aguinaldo's representatives were General Felores, Colonel Aquilles, and Señor Tores. The American commissioners were General Hughes, Colonel Smith of California, and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, judge advocate. There was a frank discussion of the whole question at issue between the United States and the Filipinos, and the intent, purposes, and aim of the United States were fully explained. Nothing came of it, however.

Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised assistance by American officials is not borne out by the facts. The records show that as early as June 20, 1898, Secretary of State Day issued instructions to United States Consul Pratt at Singapore to avoid any negotiations with Philippine insurgents, and these instructions were repeated to others who came in contact with the insurgents from time to time. In spite of all attempts on the part of various leaders of the insurgents to secure some quasi-alliance with the Americans, no such relation was ever entered into. Mr. Wildman, our consul at Hongkong, affirms in the most positive terms that he "never made pledges or discussed the policy of America with Aguinaldo, further than to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took him to Cavité" — promises that he would conduct any military campaigns in which he might engage humanely and in accordance with the laws of war. Mr. Pratt is equally explicit. "I declined," he says, "even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines. I held out no hopes to him of any kind, and committed the government in no way whatever, and in the course of our conferences never acted on the assumption that the government would co-operate with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that in accepting his said co-operation it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims that he might put forward."

The reports of relations between the rebel chieftain and

the United States officers at Manila are equally explicit. Secretary Long instructed Admiral Dewey that "it is desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future," and received in reply from Dewey the assurance: "Have acted according to the spirit of the department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents, or with any faction."

Whatever obligations the United States might be under to Aguinaldo and his forces were due not to any pledges expressed or implied, but to the course of events and the condition of affairs. The total of the relationship between Aguinaldo and the United States government is summed up in the two facts that Aguinaldo was allowed passage from Hongkong to the island of Luzon on one of the American ships, that after his arrival at Luzon he was allowed by the admiral to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal captured at Cavité as he desired, and that he informed Admiral Dewey of his military progress from time to time. That is a small basis upon which to rest such claims as the Filipino insurgents and their sympathizers in this country made in order to allege a breach of faith on the part of the United States.

When the rebel chief was landed by Dewey once more upon his native soil, neither the illustrious admiral nor Consul General Wildman considered him other than an ally, a native scout, available to abet the American cause and tell his countrymen that our war was with Spain, not with the native races, their vassals. But, hidden from the discernment of our diplomats, burned the latent spark of a towering ambition, fanned into life by the force of apparent possibilities. So the little Aguinaldo, who was prolific in protestations of allegiance to the "great North American nation," became the big Aguinaldo, who aspired to be "the George Washington of his people."

To one who had seen this little Tagal stripling the assumption seemed ridiculous. The bombastic utterances that were issued over his name were so foreign to what must have emanated from his brain that they were absurd. But Aguinaldo himself was not without genius. In a less important *role* and free from the ill-advice of his associates he could have played his part with honor and credit to his race. He had been the victim of unscrupulous natives and — let it be said with a blush — of culpable and unworthy Americans and Englishmen, undeserving of the name, who whispered lies into his ear and encouraged him to stand as the figure-head to an uprising that blasted the fair reputation he had earned and plunged his people into a desperate and ill-starred struggle.

CHAPTER LII

FILIPINOS THROW OFF THE MASK AND ATTACK OUR FORCES AT MANILA — SIGNAL VICTORY WON BY THE AMERICANS — HEAVY LOSSES OF THE INSURGENTS.

A Sentry's Orders Disobeyed — Signal Gun Fired — Outposts all Along the Line Engaged — Americans not Taken Unawares — Rebels Fought Bravely but Were Repulsed With Awful Slaughter — Intense Excitement in the City — Street Cars Stopped and Carriages Vanished — Native Troops Well Armed — Driven into the Pasig River — Fight Renewed Early Sunday Morning — Several Villages Captured — The Charleston and the Callao Shelled — The Monadnock also at Work — Rout of the Rebels — Otis Expected the Outbreak — Aguinaldo's Spies Deceived — Insurgents Penned in a Church — The Callao a Terror — Dewey's Fine Strategy — Rebels Fled to Caloocan — Fight over the Approaches to the Reservoir — How Our Troops Were Disposed — Sandico's Army Failed — Total Losses — The Official Despatch — Aguinaldo's Proclamation — Our Troops Take the Water Works.

MEANWHILE, peace between the Americans and the Filipinos was maintained, although the natives gave our forces plenty of opportunities of beginning hostilities, had they been so disposed. The long discussion in the United States Senate over the ratification of the treaty of peace was about to close, the day when the vote should be taken having been fixed for Monday, February 6th. It was known that the vote would be close, and it was the opinion of many that the treaty would fail. The agents of the Filipinos in Washington kept the insurgent leaders at Malolos and around Manila constantly informed as to the progress of the debate and the state of public opinion in the United States, and there is no doubt that the attitude of Senators Hoar and Hale and others who opposed ratification greatly encouraged Aguinaldo to strengthen his army and prepare for hostilities against the Americans.

Suddenly, on the Saturday evening preceeding the Monday

on which the vote on ratification was taken — the 4th of February — came the long-delayed, inevitable conflict. Two native soldiers refused to obey the order of a sentry belonging to the First Nebraska Regiment, which was stationed to the northwest of Manila. The sentry ordered the natives to halt, but they obstinately refused to do so, and insolently continued to advance. Their action was undoubtedly a part of a preconcerted plan, as it seems likely that Aguinaldo expected to win a decisive victory and thus convince the United States Senate that it would be folly for this country to try to keep the Philippines. As the soldiers paid no attention to the sentry's orders, he leveled his rifle and fired upon them.

Instantly a battle began. The Filipinos were ready for action. As soon as the sentry fired on the natives who refused to respect his authority, the rebels who were occupying block-house No. 7 fired a gun, which was evidently a prearranged signal for a general attack. The Nebraska regiment was encamped in the vicinity of the outpost where the shooting occurred, and it was upon this regiment that the first assault of the enemy was made. The insurgents rushed upon the Americans, evidently expecting to overwhelm them by this sudden night attack and surprise them into a panic. The firing spread on both sides, and soon the conflict became general, all the outposts being engaged in a spirited defense, and pouring hot shot into the enemy wherever he could be found in the darkness of the night. The Filipinos occupied trenches which they had been digging for some time in plain view of the Americans, much to the disgust of the latter. As their insolence had been intolerable, our forces were only too glad to square accounts with the natives, and in no case was an American regiment taken by surprise.

In order to get a clear idea of the battle on the night of February 4th, and the subsequent engagements, it should be remembered that the Pasig River divides Manila from Old Manila, running almost directly east and west. It was to the northeast of the city, along the road to Caloocan, that the fight



OUTPOST OF THE NEBRASKA VOLUNTEERS NEAR MANILA, WHERE THE TROUBLE WITH THE FILIPINOS BEGAN.

occurred, all the outposts in that direction taking part in the engagement. The natives outnumbered our forces largely, and fought bravely, but were everywhere repulsed and driven back with awful slaughter. The men of the Eighth Army



MANILA AND VICINITY.

Showing important points, line of railway, and operations of American forces.

Corps under General Otis, who participated in the fighting, numbered about 13,000. The total strength of the Filipinos under arms in the neighborhood of Manila was about 30,000, of whom 20,000 are supposed to have engaged in the battle. The American troops were made up of the following organiza-

tions: Fourteenth Infantry (regulars), the Third and Sixth Artillery, the Utah Light Artillery (volunteers), the First Washington, First Nebraska, First Idaho, First South Dakota, First Colorado, First California, First Tennessee, First Wyoming, First Montana, and Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.

These forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. While the fighting was proceeding there was great excitement among the residents of the city. The natives were wildly excited, and had it not been for the splendid police system established by the Americans there would have been a general outbreak and looting. The American soldiers in the theaters and at the circus were called out and the performances were stopped. Filipinos scurried everywhere, and the rattle of musketry and the booming of cannon outside the city was plainly heard. The residents of the outskirts of Manila flocked into the walled city with their arms full of household effects. All the carriages disappeared as if by magic, the street cars were stopped, the telegraph lines were cut, and the soldiers hurriedly but silently marched out of the city to the stations assigned to them. The stores were closed almost instantly, foreign flags were to be seen flying from many windows, and a number of white rags were hung out from the Filipino huts and houses. The police kept a strong hand on the natives and prevented any very serious trouble. There were several cases of natives attacking American soldiers in the streets. Three Tagals who tried this game were shot and killed.

The native troops were well armed with Mauser and Remington rifles, but their shooting as a rule was ridiculously bad, while on the American side it was excellent. General King's brigade charged upon a numerically strong force of the enemy, and, yelling wildly, drove them helter skelter into the Pasig River, where in the frenzy of terror, they were drowned like rats.

The fighting during the night was necessarily somewhat desultory. The Americans were on the defensive, but no

wavering occurred in the line. They simply stood their ground, returned the fire of the rebels, and pressed forward whenever possible. During the night the attack was renewed several times. At 4 o'clock in the morning, however, when daylight made it possible to engage in anything like a continuous warfare, the entire line of our outposts was engaged. The Americans moved out of the city to the east and north, driving the enemy beyond the lines they formerly occupied, and capturing several villages and their defense work. These villages included San Juan del Monte, Santa Ana, San Pedro, Macati, Santa Mesa, and Lorma.

In the meantime, Admiral Dewey had not been idle. During the night it was impossible for him to use shells, as his fire would have been as dangerous to the Americans as to the natives. He gave orders, however, that as soon as it was light enough to allow the positions of the enemy to be determined with accuracy, the cruiser *Charleston* and the captured gunboat *Callao* should take a hand in the game. At daylight these two warships took up positions and opened fire on the enemy north of the city. Later the monitor *Monadnock* was ordered to attend to the Filipinos to the south of Manila. The positions of the enemy were accurately located and the warships poured a heavy fire into them. The losses of the natives by this bombardment were very heavy.

To the north and south of the city the slaughter was sickening. Filipinos were literally torn into shreds by the fire from the warships. In some places the shells tore great holes in the earth and around these were scattered the dead bodies. The great number of dead that were afterward found everywhere showed that the natives were not lacking in courage, but no courage could withstand the terrible rain of death that fell upon them as the Americans approached their positions. When the enemy retreated it was to get out of the range of the American guns as rapidly as possible.

It is well nigh incomprehensible that Aguinaldo really believed that he could catch the Americans napping and win a

victory by surprising them. For some time General Otis had been expecting just such an outbreak and he was not the kind of a man to be caught unawares. Every precaution had been taken to guard against treachery, and General Otis had enough information of the enemy's plans to enable him to block any move they might make against our forces. It was not known from what direction the blow would be dealt, and consequently measures were taken to defend every part of the American lines. These measures were carried out in such a quiet and unostentatious manner that Aguinaldo's spies, of whom he had many in the American lines, were completely deceived as to the real strength of the American positions, and their reports to their chief led him to make a fatal blunder at a time when he thought to influence the action of the American Senate by a great victory.

Aguinaldo himself did not participate in the fighting. He was a cautious general.

Of the American forces in the battle, the Fourteenth Regular Infantry, the old command of Brigadier-General J. M. Anderson, from Vancouver Barracks, suffered the greatest losses. The regiment was quartered at Malate, under command of Major Robe, and was assigned to the task of carrying the rebel position south of that suburb. The men fought through a country covered with a dense undergrowth, and made slow progress at first. The natives took refuge in nipa-covered huts, and until they were dislodged and driven back inflicted considerable damage on our men. The Fourteenth was armed with Krag-Jorgenson rifles, and these weapons proved most effective. For every life that the gallant old regiment gave it took a score in revenge.

The First Washington Volunteers and Third Regular Artillery also saw severe fighting and sustained material losses. The Utah Light Artillery and the Sixth Regular Artillery did splendidly effective service, and the latter helped to save the First California Regiment from being badly cut up. The guns were posted east of the city and during the early



ADVANCING ON THE FILIPINOS. UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS FORMING TO CHARGE ON THE INSURGENTS
IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF MANILA.

hours of Sunday poured a deadly fire into the insurgent trenches. The Utah battery men were seasoned by their experience at Malate in August and conducted themselves like veterans.

During the engagement a hundred insurgents took possession of Pacho church and, barricading the doors, opened fire on the First California Regiment. They also fired on the ambulances that were carrying wounded Americans to the rear. The Californians sent volley after volley against the sturdy stone structure, but they were ineffective. The men wanted to rush in and storm the building, but Colonel Smith restrained them. Word was sent to the Sixth Artillery and the guns were ordered trained on the church. The gunners found the range very quickly, and in twenty minutes the old church was a wreck and half its murderous tenants were dead. The First California Regiment was also attacked by Filipinos, who were concealed in huts beside the road along which the Americans were advancing. To put an end to the danger, Colonel Smith gave orders to burn the village, which was done in a very short time.

In the district between Tondo and Malabon to the north of the city, great slaughter was done by the gunboat *Callao*, Lieutenant Benjamin Tappan, which Admiral Dewey captured from the Spaniards, as already referred to. This little vessel proved herself a terror. She mounted more guns in proportion to her size than any other vessel in the American navy, being full of one, two, and three-pounders and machine guns. She duplicated her performance of August 13th, when she covered General Merritt's advance on Manila, running in close to the beach and spitting fire from her bow guns. The *Concord's* 6-inch and the *Charleston's* 8-inch guns also did great execution. General Otis's brigade had driven a large body of the enemy from their positions and the Filipinos ran at a breakneck speed for the beach, a discouraged and panic-stricken mob. When they reached the shore they were met by a devastating fire from the warships and mowed down by

the hundreds. The sight was sickening. On Sunday afternoon the *Charleston* joined the monitor *Monadnock* off Malate, which was the scene of the heaviest fighting with the Spaniards in August, and both vessels delivered their shells with telling effect. The enemy were retiring before the steady advance of the Fourteenth Infantry and had comparatively little shelter. They furnished excellent targets for the marksmanship of the Yankee gunners, whose reputation suffered not at all from this engagement.

The *Olympia*, Admiral Dewey's flagship, took no part in the bombardment. With the fine strategy for which this American naval commander is noted, he placed his vessel directly in front of the city, between the Spanish gunboat *General Alava* and the German cruiser *Irene* and the troops ashore. The significance of this move will be at once perceived. The admiral was in a place where he could enforce the rule "hands off," if it became necessary.

The Filipinos retreated, quickly followed by the Americans, as far as Caloocan, on the Dagupan railway on the north, and on the south to Pasay, south of Malate. The burial of the dead Filipinos by our soldiers began on Monday. In one place 180 bodies were found, in another 60. Nearly every American regiment engaged reported finding fifty or more of the enemy dead.

Aguinaldo had his lines strengthened, especially at Santa Mesa and San Juan del Monte, which commanded the approaches to the reservoir that supplies Manila with drinking water. It was at that point, near Santa Mesa, that the battle started, and it was there that the fighting was fiercest. The Americans, on defeating the enemy in that quarter, marched on towards the waterworks with the object of gaining possession of them and thus preventing the insurgents from cutting off the water supply.

The Americans, while the fighting was going on, were disposed in the following manner from the bay on the north around the city to the bay on the south. The Twentieth

Kansas Infantry and the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry under command of Brigadier-General Otis; the First South Dakota Infantry, First Colorado Infantry, and First Nebraska Infantry, commanded by Brigadier-General Hale, both brigades being supported by Batteries A and B of the Utah Light Artillery under command of General MacArthur; the First California Infantry, First Idaho Infantry, under Brigadier-General King; the Fourth Cavalry, Fourteenth Infantry, and First North Dakota Infantry, commanded by Brigadier-General Ovenshine, both brigades supported by the Sixth Artillery Division, commanded by General Anderson.

In all probability there was a hitch in the arrangements of the insurgents in this their first encounter with the Americans. They had been organizing a secret army in Manila, through the agency of Sandico, the spy, of whom mention has already been made, and it was expected that an attack from within and from without would be made upon our forces. But they were not quite prepared for the attack from within, and so that part of it fell through. Of course there was no possible chance for the insurgents to hold Manila against our fleet. The whole purpose of their campaign must therefore have been to annihilate the American forces on land. It is easy enough to deal with an enemy in front, but when you have to deal with an enemy in your own camp, where every servant, every cab-driver, every innocent-looking native who glides barefooted along the streets, is a member of this army, the danger seems almost beyond control. Such a problem faced General Hughes. No better man could have been found for the position — cool when everyone else had lost his head, a keen judge of human nature, firm though kindly, he brought to the task an unlimited capacity for hard work. Under his command he had the provost guard, consisting of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, the Second Oregon, and the Thirteenth Minnesota. The number of the enemy was to all practical purposes limited only by the number of natives in Manila. Knives they could get in spite of all vigilance, and

how many rifles they had buried about the town, according to their custom, it was impossible to tell.

The provost marshal succeeded, up to February 2d, in confining the organized movement in Manila to a few shooting affrays. His methods were those that befit an American gentleman. As an instance, he called up the colonel of one regiment of Arma Blanca, and said to him:

"I know your organization and your plans. Over there on the wall is a map of our lines. Look at it. Study it as long as you please. If you can do anything against us, go ahead and do it; but I warn you that if you rise I will shoot you all down like dogs, because what you intend is murder and arson."

The insurgent colonel, seeing his identity discovered, made the best of it. He walked up to the map on the wall and examined it carefully.

"You are right; we can do nothing against your lines," he acknowledged.

"Then go and tell your people so," said General Hughes.

The total losses of the Americans in the opening encounter with the enemy were as follows: Killed, 49 officers and men; wounded, 148; total casualties, 197. The insurgent loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was estimated by General Otis to be about 4,000.

The following official dispatches give the story of the events of Sunday and the three following days:

"MANILA, Feb. 5.

"To the Secretary of the Navy, Washington :

"Insurgents here inaugurated general engagement last night, which was continued to-day

"The American army and navy is generally successful. Insurgents have been driven back and our line advanced. No casualties to navy.

(Signed)

"DEWEY."

MANILA, Feb. 5.

"To Adjutant-General.

"FIFTH FEB. — Insurgents in large force opened attack on our outer

lines at 8.45 last evening ; renewed attack several times during night ; at 4 o'clock this morning entire line engaged ; all attacks repulsed ; at daybreak advanced against insurgents and have driven them beyond the lines they formerly occupied, capturing several villages and their defense works ; insurgents, loss in dead and wounded large ; our own casualties thus far estimated at 175, very few fatal. Troops enthusiastic and acting fearlessly. Navy did splendid execution on flanks of enemy ; city held in check and absolute quiet prevails ; insurgents have secured good many Mauser rifles, a few field pieces and quick-firing guns, with ammunition, during last month. (Signed) OTIS."

"MANILA, Feb. 6.

"Adjutant General, Washington :

"Have established our permanent lines well out and have driven off the insurgents. The troops have conducted themselves with great heroism. The country about Manila is peaceful and the city perfectly quiet. List of casualties to-morrow. OTIS."

"MANILA, Feb. 7.

"Adjutant-General, Washington :

"The insurgent army concentrated around Manila from Luzon provinces, numbering over 20,000, possessing several quick-firing and Krupp field guns. Good portion of enemy armed with Mausers, latest pattern. Two Krupp and great many rifles captured. Insurgents fired great quantity of ammunition. Quite a number of Spanish soldiers in insurgent service who served artillery. Insurgents constructed strong intrenchments near our lines, mostly in bamboo thickets. These our men charged, killing or capturing many of the enemy. Our casualties probably aggregate 250. Full reports to-day. Casualties of insurgents very heavy. Have buried some 500 of their dead, and hold 500 prisoners. Their loss killed, wounded, and prisoners, probably 4,000. Took waterworks pumping station yesterday six miles out. Considerable skirmish with enemy which made no stand. Pumps damaged ; will be working in a week. Have number of condensers set up in the city which furnish good water. Troops in excellent spirits. Quiet prevails. OTIS."

"MANILA, Feb. 8.

"Situation rapidly improving. Reconnoissance yesterday to south several miles to Laguna de Bay, to southeast eight miles, driving straggling insurgent troops in various directions, encountering no decided opposition, army disintegrated and natives returning to villages displaying white flag. Near Caloocan, six miles north, enemy made a stand behind entrenchments ; charged by Kansas troops, led by Colonel Funston. Close encounter, resulting in rout of the enemy, with heavy loss. Loss to Kansas, Lieutenant Alford killed, six men wounded.

"On the 4th Aguinaldo issued flying proclamation, charging Americans with initiative, and declared war ; on Sunday issued another, calling

all to resist foreign invasion; his influence throughout this section destroyed; now applies for a cessation of hostilities and conference; have declined to answer. Insurgent expectation of rising in city on night of 4th unrealized. Provost Marshal General, with admirable disposition of troops, defeated every attempt. City quiet, business resumed, natives respectful and cheerful. Fighting qualities of American troops a revelation to all inhabitants.

(Signed)

"OTIS."

By Tuesday evening the Americans were in complete control of the situation within a radius of nine miles from Manila, their lines extending to Malabon on the north and Paranaque on the south, a distance of fully twenty-five miles. The main body of the rebels was in full retreat and utterly routed. Some members of the hospital corps made the discovery that there were women, in masculine uniform, with hair closely cropped, among the insurgent dead.

General Hale's brigade advanced Tuesday morning and captured the water-works at Singalon. Four companies of the Nebraska regiment and a part of the Utah Battery, with two field guns and two Hotchkiss guns, met the enemy on the hill half a mile out, and a sharp engagement took place, in which the Nebraskans lost one dead and three wounded. Dr. Young, formerly quartermaster-sergeant in the Third Artillery, was wounded, captured, and brutally murdered, and his body when discovered was found to have been horribly mutilated. The Filipinos were driven back, retiring in bad order and carrying with them the valves and heads of the steam chest and cylinder of the pumping machinery.

General Ovenshine's brigade advanced and took Paranaque, capturing two field guns. They met with no opposition. General MacArthur's division advanced beyond Gagalangin without loss, the enemy retreating upon Caloocan. The Americans gained control of the steam line to Malabon and 600 marines with four Maxim guns were landed from the fleet on the beach north of the city. The Third Artillery, on the main road, and the Utah Battery, in a cemetery, covered the advance of the Kansas troops.



JUST BEFORE THE BATTLE OF CATOCCAN. SECTION OF THE UTAH BATTERY READY TO SHELL THE FILIPINOS.

Among the important points captured was a strong embrasured earthwork within sight of Calocan. The Signal Corps were compelled to run their lines along the firing line during the fighting, and consequently there were frequent interruptions of communication, owing to the cutting of the wires; and the signal men were ordered to kill without any hesitancy anyone who attempted to interfere with the lines.

A Filipino colonel came out Tuesday morning from Calocan, under a flag of truce. Several American officers promptly went to meet him, but when the two parties met the Filipinos opened fire. The Filipino colonel thereupon apologized for the barbarous conduct of his troops and returned to his lines under fire.

The first encounter between the Filipinos and the Americans was a complete victory for our forces. The effect of the battle upon the United States Senate was not what Aguinaldo hoped. The peace treaty was ratified by a vote of 57 to 27.

CHAPTER LIII

THE CAPTURE OF ILOILO—AN EASY VICTORY—THE INSURGENTS SET FIRE TO THE TOWN—DISPLAYING THE WHITE FLAG.

Second Encounter with the Philipino Rebels—Importance of the Place—Its Location and Industries—City Turned Over to the Insurgents by the Spaniards—Our Expedition Starts from Manila—Delay in Movement to Take the Place—Insurgents Try to Obstruct the Channel—Gen. Miller's Ultimatum—Threatens to Burn their Villages if they Set Fire to Iloilo—Our Warships Get into Position—The Day Appointed for the Battle—The Enemy Defies Our Forces and Continues to Throw up Entrenchments—The Boston's Signal—Boston and Petrel Open Fire—A Shell Dropped into the Filipino Headquarters—Rebel General Runs Away—Insurgents Fire the City—Foreign Consulates Burned—The Ships Cease Firing—Gen. Miller's Delay in Landing his Men—Insurgents Flee to Molo and Jaro—Filipinos with White Flags Everywhere.

THE second encounter of moment between the American forces and the rebels in the Philippines took place at Iloilo, the second city in importance in the islands. It is a seaport town, located on the southeast shore of the island of Panay, about thirty-six hours sail from Manila. The native population is composed mainly of Visayans. In all there are about 10,000 inhabitants. In the broad and beautiful port of Iloilo all the trading-ships of all the nations come to take their cargoes of sugar, tobacco, and precious woods. A large arm of the sea separates Iloilo from Jaro, an outlying district, and this arm is crossed by a bridge of very original construction and mostly made of bamboo. It is of great length and of remarkable solidity. Iloilo is one of the three commercial ports of the Philippines, Manila and Cebu being the others. It is a place of great strategical importance. The city contains an *ayuntamiento*, or palace, large banks, a government house, large churches, convents, prisons, and well-constructed stores

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and residences, much of which property is owned by foreigners. The people are naturally industrious, and raise large quantities of sugar-cane, rice, abaca, corn, coffee, cacao, and tobacco. Much of the piña and jusi cloth, fine fabrics made from pineapple leaves for dresses and handkerchiefs, is made at Iloilo, there being over 40,000 looms engaged in the industry. The exports amount to 18,000,000 pesos annually. It was, therefore, important to take the town with as little bombardment as possible.

The Spanish evacuation to the insurgents was to all appearances a somewhat shady transaction, but when the news of it reached Manila, which was about the 23d of December, it was promptly decided to send an expedition to occupy the place. This expedition sailed from Manila at midnight, December 26th. It consisted of the Eighteenth Infantry on board the *Arizona*, the Fifty-first Iowa on board the *Pennsylvania*, and a battery of the Sixth Artillery on board the *Newport*, convoyed by the cruiser *Baltimore*. Brigadier-General Marcus P. Miller was in command. The expedition reached Iloilo in the morning of the 28th, and preparations were made for landing our forces. Some delay occurred, however. The insurgents informed the Americans that if the latter made any attempt to land, the native troops, who were present in large numbers and were flushed with pride over their possession of the city, would make a determined stand against them. They threatened to burn the city before surrendering to our authorities, and to continue the guerrilla warfare as long as their munitions and supplies held out. As the orders to the expedition did not contemplate such a condition of affairs, the landing was postponed until further instructions could be obtained from Manila.

When this news reached Manila, the *Petrel* was sent to Iloilo, arriving on the morning of January 6th. However, nothing was done about taking the place. Orders had come from Washington to do nothing to bring on a rupture with the insurgents, pending the ratification of the treaty of peace.

The ships simply lay there in the harbor menacing the town. The insurgents were gracious enough to allow our officers to land, thus giving them an opportunity to obtain information as to the number of men and the defenses of the city. About the 10th of January the insurgents sunk three lighters in the entrance to the river, thus partially obstructing the channel, in such a way as to allow only small steamers to pass. During the last week in January the *Pennsylvania* was sent back to Manila, as the Iowa regiment had not been on land since it left San Francisco some three months before.

On February 8th the *Boston* arrived from Manila to relieve the *Baltimore*, which left the same afternoon for Manila. The *Boston* had left Manila on the 6th, the day after the battle of Manila, bringing the first news of the rupture with the insurgents.

The delay chafed the men considerably. It was dreary work waiting in crowded transports, rocking lazily in the harbor. The insurgents could be seen strengthening their defenses, and it was rumored that they were making preparations to burn the town the moment our forces made the attack.

It was on Friday morning, February 10, that the army despatch boat *Putnam* arrived with the welcome news that the *St. Paul*, with the Tennessee regiment on board, was on the way, and that as soon as she arrived our forces were to take the town. After a conference with other officers, Brigadier-General Miller, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, sent a notice to the insurgents that they must surrender within 24 hours, or he would land troops to occupy the town, and if the insurgents offered any opposition the town would be bombarded. They were also informed that if they burned the town he would burn Molo and Jaro, two native villages; also, if they attempted to further obstruct the entrance to the river, or add to their defenses, we would open fire at once.

That afternoon the *Boston* moved to an anchorage eight hundred yards east, southeast of the fort, and the *Petrel* anchored four hundred yards southeast of it, positions which en-

abled our ships to command the entrance to the river, the fort, and the trenches. The *St. Paul* arrived that night about 10 o'clock, and the *Flora*, a British man-of-war, came in a few hours later. Again it happened that the day appointed for the battle was Sunday, apparently a fortunate day for American naval engagements.

On Saturday morning the *Petrel* signaled the *Boston*: "Enemy throwing up more trenches in our front." The *Boston* replied: "If you are sure this is so, give them a shot." She fired two three-pounders at 9.30, and soon afterward signaled: "Enemy is firing on us." At the same time the enemy was seen to bring down a field gun to the beach on the *Boston's* side. The *Boston* told the *Petrel* to crack ahead, and both opened fire. The *Boston* fired two trial shots, and then dropped a six-inch shell into a house in front of which the insurgents had stationed their field-piece. It was afterward found out that this house was their headquarters. Five minutes before this shell struck the house, an officer on horseback had galloped down and sent his horse into the compound of the house. When the *Boston's* shell dropped the people on board could see him — horseless — running away.

As soon as our forces opened fire the insurgents began setting fire to the town. The first house fired was an American storehouse. In a few minutes the town was on fire in five or six places, and it burnt all that day and night, destroying the English, American, and German consulates, several residences and warehouses, a large portion of the business part, and the native and Chinese quarters. The next day, after the army had occupied the place, the custom house and a large warehouse were burnt. Most of the foreign residence part was untouched.

The ships ceased firing at 10.20 A. M., and as the army had as yet made no motion towards landing, the *Boston* signaled General Miller: "Why don't you land troops?" This was answered by, "If you wish troops landed, send a steam-launch to tow boats ashore." The *Boston* then signaled the *Petrel*

to land men, and prepared her own landing-party for going ashore. The *Boston* sent forty-eight men and a Gatling gun, while the *Petrel* sent thirty men.

The *Boston's* party was the first to land, at 11.20, the *Petrel's* party landing two minutes later. The party from the *Boston* immediately took the fort, hauling down the Filipino flag, which was still flying, and hoisting the stars and stripes at 11.25, amid the cheers from the ships. The landing parties immediately advanced towards the town, the *Boston's* party occupying it and hoisting the American flag over the city at half past twelve.

During this time the *St. Paul* had moved close in to the fort, and at noon the first troops from the Tennessee regiment were landed in the ship's boats. The *Arizona* then moved in, and by six that afternoon all the troops had been landed. The army immediately after landing marched into the town, and as far as the Molo and Jaro bridges, the insurgents having retired to these villages.

When our men landed they met many Filipinos, all with white flags and very respectful. The natives retreated to Jaro, a town of 12,000 inhabitants, but on the following day were driven from Jaro and Molo, and sent flying toward the foothills.

It was said that the action was brought on prematurely by the navy, but the Americans had threatened that if they found the insurgents adding to their defenses, they would open fire at once, and the threat had to be kept. There is no doubt that it was the best as it happened, for one of the English captains is authority for the statement that the insurgents were perfecting arrangements for burning the whole town when we opened fire. The only thing to be regretted is that the foreigners and the women and children did not have time enough to get out of the town, though most of the foreigners had left the night before, going aboard the ships in the harbor; but, so far as can be learned, none of those remaining in the town were hurt, though they were thoroughly frightened.

CHAPTER LIV

MORE VICTORIES FOR THE AMERICAN FORCES—STRAGGLING BANDS OF REBELS DRIVEN INTO THE JUNGLE—THE BATTLE OF CALOOCAN.

Gen. Otis Given a Free Rein—Petty Warfare of the Natives—Small Villages Burned—Attempts to Cripple Manila Water Works—Nebraska and Colorado Troops in a Short Engagement—Col. Funston's Gallant Sortie—Reconnoissance to Laguna de Bay—Natives with Flags of Truce—Insurgent Leaders call on Gen. Otis—No Message for Aguinaldo—Dewey Clears out San Roque—Aguinaldo Masses his Forces at Caloocan—MacArthur's Division—Warships Begin the Attack—Sixth Artillery and Utah Battery at Work—Bravery of Western Volunteers—Natives Flee from the Trenches—Flank Movement Executed by Major Bell—Movement of Filipinos a Rout—Fortified Church Abandoned—Deadly Work of the Shrapnel—Warfare Follows Withdrawal of our Troops from Three Places.

SEVERAL days elapsed before the troops under Major-General Otis followed up their victories of February 5th and 6th, at Manila, by an aggressive movement upon any of the rebel strongholds. Preparations for sending reinforcements to Manila went rapidly forward, but so great was our government's confidence in General Otis that it left him absolutely unhampered to pursue his own plan of campaign; to wait until reinforcements came before extending his lines, or to secure all the advantage of the demoralized condition of the enemy by immediate attacks upon the insurgents wherever found.

One thing is certain, the enemy was numerically strong. Though many were killed or imprisoned or sent to the hospitals in the opening encounter, and many more betook themselves to other quarters, the "woods were full of them" all about Manila. As a result of the first fighting, our lines were extended from two to six miles in all directions around the city,

but chiefly in the north and east. Our troops were brought directly in contact with the insurgents who occupied those little villages that were everywhere about the city, groups of rude grass-thatched huts in which the poorest natives miserably exist. These villages were the source of considerable annoyance and danger, as the rebels used them as places of refuge from whence they could pour a rain of cold lead upon the Americans. It soon became necessary to destroy a number of these wretched little villages, and the torch was applied to them, the natives fleeing in all directions as the flames reached their houses. Several thousand Filipinos were thus rendered homeless. Their huts, however, were extremely simple, and easily built. Unfortunately, the country for miles around Manila is studded with bamboo jungles, and open spaces are few and far between. This fact afforded the natives, who fight best under cover, a distinct advantage. In many places the jungle is so dense that the eye cannot penetrate it, and only by the flashes of their rifles could the position of the enemy be located.

General Otis determined to make sure that the water supply of Manila was not cut off by the insurgents, who captured the reservoirs five miles northeast of the city some time before the Spaniards capitulated to the Americans. The First Nebraska Regiment, two companies of the First Colorado Regiment, and a battalion of the First Tennessee Infantry were dispatched for this purpose. They found that the natives had retreated, but had attempted to cripple the water supply by carrying off parts of the machinery. The missing parts were soon found, however, and a temporary famine averted. On the way to the pumping station the Nebraskans met with a body of Filipino troops, and a short but sharp engagement occurred. The Americans lost two killed and three wounded.

On Tuesday, Colonel Funston, the intrepid Kansas volunteer officer, led three companies of his regiment to a brilliant charge upon a company of insurgents who were harassing a reconnoitering party, which was doing duty not far from

Caloocan. The Americans fought against heavy odds, and the reconnoitering party would probably have been cut to pieces had it not been for the opportune arrival of the Kansas troops. After a desperate conflict, in which two Americans were killed and five wounded, the enemy was driven back to Caloocan. As the Americans withdrew they counted thirty dead Filipinos and a large number of wounded on the field of battle.

On the same day General Otis made a reconnoissance to the southeast as far as Laguna de Bay, and to the northeast a distance of eight miles, driving straggling parties of insurgents in various directions, but without meeting any decided opposition. In many cases natives who had gone out to fight returned, bearing the white flag of truce.

The leaders of the Filipinos, including Aguinaldo, evidently took to heart the lesson of the severe drubbing they received, as they took refuge early in attempts to settle matters by diplomacy. A number of them visited General Otis at Manila at this time, for the purpose of making overtures looking to a settlement of the dispute, but they did not find the American commander at all responsive to their importunities. His manner toward them was chilling and he listened to their explanations of their condition without showing any sympathy for them. The Filipinos earnestly pressed him for a declaration of some sort as to what they must do to secure peace, but his answer dashed their hopes of obtaining any terms that would prove beneficial to their army.

"Tell Aguinaldo," General Otis said to them, "that I have no message for him." That ended the interview. It was plain that if Aguinaldo wished to end the war for which he alone was responsible, he would have to treat with General Otis personally, and make complete submission. The recognition of Aguinaldo as the head of the so-called Philippine republic was out of the question. All that Aguinaldo could do was to submit, simply as an armed rebel.

Meanwhile Admiral Dewey was at work establishing a well-equipped navy yard and naval hospital at Cavité, and repairing

and fitting up some of the vessels he had captured. The armed insurgents at San Roque, near Cavité, annoyed his workmen considerably, and frequently fired upon them, and on February 9th he ordered the rebels to leave the place, which they did, after setting it on fire. The American troops then took possession.

The strongest rebel position in the island of Luzon at this time was Caloocan, twelve miles from Manila to the northward, on the Manila-Dagupan railroad. The railroad shops, worth half a million dollars, are located there. Aguinaldo massed his forces there with great energy, and it was determined by General Otis to attack it at once. General MacArthur's division was north of the Pasig River, and his left was wheeling around toward Caloocan, carrying everything before it. The city was within easy range of the guns of the warships, no hills, but a wide stretch of marsh land, lying between the town and Manila Bay.

It was planned to have the attack upon Caloocan opened with a bombardment by the warships. At half-past 2 o'clock on Friday, February 10th, the monitor *Monadnock* and the gunboat *Concord*, which had been ordered up the bay by Admiral Dewey, opened fire on the town. Their shells went true and great damage was done, alarming and intimidating the rebels.

At the same time that the warships began shelling, the Sixth Artillery and the Utah battery opened fire on the rebel entrenchments on the landward sides of the town. The country between the American position and Caloocan was covered with banana groves, bamboo hedges, and paddy fields, with here and there straggling collections of nipa huts, all of which afforded excellent shelter for the native soldiers near the town, who were not in the trenches. Some of these men had the reputation of being sharpshooters; but their work did not prove them experts in that line, and the damage done by them was trifling.

The artillery and the warships pounded away until 4



ON THE FIRING LINE JUST BEFORE THE BATTLE OF CLOUDMAN.
South Dakota Volunteers and section of a light battery behind intrenchments.

o'clock, when orders were given for General Harrison G. Otis's brigade, except the Pennsylvania regiment, which was held as a reserve, to move upon the enemy's works. The men had been impatiently waiting for the order, and as the word was passed down the line they responded with cheers. The movement was made in the following order from left to right: Twentieth Kansas Infantry, First Montana Infantry and Third Artillery, the Twentieth Kansas and the First Montana being supported by the First Idaho Infantry, and the Third Artillery by the Fourth Cavalry.

The Filipinos were awaiting the advance of the troops, reserving their fire with coolness, but as the Americans began to move forward the rebels started a rattling fire, which made considerable noise, but did no great damage. The Americans did not return the fire but pressed steadily forward, marching through the woods and banana groves from the left, and from the right through the paddy fields, which afforded no protection. Not a single stop was made until they reached the entrenchments, from which most of the natives hastily scrambled as the Americans drew near. The rebels tried to make their way to the shelter afforded by the town, but scores of them never reached their goal, being stopped by American bullets.

Just at this time the scurrying rebels were thrown into confusion by the discovery that they had been flanked. A company of the First Montana Infantry, under command of Major J. Franklin Bell, chief of the Bureau of Military Information, whose services proved extremely valuable, had volunteered to execute the flank movement, and, moving off to the east, had, without being detected, arrived on the enemy's flank back in the town. The natives saw that they were trapped, and, scattering, fled like sheep, many of them dropping their weapons in their anxiety to escape.

The Americans had jumped the trenches and yelling and cheering, were in full pursuit. It was simply a rout, and proved that, even with artificial defenses, the Filipinos were no match for the Americans who were pitted against them.

There is in Caloocan a large church, which, for all practical purposes, was really a fort. It was a substantial stone structure, was strongly defended, and had been occupied by a portion of Aguinaldo's army who intended to make a stand there. But when our cheering soldiers ran into the town and drove before them the rebels who had been in the trenches, the insurgents who had been in the church sallied forth and joined in the general retreat. It was found, also, that barricades had been erected at the place where the Malabon road crosses the line of the Dagupan railway, in the center of the town. These had been torn to pieces in many places by the fire from the warships and the land batteries. As the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana regiments entered the town from the south, some of the fleeing natives set fire to the huts, whose roofs were made of nipa grass, thinking doubtless to start a blaze that would destroy the town, but in this they were disappointed, as the Americans extinguished the fires.

The losses of the enemy were heavy, both in killed and wounded. The force Aguinaldo had at that point is estimated at from 8,000 to 10,000 men. Most of the casualties to the Filipinos were due to shrapnel, the screaming and effectiveness of which caused terror among the troops. Captain Dyer's guns of the Sixth Artillery and Major Young's Utah Light Artillery kept pouring shrapnel into the enemy's line at a range of 2,200 yards, with great accuracy, almost every shot telling, and ceased fire only when the infantry approached close to the town.

The American loss was 3 killed and 32 wounded. The Kansas and Montana boys, in their magnificent charge through a wooded ravine, suffered the principal losses. Nothing could surpass the fearlessness of their advance across an open field on the right, directly in the face of the enemy's strongest entrenchments.

After the Americans were in possession of the town, it was found that there was only one house in the place that had a flagstaff. This belonged to Mr. Higgins, an Englishman,

who is president of the Dagupan railway. He lent the staff to General Otis, and at half-past 5 o'clock the American flag made its appearance at its top, the signal for enthusiastic cheering by the troops.

After the capture of Caloocan, a Spaniard who had been a prisoner there came to the Americans, holding up his hands, and said that the Filipinos had offered to release the Spaniards, especially the artillerymen, if they would undertake to fight against the Americans at four dollars a day. Most of the Spaniards refused, and even those who accepted the offer did so in the hope of effecting an escape. The rebels, according to this informant, were discontented, unpaid, unfed, and thoroughly disillusioned, their amulets being of no avail against wounds, hunger, and fatigue. On Friday Aguinaldo visited Polo, a few miles northwest of Caloocan, and addressed the Filipino troops there, claiming that he had won a victory, and asserting that 2,300 Americans had been killed.

It was reported at this time that Aguinaldo turned over the active command of his troops to General Luna, formerly secretary of war in the Filipino cabinet, and author of most of the bellicose articles that appeared in the native papers during the winter. He did this in order to keep out of the reach of the Americans who wanted to capture him, and in order to devote himself to the work of inciting the natives in Luzon to join his standard. Aguinaldo professed to be indifferent to the value of American successes and announced that he would soon lure our forces into a deadly trap.


General Otis, while waiting for reinforcements, decided not to extend our lines any further about Manila at that time, the front being then nearly twenty-five miles long. Portions of the California and Washington regiments, the Fourth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Hawthorne's mountain battery, which were about to make a concerted attack on the insurgents before Pateros, were withdrawn to their former positions along the river. The Filipinos evidently mistook the withdrawal of our troops for a retreat, and were emboldened to make an

attack early in the morning. The forces here were under the command of General King, and they repulsed the rebels three times. The insurgents used Mauser rifles, but throughout the engagement, that lasted five hours, they did not hit a single American. Our troops were under orders not to pursue the enemy, but simply to hold their own ground. During the engagement twenty-two Americans were overcome by the heat.

A similar experience was had by the troops after retiring from Guadaloupe. The California volunteers abandoned that place and retired to San Pedro Macati. The rebels held the country in the vicinity of Guadaloupe, Pasig, and Patero, despite the efforts of the gunboats to dislodge them from the jungle on both sides of the river. The heat was intense, and increased perceptibly daily. Under prevailing conditions it was impossible to provide shade for the troops in certain parts of the line, particularly General MacArthur's division. General King's brigade was also exposed from San Pedro Macati to Culiculi, where it joined General Ovenshine's brigade.

In view of the fact that the rebels were concentrating on the American right flank, preparations were made to give them a warm reception in the event of attack. General Ovenshine's line, consisting originally of the North Dakota volunteers, the Fourteenth Infantry, and two troops of the Fourth Cavalry, stretching from the beach at Camp Dewey to General King's right, was reinforced by two battalions of Oregon volunteers and three troops of the Fourth Cavalry as infantry.

The *Buffalo's* searchlight discovering the rebels unusually active about ten o'clock one evening, signaled the flagship for permission to fire upon them, and this being granted, bombarded the enemy's trenches for twenty minutes. The only apparent effect of the fire was to drive the rebels further inland. Beyond a few ineffectual volleys from the trenches, which were returned with interest, the rebels were undemonstrative, and all was quiet along the rest of the line.



AFTER THE BATTLE OF CALOCAN.

Part of the insurgent intern humans after they were captured by the 3rd Kansas, 1st Montana, and 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and 3d United States Artillery. Photographed after the battle. Dead insurgents in the foreground. Wheels of an ox-cart under the tree at the left.



CHAPTER LV

A NIGHT OF TERROR IN MANILA—DISCOVERY OF A FIENDISH PLOT—GENERAL HUGHES PREVENTS THE EXECUTION OF THE ORDER—INSURGENTS BURN LARGE PORTIONS OF THE CITY.

Wholesale Assassination Planned by the Filipinos—Discovery of their Plot—All Foreigners Were to be Exterminated—Work of Sandico Again—“Death to the Tyrants”—General Hughes Catches Insurgent Chiefs in Council—Foreign Residents Alarmed—Everybody Went Armed—The Torch Applied—Filipino Houses First to be Attacked—The Escolta Threatened—Malay Killed while Cutting Hose—Brave Sailor from the Olympia—Another District Set on Fire—A Crucial Test—Tondo District Infested by Native Militia—Arrival of Reinforcements—Shooting in the Dark—Property Loss Upward of Half a Million Dollars—The American Loss—Insurgents Driven out of Tondo—Warships Shell the Retreating Enemy—Americans Find it Necessary to Burn out the Secret Militia—Gen. Otis Orders the Streets of Manila Cleared after 7 o'clock P. M.

A FIENDISH plot, well-nigh incredible in its sweeping, uncontrolled savagery, which had for its object the extermination of practically all the foreigners in Manila, men, women, and children, was frustrated by the alertness of the American officials. By the knowledge of this blood-thirsty plan, which the Filipino leaders, as well as the rank and file of the cut-throats, were eager to carry out, we are enabled to get a clear insight into the present standing of the Filipinos in the scale of civilization, and an idea of what must inevitably happen if the Aguinaldo faction should be allowed to administer the government.

We must go back for a moment to Sandico, the secret agent of Aguinaldo, whose work of forming clubs supposed to be in the interest of the United States has been referred to in a previous chapter. This enterprising gentleman had his forces nearly ready to lead a revolt in Manila when the attack on our forces on February 4th occurred, but he was not wholly

prepared at that time to strike a blow. The fact seems to be that battle was brought on prematurely; those who were to attack from without were ready and over-anxious, while those who were to pillage, burn, and murder from within the city walls were not quite prepared. The blow to the secretly organized militia of Sandico was severe, but the territorial militia came together on February 15th and Sandico, who was then minister of the interior in Aguinaldo's cabinet and commander of militia in Manila, issued to his officers the order which is given below, than which no more fiendish document even came from human pen. General Otis secured a copy of this document and cabled it to Washington on February 21st. It is as follows:

"FIRST.—You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all of the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers or guns and ammunition if convenient.

"SECOND.—Filipino families only will be respected. They should not be molested, but all other individuals of whatever race may be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation.

"THIRD.—The defenders of the Filipinos in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and presidiaries, and having accomplished this they will be armed, saying to them: 'Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them that we may take our revenge for the infamy and treachery they have committed upon us; have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor. All Filipinos *en masse* will second you. Long live Filipino independence!'

"FOURTH.—The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack from without, and their shots will be signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty; those of Paco, Ermita, and Malaté, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock, unless they see that their companions need assistance.

"FIFTH.—The militia of Tondo will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning; if all do their duty revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us; we know how to die as men, shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants. War without quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us. Either independence or death.

(Signed)

SANDICO."

rebellion, ordered the murder of all the foreign population of Manila. First the American army was to be put to the sword, then others, including helpless women, little children, and other non-combatants were to be murdered. Extermination was the word. It was fortunate that the plot was discovered in time to prevent its execution, and that General Hughes managed to surprise 125 of the insurgent chiefs in council, and later to prevent the threatened outbreak by imprisoning some of the leaders and winning others over to more civilized ideas.

This was a trying season for foreign residents of Manila. Everybody knew that many secret agents of the rebel leaders were in the city hatching nefarious plots and standing ready to set fire to the town whenever the order was given. Each man knew that at any moment his coachman might kill him, or his waiter murder him while he slept. Everyone was armed and lived prepared for the worst at any moment. Fire was expected, and everyone realized that when it came the houses of dry, inflammable material would go quickly.

On the night of February 22d the long-dreaded outbreak came. A fire broke out in the Santa Cruz district. The property destroyed there by the torches of the secret militia of Sandico was the houses of rich Filipinos who refused to array themselves on the side of the insurgents. A strong wind was blowing towards the Escolta, the business street of Manila, which made the work of the fire-fighters difficult. The regular fire department, manned by the natives, proved to be wholly inefficient, and their places were taken by American soldiers. The English and German volunteer engine companies did excellent work. But it was found that the hose was constantly being cut, and finally a soldier caught a Malay in the act of bending over the hose and running a long knife into it. The soldier made short work of the offender, bringing his gun down over his neck and killing him instantly.

The scene during the fire was one of great excitement in all parts of the city. Business men watched the progress of

the fire toward their property with anxiety. Platoons of soldiers, their arms stacked, stood at street corners ready to quell any uprising. At a corner, with the flames blowing toward him from the blazing block of buildings across the narrow street, an American tar from the *Olympia* held the hose. Sometimes he was helped by a few soldiers, sometimes by civilians, but nobody except the sailor seemed to be able to bear the heat for any length of time. He stood his ground, determined that the fire should not cross that narrow street, and he accomplished his purpose.

Scarcely was the first fire under control when a new one broke out, this time in the Tondo district, north of the city proper. It is occupied by natives, lies next to the sea, and is cut off from the main part of the city by a broad street, the Calle Iris. The tall spires and massive walls of Tondo church, surrounded by a high wall, and a stone building used by the Americans as a police station in that district, are the only large buildings in a mass of nipa huts. The incendiaries had been reinforced in that section by about 500 native soldiers who had in some manner crept through our lines near the sea, probably crawling through the swamps on General MacArthur's left wing. There was one company of the Minnesota regiment in the police station at Tondo, and General Hughes had placed another in Tondo church to meet any emergency, for it was known that the district was a hotbed of Sandico's secret militia.

At the time the fire broke out, an attack was made by the native troops on the police station. It was their intention to drive the company of Minnesota men out of their barracks and finish them off in short order. As the flames shot up to the sky, the insurgent bugles rang out long and loud, as if sounding the charge, and the insurgents tried to drive our men from the police station. They were unable to get by the guard at the gate, and then tried to scale the wall, but met with a sharp fire which prevented their climbing over. The walls of that police station are dotted with bullet marks.

Reinforcements soon arrived — two companies of the Second Oregon and two of the Twenty-third United States Infantry. They lined out along the Calle Iris in ditches, and also at right angles to the road skirting the fire. The fire leaped and roared in mountains of flame, and to add to the general hubbub the joints in the bamboo huts burst with sharp reports like those of a rifle. Bullets whistled in all directions. It was a trying time for the troops, but they kept their heads and on few occasions did any of their bullets go astray. Shots came toward the Calle Iris from all parts of the burning district, and our soldiers promptly returned the fire. The flames advancing drove before them a crowd of women and children carrying bundles of what they had been able to save from their homes. They moaned and chattered in fright, and piteously begged to be saved from the flames. Along with them came a number of men, half naked, who probably a few minutes before had been firing into the ranks of the Americans. No doubt, according to their custom, they had thrown away their uniforms and now sought protection from the men whom they had been trying to kill. They were allowed to pass into the city. The fire swept fiercely with flaming tongues and hoarse roar, driven by the wind. For some time it was doubtful where it would stop, but it finally was checked at the Calle Iris.

In the booths of the Binondo market, only one hundred yards back of the Calle Iris, the fire broke out anew. The Chinamen of the district made a hard struggle to put out the flames and tore down their booths, though fired upon by the crafty insurgents who were concealed in neighboring houses. As the Mausers gave no flash at night, it was impossible to tell from whence the shots came, and consequently they inspired double terror. Gradually the shooting ceased and the insurgents withdrew to Tondo bridge, which they held until the following day. The provost guard, which had nobly stood on watch, maintained its vigilance. It was truly a night of terror. A small force of Americans had stood up against a

large force on the outside, and it was known that the mass of the population was opposed to the Americans. It was a crucial point in the history of the occupation of the city by our troops. Had the insurgents been able to burn the city as they expected, had they won a victory over the small American force, and got the upper hand, it would have been tenfold more difficult for the Americans to have carried on the work of pacifying the island. As it was, thirteen of the Americans were wounded and a large number of the incendiaries shot. Between 600 and 700 residences and business houses were burned, and the property loss probably exceeded half a million dollars. Hundreds of the natives who had been burned out huddled in the streets for days, making the patrol duty of the Americans much harder.

On the following day General Hughes determined to drive the 500 insurgents out of Tondo. They had built barricades along the three parallel roads in that district. Tondo bridge was their stronghold, and along the road from Tondo to Malabon the enemy had possession of the houses, occupying the windows with their Mausers, and keeping the road clear in that way. Three companies of Minnesota, three of Oregon, and a battalion of the 23d Infantry, under the command of Major Goodale, started out to clear the road between the city and General MacArthur's division. The artillery could not be used, for fear of shooting into our lines two miles beyond the little insurgent band, and for the same reason our rifle fire had to be very guarded. A few skirmishers were thrown out in front. They scurried along, hugging the sides of the buildings and seeking protection behind walls. The bullets came hissing down the street; some struck the walls and went ricochetting viciously from side to side of the street. The forces advanced in three columns down the three streets of Tondo. Soon the left of the insurgent line was dislodged, and the main body near the bridge deserted their barricades and ran for the brush towards the shore.

The insurgents made off in the direction of the swamps on

the seashore near Malabon, at the left of General MacArthur's division. Some of our troops pursued them. When the remains of the insurgent forces reached the swamps they were on open ground in full sight of the *Callao*, and she picked them off with her machine guns. Five insurgents stuck in the mud gave the gunners ample time to get good aim. Further out in the bay the *Monadnock* sent several large shells to hasten the insurgents on their way. How many the enemy lost it is impossible to tell. The conservative estimate is 100; the highest, 500. Two Englishmen were shot in Tondo. They were inside the insurgent lines, and recklessly looking out of the window watching the fight.

An attempt was made to rush through our extreme left near Caloocan on that same day, but it was promptly checked by a hot and effective musketry and artillery fire. During the fighting two of our men were killed and two others were wounded. Scores of rebels were arrested in the Tondo district. One band of sixty rebels, having two carloads of arms and accoutrements, was captured in a house. Business was practically suspended. The remainder of the objectionable part of Tondo was burned by Americans on the day after the fire, thus destroying the hotbed of the secret militia of the insurgents. Major-General Otis issued a general order directing all the inhabitants of Manila, until otherwise ordered, to confine themselves to their homes after 7 o'clock in the evening, when the streets would be cleared by the police. The general also warned incendiaries and suspects that they would be severely dealt with if discovered in any locality. Around our cordon the rebels adopted the harrassing methods of guerrilla warfare. During the night they fired from time to time in such a way that neither our soldiers nor our officers could obtain much sleep, and they managed to kill or wound a few of our men every day.

CHAPTER LVI

COMING UNDER AMERICAN RULE—THE SURRENDER OF CEBU—THE NATIVES OF NEGROS VOLUNTARILY ANNOUNCE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

Cebu added to the List of Cities under American Rule—Work of the Gunboat *Petrel*—The People of Negros Decide to come under the Sovereignty of the United States—Their Delegates at Manila—No need of a Large Force of Troops—A Tug to Carry Back the News—Town Decorated with English and German Flags—Visit from British Officers—Tribesmen with Spears—Captain Cornwell Meets Native Leaders—His Ultimatum—Report of a Plot to Burn the Town—Priests Locked up the Coal Oil—Conference of Natives—Military Element Opposed to Surrender, but Finally Won Over—The Document Submitted to the *Petrel's* Commander—American Flag Hoisted—Captain Cornwell Assumes Charge of the Government—First Island to Yield Allegiance Voluntarily—Delegation from Negros—Entertained by General Otis.

WE will leave the stormy and exciting scenes of turbulent Manila for a time and journey in imagination to the comparatively peaceful island of Cebu. The island lies near Negros, which adjoins it on the west, separating Panay and Cebu. This group of important islands lies to the north of Mindanao and is quite thickly settled. The area of Cebu is 2,000 square miles, and its population is more than half a million. The capital, Cebu, dignified by the title of city, is the oldest settlement in the Philippines, and was the seat of government until the founding of Manila. It was the first place of any importance visited by Magellan on his discovery of the group, and it was upon the little island of Mac-tan, which forms the harbor of Cebu, that he met with his death on the 27th of April, 1521. Fifty years later Legazpi planned and built the city, which under the Spanish regime was of considerable commercial and political importance. It is picturesquely situated and has a fine cathedral and several

churches, but the population is not large. The island forms a province of itself, under the administration of a military governor.

On Monday, February 20th, just prior to the time when the rebels in Manila were about to try to burn and massacre and pillage, the United States gunboat *Petrel* left Iloilo for the purpose of taking Cebu. The *Petrel* undertook the job alone. No large force of soldiers was taken by transport, as neither General Miller nor General Otis had troops to spare, and it was thought that the siege of Cebu would be both short and bloodless. The *Petrel* was, however, accompanied by a tug, as stout as any in her line, and capable of quickly carrying back to Iloilo the news of whatever developments there might be at the new point of attack by the Americans.

The daring *Petrel* arrived at Cebu about 11 o'clock, Tuesday morning, February 21st, finding the *Kaiserinn Augusta* and *Pigmy* in the harbor. The whole town, as well as the craft in the harbor, was decorated with English and German flags, but there was one solitary Filipino flag flying, and that was on the flagstaff of the fort. The *Petrel* dropped anchor about 400 yards from the fort, and within 600 yards of the whole water front, the beach being circular in form.

As soon as the *Petrel* cast anchor, the *Pigmy's* commander, Captain Greene, accompanied by the British consul, Mr. Sidebottom, paid her a visit and had an interview with her commander, C. C. Cornwell. They afterwards went ashore to have a talk with the insurgent leaders. During their visit it was learned that the insurgents had only one hundred rifles, and that when the Americans were seen coming in the insurgent leaders sent for the tribesmen, who are armed with spears. They declined to return to the town, though a few hours before the place was full of them.

Captain Cornwell had a visit from eight of the leading insurgents who wanted to talk over matters with him. Their great fear seemed to be that the Americans were going to treat the natives in the same manner as did the Spaniards, lining

them up and shooting them. They were also very anxious to keep what few arms they had — doubtless they prized them highly. The captain reassured them as well as he could, telling them that, so far from harming them, he intended that they should remain in charge of the government, only he was to have general charge, appointing the collector of customs and the captain of the port. They were given until 8 o'clock the next morning to decide whether they would give up peaceably or stand a bombardment.

It was the common belief that the Cebuites would yield promptly, as it was only a year before that the Spaniards did considerable damage to the town by bombarding it in order to quell an insurrection. There were many foreign residents, and they feared that the hill men would enter the town that night and set fire to it. The *Petrel* had a landing party all prepared for such an emergency, but it did not arise. Two Filipino priests secured all the coal oil in town and placed it under lock and key, fearing that it would be used in setting fire to the town.

The native officials had a conference at night to determine what to do. The military officers pretended to be very much opposed to surrendering, but were finally prevailed upon to accept the views of those who wished to yield and accept American authority. The next morning, the 22d, shortly after 8 o'clock, the insurgent representative, Señor Megia, visited the *Petrel* with the British vice-consul, bringing a formal surrender of the town. The document is given here in full:

FILIPINO REPUBLIC,
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, CEBU, P. I.

In view of the verbal intimation given by the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Petrel* of the U. S. squadron to this government, demanding the surrender of the garrison and city of Cebu, to be accompanied by the hoisting of the American flag, in the peremptory time of fourteen hours, the Assembly, convened for its consideration, and the members of which are representatives of all the vital forces of the country, agreed unanimously to accede to the said demand in view of the superiority of the American forces; but without omitting to point out that neither the gov-

ernment of this province nor any of the inhabitants thereof have the power to conclude decisive acts prohibited by the Honorable President of the Filipino Republic, Señor Emilio Aguinaldo, our legitimate ruler, recognized as such by virtue of his indisputable capabilities of just government, illustrious generalship, and universal suffrage.

Sad and painful is the situation of this city, without means of defense, and obliged to act contrary to its own convictions; in view of which it declares before the whole world that the occupation of this town is not based on any of the laws which form the code of civilized nations, which could hardly expect to behold such scenes at the end of a century called the enlightened one.

We are told of conquests, of protectorates, of cessions made by the Spaniards, as if the archipelago, and especially our souls, were merchandise subject to barter, when a single soul is worth more than a thousand worlds of that metal called vile, perhaps for the reason that it fascinates as the eyes of a serpent.

But be that as it may; of all this the commanding officer must treat, as already stated, with Señor Aguinaldo, without whose acquiescence the act which is demanded from this government cannot be legal.

A copy of this manifesto will be given to each of the consular agencies established in this city, the greatest possible publicity will be given it, and we will communicate with Señor Aguinaldo, remitting him a copy of this document.

Given in Cebu, this 22d February, 1899.

(Signed)

LUIZ FLORES,

The Commander-in-Chief.

Thus this important Philippine city surrendered into our hands, without a shot being fired, rather than risk a bombardment by one of our gunboats. As soon as the surrender was made formally, a company of blue-jackets was landed, under command of Lieutenant Bull, and at 10 o'clock the American flag was hoisted over the fort, the Filipino flag having been hauled down that morning. The *Petrel* fired a national salute.

After the surrender everything was quiet, though there were fears of trouble from the military heroes, who were very turbulent and not easily pacified. The chief general was captured and confined by the Filipinos, so there was little likelihood of an uprising.

When the Spanish evacuated the town, they turned over everything to one man, but there was only \$14 in the treasury, and the insurgents had spent that when the Americans took charge. On February 25th, fifty men arrived by steamer

from the *Boston*, so that the Americans were amply capable of quelling any disturbance that might arise before the army arrived. Shortly afterward a battalion of the Twenty-third regulars arrived from Manila on the United States transport *Pennsylvania*.

Colonel Hamer, of the First Idaho Infantry, was appointed military governor of Cebu, and Captain Wood of the Eighteenth Infantry was chosen collector of customs. A provincial customs system was enforced, and the matter of internal revenue, licenses, and interior economy of the island received early attention. The purpose of the Americans was to have these matters largely conducted by natives who desired citizenship, and to establish a civil administration within the islands under military supervision, tentative in character, but as nearly approaching permanency as it could then be organized. The desire was that citizens of Cebu who acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States should be enabled to conduct their affairs under the guidance of a civil representative government.

The first of the Philippine Islands to voluntarily declare allegiance to the United States was the island of Negros. That event occurred shortly after the surrender of Iloilo. On February 21st, four commissioners representing the inhabitants of that island arrived at Manila on the *Newport* from Iloilo to offer the allegiance of the inhabitants to the United States and to ask for protection. Negros is situated south of Panay, and between that island and Mindanao, the second largest island of the Philippines. It is mountainous and its coasts are difficult of access. The island is an important one, being one of the most prosperous in the group, producing large quantities of rice, coffee, cacao, Indian corn, tobacco, and cocoanuts, its exports amounting to over \$4,000,000 (Mexican) annually. It is the richest island in the archipelago for the production of sugar. Many Europeans live in Negros, and steam-plows, steam-engines, and modern machinery are successfully established. The island is about 150 miles long

and from twenty to forty in width, and contains over 3,000 square miles. It is divided into the province of Western Negros, with a population of 226,995; the province of Eastern Negros, with a population of 94,782, and the province of Romblon, with 38,633 inhabitants. It has several cities of over 10,000 inhabitants.

The officials who came to announce the willingness of the people of Negros to accept American rule were fine looking men of the mestizo or half-caste type. They were large sugar planters. General Otis received the delegation cordially and gave them a dinner at the palace.

It was true at the time that the people of Negros took this action, and afterwards as well, that the majority of the islands of the Philippines were favorable to American government, but were prevented from actual demonstrations by the invasion of armed Tagals representing the Filipino government. The Visayan group, to the south, where hemp-growing is the chief industry, are inhabited by a peaceful people and entirely without arms. Aguinaldo placed 100 armed Tagals in each of the principal towns, and compelled the natives to submit to his government.

American troops were landed on the island of Negros on March 4th.

Early in March, General Otis issued an order establishing a Visayan military district comprising Panay, Cebu, Negros, and other islands to be occupied subsequently under the supervision of Brigadier-General Miller. Colonel James F. Smith of the First California Infantry, commanding the sub-district of Negros, organized an armed native police of 200 men and put them under military discipline, with good results.

CHAPTER LVII

GENERAL WHEATON'S FLYING DIVISION — FORWARD MOVEMENT TO LAGUNA DE BAY — TOWN OF PASIG CAPTURED — ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS AT MANILA — RETREAT OF THE ENEMY.

First Offensive Operations in March — General Hale's Brigade Advances — Taken in Ambush — Dastardly Work under a Flag of Truce — Transports Bring Troops — On to Laguna de Bay — Guadaloupe Captured — Enemy Fled in the Rain — The Attack on Pasig — Firing at Long Range — Advance of the Twentieth — Marvelously Accurate Fire of Artillery — Over 50,000 People Vanish — Natives Throw Arms into the Water — Another Complete Victory — 363 Prisoners Taken by Our Forces — Loss of Americans Small — Desperate Fight at Caina — Outposts in the Jungle — Charging Across the Rice Fields — An Attack by the Rebels Repelled — How they Fled Before Our Army — In Command of Laguna de Bay — Operations on the Lake — Our Army Reorganized — Generals Lawton and MacArthur Lead the Two Divisions.

THE military operations in the Philippines during the month of February resulted in the defeat of the insurgents in every encounter, the extension of our lines to include Caloocan and other places north and west of Manila, as well as the capture of Iloilo, the surrender of Cebu, and the submission of Negros. Over 1,500 insurgents were captured and held as prisoners of war, while the insurgents did not capture a single American prisoner.

The first offensive operations in the month of March occurred on the sixth of that month. General Hale's brigade advanced on San Tolan and Mariquina, encountering a large body of the enemy. The Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming regiments, with eight guns; the Utah regiment, and the companies of the Oregon regiment were engaged. A gunboat also took part in the fighting, and later General Wheaton's brigade of California, Washington, and Idaho volunteer regiments, and the Sixth Artillery, participated. The natives retreated.



PART OF THE SECOND OREGON VOLUNTEERS IN ACTION ON THE FIRING LINE AT THE BATTLE OF PASIG.



On the following day a patrol from the Second Oregon volunteers was taken in ambush near the waterworks. Two men were wounded, but the Oregonians held their ground under a heavy fire until the remainder of the company, assisted by two companies of the First Nebraska regiment, flanked the enemy, killing thirty, and wounding many more. The enemy in front of General Ovenshine's line sent out a flag of truce, but retired when a detachment from the American forces advanced to meet it. Later, they again showed a white flag, and a general, with two officers and an interpreter, advanced. When the Americans were within about 200 yards of the rebel party the latter drew rifles from behind their backs and opened fire upon the Americans, but fortunately without effect. This is a fair sample of the treacherous methods of the natives in conducting warfare.

The Twentieth Infantry arrived at Manila on the transport *Scandia*, February 23d. On March 5th the *Ohio* arrived with the remainder of the Twenty-second Regular Infantry from San Francisco. On the same date the cruiser *Baltimore* and the monitor *Monterey* arrived at Manila from Hongkong, the former carrying Messrs. Schurman, Denby, and Worcester, the civil members of the Philippine Commission. On March 10th the transport *Grant* arrived at Manila with the Fourth Infantry and four companies of the Twentieth Infantry, adding to the troops under command of General Otis 42 officers and 1,716 enlisted men. Major-General H. W. Lawton arrived on the *Grant*.

The arrival of General Lawton with these needed reinforcements made offensive operations possible, and the result was soon apparent. General King renewed his former command, of which he was relieved by General Wheaton on account of illness, and a new flying brigade was formed for the latter, consisting of the Twentieth and Twenty-second Infantry regiments, two battalions of the First Washington Infantry, seven companies of the Second Oregon Infantry, Troops E, I, and K, Fourth Cavalry, mounted, and Scott's battery of the

Sixth Artillery. This brigade, assisted by a gunboat, began the advance movement March 13th, starting at San Pedro and capturing Guadaloupe, the gunboat shelling the rebels along the Pasig River. The purpose of this advance was to clear the country to Laguna de Bay, the large lake ten miles inland, and to cut the rebel forces into two parts, those north of the Pasig River being separated from their confederates below the stream.

The advance was sounded at 6.30 A. M., the cavalry leading the column at a smart trot across the open to the right, eventually reaching a thicket in the rear of Guadaloupe. Supported by the Oregons the advance force opened a heavy fire on the rebels. The response was feeble and desultory, apparently coming from small bodies of men in every covert. While the right column was swinging towards the town of Pasig the left advanced, pouring volleys into the bush. A small body of rebels made a determined stand at Guadaloupe church, but they were unable to withstand the assault.

At 7.30 A. M. a river gunboat started towards Pasig. The rebels were first encountered by this vessel in the jungle near Guadaloupe. Steaming slowly the gunboat poured a terrific fire from her Gatling guns into the brush. For all of an hour the whirring of the rapid-fire guns alternated with the booming of the heavier pieces on board. In the meanwhile Scott's battery ashore was shelling the trenches and driving the enemy back. The artillery then advanced to the ridge of bamboo and drove a few of the enemy's sharpshooters away with volleys from their carbines. After this their advance met with little opposition.

In the meantime the infantry had been sent forward in extended order, the Washington regiment resting on the bank of the river, each regiment deploying on reaching its station and furnishing its own supports. The entire column then wheeled towards the river, driving the enemy towards its supports, and then advanced on Guadaloupe. The artillery moved to a ridge commanding Pasig and Pateros. By this time the

enemy was in full flight along a line over a mile long, and the firing was discontinued temporarily in order to give the troops a rest before making the attack on Pasig. At this stage of the engagement it was raining heavily.

The attack on Pasig began on the morning of the 15th of March. The two companies of the Oregon regiment on the bluff covered the city with volleys to protect the advance of the troops, while two more crossed, as on the previous day, to get on the flank and rear of the city on the opposite side of the San Mateo. The Washington Infantry swung around to the right of the city, and the Twentieth was ferried across the Pasig to the first island, the city standing on two islands, being divided by a creek crossed by a single stone bridge. This crossing was covered by the Oregon regiment, who poured volley after volley into the intrenchments and the churchyard, where the insurgents were stationed behind a stone fence. Although armed with Springfields, and the distance was 1,800 yards, the fire was so accurate that the natives were compelled to hug their defenses, and the crossing and deployment of the Twentieth Infantry were made without a casualty. Had they been armed with Krags they could have done even better work and could have reached still more distant intrenchments.

The Twentieth Infantry then advanced gallantly into the city, and for an hour was heard the steady rattle of musketry as the insurgents were forced from house to house and barricade to barricade. Splendid work was done by the artillery in demolishing intrenchments in front of the advancing line, the fire being marvelously accurate. It was directed with reference to the position of our own troops by the flags of the signal corps, whose men went with the attacking party and exposed themselves recklessly in order to do their important work. By four o'clock in the afternoon the city was taken, and the whole delta between it and Laguna de Bay was cleared of insurgents. The Washington regiment on the extreme right cleared out that district completely, and sent in 375 prisoners. Such of the population as had not escaped to the

south on the first day made their way northward along the lake towards the mountains. As the district occupied had no less than 50,000 inhabitants, not one of whom can now be found in it, the stream of fugitives must have been large.

The captured men were unarmed when taken, but some of them were seen to throw arms into the water, and this is known to be their practice. They all wear their regular white clothing, and when not armed cannot be identified as soldiers. It is their custom when hard-pressed to secrete their arms in various ways, and on a pinch to throw them into the rivers, creeks, and sloughs that abound in this region. Then they wave a little white flag and claim to be "amigos." This is the reason why so few arms have been captured. As to the arms of those killed in battle, they are all carried away by those who escape. Only two guns were found in a trench with thirty-eight dead bodies. However, the identity of the prisoners as soldiers was established by the fact that a colonel was among them, and when ordered to fall in they did so in the regular way, with non-commissioned officers in the rear, and formed column of fours at command. The serious problem is not to defeat the insurgents in battle, but to capture their arms.

The result of the fight at Pasig, where there were over 4,000 rebels, was important and a complete victory for the Americans. About 500 prisoners were captured; large quantities of provisions and supplies taken, considerable food supplies not available for the army destroyed; many houses burned, including a part of Pasig; and hundreds of Aguinaldo's soldiers either killed or wounded. The Americans took 363 prisoners. Four of our men were killed, and about twenty wounded. This disparity in the casualties is accounted for by the difference in the marksmanship of the two armies. Nearly every American soldier is a fair shot with a rifle, and is willing to expose himself enough to take careful aim when he shoots, while the natives are extremely poor shots, and stick so closely to cover that their bullets fly wide of the mark.

The victory at Pasig, achieved by General Wheaton, was

the greatest obtained by the Americans since the repulse of the attack on Manila, February 5th.


On the following day, General Wheaton's flying brigade continued the advance. The village of Cainta, northwest of Pasig, was captured after a desperate fight, by the Twentieth Infantry. The village was strongly fortified. The American troops were under Major Rogers. They first encountered the Filipino outposts in the dense jungle on the banks of the river. The insurgents were dislodged after half an hour's fighting. The Americans advanced in splendid order under a heavy fire, until it was necessary to volley the Filipinos from the trenches. The latter had a great advantage and wounded a number of the Americans. But the Americans charged across the rice fields in the face of a cross fire, making four advances on the enemy, who numbered a thousand men, five hundred of whom were intrenched. Our troops, however, carried the town after four hours' fighting, and burned the buildings on the outskirts, the Filipinos firing from the windows and keep up a running fire in the streets. The Americans then withdrew in order to obtain more ammunition. The insurgents lost about one hundred men and our loss was two killed and seventeen wounded. The rebels retreated northward. The insurgents at the outposts and in the trenches beyond Caloocan fired several volleys on the night of March 15th, upon the Montana and Kansas volunteers, and a part of the Fourth regulars, desiring, it is supposed, to discover whether the American line had been thinned by the movement of General Wheeler's command. The Americans in the trenches replied warmly to the fire.

Some of the rebels expelled from Cainta and the small towns in the vicinity of Pasig combined forces, and on the night of March 18th attacked a company of the Washington volunteers, a detached post at Tagnig, about a mile and a half southeast of Pasig. General Wheaton immediately reinforced the Americans with two companies each of the Washington and the Oregon regiments. The post held the enemy in check

and the fire of the reinforcing companies repulsed them, driving them across to an island formed in the estuary. They were thus in front of the Twenty-second regulars. On discovering that they were entrapped the rebels fought desperately, aided materially by the jungle and the darkness; but they were completely routed with heavy loss, after two hours' fighting. The Americans lost two killed and twenty wounded.

General Wheaton determined to punish the natives, and at daybreak on March 19th his brigade started in the following order: The Sixth Artillery, holding the extreme right; the Oregon volunteers holding the center, the Washington regiment keeping to the edge of the lake, and the Twenty-second regulars occupying the right of the line, which swept the whole country along the lake, in a southeasterly direction, toward General Ovenshine's position. The line, thus extended over two miles of country, rough and covered with thick jungle, advanced eleven miles. The enemy fled, and at scarcely any time did the Americans get within 1,200 yards of them. The troops returned to Pasig exhausted by the hard work under a hot sun. No fewer than 200 Filipinos were killed. The American army and navy were now in command of Laguna de Bay.

Many of the Filipino soldiers captured at this time represented that the Filipino army was weakening. On Friday, March 17th, the armed tugs *Laguna de Bay* and *Oeste* shelled the town of Marong on the lake, the rebels fleeing without making any response to the fire. The Americans landed a party, which destroyed a quantity of stores, and all the stone buildings except the church. The expedition then proceeded to Majayjay where a sugar-mill and sawmill were destroyed. On arriving at Santa Cruz, it was found that the enemy was strongly intrenched and prepared to defend the position, assisted by two gunboats and several strong launches. Moreover, the mouth of the river was blocked with rocks and bamboo. A few shells caused an exodus of the citizens, but not of the enemy's troops. The Americans did not attempt a landing.



PART OF GENERAL WHITTON'S FLYING BRIGADE IN ACTION ON THE FIRING LINE AT THE BATTLE OF PASIG,
OVERLOOKING THE PASIG RIVER



About this time the American army in the island of Luzon was reorganized, two divisions of three brigades each being formed. General Lawton assumed command of the First, which consisted of the Washington, North Dakota, and California volunteers, under General King; six troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the Fourteenth Regulars, the Idaho volunteers, and a battalion of the Iowa troops, under General Oven-shine; the Third and Thirty-second regular infantry, and the Oregon regiment, under General Wheaton, and Dyer's and Hawthorne's light batteries. General MacArthur's division consisted of two batteries of the Third Artillery, the Kansas and Montana volunteers, under General H. G. Otis; the Colorado, Nebraska, and South Dakota regiments, and six companies of the Pennsylvania regiment, under General Hale; the Fourth and Seventeenth regulars, the Minnesota and Wyoming volunteers and the Utah Artillery.

The battleship *Oregon* arrived at Manila March 19th, having been asked for by Admiral Dewey. She was accompanied by the *Iris*, and made the run from Callao in quick time, leaving the latter port on January 11th. That gave the Admiral three armoredclads, the other two being the monitors *Monadnock* and *Monterey*. The transport *Sherman* arrived at Manila on March 22d, bearing the Third Infantry and a battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry, a total of thirty-four officers and 1,702 enlisted men, Colonel J. H. Page, Third Infantry, commanding. The transport *Solace* arrived with supplies and several hundred seamen for Admiral Dewey's fleet on the same day.

CHAPTER LVIII

STILL ADVANCING UPON THE ENEMY—DAYS OF HARD FIGHTING — MALABON BURNED AND ABANDONED — MALINTA AND OTHER TOWNS CAPTURED— DEATH OF COLONEL EGBERT.

Gen. Otis's Curfew Order—Eagerness of the Volunteers to go Forward — Good Work of the Regulars — Weak Charges of the Filipinos— Effort to Surround the Enemy — Magnificent Entrenchments Thrown up by the Natives— Night before the Encounter— Early Start by our Forces— Gen. MacArthur's Advance to the Eastward — Filipinos Retreat Stubbornly — Three Fortified Towns Taken — Gen. Wheaton's Operations — Heavy Fire on the Oregons — German Consul Astonished — Concealed Entrenchments — Gallant Kansas Fighters — Our Losses — Battle Renewed on the Following Day — Malinta Carried by a Resistless Assault — Malabon Fired — Col. Egbert Killed — Troops Exhausted by the Heat — Prince Ludwig von Lowenstein Killed — Oregon Troops Ordered Forward — A Volley Fired into the Nipa Huts — Two Days of Hard Fighting and the Results.

THE inhabitants of Manila, after that awful night when the torches of the insurgents were applied to buildings in the city, were greatly relieved by the quiet secured by the order issued by General Otis requiring everybody to be off the streets by seven o'clock in the evening. The boldest of the natives did not think of disobeying the order, and when the church bells pealed their seven strokes there was a general clatter of hurrying feet, slamming of shop doors, and rattling of wagons along the rough streets. In a few minutes, swarming, buzzing Manila was changed into a drowsy village, and the only sounds in the streets were the footfalls of the guards as they went their way about the city. Stores, restaurants, and cafés suddenly closed, belated customers being compelled to make their exits through rear doors which were locked as hurriedly as possible; the provost guard called out "*Pronto!*" or "*Hurry along!*" as the late goers fled homewards, not on a run, for that would excite suspicion, but walk-

ing with both hands waving and linen blouse flying, and with that earnest expression which was meant to say to the guards, "Yes, Señor, I am hurrying home as rapidly as possible." Thereafter, during the night, the only sound along the Escolta was the tramp of heavy army shoes, or the ringing of a rifle butt lowered to the granite sidewalk.

This state of things was rather severe on the city population, which had been in the habit of taking the air during the evening hours, but everybody, Europeans, Filipinos, and Americans, took it philosophically, and decided that it was better to suffer the inconveniences of remaining indoors during the evening than to have men running about and setting fire to the buildings and shooting down those who attempted to put out the fires. One "night of terror" was quite enough.

It can be said with truth that the Americans rapidly settled down to the life of war and displayed that lack of excitability which characterizes steady nerves. Camp routine was carried on among the troops exactly the same as at a civil encampment at home, the evening band concert in the camps outside the city giving opportunity for some recreation and diversion that tended to relieve the monotony of camp life.

In the field the American troops had already won the reputation of possessing indomitable courage and heroic valor. Everywhere they showed the greatest eagerness to make every shot count and were willing to expose themselves recklessly to accomplish it. They showed a zest in fighting that made it difficult to restrain them. This was illustrated by a remark made by General King on the evening when the Idaho volunteers had charged the intrenchments of the enemy near Santa Ana. It was his intention only to advance a short distance, but the men had been held in leash all night and until the middle of the forenoon under a heavy fire, and when told to advance they started on a run, with wild yells, for the Filipino entrenchments. General King saw that it was useless to call them back, and, turning with a smile to his staff, he said: "There goes the American soldier, and all hell couldn't stop

him." The result showed that the men knew by instinct and long acquaintance with the Filipino much better how to fight him than the general did with his military theories, for they jumped the *insurrectos* out of their entrenchments and killed scores of them without losing a man, while if they had made the cautious advance intended they would probably have suffered severely. This eagerness to fight was displayed by the volunteers more than the regulars, for the reason that the volunteers enlisted simply because they wanted to fight, and the regulars did not have this as their chief motive.

It was admitted by officers generally that the volunteers in Luzon were thoroughly seasoned troops and equal to the regulars for all military purposes. Said a field officer of the Seventeenth shortly after the arrival of the transport *Grant*, "I was highly pleased to see the guard duty performed by the Oregon regiment yesterday. It was the best I have seen since the war begun." The men of the Twentieth regulars looked on at the work of the Washington regiment in their attack on Pateros, with astonishment, and said, "Just look at those men; they don't seem to fear anything."

The new regular army regiments also did splendid work whenever they took part in an engagement. The Twentieth and the Twenty-second, after only ten days off ship, were put into the flying brigade, and went at once into the battle of Guadaloupe, and behaved splendidly. If they lacked the dash of the older troops, they did not fail to advance steadily and use their rifles to good effect. For half an hour the Twentieth was under the hottest kind of fire, and poured a steady stream of bullets from their exposed position in the open into the woods where the enemy was concealed, advancing steadily as they did so. The only difference between them and the troops that fought in previous battles is that the latter would have charged and dislodged the enemy instead of advancing gradually. But the work was done.

The work of the flying brigade consisted in driving the insurgents from one defense to another, one example of that

kind being the attack by the Twentieth upon an elaborate entrenchment about two miles northeast of Pasig, to which the bulk of the enemy driven from the city the day before had retired. In the attack one man was killed and seventeen wounded. The assault was made without the aid of artillery, and could not have been successful if American troops had defended the works. Several times the Filipinos made a faint and farcical imitation of the American charge, by screeching in their shrill voices and rushing out a little distance, always after dark, only to retire precipitately when greeted by a volley. Occasionally a few of them would steal up near the line or some exposed encampment, headquarters, or field hospital, and from a sheltered position open a bushwhacking fire; but they would retreat quickly when their position was discovered, and they were fired upon. This was simply individual action, or the tactical idea of some chief of squad or company, and not the part of any general offensive plan.

To return to the narrative of the campaign, it was decided to make an effort to surround the insurgent army to the northward of Caloocan. To that end General MacArthur, with two brigades, commenced an advance on Novalisches, northeast of Caloocan, at daylight on the morning of March 25th. It was planned to have him swing to the left and strike north of Palo, after reaching Novalisches. General Wheaton's brigade was to press forward from Caloocan at the proper time, General Hale's brigade, on the old line north of Pasig, making a demonstration west of the Manila reservoirs. It was estimated by General Otis that the enemy numbered 12,000 on the line and was strongly entrenched.

During the six weeks that elapsed after the taking of Caloocan the insurgents had been making a series of magnificent intrenchments, and it was from these that the American troops drove them on that March morning. There were three lines of trenches, one back of the other, and all of them concealed in the woods and brush, with bamboo entanglements or almost impassable swamps in front of them. It was an im-

pregnable position, and the natives were justly confident of their ability to hold it. No such position as that had ever been captured from them by the Spaniards. Indeed, they had never felt it necessary to construct such strong works for defense against the Spaniards, who do not indulge in the American practice of charging earthworks and neglecting to stop when fired upon. For six weeks the natives held these lines, sharpshooting all day and making almost nightly attacks, and more than a score of our men were killed or wounded, and in that time they gained the greatest confidence in their fighting powers, believing the Americans were afraid to attack them. This belief was most rudely shattered.

There was great enthusiasm in the insurgent lines during the night before the battle. It was plain that Aguinaldo or some one of the leaders was making a speech, for they frequently yelled and cheered with much vigor. Their high, falsetto yells lacked the power and vigor of the deeper-toned American cheer, but no doubt as fully expressed their sentiments. Occasionally their high-keyed bugles would ring out, and once was heard the familiar air of "Marching through Georgia," which the Filipino bands all learned to play soon after the American occupation of Manila. On our side all was quiet, save for the rattle of army wagons on the hard rock road of Caloocan, bringing up ammunition and supplies, a noise unusual enough to tell the enemy that something new was on foot. At last the Filipinos quieted down, and soon the bugles of both armies sounded tattoo and taps, and nothing more was heard except the calls from trench to trench of the *insurrectos*, whose custom it was to call the numbers of their posts every ten minutes. At intervals during the night the *insurrectos* opened fire upon the American intrenchments, at the nearest point on the extreme left of the line, where Company L of the Oregon regiment was stationed, the distance being less than one hundred yards, but no attention was paid to it, and the soldiers slept until reveillé.

By three o'clock the darkness was pierced by the lights of



WAITING FOR THE BATTLE TO OPEN. UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS IN THEIR TRENCHES.



many campfires that sprang up suddenly and silently within the American lines. Before dawn the troops had breakfasted and the advance began. The start was made from Laloma. The advance was led by General MacArthur's division composed of General Harrison G. Otis's brigade on the left, made up of the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana regiments, and General Hale's brigade, which included the First South Dakota, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Nebraska regiments. As this force moved forward beyond the trenches that had been deserted by the Filipinos, the reserves occupied the trenches, prepared to advance when their services would be needed. The reserve force was made up of General Wheaton's command, composed of the Second Oregon regiment and the Twenty-second and Third Infantry, and General Hall's brigade, which included the Fourth Infantry, two battalions of the Seventeenth Infantry and the Thirteenth Minnesota and First Wyoming regiments.

General MacArthur's advance to the eastward encountered immediate and fierce opposition from the Filipinos, who were massed in considerable force in that direction and poured a heavy small-arm fire upon the Americans. General Hale quickly extended his front. Otis's artillery rushed to the firing line two guns of the Utah battery of light artillery under Lieutenant Naylor, two guns of the Sixth Artillery under Lieutenant Fleming, and a Colt automatic field gun in command of Ensign Davis. While the artillery vigorously shelled the village of Masamboug the infantry charged across the level fields in splendid disregard of the terrible volleying of the insurgents, and with a loud cheer carried the trenches, driving the enemy from them in disorder. The Filipinos gave ground stubbornly, but they could not withstand the tempestuous rushes of the United States troops, who continually pressed forward, with the precision of machinery, in the face of the most galling fire. The relentless sweep of the Americans carried everything before it.

At last the enemy fell back, and after carrying the

trenches the Americans swung to the northward, capturing in splendid style the fortified towns of Balintanae, Balza, and Cathahan, and finally driving the enemy before them into the swamps bordering the Juliaha River toward the town of Novalisches. The rough character of the country, with its dense undergrowth and the determined resistance of the enemy, prevented further advance in this direction, and the line swung to the left along the river.

General Wheaton began operations from Caloocan. He was met by a heavy fire from Malabon, about a mile to the west and slightly north of Caloocan, and from the trenches in front where the enemy were stationed in large numbers. At half-past eight the Twenty-second regulars advanced with the idea of forming connection with Colonel Egbert's regiment on the right, and the Third Artillery, which formed the left of General MacArthur's division. The attempt was a daring one, and was pluckily maintained under a galling fire; but the end was failure, which left a gap of a mile on the extreme left of the American line. The Oregon regiment advanced almost to the confines of the town of Malabon, receiving the heaviest fire of any of the United States troops that were engaged. When the order came to charge the intrenchments the soldiers as one man leaped over their breastworks and rushed forward with cheers, amid a storm of bullets that left many of their number on the ground. Before the astonished enemy fully realized what was happening, the troops had cleared the intervening space, broken through the entanglements, waded waist-deep through the mud and water, and climbed the face of the first trench, shooting right and left and front among the fleeing defenders. From the first trench the Filipinos fled to the second, and as the irresistible line swept on, they again took refuge in the third, only to abandon it in turn and seek safety across the river, which ran in the rear of their lines, destroying a span of the bridge. From strong defenses on the opposite side, and from trenches across the bayou separating the trenches from Malabon, they con-


tinued the fire until dark, and hasty intrenchments were thrown up to protect our troops from this fire. This charge of the Oregon regiment is worthy to rank with any feat of American arms in any war, and if it had been made against regular troops the regiment would have been literally cut to pieces. As it was, it sustained forty-nine casualties in a few minutes. The German Consul, looking over the ground the next day, said he would have declared its impossible to take such a position without artillery, and expressed his intense astonishment, but when told that the work was done by volunteers instead of regulars, he was completely dumfounded.

The steady advance of the right continued against strong opposition, and every regiment ran against concealed intrenchments from which they had to advance and drive the enemy, themselves being always in plain view, while the insurgents, screened by brush and timber, always retreated in time to find new cover from which to fire upon the advancing line. Occasionally the white clothing of a fleeing rebel or the striped blue of one of Aguinaldo's regulars would be descried through an opening in the brush, and almost invariably the wearer was a dead man an instant later. The greater portion of the enemy killed were slaughtered in this way, except those caught in the rush upon the first intrenchments. The Kansas regiment, which had been moved from in front of the Malabon trenches the night before, encountered a strong position, which it carried with the same gallantry that has marked all its fighting since the campaign began, and suffered severe losses. The same steadiness and courage were displayed by all regiments; all suffered heavy losses, but carried everything before them. When darkness came on and the firing ceased, the entire line rested on the river, prepared to force a crossing in the morning. The American loss in killed and wounded was about 140, that of the insurgents at least 200.

On the following day the battle was renewed, the Americans pushing forward to Malinta, taking that town by another of those resistless assaults that are the glory of our army

in the campaign in the Philippines, and causing the rebels to retreat to Polo. The attempt to get around in the rear of the insurgents was a failure because of the roughness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance made by the enemy, but General Otis's and General Hale's commands were about six miles to the east of Polo when the fighting stopped. It was expected that our men would meet with resistance at Malabon, west of Malinta, and southwest of Polo, but the enemy evidently thought it better strategy to concentrate their strength in the vicinity of Polo, so they set fire to Malabon at daylight and moved up to join their main body. There was, therefore, no resistance when a battalion of the Oregon regiment advanced north to Malabon, and then wheeled to form the left flank in an attack on the town of Malinta. Here it was found that the main body of the rebels had withdrawn from Malinta during the night, leaving only a few of their number to annoy the Americans with light firing. The Twenty-second infantry approached the place with General Wheaton and his staff close behind. When the Americans were about 300 yards from the intrenchments, there was a sudden and heavy volley from the Filipinos. The Twenty-second infantry went up the slope, through the thick grass, under the hottest kind of fire, and suffered considerably, but, with the Oregon volunteers on the left and the Kansas on the right, the fighting was kept up for half an hour. General Wheaton and his staff were all the time under a rain of bullets. Colonel Egbert of the Twenty-second Infantry, who was in the thickest of the fight, was shot in the abdomen. He was placed upon a stretcher, and an attempt was made to carry him to the cars, but he died on the way. It was a most affecting scene. General Wheaton, baring his head, said, with tears in his eyes: "Nobly done! Egbert." Colonel Egbert gasped in reply, "Good-bye, General; I'm done. I am too old."

The military career of Colonel Egbert forms an interesting chapter in the records of the War Department. He was



1. DEAD INSURGENTS IN THEIR TRENCHES AT CINGALON
 2. DEAD INSURGENTS IN THEIR TRENCHES ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF CALOOCAN.
 Photographed as found.



a born soldier, who loved the smell of powder and the thunder of battle. Like many of the heroes of recent wars, he was small in stature, but full of energy, determination, and undaunted courage. He was severely wounded on July 1st at Santiago, and promoted for gallantry in that action. Colonel Egbert never overlooked an opportunity to get to the front in time of battle. Personally, he was a genial, whole-souled man, albeit a stern disciplinarian.

No Filipinos were found in the trenches at Malinta. Though their force was apparently much smaller than that of the Americans, they had an immense advantage in position and in opportunity to retreat. General MacArthur's advance guard, the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas regiment, joined General Wheaton's brigade shortly after Malinta was taken, approaching along the Novaliches road westerly. The soldiers were much exhausted, and there were several prostrations from the heat, which was intense. The dead and wounded were collected in the shade of the trees, and carried on stretchers by Chinese across the river to the train.

After a rest General MacArthur's division advanced toward Polo. The Second Oregon regiment encountered a thousand Filipinos west of Malinta, who were retreating from Malabon. The enemy had taken up a position behind four rows of intrenchment, but was driven out after an hour's heavy firing. One Oregonian was killed and five were wounded. The Third Artillery, acting as infantry, with two guns of the Utah Artillery and the Kansas regiment, had a sharp fight east of Malinta. The Americans had but slight loss; five Filipinos were found dead and several were taken prisoners.

The death of Prince Ludwig von Lowenstein-Wertheim of Germany occurred during this encounter. He met his death at the hands of the men of the Oregon regiment, though purely by accident, for which he alone was to blame. No one could regret it more than the men of the Oregon regiment themselves, for to many of them he had been very kind and helpful. During the attack on Malabon he spent much of his

time at the dressing-station at Caloocan, aiding in caring for the wounded, and was courtesy and kindness personified. The next morning, when the line advanced across the river and halted for a time in order of battle, waiting for the extreme right, the sound of whose guns was considerably to the rear, to fight its way up to the line to which the left had been advanced, he again made his appearance and dispensed his courtesies to the men he passed on the road. When he arrived at the advanced line, he came upon Colonel Summers, commanding the Oregons, who advised him and his companion to go no farther, as they would get between the lines. He replied that he was not afraid, as the Filipinos would not hurt him, as he was friendly to both parties, and had several times been within the Filipino lines.

A short time afterwards, the Oregon troops were again ordered forward. After going about a mile they were fired on and the battle was on again. Steadily the line advanced, firing into the brush and woods where the enemy was concealed. In front of Company M were a number of native nipa huts, and in one of these persons were seen moving about. As these huts were the special refuge of sharpshooters, who were concealed in them, or were hidden in rifle pits beneath them, they were always closely watched for this reason, and fired into if there was any reason to suspect the presence of the enemy. At once a section was ordered to send a volley into the hut, and fired several times, stopping as soon as something seemed to be wrong. When the hut was reached the prince was found with a mortal wound through his body, and his companion with a wound in the arm. He was tenderly carried out and taken to the rear, but he died almost immediately. As soon as he reached the rear, the surgeon gave his body careful attention, and also dressed the arm of his wounded companion, and both were then conveyed to Manila. The latter fully absolved the troops from any blame in the matter, admitting that it was entirely their own fault for recklessly going beyond the lines.

CHAPTER LIX

FALL OF THE REBEL CAPITAL MALOLOS — VICTORIOUS MARCHES OF THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE JUNGLE — INSTANCES OF THE HEROISM OF OUR SOLDIERS.

The Insurgents under the Personal Command of Aguinaldo Routed — Notable Feat of the South Dakotas — Retreat toward Malolos — Luna's Manifesto — Getting out of Range of Dewey — Difficulty of Moving Field Guns — Rebels Beaten by their Officers to Keep them in Line — Aid of the Railroad — Reinforcements for the Insurgents — Blockade Runner Caught — A Day's Rest — Bocave Captured — A Picture of Desolation — MacArthur's Division Moves Forward to Malolos — Filipinos in Retreat — Some Little Resistance on the Way — More Fighting in the Jungle — Malolos Entered — The Town Fired — Enemy had Slipped Away — Incidents of American Heroism — Wounded Sergeant Who Would Return to the Fight — Coolness and Deliberation under Fire — Scenes at the Hospital — Cheerfulness of the Wounded — A South Dakota Hero.

THE victories of the preceding days were followed up by another on March 28th, when the main insurgent army, under the personal command of Aguinaldo, was routed, after three hours' hard fighting by General MacArthur's division at Marilao, which the Filipinos burned before deserting. The American advance began at 11 o'clock in the morning from Meicanayan, where our forces had encamped the night before. Brigadier-General Hale's brigade advanced along the right of the railroad, and the brigade of Brigadier-General Otis on the left. General Wheaton's forces were held in reserve at Meicanayan. The Americans had not advanced far when the enemy had opened a heavy fire from the left on the Third Artillery, which was General Otis's advance guard. The artillerymen responded heartily to the insurgent attack and drove the enemy helter-skelter across the River Marilao. Here the Filipinos retired within their trenches, which were only fifty yards in front of the

advancing Americans, and made a stand; but the halt proved fatal, for, under repeated volleys from two guns of the Utah Battery, under Lieutenant Critchon, and the automatic Colt guns, under Ensign Davis, they were completely routed, and left many dead and wounded on the field.

In the meantime the men of the First South Dakota had performed one of the most notable feats of the campaign. Cheering loudly, they fearlessly charged across an open field against the main line of the insurgents, who were lying partly concealed in a bamboo thicket. It was a daring act, for across the level plain the insurgents rained a shower of bullets. Ten of the gallant Westerners were killed and eleven wounded. Fearful loss was inflicted on the rebels by this charge. Eighty-eight were known to have been killed, and 100, with their arms, were captured. The rest fled towards Malolos in wild disorder.

The main body of the insurgents retreated to Malolos, where the Filipino Assembly was convened. At every railroad station, circulars were posted, signed by the Filipino commander-in-chief, Antonio Luna, ordering all spies and bearers of news to the enemy to be shot without trial, and instructing that all looters and ravishers be treated in the same manner. All towns abandoned by the Filipino troops were to be burned. While deploring the existence of war, the circular maintained the undeniable right of the Filipinos to defend their homes, lives, and lands against "would-be dominators, who will kill them, their wives, and children," adding that this motive ought to impel all Filipinos to sacrifice everything.

At Malolos it was expected that the rebels would make a desperate resistance, as it was their capital, and the loss of that meant more to them than the loss of any other place in the island of Luzon. Aguinaldo's tactics had gradually taken him beyond the range of Admiral Dewey's guns. Malolos is about seven miles back from the bay, although there are shallow estuaries which would permit light draught boats to get within a mile or two. There are many small streams along the line

of the railroad, and the passage of our troops was impeded by the burning of bridges. The roads were also almost impassable for light artillery and quick maneuvers of cavalry. Our light field guns could be moved forward slowly, but it was impossible to manipulate them so as to take advantage of every crest and rise of the ground. The only horses available for the cavalry and artillery are the small native ponies. It was owing to the character of the country and the impassability of the roads that the attempts to get a part of our forces in the rear of the main body of Aguinaldo's army failed.

The fighting which began March 25th continued for several successive days. In these long contests the main thing is to have all the supplies, stores, etc., kept abreast of the fighting force, and this was done in this remarkable campaign. But it was thought best to give our men a rest after three days' scrambling in the brush, fording rivers, and charging trenches in the blazing sun. The men were tired, but in splendid spirits. The engineers were at work repairing bridges, as the rebels failed to destroy the ironwork, and the railroad was kept busy hurrying supplies to the front. The country from Marilao to Malolos is level, with occasional stretches of wood, but there is no more jungle. The two armies were about 1,200 yards apart. According to prisoners in the hands of the Americans, Aguinaldo's generals, Garcia, Tofreo, and Pacheco, were with the Filipino army on March 27th, and drove their followers into the first aggressive demonstration. The rebels attempted to charge across the plain east of the railroad, but the Americans charged to meet them and the Filipinos bolted after a few shots, leaving several men killed on the field. The Filipino prisoners declared that the rebels had lost all taste for fighting, and that their officers had to keep them in line by beating them with swords.

The fact that the railroad was in operation as far as the American lines at Marilao greatly aided the work of forwarding supplies. Some aid was also given by the gunboats which proceeded up the Bulacan River, shelling the jungle on both

sides of the stream. The insurgents around Bulacan received reinforcements from Malolos. Our men suffered from the heat, which was fully 100 degrees in the interior. At this time our losses since February 4th were 157 killed and 864 wounded.

On March 28th the United States gunboat *Yorktown* arrived at Manila with the Spanish steamer *Mundara*, owned by the Mondezona Company at Manila, which was attempting to run the blockade. The steamer was captured after a stiff chase in the gulf in Lingayen, 245 miles north. When she was first sighted the *Mundara* was entering the gulf, but she headed seaward. The *Yorktown* fired two shots before the steamer was overhauled.

On March 29th General MacArthur's forces advanced from Marilao, after a day's rest, and passed rapidly to Bocave. At 5:15 they reached Guiguinto, three and a half miles from Malolos. On the way there was more fierce fighting. The American forces met with strong opposition in the jungle beyond Bocave. First one Nebraskan, then one Pennsylvanian, and afterwards two of the Montana regiment were killed, and thirty-five were wounded, including one officer of the Kansas regiment. Bocave was captured at 8 o'clock in the morning, and then the second advance to Bigaa was made. Bigaa was taken without a shot being fired, the enemy fleeing at the approach of the Americans.

Bodies of dead Filipinos were found stranded in the shallows of the river, or lying in the jungle where they crawled to die or were left in the wake of the hurriedly retreating army. The inhabitants who fled from Marilao and Meycauayan left in such a panic that on the tables our soldiers found money and valuables, and in the rooms were trunks containing property of value. This was the case in most of the houses deserted. They were not molested by our soldiers, but the Chinese, who slipped in between the armies, took possession of several houses, over which they raised Chinese flags, some of which were afterwards torn down.

The country between Marilao and Manila presented a picture of desolation. Smoke was curling from hundreds of ash heaps, and the remains of trees and fences torn by shrapnel were to be seen everywhere. The general appearance of the country was as if it had been swept by a cyclone. The roads were strewn with furniture and clothing dropped in flight by the Filipinos. The only persons remaining behind were a few aged persons, too infirm to escape. They camped beside the ruins of their former homes and begged passers-by for any kind of assistance. The majority of them lived on the generosity of our soldiers, who gave them portions of their rations. The dogs of the Filipinos cowered in the bushes, terrified and barking, while hundreds of pigs were to be seen busily searching for food.

From Guiguinto to Malolos is but a short distance, and on the morning of the last day in March General MacArthur's division went forward to the rebel capital. The baggage trains had been brought up and the bridges repaired, and the scouts reconnoitered the country to within a mile of Malolos. They did not discover the enemy in force, but found scattered bodies of Filipino soldiers and about 2,000 natives who were retreating to the eastward.

The Nebraska, South Dakota, and Pennsylvania volunteers were on the right of the line, and they met with some opposition from the enemy who were in the woods, but were soon dislodged. The Kansas and Montana volunteers and the Third Artillery had the left of the advance and were not on the firing line. Four Nebraskans were killed in the early skirmish. Ten men of the Dakota regiment were wounded, and one of the Pennsylvania was killed. The Americans finally drove the Filipinos back. Although there were three lines of strong intrenchments along the track, the enemy made scarcely any defense there. General MacArthur and his staff were walking on the track, abreast of the line, with everything quiet, when suddenly they received a shower of bullets from sharpshooters in trees and on housetops, but these were speed-

ily dislodged. The enemy's loss was apparently small, the jungle affording them such protection that the Americans were unable to see them and in firing were guided only by the sound of the Filipinos' shots.

It was 10:15 A. M. when General MacArthur's forces entered Malolos. The capture of the city was an easy matter. The insurgents had slipped away again, preferring to set fire to the town and run away rather than lose many of their forces in an attempt to defend it. It was Aguinaldo's policy to harrass our army as much as possible but not risk certain and final defeat by massing his forces in a determined contest. In every instance on the road from Caloocan to Malolos the rebels ran away after a more or less prolonged resistance. Aguinaldo and his cabinet left Malolos two days before, his so-called government being henceforth without a home, and the commander-in-chief a wanderer in the jungle. His abandonment of the capital greatly weakened his hold upon his men and caused great dissatisfaction among his troops.

There are many stories to be told, showing the bravery of our men in this stage of the campaign, that might well be given a place here. A few of them will illustrate some of the characteristics of the American soldier and the scenes that were witnessed during the pursuit of the insurgents. It is related by one who saw the incident that as the troops jumped over their breastworks and charged against the magnificent defenses of Malabon, a sergeant who had become famous in his regiment as a chronic growler received a severe wound. Two of his comrades stopped to help him, and bound up his wound with a first-aid package. The sergeant grieved at being hit so soon, and begged the men to hold him up long enough to give him just one shot at the enemy, but as they were in the rear of our own line this could not be done. So, telling him to lie still until the Hospital Corps reached him to take him to the rear, they hastened on to overtake the advancing line. Fifteen minutes later the hospital men came upon him and found his crawling slowly towards the front,



UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS CHARGING ON THE DEFENCES OF MALABAR.



dragging his gun with him, determined to get that one shot before his strength gave out. They put him on a litter, in spite of his protests, and carried him back to the field hospital, and in a few hours he died, still mourning his failure to do the work he had waited so long to do. His company had been on special duty until that day, and this was his first fight.

Coolness and deliberation under fire are as much responsible for the success of the American arms as the resistless impulse of the charge when the advance is ordered. A small party was advancing up a road swept by Mauser and Remington bullets from half a dozen barricades and short trenches. The party was too small to advance further, and so, at 400 yards range, they continued the fight from the open against the protected enemy. Two of the men calmly seated themselves in the road, crossed their legs, and began sharpshooting at the scores of heads that constantly appeared above the fortifications as bullets were rained upon them. There they sat, discussing with each other the range and the effect of their shots as deliberately as at target practice, and neither of these men was hit.

In front of Malabon the general field hospital was established in the waiting-room of the Caloocan depot, and, as fast as the wounded were attended to or the bodies of the dead were brought in, they were placed on the train and sent at once to Manila. In less than an hour after the battle began the first wounded men were being tenderly cared for at the general hospital. The scenes at the Caloocan station were pitiful and heartrending, and yet they made one feel proud of his countrymen. Not a complaint, and hardly a groan, was heard from a man, no matter how badly he was wounded or how much pain he suffered from the necessary handling, and even cutting, of his wound by the surgeon. On the other hand, those not exhausted from loss of blood joked and laughed about their hurts, and each was ready cheerfully to tell the bystanders how it happened and what he saw of the battle before he was hit. Not a few mingled with their stories praises

of the work of the Hospital Corps on the field, and of the heroism of their comrades, the roar of whose guns was becoming fainter and fainter as they pushed on in pursuit of the retreating insurgents. Some came hobbling up, using a rifle for a crutch, others holding one roughly bandaged arm with the uninjured other. Some crawled painfully along, shot in the leg or body, until they were observed and men went out to bring them in, while others were carried in on litters or the arms of their comrades, or walked slowly and painfully, their arms about the necks of those assisting them. Patiently they all waited for their turn on the surgeon's table, the more slightly wounded refusing to take their turn when others more severely injured had been brought in later. One man, who had waited a long time in this way, and at last had taken his place on the table, all others having been attended to, insisted upon getting up again to give place to a badly wounded man just then brought in. A man with a painful but not immediately disabling wound in the side joked with the surgeon and others as the knife and bandage were busy in getting him into shape to go to the hospital. When he was ready, he lowered himself painfully to the floor, remarking: "That's a good job, Doc. Where's my gun?"

"What do you want with your gun?" asked the surgeon.

"Why, I'm going to the front again and help the boys out."

But this the surgeon refused to permit, and the disappointed man was soon on his way to the hospital at Manila.

The cheerfulness and fortitude of the American soldier in the hospitals, as well as his bravery under fire, cause astonishment among the representatives of Germany, England, and other countries who saw them in all the phases of the campaign. Among the Americans who have performed deeds which will win for them the coveted medal of honor is Thomas Smith, a private of Company E, South Dakota volunteers. He was one of a number who was assigned to outpost duty at block house No. 2, north of Manila, being on duty on a most

dangerous part in the bamboo thickets. Shortly after sundown one day, two Filipinos approached and greeted him with the customary salutation of "Good evening, friend." Just as they passed he carelessly glanced over his shoulder. This circumstance saved his life, for immediately after passing, one of the Filipinos drew a machete, sprang at Smith, and aimed a terrific blow at his head. The stroke would have severed Smith's head from his body had he not caught sight of the descending weapon in time. As it was his left cheek was cut open to the bone from the temple to the jaw. With the blood pouring forth in a stream he sprang to face the natives, who instantly fled. Smith shot one of the fleeing miscreants through the heart before he had gone twenty feet. From pain and loss of blood he fell to his knees, but in that position he reloaded his rifle and fired at the other Filipino, who was just disappearing at the edge of the thicket. His body was found next day. Smith was congratulated and General Otis personally commended him for his bravery.

CHAPTER LX

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS ISSUE A PROCLAMATION TO THE FILIPINOS—DISCOVERY OF A MYSTERIOUS SECRET ORDER KNOWN AS THE KATAPUNANS.

President McKinley's Philippine Commissioners—Their Fitness for the Work—Arrival at Manila—Proclamation Explaining the Aims and Objects of the United States—Our Supremacy Must be Enforced—Ample Liberty Promised—Civil Rights Protected—Reforms and Good Government Guaranteed—Our Position Grossly Misrepresented by Filipino Leaders—The Mysterious Secret Organization of the Natives—Symbols of the "Ku-Klux-Klan"—Deeds of Murder, Robbery, and Arson—Whole Native Population Awed—All Able-bodied Men Forced to Join—Mystic Symbol Found Everywhere—Servants of our Officers Enrolled in the Secret Band—How Aguinaldo was Enabled to Collect his Oppressive Taxes to Carry on the War—Outrageous Lies Told to the Native Troops.

THE Board of Commissioners appointed by President McKinley to visit the Philippines and study the situation there consisted of President Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell University, Admiral Dewey, Major-General Otis, ex-Minister Charles Denby, and Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan. The President's choice was universally approved by the people of the nation.

President Schurman was widely recognized as a man in every way abundantly qualified to fill the position of chairman of the commission, a man of great learning, sound judgment, broad sympathies, and acute perception, and of conservative rather than extreme views. Professor Worcester's long residence in the Philippines made him thoroughly acquainted with the inhabitants, and no one better than he appreciated the full meaning of the problem which confronted the United States in taking into its kindly care these alien races suffering from three hundred years of Spanish misrule and oppression.

As Professor Worcester probably knew the islands better than any other American, and his published writings on the Philippines are accepted as authority on the subject, the government was extremely fortunate in being able to secure his services. Ex-Minister Denby had long service in China, which peculiarly fitted him to understand Eastern problems, and he also had written upon the Philippine question in a way to prove his capability for performing good service upon such a commission. As to Admiral Dewey and General Otis, it is wholly unnecessary to say anything of their fitness for the work. They were necessary advisers to the other commissioners, and could render them great service in every way. As a whole the commission was as strong as could possibly have been selected.

The civil members of the commission arrived in Manila early in March, and at once began a careful study of the situation, the islands, resources, and possibilities; the people, their needs, limitations, and capabilities; the insurrection, its origin and strength. Early in April they issued a proclamation to the Filipinos, assuring them of the cordial good will and fraternal feeling of the United States and the American people. It then proceeded as follows:

“The aim and object of the American government, apart from the fulfillment of the solemn obligations it has assumed toward the family of nations by its acceptance of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, is the well being, prosperity, and happiness of the Philippine people, and their elevation and advancement to a position among the most civilized peoples of the world.

“The President believes that this felicity and perfection of the Philippine people is to be brought about by the assurance of peace and order; by the guarantee of civil and religious liberty; by the establishment of justice; by the cultivation of letters, science, and the liberal and practical arts; by the enlargement of intercourse with foreign nations; by expansion of industrial pursuits; by trade and commerce; by multiplica-

tion and improvement of the means of internal communication; by development with the aid of modern inventions the great resources of the archipelago; and, in a word, by the uninterrupted devotion of the people to the pursuit of useful objects and the realization of those noble ideas which constitute the higher civilization of mankind. Unfortunately, these purposes of the American government and people have been misinterpreted to some of the inhabitants of certain islands, and as a consequence the friendly American forces have, without provocation or cause, been openly attacked. And why these hostilities? What do the best Filipinos desire? Can it be more than the United States is ready to give? They are patriots and want liberty.

"In the meantime the attention of the people of the Philippines is invited to certain regulative principles by which the United States will be guided in its relations with them. These are deemed to be the points of cardinal importance:

"1. The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago, and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin.

"2. To the Philippine people will be granted the most ample liberty and self-government reconcilable with maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective, and economical administration of public affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States.

"3. The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guaranteed and protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom will be assured, and all persons shall be equal and have equal standing in the eyes of the law.

"4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine people or the islands they inhabit as an object or means of exploitation. The purpose of the American government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people.

"5. There shall be guaranteed to the Philippine people an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent to which it is practicable, natives shall be employed.

"6. The collection and application of all taxes and other revenues will be placed upon a sound, economical basis, and the public funds, raised justly and collected honestly, will be applied only to defray the regular and proper expenses incurred by the establishment and maintenance of the Philippine government and such general improvements as the public interests may demand. Local funds collected will be used for local purposes,

and not devoted to other ends. With such prudent and honest fiscal administration it is believed that the needs of the government will, in a short time, become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation.

"7. A pure, speedy, and effective administration of justice will be established, whereby may be eradicated the evils arising from delay, corruption, and exploitation.

"8. The construction of roads, railroads, and similar means of communication and transportation, and of other public works, manifestly to the advantage of the Philippine people, will be promoted.

"9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce, agriculture, and other industrial pursuits tending toward the general development of the country in the interests of the inhabitants, shall be the objects of constant solicitude and fostering care.

"10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of elementary schools, in which the children of the people may be educated, and appropriate facilities will be provided for a higher education.

"11. Reforms in all departments of the government, all branches of the public service, and all corporations closely touching the common life of the people, will be undertaken without delay, and effected conformably with right and justice in a way to satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the people.

"Such is the spirit in which the United States comes to the people of the islands, and the President has instructed the commission to make this publicly known.

"In obeying his behest, the commissioners desire to join the President in expressing their good will toward the Philippine people, and to extend to the leading representative men an invitation to meet them for the purpose of personal acquaintance and the exchange of views and opinions.

"[Signed]

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN, *U. S. Commissioner.*

GEORGE DEWEY, *U. S. N.*

ELWELL S. OTIS, *Major-General U. S. A.*

CHARLES DENBY, *U. S. Commissioner.*

DEAN C. WORCESTER, *U. S. Commissioner."*

The proclamation was officially promulgated at Manila, was printed in the newspapers, and was spread throughout the islands by the aid of the American forces. It was hoped that it would convince the natives of the good intentions of the United States and lead them to accept American sovereignty, although it was recognized that people who had been oppressed and deceived as the Filipinos had been would not too readily accept the promises of another power. The members of the commission recognized the fact that the warfare which

Aguinaldo and his colleagues had been able to make against the United States would never have been possible without gross misrepresentation and deception, which had convinced the natives that the United States would be even more cruel, more despotic, and more unjust than Spain ever had been. They saw that the insurrection had its origin and strength in the Tagal provinces around Manila. The remaining provinces of north and south Luzon are peopled by different races, and the rest of the natives of the archipelago are not natural allies of the Tagals, but unfriendly rivals. During the months while the treaty of peace was being negotiated at Paris Aguinaldo sent detachments of about one hundred armed Tagals to the towns of the Visayan group of islands to compel the natives to submit to his government. The liberty of the populations was constrained and supremacy was enforced, there being no American troops there to prevent such action. Had the treaty been promptly agreed to and ratified without delay, there never would have been an armed insurrection of any account in the island of Luzon.

One of the things that came to the knowledge of our commission seeking information about the true inwardness of the situation in the Philippines was the unfortunate and unwelcome fact that there existed among the Filipinos a secret brotherhood known as the Katapunans, a sort of political organization, whose symbol was the same as that used by that mysterious order in the South after the war, known as the Ku-Klux Klan. The mystic symbol was "K. K. K." The organization seemed to be confined to the island of Luzon, but might have been in existence elsewhere. The members of this organization were responsible for the extension of the war and the persistence with which the insurgents kept at the work of maintaining an army long after it became apparent to every intelligent Filipino that further resistance was useless, by maintaining a virtual reign of terror among the rebels by threatening death to all who refused to fight. Financial gain and other considerations prompted the members of this

order to deeds of murder, robbery, and arson. The leaders of the insurrection united with this secret order, and for the time, at least, succeeded in making it their chief agent and means of support. The leaders of the society were so active and so powerful that they succeeded in enrolling among its members a large number of the young and reckless Filipinos, and in making the whole body of the population in the island of Luzon stand in awe of it and do its bidding. It is said that in Manila every able-bodied man was enlisted in the ranks of the Katapunans and made to join his strength to the army of Aguinaldo, even the servants of white families who were attached to their employers because of good treatment received being registered as revolutionary soldiers and cowed into accepting the orders of the leaders. The unfortunate Filipinos who were the personal servants of officers, drove their carriages, did their washing, or cooked their meals, were either Katapunans themselves or so feared the brotherhood that they deserted to a man from their posts of action when the secret order came. Many of them were found after the big fight at Manila dead in the trenches, the victims in reality of the dread power of the Katapunans.

By means of the terror inspired by this society, Aguinaldo was enabled to collect his taxes in every house in Manila. The Americans collected their taxes only where their regular military authority extended, but Aguinaldo collected his even from the body servants of the military governor himself. The mystic symbol of the three K's was to be found everywhere. The strength of this relentless force was tested by Aguinaldo immediately after the failure of his attack on Manila, and when his disastrous defeat at Calocan proved that he could not fight the army of General Otis with any hope of winning victories. There was a rumor that Aguinaldo had been deposed because he sent emissaries to General Otis to consult about peace, and that Montenegro had been made commander of the army. This proved not to be wholly true, but it appeared that Montenegro, an ardent revolutionist,

had the Katapunans behind him, and was strong enough to dictate the policy of the President, who had either to go on with the war or become a refugee, with the possibility of Katapunan vengeance seeking him out wherever he might go.

It was in all probability the Katapunans who organized the uprising in Manila on February, and set the fires that burned so many houses in the Santa Cruz, Tondo, and San Nicholas districts; and it was they who instituted the order to burn all towns which the Filipino army was about to evacuate. A reliable correspondent, writing under date of April 9th, said: "After the battle of Malabon I talked with half a dozen wounded Filipinos, and every one of them said he either had to fight or be killed. A short distance from Malabon twenty-three dead men were found, each with his head nearly severed from his body, and natives said they had been killed by the Katapunans for refusing to fight. Yesterday I was with a scouting party in the direction of Santa Maria, a town occupied by about five hundred insurgent soldiers, near the foothills. I had with me several copies of the proclamation issued by the American commissioners. We approached within half a mile of the town, and within five hundred yards of an insurgent outpost. All the natives fled as we advanced, except one old man, who remained in his house. I gave him two of the proclamations, printed in Tagalog and Spanish, and asked him to see that they were taken to Santa Maria. He promised, but said the Katapunans would cut his throat, and that they killed everybody who did anything to bring about peace.

"Nevertheless, the insurgent army is disintegrating. Noncombatants are coming through the lines and returning to their homes, or to where the cold ashes indicate the location of their former homes, and some of them freely admit that they have been soldiers, but against their will, which latter may not have been true in the beginning. Two days ago a well-dressed and gentlemanly young mestizo came in. He spoke good English, and was a fair representative of the

higher class Filipinos. He admitted without hesitation that he had been an officer in the Filipino army, but said he was convinced of the folly of fighting the Americans, and that the Filipinos would be better off with the American authority over them. He said that if the Filipino soldiers only knew the truth, they would desert and go home, but that they were told outrageous lies about the cruelty of the Americans, and for a long time were made to believe that they were whipping us, and that many thousands of our men had been killed in battle or perished from exposure to the sun. They knew now that they were beaten, but still thought that our losses exceeded theirs, and that we could not stand the climate. I asked him why he did not tell them the truth, and he simply said, 'Katapunans,' shrugged his shoulders, drew his hand across his throat, and smiled suggestively."


CHAPTER LXI

FALL OF SANTA CRUZ—LAWTON'S SWEEPING VICTORIES— BRILLIANT AND REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT OF GEN. FUNSTON—DEATH OF COL. STOTZENBERG.

Brief Respite from Fighting—Pathetic Scenes—An Expedition up Laguna de Bay—Gen. Lawton's Fighters—A Picturesque Flotilla—Moving on Santa Cruz—Delayed by Shallow Water—Landing in Cascoes—Our Men Leap into the Water—Across a Bridge in Face of a Galling Fire—Lawton in the Palace—More Towns and Some Boats Taken—"Rebels Would not Wait to be Killed"—Marching Northward—Natives Retreat Everywhere—Seven Brave North Dakotans Killed—San Antonio Entered without Resistance—Copies of the Proclamation Distributed—Lawton Recalled—His Expression of Disappointment—Objects of the Expedition Achieved—The Rebels Gather at Calumpit—An Armored Car at Work—Funston and His Heroes—Swimming the Stream—Rafts Floated in the Face of the Entrenched Natives—Complete Success of the Assault.

SEVERAL days elapsed after the taking of Malolos before hostilities were resumed. They were days of resting; of reconnoissance in various directions to ascertain the movements of the rebels; of gathering strength for the next assault. Signs that the insurrection was disintegrating were not wanting, various individuals who reached our lines from those of the enemy declaring that the great body of insurgents were anxious to give up the sword for the ploughshare; but their officers and the dread Katapunans kept them in the ranks. Old men, many of them ill and decrepit; helpless women, with neglected, hungry children,—all carrying white flags or some semblance of them,—were seen returning to their homes, begging for pity and assistance. Pitiful were the scenes our soldiers were compelled to witness daily.

Brigadier General Harrison Gray Otis gave up his command, and on April 3d sailed for his home at Los Angeles,



UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS RESTING BESIDE THEIR TRENCH.

Cal., confident that the insurrection was in its death throes. General Wheaton took command of his brigade.

The first offensive movement of importance in the month of April was General Lawton's expedition to Santa Cruz. This place is situated on the southeast shore of that big fresh water sea called Laguna de Bay, connected with Manila by the Pasig River, and is a leading town in a section of the island of Luzon which up to this time had not been attacked by the American army, the province of Laguna, with a population estimated at over 13,000 persons. The distance from Manila is less than fifty miles, and the place is an opening wedge to the country to the south and east, highways leading from it to the important point of Batangas and the province of Tayabas, whose capital city is located ninety-one miles from Manila.

General Lawton's expedition consisted of about 1,500 men, including 200 picked sharpshooters, chosen from the various regiments; Hawthorne's mountain battery, Gale's squadron, three troops of the Fourth Cavalry, unmounted; Bronck's and Tappen's battalions of the Fourteenth Infantry, Linck's battalion of the First Idaho Infantry, and Fraine's battalion of the First North Dakota Infantry. The scene as the expedition started was picturesque. Darkness was gathering when the men marched to the river, where they were to embark on board the boats waiting for them at San Pedro Macati. There were twenty canoes, towed by tugs, and the fierce little gunboats *Laguna de Bay*, *Oeste* and *Napidan*, with a steam launch for General Lawton and his staff. The expedition steamed slowly along the shallow, tortuous Pasig River, and delays were numerous, as several boats grounded. It was nearly dawn when the expedition reached the open lake, and it was a severe disappointment to the men, as it had been planned to have the attack on the city made at daybreak. Cautiously the expedition proceeded, realizing that from the wooded shores at any point the fire of the enemy might proceed, the *Napidan* and *Oeste* a mile ahead and the

Laguna de Bay guarding the rear. On the hilltops rebel signal fires were lighted, giving warning of the approach of the expedition. It was noon before the white church towers of the town appeared in the shadow of the great volcanic mountain, on a marshy plain, dotted here and there with groves of palms.

The sharpshooters were landed in a casco, a flat-bottomed, square, bow-and-prow boat, which was run into a shallow inlet about five miles south of the city. A few shells were then sent toward the intrenchments of the rebels, at the edge of the woods, and they fled away at the first shot fired. Then a number of Americans leaped into the water, and wading for about 100 yards, crept forward and formed in line, covering the landing of the remainder, which occupied until about five o'clock. The three troops of the Fourth Cavalry were sent ashore unmounted, and landed on a dangerous, marshy point, directly south of the city, under fire from the trenches of the rebels. Not a sign of life was manifest in the town itself, and no attack was made on our forces except the volleys sent at our men as they landed. As it was so late, it was decided not to attack that night, but on the following morning the American line south of the city, and the Fourth Cavalrymen on the other side, closed in, pouring volleys upon the trenches. The gunboats shelled the woods ahead of the troops and the Gatlings did good service.

General Lawton, with the Fourteenth Infantry battalions, approached a narrow iron bridge across a creek on the south border of the town, where a company of Filipinos was entrenched behind a stone barricade. The Americans rushed ahead in single file, facing a galling fire, tearing down the barricade and dislodging the rebels. Once in the town, the Filipinos gave no serious difficulty to the Americans, although annoying them a good deal. However, it was not long before General Lawton had established his headquarters in the palace of the Governor, and the town was orderly under the patrol of the American troops. Over ninety Filipinos were killed

and many were taken prisoners. Our casualties consisted of but a few men wounded, one of whom afterwards died.

On the following day our army captured Pagsajan, a town about five miles east of Santa Cruz, and Lumban, three miles further to the northeast. We also captured all the large vessels used in the lake trade, and a Spanish gunboat. They were concealed in a river.

General Wheaton, with the Tenth Pennsylvania and the Second Oregon, drove the rebels ten miles to the eastward of the railway line of communication with Malolos. He telegraphed to General Otis: "The rebels would not wait to be killed." The insurgents gave some trouble along the line of the railroad, making one or two night attacks upon our forces, damaging the railway tracks, and injuring and killing a few of our men. They were invariably driven back to their retreat in the jungle, often losing large numbers of men.

After taking Santa Cruz and the two towns mentioned above, General Lawton began marching north along the road between the lake and the hills, with the little army gunboats keeping abreast of his forces. The Filipinos, as usual, beat a retreat. Several small towns were found deserted of all save dogs and pigs, and various household goods, which had been dropped in the hurry of the natives to get away, were found scattered along the trails leading to the hills. The only serious disaster to our men was the killing of seven North Dakota boys by a group of insurgents hidden near the roadside in some thick bushes. At sunset the army entered San Antonio without resistance. Twenty unarmed prisoners, bearing copies of the proclamation of the Philippine Commission, which they had somehow secured, were afterward released and sent outside our lines with bundles of proclamations to distribute. The Fourth Cavalry was left to guard Santa Cruz. The country which our troops occupied on this expedition is thickly populated, and produces much fruit. Not a house was burned by our men, the only articles confiscated being pigs and chickens. This consideration for the property

of the natives did much to convince them of the good intentions of the Americans. At one place a woman was found hidden in a basket, and a youth was found buried in mud, except as to his head. Both were given food and money, greatly to their astonishment.

When General Lawton started on this expedition to Santa Cruz and that vicinity, his men took with them ten days' rations. At the expiration of the ten days the expedition was back in Manila. Some disappointment over General Lawton's return was expressed in the United States, but his troops were needed in the movement to the northward, and enough to garrison the places could not be spared. General Lawton seemed to have been somewhat disappointed at being recalled, for he said: "With the forces I have there is no doubt I could go through the whole island, but if a government is to be established, it will be necessary to garrison all the towns. It would take 100,000 men to pacify the islands. I regret the necessity of abandoning the captured territory."

The general's disappointment was natural, but the main objects of his expedition were accomplished, and the 1,500 men with him were needed elsewhere. One important result achieved was the spreading abroad among the natives of our government's proclamation, and it was only by such means that copies of the proclamation could be put into the hands of the people; for the Filipino leaders would not allow copies of it to be read by the people, so anxious were they to keep the natives in ignorance of the beneficent proposals of this government. Another object achieved was the demonstration of the power and effectiveness of American arms to the people of that region, and they were not slow in seeing that point. If they could not read the American proclamation they could at least understand the force of American bullets.

The American loss in this expedition was six killed and eleven wounded. Possibly 200 rebels were killed and many prisoners were taken.

While this movement had been in progress, the Filipinos

had been gathering in considerable numbers at Calumpit, about eight miles northwest of Malolos, on the left bank of the Bagbog River, at its confluence with the larger river Rio Grande. The place contained something like 2,000 houses, and had been made the center of the insurrection after the abandonment of Malolos. General Otis attempted another flank movement here, his purpose being to send General MacArthur with a large force from Malolos along the railroad, and General Lawton, with his flying column, was to go toward the northeast as far as Norzagaray, from which point he was to move abruptly west toward Calumpit. His aim was to get between the retreating rebels and the mountains, shut off their escape, and force a decisive battle. General MacArthur's forces were divided into two brigades, one under General Hale, which went to Pulilan, and moved from there toward Calumpit, and the other, under General Wheaton, co-operating with him on the other side of the river. On April 25th a general advance was made on Calumpit. General Wheaton had the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana regiments, with three guns of the Utah Light Artillery and two troops of cavalry, his line extending from the railroad to the west bank of the Bagbog River. General Hale's brigade was made up of the First Nebraska, the Fifty-first Iowa, and First South Dakota Infantry, and his left flank was practically joined with General Wheaton's right across the river.

The men marched two miles without encountering the enemy, through a flat, unbroken country in which were corn and rice fields, and then came across trenches, behind which the enemy was located. An armored car, which was being employed in the operations, was moved forward, and the trenches were shelled from it for nearly half an hour, the rebels responding bravely. Then came General Hale's troops across the unprotected fields, a galling fire in their eyes, until they reached the river banks, where they fought the enemy at short range. The Iowans were deployed to the right to flank the trenches, and when this movement was executed

the Nebraskans and South Dakotans swam the river, drove the enemy from their positions, and pursued them for half a mile before they were recalled. However, before this was accomplished, Major Young, with the guns of the Utah Artillery, dashed through a village that had been burned, and protected the Nebraskans and South Dakotans as they made their way across the river.

The armored car marked the extreme left of the American line. Little resistance was met with on the left, as a large force of the rebels left their trenches on this part of the line and deployed to the right to support their comrades against the advance of General Hale's brigade. When General Wheaton reached the river he halted. Some of the girders of the fifty-foot bridge spanning the stream had been destroyed by the rebels. The situation at that point presented great difficulties. The enemy was doubly protected. The river was to all appearances impassable. The bridge was long, narrow, partly ruined, and protected by the fire of the enemy; the stream wide and deep; on the opposite bank, the enemy, well fortified, ready to pour a withering fire into the ranks of those who would dare attempt to cross. No Spanish army would have thought of crossing that stream at that point, under these circumstances. Indeed, most armies would at least have hesitated and delayed operations until some way out of the dilemma presented itself. But the gallant United States troops know no such word as hesitation or delay. The moment the obstacle presented itself, the remedy was found. Heroism supplied the need, and the intrepid Funston, colonel of the famous Kansas regiment; that daring, versatile, and unflinching little fighter, whom many love to liken to brave "Joe" Wheeler, was the hero who saw the way to overcome the obstacle, and bravely led his comrades across the stream and against the foe.

It is hard to find in the records of warfare more heroic work than that of the brave Colonel Funston and his comrades before Calumpit. Their achievement, while perhaps

less romantic in some respects than the splendid adventure of Hobson, was, nevertheless, fully as brave, and even more glorious and important in its results.

When night came on, Colonel Funston made a daring attempt to surprise the insurgents. His plan was to lead 120 men across the river, a mile to the westward, and enfilade the insurgents. His purpose was to surprise and rout them. Eight companies of Kansas volunteers furnished the detail. The march was down the river bank, but it was a quiet moonlight night, and the barking of dogs betrayed the activity of the Americans. The insurgent artillery opened a heavy fire, and the attempt to cross had to be abandoned.

But the army must be got across that river. Colonel Funston thought it could be done by means of rafts. But before even that hazardous advance into the face of a strongly entrenched foe could be undertaken, guiding ropes must be thrown across the rushing river and secured to the opposite bank. Who would venture for such service? Colonel Funston's proposition was immediately accepted by the commander of the brigade, and the colonel went to his famous fighting regiment and asked for volunteers. Privates William B. Trembley and J. White of the Twentieth Kansas at once accepted the call and offered their services. It was a great work they were called upon to perform. With strong ropes secured around their shoulders they plunged into the stream. When they started, a particularly heavy fire was begun by our men to draw the attention of the enemy, and slowly and very cautiously the swimmers moved through the water toward the opposite shore. When they landed, the apparition of two yelling white figures frightened several insurgents from the nearest trench. But the work was done, the ropes were fastened, and the daring soldiers returned unhurt, though bullets cut the water all around them. Shortly afterward a roughly-built raft was ferried back and forth, and on this Colonel Funston and two of his companies crossed the stream amid a terribly hot fire from the enemy, who had not for a moment imagined such

bravery possible. They got across safely, rushed up the bank cheering and yelling, and immediately drove the enemy from their trenches in great confusion. This was one of the greatest achievements of the war, and General Otis promptly recognized it in his despatches to Washington. As promptly the President promoted Colonel Funston to be brigadier-general, a promotion he deserved, not only for his action upon this occasion, but for his great bravery throughout the campaign.

The advance of Colonel Funston and his brave Kansans was interrupted by a small but deep stream flowing with the Rio Grande about 200 yards west of the railway, where the heaviest trenches were located. Here the insurgents, under General Luna, attempted to check the Americans, using Maxim guns, which obliged Colonel Funston's small force to retire. Immediately afterward, however, with Captain Orjig and eight men, the intrepid Kansan crossed the stream in a small boat, charged upon the trenches, and an immense force of insurgents, completely terrified, began to break. Colonel Funston, yelling and shouting, dashed up to the railway and at once began crossing the bridge with General Wheaton, the structure no longer being protected by the insurgents' fire. The rebels retreated in all directions. An effective fire was started by the Kansas and Montana regiments, which caused the line of the enemy to crumble. Many retreated to a train which was waiting at the next station, and were conveyed to the northward. Others surrendered, thirty-seven either being captured or taken compliant prisoners. Others fled to the woods to the eastward, going to the mountains or a large swamp several miles distant.

As one of the most intrepid yet unassuming officers of our land forces, General Funston's career prior to his exploits in the Philippines is worthy of a brief notice. He was born in 1866, in New Carlyle, O., and from both parents inherited the qualities that go to make up the gallant man of action, the blood of soldiers and of pioneers mingling in his veins. After being graduated from the High School at Iola, Kansas, to the



PROMINENT GENERALS IN OUR WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS.
 General Henry W. Lawton.
 General Arthur MacArthur.
 General Lloyd Wheaton.
 General Fredrick Funston.



vicinity of which place the family removed about 1868, he entered the State University at Lawrence, but did not complete the course, as he had an opportunity to go to Colorado with a Government exploring party. He had been much interested in the study of the Spanish language, and on this trip carried his text-books and improved every occasion for using the language conversationally. His friends had tried to dissuade him from this study, but he continued it as with the foreknowledge of its future usefulness. A second trip to Colorado was made as guide to a party of prospectors. After this he was selected by the government to lead an exploring party across Death Valley, California, where so many have perished since Fremont's day. This expedition was a complete success, and the government next sent him to Alaska to report upon the people and resources of that territory. He brought back a most valuable report, and was lecturing on Alaska to Kansas audiences, when he was sent there again by Secretary Morton, and returned with a second authoritative report and a remarkable collection of native wares and curios.

In 1895 Funston went to Mexico to investigate the coffee-planting industry for a stock company. At this time he was writing magazine articles upon Alaska, and had arranged to go to Cuba as the representative of a New York paper. Before starting he secured a commission as captain in the Cuban army from T. Estreda Palma, and on his arrival in Cuba found that he much preferred fighting to writing. He was promoted to the rank of Major, then made Colonel and placed in command of the Cuban artillery. He fought constantly for eighteen months; then, his right arm shattered by a shell, his lung pierced by a bullet, and his hip crushed by a fall from a horse, his one chance of life was in leaving the island. On his way to Havana he was captured and brought before the Spanish general, by whom he would have been condemned to be shot had it not been for his ingenuity in accounting for himself. Reaching Havana, he was taken in charge by General Lee, who sent him to a hospital in New York, and from there he

returned to his home in comparative health. The cause of Cuban liberty being very dear to his heart he began lecturing in behalf of "Cuba Libre." In May, 1898, he was offered the command of the Twentieth Kansas. An appointment on General Miles's staff was declined, but he went to Tampa to give advice and information; then returned to Kansas and went with his regiment to San Francisco, from whence they sailed for the Philippines, where he distinguished himself as a most courageous and fearless leader.

Apalit, the next town from Calumpit, was burned, the Americans, with the remainder of General Wheaton's and General Hale's forces, advancing and occupying the railway station. During the engagement the Utah Battery, the Sixth Artillery, and the Montana and Kansas regiments did most effective work, and the South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa volunteers moved across the river and performed excellent service. The insurgent loss was heavy; the American small. The heat was intense, several of our men being prostrated by it.

One great loss sustained by our troops in the advance on Calumpit was the death of Colonel John M. Stotzenburg of the First Nebraska Infantry. He was killed in a reconnoissance on Ouingua, near Malolos, with three other members of his regiment. The natives had a horseshoe trench, about a mile long, encircling a rice field on the edge of a wood. Captain Bell with forty cavalymen encountered a strong outpost; one of his men was killed and five were wounded by a volley. The Americans retired, carrying their wounded under fire, and with great difficulty, being closely pursued, the fog enabling the enemy to creep up to them. Two men who were carrying a comrade were shot in the arms, but they continued with their burden. Captain Bell sent for reinforcements to rescue the body of the killed cavalryman, and a battalion of the Nebraska regiment, under Major Mufford, arrived and advanced unchecked by volleys from the enemy's trenches. The Americans lay about 800 yards from the trenches behind rice furrows, under fire, for two hours. Several men were

sunstruck, one dying from the effects of the heat, as they lay there waiting for the artillery to come up. Finally the Second battalion arrived, and then Colonel Stotzenburg, who had spent the night with his family at Manila, came upon the field. The men immediately recognized him and raised a cheer.

Colonel Stotzenburg, deciding to charge as the easiest way out of the difficulty, led the attack at the head of his regiment. He fell with a bullet in his breast, dying instantly, about 200 yards from the breastworks. Lieutenant Sisson fell with a bullet in his heart, the bullet striking him near the picture of a lady suspended by a ribbon from his neck. In the meantime the artillery had arrived and shelled the trenches. The Filipinos stood until the Nebraska troops were right on the trenches, and then they bolted to the second line of intrenchments, a mile back. The Nebraska regiment lost two privates killed, and had many wounded, including two lieutenants. The Iowa regiment had several wounded. The Utah regiment had one officer and three men wounded. Thirteen dead Filipinos were found in the trench. Their loss was comparatively small on account of their safe shelter. The Americans carried the second trench with small loss and obtained possession of the town. Colonel Stotzenburg had won a reputation as one of the bravest fighters in the army. He always led his regiment, and had achieved remarkable popularity with his men since the war began, although during the first of his coloneley, the volunteers, who were not used to the rigid discipline of the regular troops, thought him too exacting. The loss of the Nebraska regiment in the campaign was the greatest sustained by any regiment, and the disaster greatly saddened officers and men.

CHAPTER LXII

THE FILIPINOS SEEK PEACE—ATTEMPTS TO SECURE A TRUCE—MORE VICTORIES—ADMIRAL DEWEY SAILS FOR HOME—THE STORY OF HIS LIFE.

Failure of Efforts to Surround the Natives—Emissaries Sent by the Insurgent Leaders—A Request for a Truce—Gen. Otis Steadily Refuses to Recognize the Insurgent Government—Capture of Baliuag—Lieut. Gilmore Heard From—The Macabebees Come to the Front—They Act in Conjunction with the Americans—Victorious March of Our Forces Continued—San Fernando Falls—Insurgents Evidently Badly Demoralized—Valuable Supplies Taken by Our Men—Two Divisions Clear the Country—Army Gunboats Shelling the River—An Attack by Mascardo Repelled—Fresh Troops Off for the Front—Aguinaldo Wants all Foreigners to Leave—Old Request for an Armistice Repeated—Gen. Luna Bent on Carrying on the War—Request for Armistice again Refused—Admiral Dewey Sails on the *Olympia* for New York—The Story of His Life.

THE hope that our two bodies of troops in the island of Luzon would be able to surround the insurgents and take a large body of them as in a net, capturing many prisoners, including Aguinaldo, Luna, and other leaders was not fulfilled. The efforts made in that direction failed, mainly because of the great difficulties imposed by the roughness of the country and the lack of good roads in the region which the eastern column had to traverse, a region abounding in difficulties which even our persistent armies could not easily overcome. The trap was set several times, or rather almost set, for the plans of the directors of the movements of the Americans were never fully carried out, but success did not crown our efforts. As long as the troops were kept near the railroad, rapid progress could be made, but when they went back where there was neither railroad nor water transportation, the march was delayed until the enemy had beat a retreat which made it impossible for our men to surround the rebels. Had this flank-

ing movement been accomplished, the rebellion would have come to a speedy termination.

But as it was, there were not lacking attempts on the part of the rebels to end the war by patching up some kind of peace. After the defeat sustained by the insurgents at Calumpit, emissaries were sent to Manila under a flag of truce to ask for a cessation of hostilities, but the negotiations failed, simply because the United States would consent to peace only on condition that the insurgents should unconditionally surrender. The Filipinos wanted time, claiming that they must consult the people and ascertain their wishes, but it was obviously impossible for our representatives to recognize in any way the so-called Filipino government, and we could treat with the insurgents in no other way than as individuals. We were prepared to offer universal amnesty and the greatest freedom possible short of actual independence, making as generous terms as possible, but refusing to recognize the existence of anything like an actual government on Philippine soil, other than the government of the United States. The Filipino delegates held several conferences with General Otis and talked the situation over with members of the peace commission, but the negotiations came to naught and fighting was resumed. The first blow struck after this slight interruption was by General Lawton, who captured Baliuag and other villages in its vicinity, scattering and pursuing 1,600 troops. This was on May 3d, and on that same day it was ascertained that Lieutenant Gilmore and a party of seven enlisted men from the gunboat *Yorktown*, with six men from the army, were held as prisoners by the insurgents. The disappearance of Lieutenant Gilmore and party some time before created much anxiety, and it was impossible to trace them for some time.

About this time it was learned that the Macabebees, the ancient enemies of the Tagals, who inhabit the north part of the island, were anxious to fight in co-operation with the Americans against the Tagals under Aguinaldo. General Hale started from Calumpit on May 3d to meet them, and when

they saw our forces they welcomed them with great acclaim, and later made themselves useful to the Americans, mostly as servants in place of the Chinamen who had before that acted in that capacity.

The victorious march of our army continued, carrying everything before it. On May 4th, Generals Wheaton and Hale of General MacArthur's division found the enemy strongly entrenched about four miles south of San Fernando, General Luna being in command. General Wheaton, leading his troops in person, made a brilliant charge, scattering the enemy's forces and inflicting heavy losses, while General Hale was equally successful. The movable capital of the insurgents, the portable government that made so many retreats, was located temporarily at San Fernando, and on May 5th it was obliged to move on again, as that place also fell an easy prey to our army. The place was found to be very strongly fortified, and if the insurgents had had any fight in them they could easily have kept our men off for a time at least, and with proper direction could have inflicted heavy losses upon the Americans. South of the town there was a double line of loop-holed trenches, the construction of which showed good military knowledge, and there were some Spanish blockhouses that could have been utilized for defence, but, strangely enough, they were put to no use whatever. A Spanish prisoner, who was formerly a provincial official, and was left behind when the enemy retreated, said that General Luna was wounded in the chest during the fighting at San Tomas and the troops were completely demoralized. Our troops found that most of the houses in San Fernando were intact, most of them having their furniture left uninjured in the hurried flight of the rebels. In that engagement General Funston was slightly wounded in the hand. General Lawton reported the capture of 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar. The value of the subsistence captured at Baliuag was \$1,500,000.

General MacArthur with his forces at and beyond San Fernando, and General Lawton at Baliuag and Maasin, moved

along further into the heart of the enemy's country on substantially parallel lines, about fifteen miles apart. Between them was the Rio Grande River, which to some extent is accessible to our light-draught, armed steamers. An attack was made on the Americans near San Fernando by a body of Filipinos under General Mascardo, but they were easily repelled by the Kansas and Montana regiments. The army gunboats ascended the river, shelling the jungle on either bank and carrying joy to the Macabebees up the stream. Fresh troops went to the front a few days later, two battalions of the Seventeenth Infantry which had been holding the lines about Manila joining General MacArthur at San Fernando, and one battalion of the same regiment joining General Lawton near Bacolor. These troops were replaced at Manila by the Twenty-first Infantry, which arrived from the United States on May 11th. General Lawton moved on and captured Ilde Fonso and San Miguel to the north, with slight loss, driving a considerable force of the enemy.

Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to the effect that all foreigners must leave insurgent territory. He gave them forty-eight hours to go. The object of that move was plain. Aguinaldo believed that by refusing foreigners the rights of non-combatants he could force their governments to recognize the belligerency of his so-called government.

One of the most striking and gratifying successes of the Luzon campaign was the capture of San Isidro, the capital of the so-called Filipino government, adopted after its hasty and ignominious flight from San Fernando. The place lies many miles northeast of San Fernando and is on the natural line of retreat from that place to the mountains, deep in the interior of Luzon, and far away from the railroad which runs from Manila to Dagupan. The resistance of the natives to our army, instead of being stronger and more formidable as the scene of action was shifted to the north and farther away from Manila, seems to have grown less and less stubborn. This was contrary to the expectations of our generals, who naturally thought

that the Filipinos, when pressed back into the interior, would gather strength from their local resources and be stimulated to greater efforts, if only by the courage of despair. The rapidity of General Lawton's advance was unprecedented in the campaign. He drove the enemy from point to point, taking one town after another, capturing the last stronghold of the rebels, and then pursuing them even to their mountain fastnesses, and cut his way through the country with very slight losses in killed or wounded. This brilliant feat called forth high praise from all who observed it, General Otis saying in one of his brief cable despatches announcing the victory at San Isidro that "Lawton, with tact and ability, has covered Bulacan province with his column and driven insurgent troops northward." It was part of the plan of General Otis to have Lawton keep the enemy constantly on the run, to pursue relentlessly, to flank the natives at every turn, to terrify them into worse and worse disorder, and prevent anything like an orderly rearrangement of their army. This plan is similar to that which has been pursued in many an invincible campaign against the Indians, and proved a success in Luzon.

This audacious march not only resulted in the capture of many towns, but cleared the country on the right up to the mountains which run in general nearly parallel to the seacoast and in which the Rio Grande River takes its rise. The particular body that advanced upon San Isidro consisted of the Thirteenth Minnesota, Second Oregon, First North Dakota, and Twenty-second Infantry, under Colonel Summers. It started from Beluarte early on the morning of March 17th and met the enemy two miles south of San Isidro. Scott's battery shelled the natives out of their trenches and they retired to the town, where they were flanked by the American troops. The insurgents made a brief resistance and then broke away, Colonel Summers pursuing them some distance beyond the town. The force of the enemy was estimated at 2,000 men. The insurgent loss was five killed and twenty wounded and the Americans had but two men slightly wounded.

Major Kobbe, with a special command, comprising the Seventeenth Infantry, a battalion of the Ninth Infantry, a battery of the First Artillery and six mountain guns, accompanied by the tugs *Laguna de Bay*, *Caradonga*, and *Oceana* towing cascoes loaded with supplies, moved from Calumpit up the Rio Grande River on the night of March 16th. This movement was part of a plan to combine with Generals Lawton and MacArthur in a movement to capture a large body of the enemy.

About this time large numbers of Filipinos were seen returning daily to their homes inside the American lines, and many of the richer natives returned to Manila and announced their intention of accepting the sovereignty of the United States. Laborers resumed work in the rice fields which they had abandoned to join the army, and afforded a curious mark of their respect for American authority by removing their hats to the passing trains. The railroad was being repaired and trains sent forward as rapidly as possible.

On May 18th General Otis cabled to Washington the welcome news that representatives of Aguinaldo and the insurgent cabinet were on their way from their mountain retreat twelve miles from San Isidro, seeking terms of peace. This news was most gratifying, as it was the first indication that Aguinaldo and the insurgent cabinet had agreed in asking peace. After the reception which previous embassies got in Manila, the insurgent leaders must have known just what terms our commander-in-chief would be apt to make, and the people of the United States rejoiced in the assurance that the end of the war in Luzon was at hand.

Further developments at Manila, however, were disappointing. The Filipino envoys came from Aguinaldo and the so-called Filipino government, but they did not come prepared to negotiate peace, making again the old request, that of an armistice pending the session of their congress. It soon became apparent that there was a serious division in the ranks of the Filipinos, one party wishing to end the war on the best

terms that could be obtained, and the other insisting upon carrying on the losing game further. General Luna appears to have been the chief Filipino officer bent upon further fighting, and he seems to have been in command of the military end of the Filipino government, which enabled him not only to bend the army to his wishes, but also to imprison two of the peace commissioners selected by Aguinaldo, and to cripple the commission further by confining its powers to the simple request for an armistice. The commissioners who were allowed by the despotic Luna to go to Manila were General del Pilar, Gracio Gonanza, a member of the Filipino cabinet; Lieutenant-Colonel Alberto Barretto, military advocate, and Major Zealcita, a member of Aguinaldo's personal staff. Florentino Torres, Pablo Ocampo, and Thedor Yanco, residents of Manila, were also empowered to act with these commissioners. The two commissioners, Buencamino and Colonel Aruelles, who were detained by General Luna, were said to be outspoken advocates of unconditional surrender, and they thus incurred the severe displeasure of the commander of the army.

The commissioners had a conference with General Otis on May 20th, but he absolutely refused to grant an armistice pending the decision of the Filipino congress as to a line of policy. As the commission was not empowered to do anything further, the interview was fruitless. However, the commissioners were treated with every courtesy, were allowed to see their families in Manila, and were escorted about the *Oregon*.

The Nebraska regiment returned to Manila on May 19th for a thirty days' rest. They were on the firing line constantly after February 4th and participated in twenty-seven engagements, including skirmishes, and lost 225 in killed and wounded. Many of the men were sick and utterly worn out by their long participation in battle, much of their time having been spent in the trenches.

It was clear at this time that the Filipino people were, as a rule, ready to end the rebellion. Aguinaldo was evidently

discouraged; hundreds of natives were seen returning to their former homes, saluting our flag and showing white emblems of some sort, and reports from the army told but one story of demoralization and despair.

Admiral Dewey, who had borne the burden of the naval campaign and subsequent negotiations at Manila for over a year, sailed for home on the *Olympia* on May 20th. He had asked to be allowed to retire from control of the naval forces of the United States in order to get needed rest, and Rear Admiral John C. Watson was ordered to succeed him at Manila. The news that the great naval hero was coming home to the people who regard him as their idol naturally caused great interest throughout the United States. The Navy Department allowed the admiral to take his choice of routes, and he preferred the one by way of the Suez Canal. This would bring him to New York first, and at once preparations were made to give him a grand welcome. All sorts of schemes were proposed for doing him honor, and public men and enterprising newspapers came forward with many plans, some of which were more ingenious than sensible.

America's muster-roll of naval heroes bears many an inspiring name, Paul Jones, Perry, Farragut, Foote, and others of rare energy and heroism, men whose lives were unselfishly devoted to their country's glory, and whom an admiring people will ever delight to honor. Our war with Spain developed no hero more resolute and intrepid than Admiral George Dewey, the modern king of the sea. Other men, like Sampson, Schley, Hobson, Roosevelt, Funston, and Otis, achieved lasting fame, but none of their achievements equaled that of Dewey. No circumstance was lacking to make his deed and that of his gallant sailors most brilliant and historic. It was theirs to strike the first decisive blow in the first war ever waged for humanity's sake; theirs to test in a fair fight the strength and effectiveness of our modern warships and their armament, and theirs to uphold to the world the power and dignity of the American nation.

The record of Admiral Dewey's forty-one years of naval service is inspiring. His early youth was spent in the little town of Montpelier, Vermont, his people being among the most substantial and prominent families of the town. His father was a successful physician who would have preferred a landsman's life for his son, but the boy, after attending the public school in his native place, and a military school at Norwich, Vt., announced his determination to enter the navy, and at his entreaties the father exerted his influence to procure him an appointment to the Naval Academy at Annapolis. He entered in 1854, being then seventeen years old, an active and hardy and generous youth who feared nothing and dared everything. He was graduated with distinction in 1858, and ordered to the *Wabash*, the flagship of the Mediterranean station, where he remained for a year. He was then transferred to the old frigate *Mississippi* of the West Gulf Squadron.

In January, 1861, he attained the rank of Passed Midshipman, and in the troubled days of early spring, when many Southern officers resigned their commissions, was promoted to the grade of Master, a title corresponding to that of Lieutenant, junior grade. In April he received his commission as Lieutenant, thus achieving three grades in four months.

Rear-Admiral Dewey's war record dates from the firing on Fort Sumter, in 1861. He did gallant service with the West Gulf squadron, and received his first real "baptism of fire" in April, 1862, when Farragut ran the gauntlet of the forts and forced the surrender of New Orleans.

Later, after much desultory but effective fighting on the river, he took part in the attack on Port Hudson. When he stood, unmoved and calm, on the roof of the *Olympia's* pilot-house off Cavité on that memorable first of May, his memory must have reverted to that splendid service of his eager youth, and found a parallel for it in what he was now accomplishing in a new field on the other side of the world. For after the New Orleans forts had been passed his ship was selected out of all assembled as the one best fitted to meet and overcome the

desperate essay of the Confederate steamer *Manassas*, which was rushing, under a full head of steam, to ram the victorious fleet. He was filled with the ardor of this fight, as he said in after years, and sorely disappointed when the *Manassas* turned and ran ashore almost under the muzzles of our guns, and was sunk by the rending and smashing broadsides of the *Mississippi*. At Port Hudson, misfortune befell the old frigate; for while attempting to run the batteries she grounded, heeled to port, and lay with almost useless guns at the mercy of the enemy. Her range was quickly gained; and so pitiless and sure was the Confederate aim that, all else failing, she was set on fire and abandoned, her crew escaping in the small boats, the captain and Lieutenant Dewey being the last to leave.

His next appointment was to the *Agawam* of the North Atlantic blockading station, and he rounded out in her his war service by duty on the blockade and in the two memorable attacks made upon Fort Fisher in December, 1864, and in January, 1865. In March of the latter year he was promoted to the grade of Lieutenant-Commander, thus attaining in less than eleven years after entrance a rank which rarely comes to even the most deserving lieutenants until over thirty years' service has been done. He carried out of the Civil War a splendid record for gallantry and coolness under fire, for fertility of resources and quickness of apprehension under many trying circumstances, and for intelligence and a trained zeal, which gave him a high reputation with his brother officers and an excellent standing in the department. Hence he was appointed to many important stations, and during the twenty succeeding years he saw service in command on the European, Home, Pacific, and China stations, at the Naval Academy, in the Light-house Establishment, and in the Navy Department as chief of one of the most important administrative bureaus. For a number of years he made his home in Washington, and here he was as prominent in official and social life as he was keen in athletic exercises, in which from boyhood he had been most expert and enthusiastic. His wife, who was a daughter

of Governor Goodwin of New Hampshire, died after a few years of married life, and his affection for their only son was as marked as the zeal and energy which caused him to be looked upon everywhere as one of the ablest officers of our naval service.

In manner he was ever courteous and considerate to strangers, and genial with his friends. He was just in duty to his junior officers, and among his intimates and when freed from the restraint of discipline, was a cordial yet ever prudent companion. This quick thinker and sharp fighter was so precise in dress that it said that "the creases of his trousers are ever as well defined as his views on naval warfare."

Furthermore, the admiral proved himself great in diplomacy as well as in action, discreet as well as brave, cautious as well as firm. His modesty, his affability, his thorough Americanism won for him the respect and hearty esteem of those who met him, and the straight course he steered during those trying times, when the obtrusive German admiral was in Manila Bay, and the Spaniards and the insurgents constituted sources of serious embarrassment, during the long negotiations of the peace commission at Paris, and the longer, more trying period when the United States Senate was deferring action on the peace treaty, amply proved his greatness. His victory over the Spanish fleet was an unparalleled feat in naval history, but the revelations of character disclosed after that brilliant achievement did fully as much to endear him to the hearts of all loyal Americans.

CHAPTER LXIII

PROPOSED FORM OF GOVERNMENT REJECTED BY FILIPINO LEADERS — THE INSURGENTS AGAIN ACTIVE — AMERICAN TROOPS CAPTURE ANTIPOLLO AND MORONG.

Optimistic Views of Admiral Dewey — Proposed Temporary Plan of Government — A Perplexing Problem — A Genuine Surprise — Commissioners meet at Manila — Endurance and Patience of our Soldiers — Refugees Within American Lines — Captain Tilly Treacherously Murdered — First Memorial Rites in Manila — Mounds Covered with Flowers — Impressive Services — Troops in Motion Again — A Panic Among the Insurgents — Arduous March of Gen. Hall's Column — Advancing on Antipollo — Americans Take Possession of an Abandoned Town — Skirmishing on the Way to Morong — Driving the Insurgents into the Mountains — Occupation of Las Pinas and Paranaque. — A Filipino Trick — Sawing the Stringers of a Bridge almost in two — Gen. Lawton's Bravery — Advancing to the Battle of Zapote.

THE departure of Admiral Dewey from Manila removed one of the five members of the commission which represented the United States in all negotiations concerning the islands. Before leaving the beautiful bay over which he had stood guard for more than a year the admiral enthusiastically expressed his belief in the progress of the Filipinos under the protection of the United States, and declared his strong hope that America's possessions there would be the key to Oriental commerce and civilization.

With his views the other members of the peace commission were in complete accord. As they had the situation well in hand and were able to handle it in all its phases, it was not deemed necessary to appoint a fifth member in place of the admiral. Shortly after his departure the commission submitted to the Filipino commissioners at Manila a draft of the form of government the President was prepared to establish in the islands. The exact terms of the brief form of proposal

which the commission submitted, after laying the matter before President McKinley, were as follows:

"While the final decision as to the form of government is in the hands of Congress, the President under his military powers, pending the action of Congress, stands ready to offer the following form of government:

"A governor-general to be appointed by the President; a cabinet to be appointed by the governor-general; all the principal judges to be appointed by the President; the heads of all departments and judges to be either Americans or Filipinos, or both, and also a general advisory council, its members to be chosen by the people by a form of suffrage to be hereafter carefully determined upon.

"The President earnestly desires that bloodshed cease and that the people of the Philippines, at an early date, enjoy the largest measure of self-government compatible with peace and order."

A more difficult proposition in government was never encountered than that which the peace commission had before it, and the general opinion in the United States was that the problem was met and answered in the proposal submitted to the representatives of the rebels as satisfactorily as could possibly have been expected. The Philippine group was composed of many islands, peopled by different races whose interests were diverse, and of whom some were hostile to the others. The intention was to give to these people as large a measure of self-government as possible, and to that end it was proposed to allow them to elect an advisory council which would present the claims of the people to the Governor and cabinet, and thus give them a voice in the government. It was also proposed to give them a voice in the conduct of the courts by allowing them to elect their own minor judges. That was as far as it was safe to go at the beginning, but the promise was given that more liberal terms would be made and the powers of the people enlarged as fast as they proved themselves capable of assuming more responsibility. At the outset the government would have to be military in character, like that in Cuba, but as conditions became more settled, the military element of the government would be more and more modified. President McKinley, through the peace commission, notified the Fili-

pinos that it was his duty to establish a suitable form of government and let Congress determine the question of the future government of the islands, but it was understood that Congress would be largely influenced in its action by the advice of those who had been on the ground and were thoroughly familiar with the existing conditions.

The Filipinos insisted upon an armistice for the purpose of getting the views of the people on the question, and this our representatives would not grant. Consequently the negotiations were fruitless.

It was then decided that the three civil members of the peace commission should visit various ports in the archipelago for the purpose of meeting prominent natives, to whom they would explain the friendly intentions of the President, in order to be guided in making recommendations to Congress relative to the character of the government to be supplied. It was believed that through this means something of the ill effect of the falsehoods circulated by the emissaries of Aguinaldo might be in a measure overcome, and the people be led to demand the cessation of the rebellion that was costing them so dearly in lives and treasure.

But the negotiations at Manila were prolonged by the Filipino commissioners appointed by Aguinaldo. They presented as the desire of the insurgents absolute independence under the protection of the United States, but the nature and scope of this protection they could not explain, and the conference resulted in failure. The Filipino commissioners left Manila on the 25th of May, being escorted to their lines under a flag of truce.

On May 22d the conditions, as far as the army was concerned, were as follows: In Bulacan province troops were maintained at Quinga, Balinag, and San Miguel, other places that had been captured having been evacuated. General Lawton proceeded down the Rio Grande river from San Isidro and drove the army westward from San Antonio, Carios, and Arayat, where he was joined on May 21st by Major Kobbe's col-

mun. He then proceeded to Santa Ana and Kadaba. General MacArthur was at San Fernando, and from that point he moved southward and westward. General Luna's force at Tarlac was much diminished, a number of his officers deserting. In Pampanga and Bulacan the inhabitants were returning to their homes, expressing no fears save of the treatment they would receive from the insurgent forces. South of Manila the insurgent troops had been quietly gathering and a large force was believed to be there, thus threatening Manila from that direction. A battalion of troops was sent to allay the excitement of the natives in the southwestern portion of Negros and the west coast of Cebu, where agents of Aguinaldo had succeeded in making some trouble.

About this time General Otis was withdrawing the volunteer regiments as rapidly as possible in order to allow them to return to the United States, replacing them with regular army organizations. On May 25th the Oregon volunteers on the north line, who had done splendid service through the campaign, returned to Manila. Other regiments followed, leaving three regiments of regulars to guard the north from Balinguag to San Fernando.

The natives were not slow to follow up the advantage they hoped for by the approach of midsummer heat and tropical storms. It was apparently their purpose to give the invaders no rest day nor night. Their guerrilla tactics were kept up with increasing activity and they managed to make it impossible for the Americans to leave their positions in the trenches, where they slept in their clothes, constantly on the alert against sudden, fierce dashes of the barefooted rebels. The bands of General Luna and General Mascardo, which retreated toward Tarlac when they feared they would be caught between General MacArthur and General Lawton, returned in force to their old trenches around San Fernando, and there were daily collisions. Opposite our lines on the south, protecting Manila, the Filipinos had erected three rows of trenches, and reports that were given by men who were taken

prisoners or voluntarily surrendered themselves to the Americans indicated that the natives were relying upon the supposed inability of their opponents to keep up the fighting much longer. Friendly natives continued to throw themselves upon the protection of the Americans. They entered our lines by land and river routes, coming from that section of the country where the passage of the two armies had practically exhausted the food supply, asking for charity and begging to be received as friends. Old men, women, and children formed the great body of these refugees, as most of the men who could work and were not in the army were retained by Aguinaldo for the purpose of digging trenches.

Captain George H. Tilley, of the United States Signal Corps, was killed at Escalante, on the east coast of the island of Negros, on the 11th of May. His party was treacherously attacked by a large body of natives. The cable company's vessel that was engaged in placing a cable between Iloilo and Cebu went to Escalante to remove the old cable there, and Captain Tilley, with the captain of the vessel and three men, visited the town, the natives making a friendly demonstration. While there they were ambushed by the crafty rebels. The captain of the vessel and one man escaped, but Captain Tilley and the other two men were not so fortunate. They were horribly beaten and maltreated. The body of Captain Tilley was afterwards found floating in the river, with marks of violence on the head. This led to the sending of a small body of American troops to Negros, where a few insurgent bands threatened resistance, though not upheld by the better class of the people.

On Memorial Day, May 30, 1899, the first occasion of the kind ever observed in Manila, there were appropriate services that were of special significance, while all through the United States the day was observed with unusual feeling because of the new graves that marked the last resting places of those who fell in the war with Spain, and prayers went up for those who were carrying the United States flag on the bloody battlefields

of the Philippines. It was at Battery Knoll, where Scott's guns were planted against the Filipino trenches during the first days of the fighting at Manila, that services in honor of the soldier dead were held. Nearly 300 soldiers lay buried there on a bleak mound surrounded by rice fields, rough boards marking the graves, which were ranged in five unbroken rows. Beyond these were the Spanish blockhouses which were battered by shells from the American lines. All the American troops who could be spared from their places in the trenches marched to Battery Knoll, carrying a wealth of tropical flowers and foliage with which to decorate the graves of their comrades. Over each mound fluttered the folds of a silken flag. The day was as soft and balmy as a June day in New England, when just before sunset the soldiers, dusty and bronzed, in their blue and brown uniforms, gathered in a circle around Battery Knoll. Interspersed among them were groups of American women, and brown-faced natives, from a little distance, peered curiously at the unwonted spectacle. The guns of the monitor *Monadnock*, bombarding Paranaque, boomed a significant reminder that war and carnage were still at hand, but just as the Sixth Artillery Band began a solemn dirge the thunder of the *Monadnock's* guns ceased, while "taps" sounded from the bugle. Similar services were held over the graves of those interred in Paco cemetery.

On the morning of June 3d the troops under General Lawton's command began a forward movement that caused the rebels to take to their heels once more. A column under General Hall crossed the San Mateo river and about noon encountered and repulsed a large band of insurgents, twelve miles east of Manila, between Mariquina and Antipolo. A running fight was in progress all the afternoon, and the insurgents were driven from the hills toward the sea. A Filipino outpost first attacked a few American scouts, whereupon the Fourth Cavalry formed a skirmish line and easily drove the insurgents into the hills. Then the Second Oregon volunteers in extended order moved across a wet, soggy rice field

toward the hills, where it was believed a large force of the enemy had concentrated. When the Oregonians were within about a mile of the position, the Filipinos opened a heavy fire, the Americans replying and pressing forward more rapidly. After a few volleys the insurgents were seen scattering over the crest of the hills in every direction, and their panic was increased when the artillery opened upon them and the shells began to explode all around them. The bombardment by the batteries and the musketry was maintained for nearly half an hour, after which not a Filipino could be seen on the hills and not a shot came from the position. The heat was fearful and caused the most intense suffering among the troops, but they continued on the trail taken by the fleeing enemy in the hope of driving them toward the lake.

It had been the original intention to surround the forces of General Pio del Pilar so that he would be obliged to retreat to the Morong peninsula, where capture would have been inevitable. This plan was not completely successful, because General Hall's column found the country full of difficulties which greatly prolonged the march. There were several streams to be bridged or forded, and the men frequently floundered through morasses waist-deep in mud, an experience which, under the terrific sun, exhausted them completely. General Hall's forces completed a circuit of twenty miles in the rough country and drove the enemy before them. They swept down the Antipolo Valley, their objective point being the rebel town of Antipolo, a place far up in the mountains which had cost Spain the lives of three hundred men, and which the Spaniards had said the Americans could never capture. They met with spirited resistance from General Pio del Pilar's forces, but their heavy skirmish line carried all before it. The movement was so rapid that the Filipinos had no time to defend the place or to destroy it. The lines were thrown around three sides of the town and then the final advance was made. It was found unnecessary to fire a shot. Not an insurgent was to be seen, the place being abandoned.

It was believed that the insurgents had a large force on the peninsula of Morong, which projects southward into Laguna de Bay. Near the peninsula was the town of Morong, and a battery was located on the western shore. Upon this place the American troops next advanced, but their progress was greatly impeded by the roughness of the country. Transportation over it was impossible, and even the Signal Service wagons had to be abandoned. This prevented the maintenance of a complete cordon of soldiers. The heat was terrible, prostrating large numbers of the troops, who had to be taken across the lake in hospital tugs, one of which was struck by a shot from an insurgent cannon.

The result of the movement in Morong province was to drive the insurgents into the mountains. The city of Morong was occupied and garrisoned, but the troops from all other places were withdrawn. The inhabitants of the provinces professed friendship and asked for protection. A large number requested permission to enter Manila, but General Otis refused, as the population of the city was increasing too rapidly.

A most important movement was begun on the morning of Saturday, June 10th, which had for its objective point the coast region south of Manila. The town of Paranaque especially was regarded as one which it was desirable to capture, as it has been used for some time as a base of supplies by the insurgents, and a considerable force was gathered there. It lies on the coast a short distance south of Manila and in such a position that the vessels of the fleet were able to aid the land forces in attacking it.

The brigades commanded by General Lawton marched southeast from San Pedro Macati and then turned toward Bacoor, to the south of Paranaque. The insurgents were soon found, and at 9 o'clock the Colorado troops had a short contest with the enemy, in which ten of the Americans were wounded, two of them mortally, while the rebels left forty of their dead upon the field. General Wheaton swung to the northwest between Bacoor and Las Pinas, while General

Ovenshine advanced to the westward. The insurgent outposts fired when they saw the Americans and then ran, stopping occasionally to fire again. They made no attempt to hold their ground. The main body of the rebels was heavily entrenched at Paranaque. The heat was terrific and it was utterly impossible for the men to advance rapidly. The wounded, the ammunition, and the supplies were carried on litters by Chinese coolies. At noon a halt was called to allow the wearied soldiers to rest and seek the friendly shade, but in an hour they were again on the march, advancing slowly to the southeast of Las Pinas, General Lawton and his escort at the head of the line. A body of Filipinos who were securely ensconced behind protecting trenches opened fire on the Americans when the latter were about 500 yards distant. The Colorado regiment deployed quickly and returned a fire which, with the volley firing of the Ninth Infantry, soon silenced the enemy. The Americans advanced along the river fronting the trenches, whereupon the rebels ran, circled the American left, and tried to attack them in the rear, but were unsuccessful. There were seven casualties among the Americans. Our men were unable to reach the beach of Manila Bay before nightfall, and they bivouacked in the fields south of Las Pinas.

During the night the rebels retreated southward along the shore, and the sound of their bugles could be plainly heard as they marched away. In the morning the Americans occupied Las Pinas and Paranaque. They found plenty of "friends" among the natives, who told them that the insurgents, numbering about 3,000, commanded by General Noriel, were then at Bacoar. Our casualties were about thirty wounded. North of Paranaque there were three series of trenches, the outside one measuring twenty feet. They anticipated an attack from the bay side and had constructed a fifteen-foot trench for nine miles to prevent the landing of boats. Heavy defensive works encircled the town. Paranaque had been repeatedly fired on by warships and it was found that the church had been completely riddled by the American fire, over one hun-

dred shots being counted on this building alone. In entering the town the troops found a bamboo bridge that had been partly destroyed by the rebels. The apparent damage was quickly repaired and an attempt was made to use it without a careful examination. A mule team with a load of ammunition started to cross and had gone but a short distance when the bridge gave way, precipitating the team and the wagon twenty feet into the water below. Then it was found that the insurgents had sawed the stringers half through. The rebels in their retreat to Bacoor dragged two heavy cannon taken from the arsenal at Cavité. The gunboats did excellent execution along the shore during the movement, but many of the insurgents retired in that direction, protected by the presence of women and children whom they made to go before them. The loss of the enemy was placed by General Otis, on a conservative estimate, at about 400.

One feature of the advance was the plucky work of General Lawton, who personally led an attack on the trenches of the enemy. He was a target for their sharpshooters and, though he had a narrow escape, he came out of the engagement unscathed. Three members of his staff, all of whom followed their dashing leader, had their horses shot from under them.

General Lawton's command now occupied Paranaque and Las Pinas, and the insurgents had fled to the southward. Information had reached General Otis at Manila that the rebels would abandon both places and would probably take a stand on the bank of the Zapote river, where their strongest position was located, and where, in 1898, the Filipinos destroyed a Spanish battalion numbering 800 men. Notwithstanding the fact that over 500 of General Lawton's command had dropped out from heat exhaustion on the march from San Pedro Macati, he determined to resume the advance upon Bacoor.

CHAPTER LXIV

THE BATTLE OF LAS PINAS—DESPERATE FIGHTING AT ZAPOTE—MANILA THREATENED FROM THE SOUTH—ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL LUNA.

Persistence of the Insurgents—The Rainy Season Their Ally—Americans Not to be Daunted—A Fiercely Fought Battle—United States Soldiers in a Rain of Bullets—Seven Warships Open Fire—Taking Zapote Bridge—Peppered by Filipino Sharpshooters—Brave Leaders of the Brave—Insurgents Massing Their Forces—They Intend to Capture Manila—General Otis Thwarts Their Plans—The Trenches Carried—Rebels Retreat through Imus—The Town surrendered—Telegraph Wires Cut—Sharp Skirmish at San Fernando—Dissension Between Aguinaldo and Luna—A Statement from Agoncillo—His Criticism of President McKinley and General Otis—Luna's Death Reported—Insulted by a Captain of Aguinaldo's Guard—Ramon Endeavors to Defend Luna—Luna and Ramon Assassinated.

THOUGH thoroughly beaten wherever found, the Filipinos were by no means conquered. When driven, as they always were, from every point wherever a stand was made, often from strongly intrenched positions that had required months of patient labor, they speedily reappeared at some other point only to be again routed and driven to another place. It must be admitted that the task of subduing them had been underestimated.

From the beginning of hostilities, Aguinaldo had shrewdly adopted a plan of guerrilla warfare well calculated to exhaust the American troops with the least possible damage to his own followers. He cautiously avoided decisive engagements, while keeping our troops on the alert night and day to guard against sudden attacks. With a comparatively insignificant force he had succeeded in harassing and evading the army under General Otis for nearly six months. Now, the ally that he had confidently counted upon had arrived. The dreaded

rainy season had set in, and the American troops had already begun to feel its deadly effect. But the Filipinos underestimated the resources, energy, and endurance of the American soldier. General Otis at once proceeded to destroy the tradition in the Philippines that the rainy season is a bar to military operations by white troops. In these operations the intense heat of the tropics was well-nigh overpowering, but our troops pressed forward through jungles and swamps with unflinching courage. Some of our famous and successful campaigns against American Indians were undertaken in the middle of winter when the Indians relied on the intense cold and deep snows to protect them, and among the officers and men of our forces in the Philippines were many old Indian fighters with whom climatic conditions never interfered in carrying out their plans. The successful advance of General Lawton's command south of Manila and the evident determination to push the campaign must have convinced Aguinaldo that aggressive operations would go relentlessly on, rain or shine.

One of the most fiercely fought engagements of the war took place on Tuesday, June 13th, between the forces of General Lawton and the enemy south of Las Pinas, American field guns being engaged in their first duel with a Filipino battery which was concealed in the jungle. The native troops fought more desperately than ever before, and it was only by the most determined and valorous work on the part of our forces that victory was obtained. Companies F and I of the Twenty-first Infantry were nearly surrounded by a large body of insurgents, but they cut their way out, with heavy loss. General Lawton, Wheaton, and Ovenshine showed the utmost personal bravery during the day's fighting.

The engagement was, in a measure, unexpected. During the night three cannon shots were fired at the Americans on the outskirts of Las Pinas. In the morning, General Lawton took a battalion of the Fourteenth regiment and two companies of the Twenty-first regiment to locate the rebel battery

in its hiding place in the jungle. When it was found, two guns of the Sixth artillery and four mountain guns were planted against it at six hundred yards' distance. The Filipino battery consisted of one large gun, from which they fired home-made canister, loaded with nails, and two smaller guns.

The companies of the Twenty-first regiment, skirmishing along the beach with guides, encountered what was apparently a handful of rebels, who retreated. The regulars followed close, when suddenly the rebels opened a terrific fire on them from the sides and rear. They withdrew to the water's edge, finding what shelter they could, but exposed to a continuous fire.

When their ammunition was nearly exhausted, the companies retreated, but General Lawton dashed down to them and rallied the men. A little group made a desperate stand, General Lawton, Major Starr, and Lieutenants Donovan and Connolly taking rifles from the wounded men and firing at the enemy. The general's shots brought down some of the rebel sharpshooters from a tree. Finally, with their cartridges all gone, the little force was compelled to break through the enemy's flank, carrying the wounded to the main body of the troops.

Meanwhile, hostilities had been in progress on the bay. At daylight the rebels at Cavité dropped two shells from a big smooth-bore gun, mounted in front of the church, into the Cavité navy yard. The only damage done was to splinter the top of the huge shears on the Mole.

The gunboats *Callao*, *Manila*, and *Zafiro* proceeded to silence and dismount the gun, and then ran close along the shore, bombarding the rebel position. The insurgents replied all along the beach to Bacoor with rifle fire and a fusillade from some small pieces of artillery. So vigorous was the enemy's fire that soon after 9 o'clock the gunboat *Helena* joined the small gunboats mentioned, and the *Princeton*, *Monterey*, and *Monadnock*, from their anchorages, dropped occasional big shells among the rebels. The *Monadnock*, *Helena*, and *Za-*

firo trained their guns on Bacoor and finally set the town on fire, but the insurgents put out the flames.

The fire of the seven warships apparently only served to excite the rebels, as they kept up an incessant fire of musketry and artillery from near the mouth of the Zapote river, two miles north of Bacoor. The fire of all the warships was concentrated on this point soon after noon, as a preliminary to a resumption of the land battle. The *Monadnock* anchored close to the shore, and her heavy guns pounded the rebels continuously, while the smaller warships, steaming along the shore, poured bullets from their rapid-fire guns at the enemy. The rebels were eventually forced to abandon their artillery, after holding out about four hours.

The troops began at one o'clock to move forward to resume battle after the enemy's land battery had been silenced. The roads were narrow, and the small bridges that spanned the streams were, as a rule, commanded by almost impregnable breastworks twenty feet thick. The American troops moved slowly forward, often wading waist-deep in the mud of the salt flats. With their steady volleys of musketry they finally drove the rebels beyond the Zapote river. The only means of crossing this deep stream was by a small bridge, which the Filipinos commanded with trenches, spreading V-shaped, whence they could concentrate their fire upon the bridge. They also were concealed by the trees and jungle. The only approach to the bridge was by a narrow, winding road, where the rebel bullets dropped thickly. The short range made it almost impossible for the Americans to use artillery, and the mountain guns were fired at twenty-five yards. The two armies lay facing each other with the river between. The enemy were practically out of sight, while the men in blue and khaki lay in the mud and bushes, many of them without any shelter for three hours, without a moment's cessation in the firing.

One battalion after another of the reserves was summoned by General Lawton from Las Pinas, until only enough troops were left in the town to prevent the Filipinos from attacking

the Americans in the rear, which was feared, as they were creeping around our left through the woods, delivering a flanking fire, which put a great strain upon the endurance of the Americans floundering in the mud, while the Filipino sharpshooters, hidden in trees, were peppering our men. The Fourteenth regiment lay to the right of the bridge. In front of them was the Twelfth regiment, while the Ninth was on the right, and the Twenty-first up the road, facing the bridge. On the bridge were the bodies of two Americans who had attempted to rush across. Many wounded men had been carried from the open ground before the bridge. The fire of the insurgents was terrific. General Lawton was told by a priest at Las Pinas that Zapote was defended by four thousand men, who had sworn upon the crucifix never to leave the field alive. The report of General Otis was as follows:

“MANILA, June 15.

“*Adjutant-General, Washington:*

“Success of Lawton’s troops in Cavité province greater than reported yesterday. Enemy, numbering over 4,000, lost in killed, wounded, and captured more than one-third; remainder much scattered. Have retreated south to Imus. Their arsenal of five pieces of artillery, three captured. Navy aided greatly on shore of bay, landing forces occasionally. Inhabitants in that country rejoiced at deliverance and welcome with enthusiastic demonstrations arrival of our troops.

OTIS.”

General Lawton, although exhausted by the morning’s fight, rallied by sheer will power, and was the commanding figure in the battle. He went up and down the lines, directing and encouraging the troops. General Wheaton and General Ovenshine were equally courageous. In fact, the generals were among the few men on the battlefield who refused to take shelter under hottest fire. After the battle General Lawton remarked that it was more like war than anything he had seen in the Philippines. He was a conspicuous mark for the enemy, as he was a man of large stature, and his uniform and white helmet could be easily distinguished for a great distance, but he went up and down the line unseathed. Our loss was ten killed and forty wounded.

The reason for the movement against the insurgents to the south of Manila was to prevent an attack on the city. There was good reason to suppose that they intended to try to take the city and were massing their troops in the vicinity of Cavité with that end in view, but General Otis determined to break up their organization before they could perfect their plans. The policy which General Otis pursued was that of keeping the enemy constantly on the move and preventing at all times the concentration of the natives at any place where they might be able to organize. The Filipinos who were to the south of Manila had been left alone until they became dangerous. Then it became necessary to attack and subdue them.

Before dark on the night of June 13th the Fourteenth Infantry swam the Zapote river, charged and carried the trenches, a heavy fusilade of artillery preparing the way and covering the crossing. The insurgents broke from the woods before the Fourteenth reached them. Almost at the same time the Ninth and the Twelfth Infantry crossed a bar of the sea and came upon their left flank at a point where a body of marines with Maxim guns landed under protection of the ships' batteries and fired upon the enemy's left rear with a demoralizing effect. The Twenty-first crossed the river by a bridge as soon as it could be mended. Sixty-five dead Filipinos were found in the trenches. Several five-inch bore guns were captured, with ammunition marked "U. S. Navy Yard."

After crossing the river the troops were withdrawn with the exception of the Ninth and the Twenty-first infantry, these regiments being left with four guns to guard the bridge. As they were being formed into companies the insurgents commenced to fire volleys from the bamboo jungle 300 yards away. The regiments formed into line rapidly, and coolly, though under fire, and cheering, rushed to the woods, driving the enemy a mile away, the Filipinos disputing every foot. The Fourteenth encamped across the river, the men caring for many of the wounded Filipinos. Eight prisoners were captured.

On June 15th the town of Imus, which the Spaniards spent months in capturing, was finally surrendered by its mayor to the Americans. The town occupied a naturally strong position on a deep river with steep banks, which was crossed by a single bridge. The church and arsenal were loop-holed for rifles. A cartridge factory and powder mill at this place furnished ammunition to the insurgents, who attempted on the 12th to remove the stores from the mills and arsenal, but who hastily retreated, as if expecting defeat, leaving quantities of shells and powder behind them. A white flag floated from the church tower as the Americans entered, and that night the town was peacefully garrisoned by two battalions of the Fourteenth Infantry. The terrified and poverty-stricken inhabitants, who fled from the town when the American scouts came in, began to return, being reassured by the mayor, who declared that the Americans were welcome, that the Filipino army were a "band of cutthroats," and that they retired in utter confusion on the night of the 13th, carrying with them one hundred dead and three hundred wounded, and neglecting to guard their Spanish prisoners, fourteen of whom escaped. General Lawton distributed beef and rice to the needy, and the pervading sentiment seemed to be that of friendliness.

San Fernando, captured by our troops in May, was the scene of the next skirmish. The telegraph between that place and Calumpit failing to work, a signal sergeant and three men were sent to make repairs. They found that the line had been cut at Apalit, and a section of the railroad torn up. This was done to sever communication with Manila and prevent troops being sent to reinforce General MacArthur, who was in command at San Fernando. The party were fired upon by sharpshooters concealed in huts near by and they returned for reinforcements, and succeeded in making repairs.

Early on the morning of the 16th there was a simultaneous attack on the American lines encircling the town. An Iowa regiment held the right of the line, the Kansas regiment the

left, and the Montana regiment and Seventeenth Regular Infantry the center. The fight continued but for a short time, the work of the Americans being sharply effective, as they repulsed the rebels everywhere along the line with heavy loss. Nearly five thousand Filipinos took part in the attack, and the field was strewn with their dead and dying. The American casualties numbered but fourteen wounded, most of them only slightly. Preparations for the attack had been in progress for several days, and General Otis believed it to have been under the personal supervision of Aguinaldo.

Much having been reported as to serious disagreements between Aguinaldo and General Luna, a rupture between the leaders, and a breaking up of the insurgents into two or more conflicting parties was somewhat expected. Fearing that this state of affairs would tend to their discredit, and lessen the sympathy they had hoped to find in Europe, and even in America, Aguinaldo and his chief adviser, Agoncillo, were prompt to deny all such reports. A signed dispatch was sent from Paris to New York by Agoncillo, which read as follows :

“The report that there are differences of opinion between President Aguinaldo, General Luna, and other subalterns, is entirely false.

“It is more false that they refuse to have any dealing with the United States.

“Aguinaldo, the supreme chief, is obeyed by all. The only obstacle in the way of an amicable arrangement with the Americans is the unyielding spirit of General Otis and his inspirer, President McKinley, who refuses to fulfill the solemn promise given by the American representatives to the Filipino people of independence as soon as triumph should be gained over the Spanish forces—a noble act which our country received with gratitude and joy. It is utterly false that they have laid plots against their religious interests. If it becomes independent the Philippine government will proclaim liberty for all religions. All these reports referred to are but pretexts intended to deceive the American people, and invented by the imperialists who make a business of politics, which they put above the true interests of America and the Philippines.”

This was published on the 10th of June, and a day or two later came the report that Luna had been assassinated by members of Aguinaldo's guard. The news was soon confirmed,

and it was learned that on June 6th General Luna and his adjutant, Colonel Ramon, visited Aguinaldo's headquarters at Cabanatuan, their purpose being, it was said, to secure Aguinaldo's authority to imprison all Filipinos suspected of being friendly to the United States. General Luna asked the captain of the guard if Aguinaldo was at home, to which question the captain replied in an insolent manner, "I don't know." The general was incensed at the manner of the subordinate and berated him for his insolence, whereupon the captain put his hand to his revolver. Luna instantly drew his revolver and fired at the captain, who returned the fire. Both marksmen missed in their excitement, and Colonel Ramon at once interfered, drawing his sword, whereupon a sergeant of the guard stabbed him with a bayonet. The entire guard then sprang upon Luna and Ramon with bolos and bayonets, inflicting many wounds and killing them both.

The conviction was general that the death of Luna was connived at by Aguinaldo. There was a difference of opinion as to the real position of General Luna, in regard to his attitude towards the Americans. The first Filipino envoys who entered the American lines with a request for the suspension of hostilities pending the arrangement of peace came from General Luna. Later, when peace commissioners, direct from Aguinaldo, started for Manila, they were detained by Luna, who, according to reliable reports, had become an uncompromising opponent of overtures to the Americans. President Schurman of the Philippines Commission reported that Aguinaldo was in favor of making peace, but was deterred from doing so by Luna, who wanted to keep up the resistance to American authority. Other United States officials, however, believed that Luna was in favor of peace, and that he was opposed by Aguinaldo in regard to making overtures to General Otis. General Luna was, next to Aguinaldo, the foremost leader in the insurrection. He was a man of better education than his chief, having taken a college course in Europe, and had considerable force of character.

It was decided by the administration at Washington about the middle of June to increase the fighting force of the army in the Philippines to 35,000 men, all regulars, by the beginning of the dry season. This was 5,000 men more than General Otis estimated were needed to quell the insurrection.

An order was issued by the War Department at Washington, June 13th, increasing from 112 to 128 the number of men in each infantry company then serving in the Philippines or under orders to proceed there. General Otis had at that time in the Philippines, on the way thither and under orders for service in the islands, a total force of 23,400 enlisted soldiers, distributed as follows: Infantry, fifteen regiments, 20,160 men; artillery, seventeen batteries, 2,040 men; cavalry, one regiment, 1,204 men. In addition, there was a total of about 584 men belonging to the non-commissioned staff and bands. The assignment of eight companies each of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry made a further increase of 2,090, including the non-commissioned staff and the proposed increase of sixteen men in each company. The order of June 13th also increased each company of infantry of the fifteen regiments by sixteen men, making a further increase of 2,880 men. Altogether, the raising of the strength of the infantry companies to 128 men, and the assignment of the companies of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, made a total increase of 4,979 men. Adding to this 150 men of the engineers gave General Otis a complete total of 29,147.







APPROXIMATE SCALE, EAST AND WEST.

At the equator the scale is 1 inch to 100 miles. At 10 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 98 miles. At 20 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 96 miles. At 30 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 94 miles. At 40 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 92 miles. At 50 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 90 miles. At 60 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 88 miles. At 70 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 86 miles. At 80 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 84 miles. At 90 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 82 miles.

APPROXIMATE SCALE, NORTH AND SOUTH.

At the equator the scale is 1 inch to 100 miles. At 10 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 98 miles. At 20 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 96 miles. At 30 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 94 miles. At 40 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 92 miles. At 50 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 90 miles. At 60 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 88 miles. At 70 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 86 miles. At 80 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 84 miles. At 90 degrees north or south of the equator the scale is 1 inch to 82 miles.

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